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No. 1

With the present issue, *Indian Studies : Past & Present* enters its eighth year. It opens with two articles by Professor J. Filliozat, both translated from the original French by Mrs. R. K. Menon of the Delhi University. The first of these, *The Festivities of the Dhamma as Practised by Aśoka*, originally appeared in *Journal Asiatique*, 1957. The second one, *The "Devas" of Aśoka : Gods or Divine Majesties?* originally appeared in the same journal in 1949.

Another brief instalment of the *Studies in Nibandha-s* by Professor Bhavatosh Bhattacharyya appears in this issue.

The *Introductory Note on the Selected Writings of Dipaṃkara Śrījñāna, alias Atiśa*, contains the references to the works translated. The translators are Professor Lama Chimpa of the Viśvabharati University and Professor Alaka Chattopadhyaya of the Vidyasagar College for Women, Calcutta. The Selected writings include the Sanskrit restoration of Dipaṃkara's *magnum opus*, the *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*, done by Professor Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Vidyasagar College, Calcutta.

The note on *The Tibetan Sexagenary Cycle*, with which the present issue ends, is prepared by Dr. R.N. Bhattacharya, Department of Mathematics, Jadavpur University, in collaboration with Professor Alaka Chattopadhyaya.

The following abbreviations are used in the last two :

BA - *The Blue Annals*. Tr. G. N. Roerich

CNB - *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* by F. T. Stcherbatsky

D-TED - S. C. Das, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*

ERE - *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*

ITB - *Introduction to Tantric Buddhism* by S. B. Dasgupta

JA - *Journal Asiatique*

JBTS - *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*

J-TED - H. A. Jaschke, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*

L - *Lamaism* by L. A. Waddell

NNMVRP - Nava-Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publications

SED - *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* by M. Monier-Williams

THE FESTIVITIES
OF THE
DHAMMA AS PRACTISED BY AŚOKA
[*In memory of Pierre Dupont*]

J. FILLIOZAT

The fourth Rock Edict of Aśoka is one of the clearest in its general intentions, but one of the most difficult in interpretation of its details.

Aśoka contrasts the past time (*atikātaṃ* in the Girnar version), the times of violence and disrespect, to the present time (*aja*) when the practice of the Dhamma is happily installed and the cessation of violence (*avihīṣā*), the sweetness and requisite respect towards parents, brāhmaṇa, the monks and old men established. Further, this practice will spread still further with the preaching of the Dhamma (*dhammānusaṣana*), but not for he who lacks good discipline (*aśīlasa*).

The passage which has given rise to much controversy and several hypotheses, is the one which evokes the material signs of this beneficial revolution. It is presented as follows in the Girnar version :

*aja devānaṃpriyasa priyadasino rāṇo dhammacaraṇena bheṛīghoso
aho dhammaghoso vimanadarsaṇā ca hastidasaṇā ca agikhaṃdhāni ca añṇāni
ca dīvyāni rūpāni dasayitpā janam yārīse bahūhi vāsasatehi na bhūtapuve
tārīse aja vaḍhite devānaṃpriyasa priyadasino rāṇo dhammānusaṣṭiyā
anāraṃbho prāṇānam avihīṣā.....*

Before coming to the interpretation of details, we note that the practice of the Good Order as undertaken by the king showed many things to the people. But, it was a question of the habitations of the divinities (*vimāna*), of elephants, of “pieces of fire” (*agokhaṃdhāni*) and other divine spectacles, all of which evoke not only celestial representations such as are described in books, but also and far more simply, religious festivals as can still be seen in India today.

If this resemblance has not commanded attention from the majority of interpreters who have studied the inscriptions of Aśoka, this is without doubt for two reasons :

IS. 1/a

The first is that the contemporary festivals, where one sees precisely the sanctuaries of divinities (permanent sanctuaries such as temples or processional palanquins) of elephants, fire-works, etc., are Hindu festivals which, it is generally considered, Aśoka as a Buddhist king, could not patronised.

The second reason is that Aśoka seems to speak of these spectacles as manifestations as yet unknown, as innovations due to him and that if it were a question of Hindu-type festivals it would have to follow that their inauguration was due to Aśoka himself—something which is clearly untenable.

However, one has still to reconcile the similitude between the elements of the spectacles enumerated by Aśoka, with those of the Hindu festivals, and one cannot fail to note that in the text, even as elsewhere, Aśoka presents himself much less as Buddhist than as a *devānampiya*, “friend of the gods”, his Buddhism being far from a complete turning of the back on Brahmanism.¹ Further, on careful reading of the text, it appears that what is new, what had not been seen for centuries, was not the festivals, but essentially the moral change achieved by the practice of Dhamma. It could not be the presentation of the elephants or fires; they, together with the presentation of the *vimānas* and other “divine spectacles” represent only the solemn apparel of the public inauguration of the better Order, contrary to that of the past. The latter is described as a time of violence, and not as an absence of festivities.

We can thus already reject the idea that the public manifestations of Aśoka were part of the innovations introduced by his action in favour of the Dhamma, and can admit that they corresponded to the usual pomp, merely deployed by Aśoka on the occasion of the proclamations of the Dhamma.

1. On Aśoka's persistence concerning the care of Brahmanic things, cf. *The Enigma of the 256 Nights of Aśoka in JA*, 1949, p. 149.

But up to now, it has been most often claimed that the things shown to the people had been marvellous phenomena, divine manifestations. La Vallée Poussin notably, thinks that our text shows that Aśoka shared the popular belief in divine manifestation.² With Hultzsch he again brings together the *divyāni rūpāni* and the *devas* mentioned in the Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri edicts as having “intermingled” with men. There would have been “theophanies” to which the IVth Rock Edict, under the name of *divyāni rūpāni* would have made allusion, and this would have marked the mixing of gods with men, the intermingling in question at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri. In the end he thought that one could suppose that in Magadha at the time of Aśoka, there had been “theophanies, divine apparitions in the midst of the celestial drums, that is, to the crash of the thunder.”³

Mr. Meile showed on his part⁴ that such an interpretation would be supported by the discovery of allusions in the texts to a participation by gods in human pomp.

I have elsewhere taken up the theory of Sylvain Lévi according to which the *devas*, whose intermingling with men is celebrated at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri, are not gods but kings designated as gods ; the manifestation of this intermingling being precisely a pilgrimage undertaken by the king Aśoka in the manner of a Buddhist among men, in spite of the ban on contact between divine majesties and their subjects⁵ In this interpretation I had rejected the identification between the *devas* of Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri and the *divyāni rūpāni* of the IVth Rock Edict.⁶ Moreover, there is a big discrepancy in dates with regard to the alleged facts in the IVth Rock Edict, promulgated twelve years after the coronation, and the fact of the

2. *L'Inde au temps des Mauryas*, Paris, 1930, p. 109 onwards.

3. *Loc. cit.*, p. 114.

4. JA, 1949, p. 93 onwards.

5. JA, 1949, p. 244.

6. JA, 1949, p. 244.

intermingling between the *devas* and men mentioned at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri, which is placed ten and a half years after the coronation.⁷

I had then indicated, in order to terminate the uncertainty, that many hypotheses were possible with regard to the phenomena mentioned in the IVth Rock Edict. Namely, that the former could have been meteoric phenomena which would have been interpreted as theophanies and would have appeared to mark the beginning of a new era.⁸ On that the *agikhamdha* of the Edict could have been designated figuratively, according to a usage of that term attested elsewhere, for eminent personages who could thus have been introduced into the ceremonial displays marking the public installation of the new era.

But the novelty, as we noted earlier, really only lies in the promotion of the Dhamma, not in the spectacles offered on its occasion.

If this is understood, nothing now hinders us from examining which of the two interpretations—the festivals ordained by the king or the natural phenomena interpreted as signs—best accords with the details of the text.

La Vallée Poussin considered that every interpretation of the Edict rested on that of the words, *bherighoso aho dhammaghoso*, in which the majority of translators, since Kern, had regarded *aho* as a middle-Indian form equivalent to the Sanskrit *abhūt*, “became”, whence the version: “the sound of the bheri or drum became the sound of the Dhamma.” But

7. Cf. JA, 1949, p. 232. One could think that the facts alluded to in the IVth Rock Edict as new and actual, could well be, despite everything, put back a year and a half and consequently made to coincide with the intermingling of the *devas* with men. But then how to explain the great difference in description between, on the one hand, this intermingling of gods and men, which corresponds to the *dhamayātā* of the VIIIth Rock Edict and which is a royal pilgrimage and on the other, the manifestations alluded to in the IVth Edict ?

8. *Ibidem*, p. 245-247.

against this version La Vallée Poussin, after Burnouf, saw in *aho* simply the known interjection *aho* and remarked that *aho dhammam* is in the *Mahāvastu* (I, 236, 237-241 ; II, 406), an acclamation frequently uttered by the gods, which Senart explains as : “Ah ! what a miracle ! what a marvel !”. He concludes from this that one should read *ahodhammaghoso* to mean :

“the sound of the drums (that the gods beat on their chariots and that is at first heard), their joyous exclamations : ‘What a marvel !’, their celestial chariots (*vimāna*), the elephants, the fiery balls and other celestial forms”. All this reinforces the idea that the IVth Rock Edict was alluding to celestial “theophanies” conforming to those of the legends, rather than to festivals ordained by the king.⁹

Jules Bloch,¹⁰ however, adopted the sense of *abhūt* for *aho* after having remarked that the group “*bherighoso aho dhammaghoso* is isolated from the rest, where the terms, which anyway designate only visual spectacles, are joined by the *ca-s*”, and he translated it as “the noise of the drum became the announcement of the Law.” But he equally observed in recalling the interpretation of La Vallée Poussin that the Dhauli version appeared to substitute the accusative *ghosam* for the nominative *ghoso* of Girnar and that this accusative was governed by *dasayitu*, which supports La Vallée Poussin, at least for the Dhauli version. And he further drew attention to the absence of *ca* to join the group with the following enumeration of spectacles.

We can observe from our side that the reading of Dhauli is isolated and appears less appropriate than the others. In fact, if the absence of *ca* can be explained on the basis that the noises of the drum etc., are not of the same order as the visual objects enumerated immediately afterwards, then it remains even less probable that the original of the Edict placed the noises and the spectacles in the same enumeration, by saying that both had.

9. *Les L'Inde au temps des Mauryas*, p. 109-111.

10. *Inscriptions d'Aśoka*, Paris, 1950, p. 98.

been "shown." In any case, the unique reading of this slight difficulty has not the authority of the totality of the others, which separate the group of three words in the nominative, from those following in the accusative.

Thus one must necessarily accept the syntactic analysis of Jules Bloch, but it does not follow that the interpretation of *ahodhammaghoso* proposed by La Vallée Poussin can only be made compatible with the reading of Dhauḷi. A new comment on the contrary will lead us to adopting it for all the known versions of the Edict and at the same time show us that the exclamation *ahodhamma* is not reserved for the gods. In other words it is not necessary to believe with La Vallée Poussin that the Edict alludes to celestial manifestations.

In fact, the commentary of Buddhaghosa on *Dīghanikāya*, the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, glossing the *Janavasabhasutta*, speaks in these terms of him who distinguishes himself in exalting the Happy One :

*bhagavantam kittayamānarūpo ti aho buddho aho dhammo aho sangho aho dhamma svākkhāto evam kittayanto va kālam akāsi.*¹¹

"He whose characteristic aspect is to exalt the Happy One, it is on exalting thus : 'Ah ! the Buddha !', 'Ah ! the Dhamma !', 'Ah ! the Community !', 'Ah ! the well enunciated Dhamma !' that he passes his time,"

Therefore, one can study the text of the Edict thus (in reading *ahodhammaghoso* and no longer *aho dhammaghoso*) :

"At present thanks to the practice of the Dhamma by the king, friend of the gods, in friendly regard, there is a noise of drums¹² a sound

11. PTS II, p. 637. Thailand edition, II, p. 315.

12. The interpretation which does not see the unity of the formula *aho-dhammaghoso*, whether *aho* is made a middle-Indian form of *abhūt* or whether one recognises in it the interjection *aho* (as Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 731, who translates "the sound of the drums [has reverberated] ;

of 'Ah ! the Dhamma !' In showing to the people presentations of the divine sanctuaries, presentations of elephants, balls of fire and other divine spectacles, which in the preceding several centuries had not taken place, which prosper at present, thanks to the teaching of the Dhamma by the king, friend of the gods and with friendly regard : abstention from murder, abstention from inflicting injury to lives..."

The reading *aho dharmam* in the *Mahāvastu* had appeared unusual. Senart could see in this *Mahāvastu* (I, p. 560) no other manner of explaining it than by taking *dharmam* as the abridged equivalent of *adbhuta-dharmam* which led to its translation as "Ah ! what a miracle ! what a marvel !" But this is no longer necessary. For his part, Mr. J. J. Jones indicates¹³ that Miss I. B. Horner had suggested to him a combination of expressions like *Bhagavā dhammabhūto* and *yo dhammam passati so mam passati* ("the Happy One has become the Dhamma," "He who sees the Dhamma sees me"), in order to explain in the *Mahāvastu* (I, 236, 18), that the exclamation of the gods is related to the Dhamma although it is the Buddha that they see. Further Mr. J. J. Jones, translating *udīrayensuḥ ahodhammam* by "exclaimed", "Behold the Dharma", observes that if there is any objection to translating *dharmam* as accusative of exclamation, there is a reading of the manuscript which gives the vocative *dharmā*. But we can now easily see that here it is necessary to take *ahodharma* not as the citation of the exclamation (*iti* does not figure elsewhere in the text),

yes, the voice of the Law [is heard]") would have been able to find support in the remark that in the Buddhist texts it is sometimes a question of marvellous drums which render the sound of stanzas on the Law, as in a case already mentioned by Burnouf, in his analysis of *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*, cf. *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 531. This at least recalls for us that a link has been established between the rolling of the drums of the festivals and the proclamations of the Buddhist Dharma.

13. The *Mahāvastu*, vol. I, London, 1949, p. 192, n. 4.

but as a substantive : “the (cry) *ahodharma*” and translate : “...they cried out *ahodharma*.”

We see also that the *ahodharma* fits well with the exaltation of the Happy One, in the *Mahāvastu*, as Miss Horner has pointed out, since Buddhaghosa twice places its equivalent (once with *svākkhāta*) in the list of exclamations which characterise precisely the exaltation of the Happy One. In any case, we cannot deduce that in the Aśoka Edict, the noise of *ahodharma* is that of a celebration of the Buddha. On the contrary, it is clear that it is a question of Dhamma, according to the direct sense of the expression, since it is not made in the context of any allusion to the Buddha, and because everything is in relation to the installation of the Dhamma, as the ethical norm, and not in relation to the founder of the Buddhist Law. Besides, the indication that the absence of murder and other practices had not occurred previously, for “numerous centuries”, implies that the Good Order put into force by the king was not conceived as absolutely new, but only as new in relation to a long period of “many centuries”, during which it was lacking, but before which it had flourished. Hence the Dhamma in question here is not the specific Buddhist Law, which pre-dates the Asokan period by only a little more than two centuries, since, according to the *Mahāvamsa*, only 225 years had passed between the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha and the coronation of Aśoka.

Buddhist assuredly, but not only Buddhist ; and above all the guardian-king of the general Good Order, Aśoka refers to an ideal pre-Buddhist and legendary Order, and in all probability and more precisely, even a Brahmanic order.

There is nothing surprising in this ; the virtues of benevolence (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (in seeing good, *muditā*) and imperturbability (with regard to evil, *upekṣā*), are classically called “Brahmanic” in Buddhist literature and were the ones that had necessarily to be put into play for the installation or rather the renaissance, of the Dhamma on the initiative of Aśoka. And, according to the most well-attested Buddhist canonical ideas, the Brahmanic *devas* co-operated with the Good Order.

According to the *Dīghanikāya*, it was under the Brahmin Saṇḍakumāra that was held the assembly of the gods who control the world. It was Brahman who persuaded the Buddha to preach, Brahman again and Indra who participated in the important events in the life of the Buddha. Aśoka, himself a *deva* as well as Royal Majesty¹⁴ quite naturally had Brahmanic pomp accompanying the proclamation of the Dhamma, which was the material and moral God Order, re-established in the world, as it must have been in the Golden Age of the legends, and which could not have been only the teachings of the Buddha, for then Aśoka would not have been able to say that it had not existed for many centuries previously.

In these conditions, what the IVth Rock Edict enumerates, are clearly the ordinary elements of festivals and processions of a type still contemporary in the Hindu cults, and it appears that the content of this Edict constitutes a direct evidence of their usage in the middle of the 3rd century B.C. This evidence certainly does not hold true for the religious ideas of the moment, but only for the materiality of the public manifestations. But consequently, it is susceptible of being joined with other evidences already well-known, though till now, fortuitous and isolated, on the divine images of Mauryan times, such as that of Patañjali. The latter in fact mentions *arcās*, divine images dedicated for worship, which according to him, the Mauryas used to sell¹⁵ and which, therefore, was quite current in those times—although archaeological researches have not as yet revealed those images to us.

Aśoka, must not have been among those Mauryas who sold divine images, but he could at least have shown them in the *virmānas* carried in

14. *Les "Devas" d'Aśoka, "dieux" ou "divines majestés"*, in JA, 1949, p. 225.

15. *Mahābhāṣya*, V. 3, 106, Bhārgavasāstri Joshi (ed), Bombay, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 403-404 ; cf. *Indische Studien*, Vol. V, Berlin, 1862, p. 147 onward ; La Vallée Poussin, *L'Inde au temps des Mauryas*, p. 169.

the processions, to the noise of drums, and to the exclamations of the Dhamma, of which the gods were the protectors, even if it had a Buddhist colouration, in the midst of the elephants of the parade and the balls of fire—torches or perhaps as Burnouf thought, fire-works and with other *divyāni rūpāni*, that is to say, “divine figurations”, if “others” had been placed there in thinking of the images contained in the *vimānas* or perhaps and more likely “divine spectacles”, because at the festivals of the king, friend of the gods, the gods were present and all pomp was divine.

Translated from the original French by Mrs. R. A. Menon

**THE DEVAS OF ASOKA
"GODS" OR "DIVINE MAJESTIES" ?**

J. FILLIOZAT

Sylvain Levi's theory¹ that when Aśoka, in the edicts of the Rūpnāth, Sahasrām and Brahmagiri etc. group, spoke of men mingling with *devas* he meant the commingling of men and kings and not gods, has frequently been contested. In an article (*Misa Devehi Chez Aśoka*, Pierre Meile, J. A. 1949, pp. 193-223). Mr. Meile rejected the theory in line with the principal critics who have taken up this question. Nevertheless, even if the theory were eventually to disappear definitively, it would still be worthwhile breaking a few lances for it, especially as it is possible to recognise it as being well-founded without having to put aside the most immediate interpretation of *deva* as "god."

The reasoning of Sylvain Levi is seductive. Aśoka drew near to the Buddhist community ; in order to show his pious zeal, he undertook the pilgrimage prescribed for Buddhist monks by their Rule. In doing this he accomplished a revolution, for he mixed with men—men were able to approach him as a simple mortal, but at the same time, in his quality of king he was a *deva*, a god that one does not approach. In circulating among men he broke with consecrated usage of holding men as outside the pale of kings, preventing them from mixing with kings. This is what Aśoka wanted to express when he said they mixed with *devas*, since this precisely is what had happened, and since *deva* has the sense of "king."

The interpretation of *deva* as "god" is even more tempting. Aśoka drew near to the community, he showed his zeal, and the gods came to celebrate the event with men, as in all Buddhist legends they are said to do, each time there takes place a resounding conversion, a success for Buddhist Law. Here then, thanks to Aśoka's zeal, the crowd of men found themselves commingling with the gods. When Aśoka said that men are commingling with *devas*, he wanted to say nothing other than this.

But each of the two explanations has its difficulties. We will first examine the difficulties of the second. Those of the first we will take up

1. *Vyuthena* 256, J. A. January-February, 1911, 119ff.

thereafter as these constitute the main object of these remarks. The difficulties of the second arise from the fact that the belief that there were gods on earth was wide-spread, well before the Asokan period. How then could he have pretended that by his zeal he had brought about a state of affairs that everyone believed had always existed ?

We are all aware of the Brahmanic legend according to which in the beginning, gods and men had lived together, and only found themselves separated when the gods importuned by men, departed for heaven.² But, though inhabiting the sky, the gods never ceased to return to be near men, called back by their sacrifices and offerings. Further, some among them remained below. There were three classes of gods—those of the sky, those of the atmosphere and those of the earth. The Vedic texts readily testify to this.³ The Buddhist texts also do not ignore it. Those which one can cite in this connection, in their actual form, come later than Aśoka's time,⁴ but apart from the fact that the beliefs common to them happen to go back right up to Buddhist origins, the idea that gods dwelt permanently on earth was certainly wide-spread in the Aśokan period, since it is testified to from the Vedic period onwards, and preserved in the classical literature of Buddhism.

But among the terrestrial gods were some who were necessarily in continuous touch with men. Such were the divinities of towns (*nagara-devatā*),⁵ of gardens (*ārāmadevatā*), of woods (*vana-*), of localities (*catvara-*),

2. *Śat. Brāh.*, 11' 3, 4, 4. Cf. Sylvain Lévi, *La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇas*, Paris, 1898, p. 84, in the article of M. Mele, *Misā Devehi Chez Aśoka*, J. A. 1949.

3. RV. viii, 35, 14., AV., x, 9, 12 : xl, 6, 12 (where it is specified that the terrestrial gods are powerful) ; xix 27, 13.

4. *Majjhimanik.*, *Cūlagosingasālasutta*, Siam edition, v. xii, p. 393-394, PTS, 1, 210 (*bhumā devā*) ; *Lalitav.* xxv, Lefmann edition, p. 401, I. 1 (*bhaumā devāḥ*) ; *Mahāvastu*, Senart edition, v. 111, p. 319 (*bhūmyā devāḥ*).

5. *Mahāvastu*, 11, 164. The *nagaradevatā* of this passage has several pedants in the non-Buddhist Sanskrit literature. Cf. for example

of squares (*śṛṅgātaka*-), and above all the family gods, born with man (*sahaja*-), having the same standard of life as man (*sahadhārmika*-), perpetually linked to him (*niccānubaddha*) or (*bandha*).⁶ In the *Mahā-umma-ggajātaka* a king is questioned by the god of his umbrella. In the *Mahā-govindasutta*,⁷ the Brahman, Mahāgovinda, turned saint, is wherever he goes, a king for the kings, Brahmā for the Brahmins, a divinity for the masters of the house, or as the *Mahāvastu* says in the corresponding passage,⁸ king of the kingdom, a god among the masters of houses, Brahmā for the Brahmins. This is of course a figure of speech but it proves that the idea of gods sojourning among men was strongly established in the imagination.

Equally well accepted was the possibility of the descent of celestial gods. The same *Mahāgovindasutta* describes how Mahāgovinda, deep in meditation during the four months of the rainy season, had obtained a visit from Brahmā. It was believed that near relations, who died and obtained rebirth among the gods, could return to tender advice to human beings in case of danger.⁹ In the recitations on the life of the Buddha

outside of the popular *grāmadevatās*, the divinity of Laṅkā made famous by the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Sund. 111*, 20 ff, Bombay edition.

6. All these latter divinities (are) mentioned in the *Divyāvadāna* (1 and 30) and the *Avadānaśataka*, in a stereotyped list of gods invoked by men desirous of posterity (recitations 3, 21, 24, 36, 49, 73 and 98). Cf. again the divinities of habitations (*vatthudevatā*) mentioned in the *Petavatthu* cited under the word in the dictionary of Rhys Davids and Stede. On terrestrial divinities see again J. Masson *La religion populaire dans le canon pāli*, Louvain, 1942, p. 136.

7. *Dīghanikāya*, xix, PTS. Vol. 11, p. 250.

8. iii, 223, (bhavati rājā vā rāṣṭriya devo vā gṛhapatikāye brahmā vā brāhmaṇānām).

9. At the time of a great epidemic at Vaiśālī, the parents of Vaiśālīans who were dead and had obtained rebirth with the gods, came to advise

and in those concerning the conversion of saints, divine intervention of the gods is commonplace. Several groups of *suttas* are devoted to accounts of the visits of divinities to the Buddha.¹⁰ As Mr. Meile has particularly pointed out in the article cited above, even a humble sweeper, Sunīta, having become a monk, could be honoured here below by the gods of the sky.

In short, belief in the participation of the gods in the affairs of men is so readily attested to in the texts of all schools, that it must be looked upon as organic in primitive Buddhism itself, whatever the dates of the works in which it is found expressed. It is impossible that Aśoka did not know and share in this belief. Under these conditions if, in speaking about the *devas* commingling with men, he meant gods, it is difficult to understand how he regarded this and specified it as not having happened before in India.

True, it could be held that Aśoka considered this commerce between the gods and men as having been suspended over a long period and therefore that he was celebrating its re-establishment rather than its first manifestation. That was the opinion held by La Vallée Poussin, to which Mr. Meile subscribes. Aśoka might here have flattered himself with having established a paradise on earth, as in the olden days of the Buddhist legends. Nevertheless, when he alluded to the past, it was solely to say that the commingling of the *devas* and men had not till then taken place.

Further, it is remarkable that in the latter part of the edict, Aśoka promises to the humble, if they are zealous, not paradise on earth, achieved through the presence of gods, but only ascension to heaven after

recourse to the Buddha (*vaiśālikānām jñātisālohitā kālagatā devehi upapannā...* *Mahāvastu*, 1, 253).

10. *Samyuttanikāya*. At the beginning, all the *suttas* of the *devatās*- and *devaputta-samyutta*. *Aṅgut. Nik.*, the three groups of *suttas* entitled *Devatāvagga* and the two *Devatāsuttas*.

death. Thus for the humble he excludes commerce with the *devas* in this world, contrary to the Buddhist legends which made the gods come down to earth even for a poor sweeper like Sunīta. This then is a new difficulty which arises around the interpretation of *deva* by “gods”.

If on the other hand, it is accepted that the *devas* of Aśoka are gods in the form of kings, this difficulty and many others with it, disappears.

It is certain that in the India of the Mauryas, kings did not mix with men, but Aśoka mixed with them, by himself coming close to the Buddhist Community and undertaking a pilgrimage. It is also certain that he was not approached by everyone. Although he made himself available to the people—we will see this later—only an infinitesimal minority of the common people would have been in a position to come into direct contact with him. In reality he could only mix with the more important people of his entourage, and with the religious eminents who conversed individually with him. The latter benefitted from the contact with the god that he was and with the gods who were in him ; the mass of the others without being forever excluded from a commerce with gods, could count on it only in heaven.

That the kings of India could be *devas*, “gods”, is proved not so much by the emphatic title of *deva* used in speaking about them or by that of *devī* given to the queen, which Aśoka himself used when speaking of his second queen,¹¹ as by the texts defining the royal function or the genealogies which made kings the descendants of the Sun or the Moon, the king par excellence of the planets.

11. The queen's edict, Allahabad-Kosam, Hultzsch, p. 158... The *Amara-kośa* specifies that *devī* designates the crowned queen (I, 1, 7, 13. Loiseleur-Deslongchamps edition, p. 44, 1 to 10 : *devī kṛtābhīṣekāyām*).

The ritual of *rājasūya* identifies the king with divinities¹² and the classic Manu is quite formal in this regard. The king was created "by extracting the eternal substances from Indra, Vāyu, Yama, the Sun, Agni, Varuṇa, the Moon and the Lord of riches...He is Agni and Vāyu, he is the Sun, the Soma, he is the King of the Norm (Yama), he is Kuvera, he is Varuṇa, he is the great Indra, by his power" (Manu, VII, 4 and 7). "He is a great divinity present in human form" (8),¹³ who blinds me like the Sun (6) and whose function is to realise Dharma (10). Cf. Manu, IX, 303, etc.

That this divinity does not mix with men, even those of the highest castes of society, is established precisely in the case of the founder of the dynasty to which Aśoka belongs, his grandfather, Chandragupta. Megasthenes observed at the latter's court that he (Chandragupta) would come out on only three occasions : the sovereign audience of justice, public sacrifices, great hunts. Cords were stretched along the route of the royal procession which could not be crossed on pain of death. This was not merely an arrangement undertaken as a measure of safety. It was always impossible to approach the king, beside whom not even bodyguards remained, as the king was surrounded only by women, albeit armed.¹⁴

Further it may be noted that according to Megasthenes, the king

12. *Kāty. sr. s.*, xv, 7, 8ff.

13. *mahatī devatā hy eṣā nararūpeṇa tiṣṭhati.*

14. Strabon, xv, '55. In addition Quinte-curce, viii, 9. Cf. *Sur la vie du roi Megasthene* : B.C.J. Timmer *Megasthenes en de indische maatschappij*, Amsterdam 1930, p. 281ff. The armed female guard is again found in the South, associated with a guard of foreign mercenaries, in the Yavana occurrence. See P. Meile, *Les Yavanas dans l'Inde tamoule*, in J. A. 1940, p. 111. The use of exclusively female guards is maintained up to the modern epoch in the Hinduised courts of Indonesia, cf. *Voyage de Gautier Schouten*, French translation, Paris 1725, Vol. ii. p. 378 (cf. also p. 154 where it is indicated that there are also eunuchs in the guard).

never slept during the day and at night had to change his room from hour to hour for fear of assassination. If the detail about changing rooms, which appears exaggerated, is correct, then one can ask whether it should not be interpreted otherwise. The King, on earth representing the Sun during the day, could not sleep. At night representing the Moon (most especially in the case of Candragupta, “Protégé of the Moon”), he was obliged from night to night, if not from hour to hour, to change his room as the king Soma changes the *nakṣatra*.

In all these cases Strabon noted, from sources dating from the time of Alexander and Candragupta, that in India kings and great nobles (who shared in the royal majesty) did not simply receive salutations, but were adored in the manner of divinities.¹⁵

Aśoka, like his grandfather and every great ideal monarch of India, was necessarily such a divinity. Sylvain Lévi was right in speaking of a revolution in regard to Aśoka’s approach to the Community and the pilgrimage alluded to at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri. By an indubitable comparison with the VIII Rock Edict, we can today state with precision that the pilgrimage in question was for Aśoka a solemn rupture with the protocol of earlier kings.

To the “round of pleasure” (*vihārayātā*) which the kings used to undertake previously, Aśoka opposed in this edict, the “round of the

15. xv, 1, 67. It goes without saying that all this ceremonial does not exclude for either the king or his nobles, or even for other men, the possibility of conferring between themselves ; it is the immediate approach and contact with the king that are absolutely forbidden, and sometimes even sight of him (*Dighanik*, i,103). In the customs preserved to a later period in Indonesia, ministers prostrated themselves when speaking with the king, without looking at him, and with much greater reason without approaching or touching him.

norm" (*dhammayātā*) which he had just accomplished and which consisted of "meeting Brahmans and religious people, making offerings, meeting the 'old', distributing gold, seeing the people of the country, teaching dhamma and asking questions on the dhamma." But this round was necessarily that of the 256 nights. The dates show this. The *dhammayātā* of the VIIIth Rock Edict was made when the king had already been crowned ten years. On the other hand, in the Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri Edict, given over to the question of the 256 nights of voyage, it is said that the conversion of the king goes back more than two and a half years. But this conversion began the minute Aśoka was seized with remorse on the occasion of the conquest of Kalinga, which took place according to the XIIIth Rock Edict when he had already been crowned eight years. The great pilgrimage of the 256 days was thus undertaken when more than ten and a half years had already devolved since his coronation. This is the very *dhammayātā* which was carried out when the king was already ten years on his throne.¹⁶

The act of increased zeal on which Aśoka was felicitating himself at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri, and by which he flattered himself that, contrary to the state of things obtaining earlier, men and *devas* mixed together, thus consisted in the undertaking of the *dhammayātā* during which, breaking

16. There is no scope to suppose as Hultzsch does, that in speaking of this *dhammayātā* as of the *vihārayātā* of the earlier kings, Aśoka used the singular for the plural. The singular is indispensable. Aśoka had in mind only one *dhammayātā*, that which he describes and dates, which does not exclude the possibility of course that he could have made others subsequently. With regard to the "rounds of pleasure" of the earlier kings, Aśoka is in agreement with Megasthenes who counted the hunts as a single outing. The period of the hunts and other diversions outside the palace imply only a single absence. The indications of Megasthenes are equally in accord with the Buddhist texts relating to the ceremonial of the royal outings. The *Lalitavistara* (xiv, edited by Lefmann, p. 187) specifies, for example, that apart from the outings of the Bodhisattva, which had been the occasion of the four

with the usage of his predecessor kings, he had gone to visit the holy men and the people, with a view to practising dhamma.

There is nothing to indicate in the VIIIth Rock Edict that there took place on this occasion any marvellous phenomenon which could be pictured as the descent of the gods from the skies to mix with men. At Rûpnāth-Brahmagiri, Aśoka had specified that the mixing of the *devas* and men was the “fruit” of zeal. In Indian usage “fruit” (*phala*) can mean the “effect”, the “result” in general, as well as the “benefit”, the “reward”. But it is the latter sense which must be recognised here, for a little later he says that everyone can, like the great ones, attain heaven through zeal, which is quite clearly a reward. If therefore, the commingling of *devas* and men is the reward of zeal, as Aśoka has just specified in speaking of his own zeal, it is but proper that this commingling be its own reward. And it is this which leads us to believe at first, that he counted himself among the men benefitted by a visit by the gods of the sky. But the VIIIth Rock Edict appears clearly to rule out this interpretation. Not only does it make no allusion to a visit of the celestial gods, speaking only of visits by the king to men, but it also expressly indicates what benefit the king draws from his *dhammayāta* and this benefit is not at all a communication with the gods : it is simply in the pleasure that the king took in his good work.

At least, it very much seems that this is how the last sentence of the

decisive meetings of his religious vocation, the route was cleared of all that the prince should not see and decorated with all sorts of things, especially with wreaths and garlands. These measures had been ordered by the king who wished to shelter his son from all spectacles capable of inciting him to renounce the world. But they were also the perfectly normal preparations for royal outings. If the *Lalitavistara* embellishes their details, it is still in accord with Megasthenes who had seen the clearing of the route and the border of ropes which held the decorated nets, the curtains and the garlands of the Buddhist texts, for the passage of Candragupta.

edict should quite naturally be interpreted : *tadopayā esā bhuya rati bhavati devānaṃpiyasa priyadasino rāño bhāge aṃñe*. The *bhāga* is normally the “share, the beneficiary part” that is obtained from a business, such as the gods receive in sacrifice, or the tax assured to a sovereign. It is thus easy to translate it literally as “this surplus pleasure resulting therefrom,¹⁷ becomes for the king Piyadasi, dear to the gods, another part”, “a second revenue”.¹⁸

For a zealous convert, this was the better part. The terms that Aśoka employed in speaking of his departure for *dharmayātā*, although they have long been the subject of controversy, are quite clear. In the Girnar version the king “has gone towards complete Awakening”, *ayāya saṃbodhiṃ*, in the other versions that he “came out towards complete Awakening”, *nikhami saṃbodhiṃ*. Thus quite simply he followed the example of prince Siddhārtha who, also having formerly accomplished *abhinīṣkramaṇa*, quit his palace, against all etiquette, in order to go in search of Sambodhi. The renouncement of Aśoka was certainly not as complete ; he remained sovereign. Crowned king, he remained faithful

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17. Hultzch, in agreement with Lüders, had attached *tadopaya* to the end of the preceding phrase which enumerates the acts of which the *dharmayātā* consisted. For the object we have in mind, this detail of interpretation is of secondary importance.
18. Hultzch’s interpretation is quite different. It rests on a conjecture plausible in itself, but weakened by the context. Hultzch having placed the *dharmayātā* in the plural, and failing to examine its date and to recognise its identity with the period of the 256 days designated by the Rupnāth-Brahmagiri, conjectured that this referred to an entire series of pious journeys, which must have occupied the second half of Aśoka’s reign. He wanted to discover this second part of the reign in *bhāge aṃñe*. Then, misconstruing the phrase, making *bhāge aṃñe* his subject and adding in brackets to the text “of the reign”, he arrives at the understanding that Aśoka wanted, in elliptical fashion, to say that the second part of his reign was happier than the first, during which he used to make only outings for pleasure in the old style.

to his divine function on earth, the function of maintaining *dhamma*. But in order the better to acquit himself, he approached holy men who practised this *dhamma*, all holy men : those holy by birth, the Brahmins, or by their personal effort, the Śramaṇas. He approached Buddhists also, necessarily, since, without his *dhamma* being strictly Buddhist, he had a marked predilection for Buddhism. Also, among the “old men” that he visited in the course of his *dhammyātā*, one has apparently to include the “presbyter” Buddhists, whom, moreover, the Girnar Edict calls the *thairas*, a word which inevitably evokes the *theras*, the distinguished and respectable Buddhist monks,¹⁹ who surprisingly are not found mentioned elsewhere, unless it is true they are to be included in the Śramaṇas.

As for the people, to the king desirous of spreading the *dhamma*, It was another satisfaction to himself to go and teach and ask questions, although he could reach only a few amongst the people and was consequently obliged, in order to complete his work, to institute five-yearly tours by officials²⁰, and to create special inspectors called the *dhamma-mahāmātas*.²¹

19. These *thairas* participate in the distribution of gold by the king but the monks could not receive it directly. To do so was an abuse that the monks of Vaiśālī were permitted under Kālāśoka, and that the council meeting on this occasion, had condemned. This, without doubt, is why Aśoka never employs the word to give, which he had used immediately prior to this in order to speak of his alms to Brahmins and monks. He uses the expression *paṭivīdhāna* which implies an indirect donation, always acceptable to the Community.

20. Rock III, twelve years after the coronation. The periodicity of these journeys corresponded with the *yuga* of the *Jyotiṣavedāṅga*, which is of five years, this period being considered as the smallest lapse of time during which the Sun and the Moon simultaneously each make an entire number of complete revolution.

21. Rock V, thirteen years after the coronation.

We can add that the god-king, by presenting himself amongst men, in the pursuit of *dhamma*, thereby fully carried out a function of the regulating divinity of the *dhamma*, and at the same time, by visiting the monks, depositories of the knowledge of *dhamma*, imitated the gods of Buddhist legends, who came to learn from the Buddha or the saints. And this double function delighted him.

For men favoured with a meeting with the god-king, the advantage was obvious, and if, as he himself proclaimed, the king had specially visited the monks, presumably it was the latter's zeal which more particularly recommended them to the royal notice. When, at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri, Aśoka underlined that the mingling of the *devas* with men was the fruit of zeal, he was referring to the zeal of both, as reciprocal advantages which they drew from their reunion.

All the things that the edicts of Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri group, and the VIIIth Rock Edict, tell us of the zeal of the king, his approaching the *theras* and the unsolicited character of this approach, are well preserved in the texts on Aśoka.

The *Mahāvamśa* (V, 62 ff) recounts how Aśoka was converted by the young Nigrodha, his nephew. Perceiving the latter from the window of his palace and struck by his pious bearing, he is said to have summoned him to the royal presence. Nigrodha, invited to occupy the seat best befitting his religious state, is said to have sat on the royal throne, (and in so doing) actually supporting himself by the king's hand, to the great satisfaction of the latter, who was happy to have bestowed on him so much honour. This was of course a violation of protocol, but it was neither public nor official. From this moment onwards Aśoka manifested increasing inclination towards the Buddhist religion, had constructed 84,000 vihāras and on the prompting of the thera Tissa Moggaliputta asked his son and daughter to renounce the world (enter the Buddhist Saṃgha as a monk and a nun). But it was only later that he established contact in

public, with the monk Tissa, in a way which brought about a revolution in royal protocol.

The *Mahāvamsā* in fact shows how (Aśoka) filled with deference (*sādara*) on learning that Tissa would resolve all his remaining doubts (V, 245-246), had himself carried before the latter on his arrival by boat at the capital. He himself even descended into the water up to his knees, and extended his hand to help Tissa to disembark (V, 255-256). The text contents itself with adding that the thera then took the right hand of the king "out of compassion" (*anukampayā*). The commentary, the *Vamsaṭṭhappakāsinī*²² makes no comment on these details, but refers back to the commentary of Buddaghoṣa on the Vinaya, the *Samantapāsādikā* which describes the scene at length.²³

According to this text, "the sword-holders, seeing this, unsheathed their swords, saying : "We will strike off the head of the thera." "Why ?" "It is the custom in regard to royal families, to cut off with the sword, the head of anyone who takes the king by the hand." The king seeing their shadows²⁴ said, "Although previously, because of incompatibility, I had no confidence in (Siam edition : was not in agreement with) the monks, let no one oppose the thera !" And why did the thera take the king by the hand ? As the king had called him to ask questions, the monk took the king's hand, saying : "He is my *antevāsika* disciple."²⁵

22. Edited by Malalasekera, London, 1935, v. 1, p. 239.

23. Edited by Takakusu-Nagai, London, 1924, v. 1., p. 58. Siam Edition, 1, p. 57-58.

24. They (men or women) approached from behind, since the king, having stepped into the river, faced the thera and had his back to his suite.

25. *tan disvā asiggāhā therassa sisam pātesāma ti kosito asim abbāhimsu. kasmā etaṃ kira cārittaṃ rājākulesu yo rājānaṃ hatthe gaṇhāti tassa asinā sisam pātetabban ti. rājā chāyaṃ yeva disvā āha : pubbe pi ahaṃ bhikkūsu viruddhakāraṇā assāsaṃ* (Siam edition : *assādaṃ*) *na vindāmi*,

This recitation is significant. As long as the king discoursed with the theras and with Tissa himself, in the eyes of the royal entourage, there was nothing abnormal. But when, even though responding to a gesture of the king himself, the thera in public touched the hand of the monarch, his (the thera's) head had to be cut off there and then. Aśoka confirms that such was the earlier rule, but he changes it in his religious fervour. This appears to accord well with the protocol reform that in his VIIIth Rock Edict, Aśoka flatters himself he had carried out, in going to meet the monks in his zeal for *dhamma*. And when we know that being king, he was also a god and a representative of the gods, one can well believe that this contact with Tissa corresponded to the act by which he, on the same occasion proclaimed that gods and men were hereafter "mixed".

The very expressions in the texts confirm this opinion in a manner precise and unexpected. Mr. Barua recently raised the point²⁶ that in the version of the Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri edict found at Maski, Aśoka says that the *devas* who had not "mixed" (*amisā*) with men were *misibhūtā*, and that this compound is found in the Jātaka (Vol. V, p. 86), interpreted by the commentary to mean that the contact had been made "by joining hand to hand" (*hatthena hattham gahetvā*). That, according to the *Samantapāsādikā*, is exactly what Aśoka and Tissa did, to the great consternation of the guards. Further we have seen that according to the word of this text, in the period previous to the unheard-of incident of the joining of hands, the *bhikkhus* were, in relation to the king, *viruddha*—and this term had precisely a technical value which expressed the impropriety of a physical contact. It is the term devoted in Indian medicine to mark the foods

mā kho there virujjhittā ti. thero pana kasmā rājānam hatthe aggahesi. yasmā raññā pañham pucchanatthāya pakkosāpito, tasmā antevāsiko me ayan ti aggahesi. The disciple *antevāsika* is he who just takes lessons from the master and does not live with him constantly like the *saddhivihārī*.

26. *Aśoka and his inscriptions*, Calcutta, 1st part, p. 267. It is certain that in Sanskrit *miśribhūta* most often implies a bodily contact, and due to this fact has a precise erotic sense.

which must not be mixed. Fish and honey, for example, are *viruddha*, "incompatibles", in the sense that diatetics forbids mixing them. *Viruddha* is thus counter-poised to *misibhūtā* and corresponds to *amisā*. A thing is *amisā* when there exists a ban on contact, some untouchability; it is *misibhūtā*, "become mixed" when hand is joined to hand. If in the Jambudvīpa, the *devas* and men previously not mixed, now became so, thanks to religious zeal, it was when the king, in his pious enthusiasm, lifted the ban on contact, when he and the therā, animated on his part by the pious intention to teach, joined hands, and the *devas* in question are none other than the kings. The VIIIth Rock Edict explains to us the one of Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri. The *Samantapāsādikā* illustrates them both.

However, in this connection one could raise a chronological difficulty. The *Dīpavaṃsa* (V, 82), the *Mahāvāṃsa* (V, 209) and the *Samantapāsādikā* (Vol. 1, p. 52) places the gift by Aśoka of his son and daughter to the community, six years after his coronation. The episode of coming before the therā Tissa and holding his hand should have taken place much later.²⁷ Thus, it would not fall in the eleventh year after the coronation, the date of the *dhammayātā* and of the visit to the theras. But this difficulty is not really decisive. The chronology of the *Dīpavaṃsa*, of the *Mahāvāṃsa* and of the *Samantapāsādikā* is in error on the subject of the date of the conversion, which followed the conquest of Kalinga, accomplished, according to the XIIIth Rock Edict, an authentic source, in the ninth year of his reign. Hence this chronology can be invoked against commingling only

27. In fact there elapsed a good number of years between the entry of the son and daughter of Aśoka into the Community and the episode of the holding of the hand of the therā. Between these two events, and some time after the first, Tissa would have abandoned the direction of the Community to Mahinda (*Mahāvastu* v, 228 235). According to the *Dīpavaṃsa* vii, 42-43, it is 236 years after the Nirvāṇa, thus 18 years after the coronation, that a schism appears in the Theravāda. But it is because of this schism that, according to the *Mahāvāṃsa*, Aśoka and the therā Tissa meet. We will return to this chronology in a later study.

to suggest the conformity of facts between the *dhammayāṭā* and the coming into the presence of the monk Tissa.

The foregoing now makes it possible to suggest an easy solution to the difficulties, at first sight considerable, arraigned against the translation proposed by Sylvain Lévi of *deva* by "king".

Senart,²⁸ Hultzsch²⁹ and La Vallée-Poussin³⁰ are in agreement, though for partly differing reasons, on the impossibility of accepting this translation. In the Edicts, *deva* is never found in the sense of "king" in any passage other than in the one under discussion. On the contrary, it figures in the sense of "god" in one of the very titles of Aśoka, *devānāmpiya* "dear to the gods".³¹ And Senart has asked how Aśoka, who ordinarily referred to himself quite simply as *rājā*, could suddenly assume an oratorical tone when talking of himself, giving himself the ostentatious and affected title of *deva*, further underscored by the use of the emphatic plural.

But in reality these objections have hardly any significance. In the first place, there is no reason why *deva* could not be used by the same author, as quite another word, in two legitimate, different senses. In the second place, when *deva* is used for "king", it does not become a simple synonym for *rājā*; it fully preserves its sense of "god", being applied solely to the king because the king is a god and not a sovereign. In the ordinary usage of the texts, it is used in the vocative case when speaking directly to the king, and if used in some other case it is when

28. J. A., April-June, 1916, p. 439.

29. *Corpus*, p. 168, Note 1.

30. *Inde au temps des Mauryas*, p. 114.

31. This title is specially suited to a cakravartin who assures the safety of his subjects (cf. B.M. B.C.C. *Ceylon Lectures*, Calcutta 1945, p. 60), what in short Aśoka wished to be.

speaking to the king in the third person or speaking of him in his presence. Although *devī* can be a current substitute for “queen”, *deva* cannot be used as a pure equivalent of “king”, and without doubt one cannot, as Sylvain Lévi does, consider it simply as such. It signifies in fact, divine Majesty or if one wishes “Majesty”, it being understood that a royal Indian Majesty is divine. But in order to designate kings, it was sufficient for Aśoka to use their normal title, and in this particular case no other term served to convey it better since the unusual character of the commingling of kings with men, arose not from their being sovereigns but from their being gods. Of little matter then, that at one and the same time Aśoka had been called “dear to the gods” (if he was their equal, he deserved their affection all the more) and that he had been able to designate himself indifferently as *rājā* or *deva*. If he called himself “king” and not “god”, it was not because he was not “god”, but because he was following a normal usage. F. W. Thomas has remarked that in the texts although kings were currently addressed as “*deva*” they never themselves used this title, any more than the King of England says “My Majesty”. Finally, if Aśoka uses “*deva*” and in the plural, it is not in order to designate himself alone and personally. He did not mean to say : “I mingle with men” or “Men mingle with me”. He was enunciating a general law which his action had just established, but which henceforth was valid for all the Kings to come, for it replaced a contrary usage of former kings. His formula was equivalent to : “Henceforth their Majesties are mixed with men” or rather “Men are mixed with their Majesties”. He was all the more justified in saying “*devas*” for “Majesties” if he wanted to play on a Vedic formula *miśā devebhir*, using it in a new application.

La Vallée-Poussin raised still another objection ; he judged as unacceptable the hypothesis of “a democratic mystical intermingling of kings and men”. But it was not a question of any such thing. In going to visit men, in entering into contact with them, Aśoka did not give to his people any right to govern themselves, nor was there anything mystical about his religion. For the rest, the ban on contact with kings and the lifting of this ban by Aśoka are not hypotheses but attested facts as we have seen. We even have proof that the Buddhists sometimes considered

as a veritable crime, the custom of the kings of thrusting aside the people on their route, and reciprocally considered as meritorious the admission of men to the commerce of kings. In a recitation of the Chinese *Tripitaka*, translated by Chavannes, a prince recalling his earlier lives,' explains to his father that he does not wish to become royalty, because he had been, in an earlier birth, a completely virtuous king but one whose guards would chase away the people whenever he went out, and for this fact alone, he had endured the torments of hell for sixty thousand years.

Thus, from all points of view, it appears quite legitimate to recognise in the *devas*, the royal divine Majesties, with whom men intermingled. It is certainly only this interpretation which corroborates directly on the one hand the VIIIth Rock Edict, which noted the commerce of Aśoka with men and the benefit of satisfaction which he derived therefrom without any reference to any descent of the gods from the sky, and on the other the *Samantapāsādikā* which furnishes a precise illustration of the edict without further invoking any divine intervention.

It is true that the tradition of the *Mahāvamsa*, found in the *Samantapāsādikā* itself (Vol. 1, p 42) has the gods intervene, in the Aśokan legend, but on the occasion of his coronation in a circumstance which has no relation to his religious action. It must be seen that the relevant account in the Pali texts has a quite natural Buddhist arrangement of the narration of the coronation. The Brahmanic ritual of this coronation normally presupposes the intervention of gods. The Buddhist legend recounts it in its own style and gives it a very special importance, because the king being crowned is destined to become a great protector of Buddhism. One could even, from the presence of the gods at a coronation thus exalted, evolve a new argument against the interpretation of *devas* by "gods" in the Rūpnātn-Brahmagiri. If Aśoka had wanted to invoke some appearance of divine manifestation, something like establishing a heaven on earth on the occasion of his act of zeal, how could the Pali legend, which took so much pleasure in making the gods participate in the coronation, forget their presence, recognised and solemnly proclaimed in a circumstance, of far greater interest to religion? On the whole, of

these two interpretations of *devas*, by “gods” or by “divine royal Majesties”, it is the first, the simplest and most immediate, which is the less authorised.

It would not, however, be advisable to go to the point of completely rejecting the interpretation, since some support for it can be found in the IVth Rock Edict. This edict evokes the earlier reign of indolence, thereafter at an end and replaced by a new era in which appear the *vimānas*, the elephants, *agikhaṇḍhas* and other *diviyāni rūpānis*. Hultzsch proposed bringing together these *diviyāni rūpānis* with the *devas* of Rūpnāth Brahmagiri. It is readily concluded from this bringing together that the commingling of the *devas* and men must have consisted of marvellous fetes where divine hunts, balls of fire (*agikhaṇḍhas*, the “fires of joy” according to F. W. Thomas) and divine images were shown to the people.

This interpretation is hardly convincing, for if it were a question of fetes, they would have been ordered by the king and organised by his functionaries and would represent only a simulacrum of paradise on earth, and it is hardly conceivable that the king could have seen in them a manifestation of a real mixing of gods and men. On the other hand, it is not certain that the marvellous spectacles in question took place just at the epoch when Aśoka proclaimed the commingling of the *devas* with men. The edict which mentions them was engraved when the king had already been crowned twelve years, that is to say, in the thirteenth year of his reign. The facts alleged at Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri and in the VIIIth Rock Edict, as we saw, does not speak of any divine manifestation and the marvellous spectacles which would have been able to pass for such a manifestation must have taken place later than the *dhammayāsi* described in this edict between the eleventh and the thirteenth year of the reign. These spectacles are thus placed in time quite near the great act of royal piety, but do not necessarily coincide with it.

On the other hand, it could well be a question of phenomena occurring spontaneously, and quite naturally interpreted as divine manifestations.

The word *rūpa* does signify not only “image”, it has a general sense of “apparition” and could assume that of “phenomenon”. These are phenomena and not images or forms that a characteristic passage of the *Mahāvastu* (V. iii, p. 317) describes to us under the name of *rūpāṇi*. The phenomena are baleful : “the wind no longer blew, the rivers no longer flowed, pregnant women no longer delivered, birds no longer flew, fire no longer flamed, the Moon and Sun were no longer known to rise, the world was enveloped in darkness.”

In these conditions, the *divyāni rūpāṇi* of Aśoka could well be “celestial phenomena”. For example the balls of fire (*agikhaṇḍha*) which could have been meteors seen at that time. Similar natural apparitions easily give immediate birth to recitations enriched with details which are more or less fantastic. One could believe that one also saw chariots, and divine elephants to boot, for chariots and elephants are a part of every Indian parade.

But all this necessarily remains very conjectural. One could even ask whether Aśoka's terms were not also to be taken figuratively. The *Samantapāsādikā* in fact relates that the Buddhist saints who authenticated the Law to the second Council “after having shone in the world as balls of fire, extinguished themselves, *aggikkandhā vā lokamhi jalitvā parinibhūtā*. They could thus not be there at the moment when a new council was going to become necessary during the reign of Aśoka. Tissa, who was then a god, a Brahma, incarnated himself among men in order, when the Asokan epoch came, to assume, in his turn, their ancient role on earth. If a parallel legend and a parallel comparison already existed during the lifetime of Tissa and Aśoka, it could be that the divine manifestations of IVth Rock Edict were solemn processions in which the king commanded the presence of the men considered the divine *aggiakkandhas* of the moment, namely, Tissa and the theras of his entourage. It would not in any case

be necessary to seek to see in them gods who had intermingled with men. The intermingling of the *devas* and men was due to the initiative of the king, who could not pretend to have provoked the incarnation of Tissa, or assured his contact with men.

But all these possibilities lead to an uncertainty relative to the spectacles mentioned in the IVth Rock Edict. In this uncertainty and the doubt about the exact date of these manifestations, one cannot firmly depend on the IVth Rock Edict in order to maintain that the *devas* of Rūpnāth-Brahmagiri are celestial gods. In confining oneself to the indisputable commingling of the *dhammayātā*, during the course of which Aśoka visited men, thus breaking with previous royal custom, and of the act of zeal, after which the *davas* were in contact with men, one would have to conclude that the *devas* are kings *qua* "divine Majesties", kings *qua* gods and not to the exclusion of the gods. If these celestial manifestations were produced on the same occasion—which remains problematic though perfectly possible—they would have been a confirmation of the new law established by Aśoka, a participation by his divine equals in his own pious action.

Translated from the French original by Mrs. R. K. Menon

STUDIES IN NIBANDHA-S

Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya

II. Caṇḍeśvara Ṭhakkura (1310-1360 A.D.)

The *Ratnākaras*

(a) His own account of himself and of his royal patron, Harasiṃhadeva.

MM. Dr P.V. Kane says on p. 370 of his *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I. (1930), that 'we learn a great deal about the family and personal history of Caṇḍeśvara from his works.' He then collects information about the same from the author's introductions and colophons of the printed editions of the *Vivādaratnākara*, *Kṛtyaratnākara* and *Rājanītiratnākara* and from Mitra's Notices of the MSS. of *Vyavahāraratnākara* and *Dānaratnākara*. Though the *Gṛhastharatnākara* of this author was published in 1928, he has not utilized the printed edition but consulted the incomplete Deccan College MS. of the same, which has only folios 30,72-113 and has thus failed to supply the additional information, contained in its introductory verses. Though there is an incomplete MS. of the *Śuddhiratnākara* of the same author in the Government collection of the Asiatic Society (Calcutta), covering 97 folios in the Bengali script and containing four of the introductory verses, Dr. Kane has not used it. Besides utilizing the historically important verses at the end of the *Dānaratnākara* MS., noticed by Mitra, he has also fallen back on the Deccan College MS. (No. 114 of 1885-86) of the same. We, therefore, wish to take up the matter, as gathered from various works of this author, one after another, with a view to supplementing the information of Dr. Kane, regarding the personal history of Caṇḍeśvara and of his royal patron, Harasiṃhadeva, in the light of further editions, MSS. and studies.

(I) *Kṛtyaratnākara*

Though this work contains 26 introductory and two concluding verses of high poetic merit and genuine historical information, Dr. Kane has satisfied himself by referring to and utilizing partial matter of the introductory verses 10 and 15 only. The subject-matter of the 26 introductory verses turns out on analysis to be divided into the following sub-headings :

Verses 1-3 : Invocation to Śiva, to the Supreme God and to *Dharma*,

„ 4-8 : Harasiṃhadeva,²⁸

„ 7-6 : Devāditya,

• „ 9-12 : Vireśvara,

„ 13-26 : Caṇḍeśvara [political (13-17), relating to munificence (18 and 20),
relating to the great tank (21-23) and relating to the *Kṛtyaratnākara*

8. The late Dr. K. P. Jayaswal pointed out in his Introduction to the *Rājanītiratnākara* that the correct name of the king was Harasiṃhadeva, though verse 4 (in some MSS.) of the *Kṛtyaratnākara* gives the name as Harisiṃhadeva.

(24-26), the verse 19 being simply a paraphrase of a part of the verse 13].

Of the two concluding verses, the first is an apology to the readers for the defects of a work and the second is simply self-applause.

All the introductory verses except the first three are historically important and we wish to give below their purport for a better understanding of the subject in view. "There is a king of the name of Harasiṃhadeva, who destroyed his enemies to the last man, who was sprung from the Kārṇāṭa dynasty and who ruled over the entire Mithilā and who sprinkled over the directions spotless fame, just as the autumnal moon, which confers innumerable good on others, sprinkles nectar-like rays over the same. When this king was out in his conquests, the *śeṣa* serpent, with its thousand hoods bent down and meeting one another closely owing to the pressure of the king's forces, resembled the body of the lotus-stalk, just closed, after the sun, the friend of the lotuses, had gone down the western sea. Let not the unfortunate *cakravākas*, suffering from the fear of the misfortune, caused by the anger of the god of Five Arrows (i.e. the god of Love), become dejected on account of the friend of the lotuses (i.e. the sun) having gone to the sea (i.e. having set), for the effulgence of the crest-jewel of the king of the Kārṇāṭa dynasty, having pleased all the worlds, is on the ascendancy.

"Devāditya, of cheerful disposition and a veritable moving celestial tree, the lustre of whose counsels dispelled the rise of the darkness-like foes and who purified the earth by the Gaṅgā-like flow of his unalloyed fame, resembling the autumnal moon, filled the unique office of the minister of peace and war of this king. He satisfied the Brāhmaṇas by *mahādānas* (such as the *tulāpuruṣa* and other great gifts), entailing lavish display of wealth and the gods by many kinds of sacrifices and pleased the black-bees, humming with intoxication by the draught of the honey of the lotuses, by the excavation of large ponds and benefited the earth by the construction of pleasure-gardens.

"Just as the moon came out of the ocean, the god Brahman from the lotus, new nectar from the moon and material prosperity from praise-worthy policy, so in this world Vireśvara, the best among the ministers, was born to this ocean of merits and lover of power. This Vireśvara enriched the best Brāhmaṇas by lavishly bestowing great gifts, heaped one upon another, being himself determined to do so, gave away *Rāma* and other grants of land to learned Brāhmaṇas and dug a lake, which resembled the sea in extent. This extremely worthy person built a high palace in the city of Dahivata, which excelled the enemy's fort and was fitted with beautiful staircases and approaches. He, being possessed with many abilities in the arts of peace and war, rendered the burden of royalty of the king of Mithilā free from enemies with his prowess and also filled it with wealth and with the seven expedients by virtue of his good policy. Whether in the meeting of the wise and eloquent, or in the assembly of kings and ministers, or in the heart of the suppliants and poetry of the good poets, Vireśvara still exists with his world-wide fame.

"Let this Vireśvara's son, Caṇḍeśvara, who is like a new wish-fulfilling tree, reared

up by the watering of good spies of the kingdom and who occupies the office of a good minister of peace and war, attain prosperity. When this minister was out in his conquests, the earth was lowered down by the pressure of his forces, the pitchy darkness of the nether world was removed by the rays of the partial lamps, displaced from the gem on the hood of the foremost head of the king of serpents and the serpent wives, having thus got an opportunity of seeing their beloved ones and thereby reaping temporarily the utility of their eyes, begin to sing his praise. Is not he, the best minister Caṇḍeśvara, who invaded Nepal, inaccessible owing to hills, who, being equal to the enemy of the sun-god (i.e. *Rāhu*) by dint of his prowess, dethroned all its kings of the Rāghava dynasty by the might of his arms and who worshipped the god *Paśupati*, the bestower of immense boons, by touching the idol, an object of universal adoration on this earth? The frightened kings of Nepal, being defeated by him, forgot their origin in the solar dynasty and either fled to the mountain caves or disappeared in the forests, took shelter near the great water-falls or reached the precipices, when the extensive battle-field, disturbed by the feet of horses, was furrowed by the wheels of chariots and irrigated with the fat of elephants; and pearls, resembling date-palms and fallen from the back of the elephants by the strokes of arrows, looked like so many seeds of fame of the minister, sown on the earth. When the wish-fulfilling tree of heaven was deserted by the supplicants, who were honoured by this crest-jewel, as it were, of the highly munificent (i.e. Caṇḍeśvara) by the bestowal of great gifts, far in excess of their expectations, the former, being rendered black as a row of black-bees or ink or flame, was weeping, as it were, by the trickling down of drops of honey from its body. This best of minister, having been delighted, gave away to the Brāhmaṇas a good many villages, equalling the city of gods and green with forests of plantain trees—villages in which black-bees, attracted by the pleasing smell of the opening mango-blossoms, were humming and which thus resembled full-blown lotuses by reason of the waters of the encircling rivers.

“This Caṇḍeśvara excavated a lake in Abhirāmapura, which was shining with lotuses and making sounds of clouds by the passing of gentle breezes over it and thus created the illusion of the autumnal clouds, surcharged with water and floating on the sky. This lake, with its surging waters, resembling those of a sea, was, as if, saying the following words as proudly as an infuriated elephant or ass does in yelling :

‘O you, the sage, born of a pitcher (i.e. Agastya), you have drunk off the ocean, full of saline water, by one sip of your hand. Come, if you can, to drink myself, sweeter than the ocean-water as I am.’

“The moon-god worshipped the god Śiva with a desire to surpass the fame of this lake and though it reached almost the position in the crest of the latter god, yet it did not drive the desired result from him. So his mind melted and he (i.e. the moon), with his subdued lustre, thus holds, as it were, within himself spots, equal to the marks of mud.”

The purport of the verses 24 and 25 have already been given above in section

I (a), viz. 'The *Kṛtyakalpataru* : its place etc.' The verse 26 means that this scholarly author (i.e. Caṇḍeśvara) has reconciled the conflicts among the many Vedas, various Smṛtis, numbers of Purāṇas and other authoritative works such as the History of Gauḍa (i.e. Bengal) and compiled this *Kṛtyaratnākara* for the benefit of the readers. •

(II) *Gṛhastharatnākara*

Of the twenty-one introductory verses of this work, the first is an invocation of benediction from the god Śiva, who became a *gṛhastha* (i.e. householder) after marrying the daughter of the presiding god of the Himalayas and the second only supplies some information regarding the personal history of the author. The rest 19 verses enumerate the topics, dealt with in the body of the work.

The purport of the second verse is given below :

'Caṇḍeśvara, the most renowned in the long list of minister and practising celibacy, who taught many persons of the twice-born classes the entire Vedas with the six auxiliaries, satisfied them with gifts of money and initiated them into the life of householders, is laying down a treatise named *Ratnākara* (lit, sea) on the duties of *gṛhasthas* (i.e. householders), based on the principles of the *Pūrva-* *Mīmāṃsā* (i.e. the Science of Interpretation).'

(III) *Śuddhiratnākara*

Of the four verses existing in the incomplete MS. of the *Śuddhiratnākara*, the first invokes benediction from the god *Nilakaṇṭha* (a name of the god Śiva) and the second only supplies some information regarding the personal history of Caṇḍeśvara. The remaining two begin with the enumeration of the topics, dealt with in the body of the work. The purport of the second verse, which is faulty at places, is to the following effect :

'Caṇḍeśvara, the best of the ministers of the king of Mithilā and the foremost of orthodox persons, who performed sacrifices with the help of pure and proper money along with the discharge of duties viz. daily, casual and voluntary, is composing this beautiful book, entitled *Śuddhiratnākara* (lit. 'sea of purification').'

(IV) *Vivādaratnākara*

The concluding verse of this work states that 'he (i.e. Caṇḍeśvara) weighed himself against a heap of gold and gave the gold away, before the god Somanātha on the bank of the Bagmatī in the bright fortnight of the month of *Agrahāyana* (November-December) of the śaka year 1236(=1314 A.D.).' MM. Smṛtitīrtha has quoted the above Sanskrit verse and explained its implications on p. VI of the preface to his edition of the *Kṛtyaratnākara* in 1925 and Dr. Kane has referred to it in the section on Caṇḍeśvara of his *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, in 1930. It may incidentally be stated that the *Vivādaratnākara* has been twice published in the B.I., in 1887 under the editorship of Pandit Dīnanātha Vidyālaṅkāra and in 1931 under that of MM. Kamalakṣṇa Smṛtitīrtha.

Selected Writings of Dipamkara

Translated by

Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya

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Section 1

Introductory Note

Of the large number of works of Dīpaṃkara preserved in Tibetan translation in the bsTan-'gyur, the Tibetan authorities consider the *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa* to be most important. It occurs twice in the bsTan-'gyur (mDo xxxi 9; xxxiii 1). The present translation generally follows the text as edited by S. C. Das (JBTS I. i. 57-74). Where, however, it differs significantly from the text of the Peking edition and the latter appears to give clearer meaning, the translation follows the latter. The Sanskrit original of the work, even if not lost, cannot be easily traced today. Professor Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya attempts a restoration of it, which is also reproduced here.

The *Vimala-ratna-lekha* (mDo xxxiii 103 & xciv 33) is the famous letter written by Dīpaṃkara to Nayapāla from Nepal en route to Tibet. The present translation follows the Peking edition of the text (*The Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, vol. 103, No. 5480).

The *Caryā-gīti* (rG xiii 44; mDo xxxiii 10), *Caryā-gīti-vṛtti* (rG xiii 45) and the *Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna-dharma-gītikā* (rG xlviii 34) are translated from their Peking editions (*The Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, 103. 5387 ; 52.2212 and 69.3203 respectively).

To these are added the *Sayings of Aśīśa* taken from a manuscript copy now in possession of Professor Lama Chimpa. Portions of the manuscript translated are given also in photo-stat reproduction.

The translations are intended to be literal and annotated.

Section 2

Caryā-gīti

In Indian language it is called the *Caryā-gīti*, in Tibetan *sPyod-pa'i-glu*.

Salutation to Ārya Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta.¹ Salutation to Vajrāsana.²

This world is as reflection (*prativimva*). When examined, the nature of its self is found to be nature-less (*svabhāva-hīna*). The self (also) is a reflection. Oh, my silly mind, do not

1. "Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta is the first of the eight spiritual sons (*upa-putra*) of the Buddha : (a) Mañjuśrī, (b) Vajrapāṇi, (c) Avalokiteśvara, (d) Kṣitigarbha, (e) Sarvanivāraṇa Viṣkambhi, (f) Ākāśa-garbha, (g) Maitreya, (h) Samantabhadra. He is ordinarily called 'Jam-dpal dByaṅs (Mañjuśrī Ghoṣa), the noble one with sweet voice. He is the Bodhisattva who presides over science and learning. The Mahāyāna scriptures were chiefly delivered to him by the Buddha. The work called *Yum-rnam-'grel* explains the reason why he is called Kumārabhūta or 'grown youthful' : 'The Bodhisattva who observes only *brahmacharya* from the time he has imbibed faith in Buddha until he attains to the state of *bodhi* (enlightenment) is called Kumāra or the youthful ; for then all his faculties, moral and psychic etc. are fully developed and his wisdom perfect.' His state then may be compared with that of a youthful person. Mañjuśrī being the divine Bodhisattva, who presides over learning and *prajñā* and all kind of arts and sciences, is believed to be a youth at all times and in all ages. He never grows old. Among the Tirthikas etc. the goddess Sarasvatī is believed to be always youthful... Like Gaṇeśa, Mañjuśrī is first invoked in all literary undertakings." JBTS I. i. 39n.

2. An epithet of the Buddha. Also "the navel of India, namely Gayā, considered the holiest of all places in the Buddhist world." D-TED 705.

(be deluded) by ignorance. You are under darkness so long as this knowledge does not dawn on you. //1

The self as well as all the living beings are clearly seen (as reflections are seen) in a vast mirror (*maṇi-darpaṇa*) on a day with clear sky. Why do you have the delusion about the difference between yourself and others, in the way in which the child is deluded by its own reflection ? //2

One who sees permanence in reflections is like the animal fighting (its own) shadow (reflected image). Firmly meditate on the *maṇḍala-cakra*.³ With the knowledge of this, the *yogī* does not stay there (i.e. at the stage of mistaking reflections as real). //3

The great bliss (*mahāsukha*),⁴ precious and noble (*priya* and *uttama*), is already included in the *maṇḍala*. How do you think that what you imagine and create in your mind is by nature (*svabhāva*) like that ? //4

How can one attain the best enlightenment (*anuttara bōdhi*) so long as the nature of all these is not realised ? The complete (*aśeṣa*) negation (*abhāva*) of delusional actions (*vikalpa-karma*)⁵ is of the nature of the perfect beatitude (*uttama mahāsukha*). //5

3. See D-TED 56 for the Tāntrika significance of *maṇḍala-cakra*. However, as Dīpaṃkara himself explains in the *Caryā-gīti-vṛtti* (See Section 3), by the meditation on the *maṇḍala-cakra*, here, he means the meditation on the *pratītya-samutpāda* and its implication, as claimed by the Mādhyamikas, viz. *śūnyatā*. In other words, he retains here the Tāntrika form but makes the meditation *śūnya-vādi* in content.

4. "In Buddhism there are two kinds of happiness : the happiness of bliss that terminates or becomes exhausted and the happiness that is eternal and cannot be exhausted; the first being mixed up with the miseries of transmigratory existence, the latter remaining unaffected by any cause." D-TED 668. For the conception of *mahāsukha* in Buddhist Tantrism, see S.B. Dasgupta, ITB 128-44.

5. *rnam-rtoḡ* : *vikalpa* : unreal conclusions, imagination,

Keep your mind aloof from the *loka-aṣṭa-dharma*.⁶ Be firm on your *punya-samādhi*-s.⁷ Thus you will remain pure and completely free from all unnecessary actions. //6

Whatever is the product of the various *vikalpa*-s is devoid of good and pure nature. That *tattva* alone is pure which is absolutely free from *karma* and *vikalpa*. //7

The absorption in the highest meditation on truth (*mahā-agni* of *tattva-samādhi*) will, as the flame of the great fire, burn like oblations the dirt (*mala*) of *kleśa*-s.⁸ When the world is known, the whole world will be like the void (*ākāśa*—emptiness). //8

aberrations of the mind. In philosophy—obscuration namely of the clear and direct knowledge of truth by reasonings in the mind of the individual ; error. D-TED 759.

6. “Eight worldly doctrines or principles : 1) gain, profit : *lābha*, 2) loss : *a-lābha*, 3) fame, reputation : *yaśaḥ* 4) bad-name, notoriety : *a-yaśaḥ*, 5) scandal, slander : *nindā*, 6) praise : *praśamsā*, 7) happiness : *sukha*, 8) misery or unhappiness : *duḥkha*. D-TED 428.

7. *tiñ-ñe-'dsin*, *samādhi*. Intense contemplation, profound meditation, perfect absorption of thought into object of meditation. The following nine *samādhi*-s of a Bodhisattva are mentioned : 1) *ratnasamudgata*, complete coming forth of jewels, 2) *su-pratiṣṭha*, well-established, 3) *akampa*, unagitated, 4) *a-vinivartanīya*, not liable to return, 5) *ratnākara*, abode or mine of jewels, 6) *sūrya-prabhātejaḥ*, brilliance like sun-shine, 7) *sarvārthasiddha*, successful in effecting all objects, 8) *jñānā-loka*, light of knowledge and 9) *pratyutpanna-buddha-sammukhā-vasthita-samādhi*, meditation attained in presence of the future Buddha. D-TED 516.

8. *ñon-moñs-pa*. The word has often “the technical meaning of *misery* as the result of ignorant clinging to existence and the world, and therefore in the Buddhist sense the misery of sin.” According to Buddhism, the ten smaller causes of moral misery are : wrath, spite, ostentation or, show, adherence to what is contrary to Buddhism, illusion, deception, jealousy, covetousness,

Have no illusion about the nature of the world, which is like emptiness (*ākāśa*). Do not remain blind under the darkness of the *vikalpa*-s. The world remains the same before and after. Past, future and the present do not differ. //9 •

Just as one suffering from [the disease called] *timira*⁹ sees the hair in the sky, so does one afflicted with the disease (*timira*) of *vikalpa*, sees the world. Therefore, meditate on and examine the numerous *vikalpa*-s, which by nature are restless (*capala svabhāva*) and empty [lit. like *ākāśa*]. //10

Guard your *śīla*, the great treasure, so that it is not stolen by the dangerous thieves of *pāpa-vipāka*. Do not, oh mind, make the long night of the worldly existence an endless one under the sleep of delusion (*moha-nidrā*). Be alert ! //11

There can be no day without the sun. Similarly, how can there be *samādhi* without the treasure of *śīla* ? The thief has entered the chamber of your sleep. Oh you, your great treasure of *śīla* is running the risk of being stolen. //12

Do not allow your mind to desire unbecoming actions (*abhadra kārya*) even for a single moment. Keep close watch on it till the sun of *tattva* rises. Till this sun-rise, remain firmly attached to the principles of duty as one remains attached to the jewel (*maṇi*)¹⁰ //13

pride, arrogance. The ten greater causes of moral or mental misery are : want of faith, repentance or regret, bartering, also vacillating, inattention or changing the mind, confusion or mental derangement, practising actions in accordant with custom, irreverence, laughing aloud, ignorance, modesty. D-TED 489-90.

9. *timira*—"darkness of the eyes, partial blindness (a class of morbid affections of the coats,—*paṭala*,—of the eye)"—Monier-Williams SED 447. This seems to be a favourite example of the perception of illusory objects used by the Mahāyāna Buddhists. Cf. Vasubandhu : *yathā taimirikasya-asat-keśacandrādi-darśanam*, *Viṃśatikā*, verse 1. Cf. also *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* (Anand. Ed.) p. 13 : *timira-ādi-upahata-akṣṇām-keśa-undūka-nāḍi-jñāna-bhedavat*.

10. The exact meaning of the last sentence is not clear.

Your self and the living beings are identical. Do not allow the inner evil (*doṣa*) to differentiate between the self and others. This inner evil is *vikalpa*. Subdue it like a poisonous snake ; charm it with *amṛta-rasa*. //14

The inner evil is like the hydra-headed poisonous snake. The [right] understanding of all the living beings is the great *amṛta-rasa*. It brings tranquillity to the mind of the *mahā-yogī*. //15

That *mahā-sukha* of *nirvāṇa* is to be known as best which comes from the continuous drinking of this great *amṛta-rasa*. By nakedness and performance of sacrifice one does not become a *brāhmaṇa*. Nor does one become a *brāhmaṇa* by wearing matted hair (*jaṭā-dhāraṇa*), nor by the nature of birth (*kulasvabhāva*). //16

He who has purity of body-speech-mind (*kāya-vāk-citta*) is a [true] *brāhmaṇa*. This is said by the Buddha. One [i.e. a true *brāhmaṇa*] must renounce all the ten vices (*daśa-pāpa*) and must strengthen the ten virtues (*daśa-puṇya*)¹¹ //17

Even though born low, one should, throughout one's life, avoid immoral action (*adharma ācaraṇa*), conquer anger by forgiveness (*kṣamā dharma*) and renounce the desire for worldly pleasures. //18

We have given here the tentative meaning that appears to us to be appropriate for the context.

11. The ten sins or vices (*pāpa*-s or *a-kuśala-karma*-s) are the exact opposite of the ten virtues (*daśa-puṇya*-s), namely 1) not to kill anything living, 2) not to take what has not been given (those who closely stick to the precept go even so far that they will not touch or accept an alms unless it be put into their hands), 3) not to fornicate, 4) not to tell a lie, 5) not to abuse or revile, 6) not to talk foolishness, 7) not to calumniate, 8) not to be avaricious or covetous, 9) not to think upon doing harm or mischief, 10) not to entertain heretic notions, or positively, to be orthodox. J-TED 85.

Always bathe in the ocean of *kuśala-dharma*. Avoid the evil (*doṣa*) of lust, fear and delusion (*moha*). It is because of stupidity that you do not understand [the futility of] riding again and again the skeleton that drops dirt [i.e. woman]. //19

Avoid *kāma* and *moha*, the paths to miseries. Oh, my mind, clean your own dirt. Take refuge with reverence, to the *sad-guru*, [who is] like the fountain. Wash the linen that is dirty with the filth of the Great Delusion (*mahā-moha*). //20

The precepts of the *guru* are like clear water. Accept these and learn to wash yourself. Oh, my mind, understand and see yourself well. Clean the great filth of delusion. //21

One that does not listen to the preachings (*dharma-vacana*) of the Śākyamuni is like one that enters the forest fire or flood. You have certainly to go to the other world¹² in the future. Therefore, listen to the words of the Buddha. //22

Never be an agent of *adharma* after listening to the precepts of Śākyamuni. There is none [else] to hold you back from the Avīci hell.¹² He alone who, after listening to *dharma* meditates on the meaning of *dharma*, will gain heaven with ease and attain *mokṣa*. //23

Dharma is the lamp [that guides through] the darkness of ignorance and it is the ship in which one crosses the ocean of existence. //24

Here ends the song of *śīla-caryā* by *mahā-ācārya* Dīpaṃ-kara-śrī-jñāna ; translated, revised and finalised by the Indian *paṇḍita* Vajrapāṇi and lo-tśā-ba *bhikṣu* Dharmaprajña (Chos-kyi-śes-rab).

12. One of the eight hells the torments of which are excruciating.

Section 3

Caryā-gīti-vṛtti

In Indian language it is called *Caryā-gīti-vṛtti*, in Tibetan *sPyod-pa'i-glu'i-'grel-pa*.

Salutation to Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta. Salutation to Yuganaddha,¹ the all-perfect.

For the welfare of others I am explaining this *Caryā-gīti*.

The pure philosophy (*samyak-siddhānta*) is explained here in a two-fold way. It is a *vajra-gīti* in form and in it are primarily shown the *nirodha satya*.²

The *caryā-gīti* is *ātma-pratiṣṭha* [i.e. has its own blessings] and it shows the *mārga-satya*³ and the *saṃvṛti satya*.⁴

The words “as reflection (*prativimva*)” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 1) have two objects (*viśaya-s*) to be seen with the eyes of knowledge (*jñāna-cakṣu*), viz. the *nāsti-svabhāva*⁵ and the *asti-svabhāva* ⁶ [In short, in the *Caryā-gīti* the words “as reflection” etc. are used to indicate what is unreal and what is real).

The *nāsti-svabhāva* is that which, though not existing, is seen. For example, [things] seen by diseased vision [i.e. by a person suffering from the eye-disease called *timira*].

1. For *yuganaddha*, see J-TED 488; D-TED 1095; S. B. Dasgupta ITB 113ff. In the present context it appears to have been used as an epithet of the Buddha.

2. The Third Noble Truth (*ārya-satya*) namely concerning the cessation (*nirodha*) of suffering.

3. The Fourth Noble Truth, namely concerning the path (*mārga*) that leads to the state free from suffering.

4. Truth from the phenomenal point of view, as contrasted with the *pāramārthika satya* or the ultimate truth.

5. *med-pa*, literally “to be not, not to be, to be non-existent” ; the opposite of “to be” ; in short the unreal.

6. *yod-pa*, literally “to be, to exist”, i.e. the real.

“As reflection” etc. In it [i.e., in the example of the reflected-image of the face in the mirror] there are three [factors] : the clear mirror, the proximity of the face and the sky being without cover. Similarly, because of the distortions of the *citta* and *vāyu*,⁷ caused specially by ignorance (*avidyā*),⁸ the living beings of the three worlds⁹ are seen. Still, [their] truth does not follow because of their being seen. That is why, it is said, “When examined the nature [of the self is found to be] nature-less.” (*Caryā-gīti*, 1)

By what examination (*parīkṣaṇa*) is this non-existence known ? Know the *svabhāva* of *ātman* and the living beings of

7. *rluñ*, literally air. The word has, however, technical meaning in physiology and mysticism, which is more relevant in the present context. “In physiology : one of the three humours of the body, supposed to exist in nearly all the parts and organs of the body, circulating in veins of its own, producing the arbitrary and the involuntary motions and causing various other physiological phenomena. When deranged, it is the cause of many diseases, especially of such complaints the origin and seat of which is not known, as rheumatism, nervous affections, etc... In mysticism : *rluñ-dzin-pa* seems to be equal to *dbug-sbsgyaṅ-ba* and to denote the drawing in and holding one’s breath during the procedure called *gtum-mo* which is as much as to prepare one’s self for contemplation, or enter into a state of ecstasy.” J-TED 537-8.

8. *ma-rig-pa*, *avidyā*, ignorance. “Mostly used in the specific Buddhist sense, namely for the innate principal and *fundamental error* of considering perishable things as permanent and of looking upon the external world as one really existing, with Buddhists in a certain manner the original sin from which every evil is proceeding.” J-TED 527.

9. According to Buddhistic speculation, the three worlds are : 1) the earth with the six heavens of the gods, as the “region of desire” (*kāmaloka*), 2) above this is the “region of form” (*rūpaloka*) and 3) ultimately the “region of formlessness” (*a-rūpa-loka*).

the three worlds as but reflections, which are merely seen. Know these as non-born [*ajāta*, i.e. never came to exist]. This is shown by addressing “Oh,” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 1)

Make no mistake about the reflection (*prativimva*). Make no error about the nature (*svabhāva*) of the reflection.

To explain more fully the example and its implications cryptically mentioned as “with clear sky” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 2).

The reflection is the joint product of the three, viz., 1) the clear sky, 2) the *maṇi-darpaṇa* [mirror] and 3) the face. Similarly, *ātman* and the three worlds which are [but] reflections, are seen because of *citta*, *vāyu* and *karma*, working under [the influence of] ignorance (*avidyā*). To misunderstand these and to think these to be permanent and real (*samyak*) is [to behave] as foolishly as the lion does when it dies in the sea¹⁰ by seeing [and jumping to fight] its own shadow, or as foolishly as the ignorant child who tries to scratch its own reflection.

Similarly, looking at the *ātman* and the three worlds, which are but reflections, why do you make the mistake of *ātma* and *para*? Hence it is said, “Why do you have the delusion” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 2).

As it is said in the *sūtra*, too, “In spite of being seen it is not there in the mirror. The *svabhāva* of everything is like that.”

Again, “There is nothing real. It is only the mind, under the turmoil caused by habit, that see the real”, thus it is said.

Thus *ātman* and the three worlds, the objects of the layman’s knowledge, are unreal like the sky-flower [i.e. as unreal as a flower growing in the sky].

Now, as to seeing [knowing] the *asti-svabhāva* [the real].

For this it is said, “Firmly meditating on the *maṇḍala-cakra*” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 3). There are five [marks] of this [meditation on the *maṇḍala-cakra*], viz. the power of *prāṇīya-*

10. *rgya-mtsho*, literally the sea. But according to the current parable, the lion killed itself by jumping into “the well” to fight its own shadow.

*samutpāda*¹¹ being always there, to be it, to know as it, to meditate as it, to obtain blessings (*adhiṣṭhāna*).¹² In this way, for purifying the *citta* and *vāyu* [i.e. making *citta* and *vāyu* free from *āsrava* or impurity, the influence of *avidyā*] concentrate on the *āśraya-āśrita* [i.e. *pratītya-samutpāda*] *devatā*¹³ and know it as the cause of cause.

When the three—viz. *citta*, which is the co-operating cause, *vāyu*, which is the general cause and the quality of being pure (*anāsrava*)—are combined, [all the] creations of the mind [literally, body of the mind, i.e. things that owe their thinghood to the mind, the mental] will appear as *māyā*.¹⁴

11. The doctrine of dependent origination or conditional existence of things, i.e., the view that the existence of everything is conditional or dependent on a cause. Nāgārjuna used this as the central argument of his *Śūnyavāda*: “The Law of Dependent Origination (*pratītya bhāva*)”, said Nāgārjuna, “is equivalent to and proof of the intrinsic unreality (*śūnyatā*) of things. A thing which is found to come into existence in dependence upon an antecedent fact must forfeit its claim to intrinsic reality.” (*Vigrahavyāvartanī*, verse 22. Tr. S. Mookerjee in NNMVRP, i. 17). As Stcherbatsky (CBN 41) explains, “a dependent existence is no real existence, just as borrowed money is no real wealth.”

12. From the literal meanings of the words, the details of all the implications are not clear. Broadly speaking, however, it is clear that the “meditation on the *maṇḍala-cakra*” is here intended to mean the “meditation on the *pratītya-samutpāda*.”

13. The Tāntrika meditation on *maṇḍala-cakra* is the meditation on a *devatā*, there being a *devatā* corresponding to each *maṇḍala*, whose house the *maṇḍala* is supposed to be. The meditation on the *maṇḍala-cakra*, here, is intended to mean the meditation on *pratītya-samutpāda*. Hence, *pratītya-samutpāda* itself is conceived as the *devatā* of this meditation, which leads to the knowledge of the *asti-svabhāva* or the realisation of the truth, which is of course nothing but *śūnyatā*.

14. The sense seems to be as follows : since *citta* and *vāyu*,

When this knowledge, viz. that the quality of the *anāsrava-svabhāva* is the *svabhāva* of everything, dawns, then it [the creation of the mind] is not there [i.e. there is no longer the delusion of things being real].

Therefore, relying on the *kalyāṇa-mitra(guru)* of *samyak-buddhi*, one should reach the firm knowledge of the self with the help of the three and twelve examples. [The significance of “the three and twelve examples” is not clear].

The abiding blessing (*adhiṣṭhāna*) resulting from the meditation that subdues the five senses is the certain knowledge that everything is *māyā*.

All these are further to be known from the words of Devapāla and other Ārya-s.

“The yogī with the knowledge of truth will never behave like that” (*Caryā-gīti*, 3). This is said [because it is not enough to know that everything is *māyā*], for in spite of knowing that the *māyā*-woman is created by *māyā* there grows the lust for her.¹⁵ Therefore, that [knowledge] will have to be [further purified by] *prabhā* (*‘od-gsal*).¹⁶

The two words “*mahā-sukha*” (*Caryā-gīti*, 4) are easy to understand.

“How do you know that what your reasonings create in your mind”, etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 4)—This is in refutation of the yogī who has no [knowledge] of the marks (*lakṣaṇa*) of *satya-dvaya*. And this is easy to understand.

“How can one attain the best enlightenment without

under the influence of *avidyā* (which is *āsrava* or defilement) cause the delusive idea of the reality of self and the three worlds, when the influence of the *avidyā* (*āsrava*) is removed, i.e., when *citta* and *vāyu* become defilement-free, (i.e., are combined with the quality of *anāsrava*), it will be realised that everything is the illusory creation of the mind.

15. That an example like this was current among the Mahāyāna Buddhists is evident from Nāgārjuna’s *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, verse 27.

16. The supernatural enlightening of the saints. J-TED 502.

realising the nature" etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 5) refers to the *prabhā* ('*od-gsal*) and *yuganaddha*.

"The complete negation of all delusional action" etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 5) refers to the 160 *loka-citta-s* ('*jig-rten-pa'i-sēms*). These will be purified by the *prabhā*.

If one asks, "How to realise the *uttama-mahā-sukha*?", [the answer is], "Keep your mind aloof from the *loka-aṣṭa-dharma*" and "Be firm on *uttama samādhi*" (*Caryā-gīti*, 6).

There are two ways to achieve it [the *uttama samādhi*. These are]

1) The ordinary path (*sādhāraṇa-varga*), which means to be possessed of the *śīla-s* (*śīla-yukta*), to be detached from enjoyments, to be forgiving, to have firm determination, to be repelled by noise, to be careful, to be continually conscious of the *satya-dvaya*, to be possessed of the knowledge of what should be done and what should not be done, to be divorced from the five *āvaraṇa-s*,¹⁷ to be aware of the right measure of food, to be impartial in the treatment of friends and foes.

2) The extra-ordinary (*a-sādhāraṇa-varga*), which means the attainment of the four powers (? due to the four *abhiṣeka-s* or *dbañ-skur-ba*), to have firm *bodhicitta* and to have reverence for the *guru*.

When you are in this *varga*, your body-speech-mind (*kāya-vāk-citta*), the three coverings (*tri-āvaraṇa*), will be purified.

"Completely free from all unnecessary actions" (*Caryā-gīti* 6) and "*vikalpa-s*" etc. (*Caryā-gīti* 7)—these two are in refutation of the *yogī-s* who are engaged to such unnecessary actions. And that is easy to understand. This is clear, because [in that stage] the *tri-bhava*, the *loka-citta* and the endless *vikalpa-s* will have no efficacy. Thus is attained a stage of pristine purity. In that state the five senses will be under

17. "The five kinds of moral obscurations are the following : 1) defilements or sins of passionate desires, 2) sins of an evil heart, i. e. of the wish to do evil to others, 3) sins of laziness and indolence, 4) sins of sleep and 5) sins of doubt." D-TED 333.

control and the *loka-citta*,—the dirt of *kleśa*—will be burnt in the fire of *samādhi*. (*Caryā-gīti* 8). The *tri-loka* and the *loka-citta* will then be like the centre of the sky (*Caryā-gīti*, 8). The knowledge of all living beings will be dissolved into nothingness [lit, will be like the sky. *Caryā-gīti*, 8].

The knowledge of everything as it appears is in the nature of a dirt and it is necessary to cleanse it, of the knowledge of everything as seen. This is implied by the words, “Do not remain blind under the darkness of the *vikalpa-s*” (*Caryā-gīti*, 9). If asked, “Why?”, [the answer is] : there is no difference between the *tri-prāṇi-s* if viewed from the point of view of their natural purity. The difference is due to *kalpanā* (*rtog-pa*).

“Under the darkness” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 10) is easy to understand.

Now is being shown the necessity of avoiding, till the purification of all *karma-s*, all the minute *karma-phala-s*, the sources of misery.

“The thief of *pāpa*” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 11) is easy to understand.

Sāṛthavāha¹⁸ (?) became merciful by renouncing his own *karma-s* through the *sūrya-prabha-samādhi*.¹⁹ Thus it (? *karma*) is unnecessary when the *kalyāṇa-citta* within oneself is fulfilled. Hence are used the words, “principles of duty” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 13). And it is easy to understand.

A *brāhmaṇa* is to be known by a man’s views (*drṣṭi*) and behaviour (*ācaraṇa*), not by his descent (*kula*) etc. Thus is said, “nakedness” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 16). This is easy to understand.

Attach no importance to one’s *kula*; consider rather whether one follows the right path. This is indicated by the words, “One with low birth” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 18).

18. In the Peking edition, which is followed here, this word is not clearly printed. Our reading of the word is tentative.

19. One of the nine meditations of a Bodhisattva. D-TED 516.

“Again and again” (*Caryā-gīti*, 19) is said to bring him back to the right path who, under delusion, continually moves in the vicious circle.

The implications of addressing as “Oh,” and of saying, “Oh my mind, clean your dirt yourself” etc. (*Caryā-gīti*, 21) are [as follows]: It is like cleaning the dirt of the face with the help of the mirror. The *guru* is like the mirror, his *upadeśa* is like water, which cleans *avidyā*, the dirt in need of being removed. That is why it is said, wash the dirt of *kalpanā* by the water of the *guru*’s precepts (*Caryā-gīti*, 21).

Everything is the delusional product of *citta* and *vāyu*. You should understand yourself like that. Realise the *svabhāva* of *citta* and *vāyu* as but *ākāśa*.

One who does not listen to the words of Śākyamuni and who is not fortunate enough to have heard it, looks like [one in] fire (cf. *Caryā-gīti* 22). Remember, one has certainly to go beyond this world. Therefore, it is necessary to practise *bodhicitta* etc. after listening to the words of Śākyamuni (*Caryā-gīti*, 22). After listening to that, never act contrary-wise.

Except that (*muni-vacana*), nothing can stop one from going to the Avīci hell. Listen to it and practise the precepts: the temporary result of that will be the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) and the ultimate result of that will be the attainment of the final illumination. (*Caryā-gīti*, 23).

The lamp for the darkness of *avidyā* is *dharma*, *śaraṇa-gamana*, *bodhicitta* etc. and, finally, the supreme absorption in the great bliss (the *samādhi* or *mahā-sukha*). This lamp will certainly be illumined. Therefore, you must depend upon it [the *muni-vacana*] for crossing the *saṃsāra* (*bhava*) as one depends on the boat or the ship for crossing the sea.

Here ends the *Caryā-gīti-vṛtti* translated by paṇḍita Dīpaṃkara and lo-tśā-ba Jayaśīla.

Section 4

Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna-dharma-gītikā

Salutation to the Buddha.

If you know *vikalpa*, the dangerous thief, to be a danger, then guard against it the great treasure of *śīla* and keep it safe.

Oh, do not be a fool and remain sunk in a sleep of delusion (*moha*) throughout the long night which is *saṃsāra*. Keep close watch on your mind. If you remain asleep the thief will enter your room and your treasure of *śīla* will be stolen. Without the wealth of *śīla*, there will be no *samādhi*. And without *samādhi* there will be no sunrise. Therefore, save your *samādhi*.

Even for a single moment do not imagine that the wealth of *śīla* is an ordinary wealth. Then will emerge absolute knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) like the rising sun. Thus there will be the dawn and the end of *saṃsāra*.

Oh, do not be fool. Guard your *citta*.

Thus ends *Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna-dharma-gītikā* (*Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna'i-chos-kyi-glu*).

Section 5

Vimala-ratna-lekha-nāma

In Indian language it is called *Vimala-ratna-lekha-nāma*, in Tibetan *Dri-ma-med-pa'i-rin-po-che'i-phrin-yig*.

Salutation to the *guru-s*. Salutation to Bhaṭṭārikā Tārādevī.

Naryapāla, who was born in Magadha, has spread Buddhism and has ruled the kingdom according to *dharma*, may he be prosperous. //1

You have made gifts in the past, have observed the 'ten virtues' (*daśa-puṇya*), have practised forgiveness (*kṣamā*) and courage (*vīrya*). That is why you, *deva*, are perfect with the three.¹ //2

Place with reverence on your head the instructions of the *guru-s* and the obedience to the *sūtra* and *tantra-śāstra-s*. This will bring blessings for yourself and for others. //3

Avoid all doubts and vacillations. Be particularly active for attaining *siddhi*. Avoiding sleep, folly, and laziness, remain assiduous and ever careful. //4

Always guard the doors of the senses with remembrance, continuous knowledge and care. Examine repeatedly the movement of the mind day and night. //5

Behave like [one with] eyes with regard to your own fault but as the blind with regard to the faults of the others. Avoid arrogance and egoism and always meditate on the *śūnyatā* //6

Give publicity to your own faults ; do not find faults of others. Give publicity to the virtues of others ; keep your own virtues hidden. //7

Do not accept gain and gifts. Always avoid profit and fame. Meditate on *maitrī* and *karuṇā*. Strengthen the *bodhicitta*. //8

1. Possessed of the three, viz. grace, glory and wealth.
D-TED 825.

The ten *akuśala-karma*-s are to be avoided. Reverence is to be always strengthened. Remember to curb the desires, to remain self-content and to act in the virtuous way. //9

Give up anger and egoism. Have a humble mind. Avoid the wrong way of living and live the life of *dharma*. //10

Renouncing all worldly objects get enriched by the *ārya-dhana*.² Always avoid noisy places and live in solitude. //11

Do not be garrulous ; keep the tongue under control. When you come across the *guru* and the *ācārya*, serve them with reverence. //12

Whosoever acts for the *dharma*—be he a distinguished person, a beginner or just an ordinary person, should be regarded as the *guru*. //13

While looking at the living beings pining under miseries, raise the *bodhicitta* in you. Assume towards them the same attitude that the parents have to the child. // 14

Renouncing all worldly occupations meditate always on *samādhi*. Avoiding the sinful friend, follow the *kalyāṇa-mitra*. //15

Do not be indifferent to the *bhikṣu*-s that transgress the *śīla*, those that are wanting in *dharma* and those that are observed to commit the sins. //16

Do not spend more than three days with unholy companions or companions of sin, those that have no reverence for the *ācārya*-s etc , those that are ungrateful, those that think only of this life and those that are wanting in reverence. //17 & 18

Avoid the places of anger and discontent. Go there where there is bliss. Renouncing those to whom you are attached, be without attachment. //19

Attachment will not lead to welfare. It destroys the very essence of *mokṣa*. Remain always with the *kalyāṇamitra*. //20

Complete first the work that you begin first and this by

2. Riches of a Buddhist saint. Seven of these are mentioned, viz. the wealth of faith, of pure morals, of modesty, of sensibility to *dharma*, of attentiveness, of charity, of wisdom. D-TED 846.

following the *guru* and studying the *sūtra*-s. Or else, both will be spoiled. //21

Again, atone for the sin. Care for the good *punya*. Even while following the worldly affairs, keep the mind detached. //22

Suppress egoism when the mind gets swelled. Remember the precepts of the *guru* whenever the mind becomes careless. //23

Encourage the mind when it gets depressed. Remember *prajñā-pāramitā* and make the actions tranquil. //24

Look at the objects that attract or repel as but the creations of *māyā*. Consider the undesirable sounds as but mere echoes. //25

Look at the sufferings of the body as but the [results of the] past actions. //26

After completing the work retire into solitude and remain there like the corpse of the animal that is not found by any. Your self should keep itself hidden. //27

Be always on the alert. Go on counting your own defects and remember the essence of the *vrata*-s when desire, ill-will, sleep, folly, laziness and weariness etc. crop up in your mind. Meditate on impermanence and death. //28

Speak carefully in the presence of others. Avoid brow-beating and sneering. Always remain with a smiling face. //29

Be ever generous to others. Do not be miserly. Always avoid jealousy. Act as the protector of the others' minds. //30

Always avoid clash with others. Do not show artificial grace and do not make new friends. Always maintain alertness. Be always forgiving and remain content with the minimum of desire. //31

Consider yourself to be but a humble servant. Learn to be ashamed and remain humble. Be careful to make others happy. Abide by your *saṃvara*-s.³ //32

3. Obligation, engagement, duty. These are mainly three, viz. the vow of an ordinary Buddhist for self-emancipation, the vow of a Bodhisattva for universal liberation and the

Avoid insulting others. Be modest. While advising others, have love for them and concern for their welfare. //33

Have reverence for the Buddhist religion. Never get distracted from the religion of truth. Always have reverence for God and keep the *tri-cakra*⁴ pure. //34

Get yourself sprinkled all over first by universal love (*karuṇā*). Be famed as the performer of the seven forms of worship⁵ thrice during the day and the night. Have a direct realisation of *tri-skandha*.⁶ //35.

Work for removing the sufferings of the living beings. Make your prayer (*praṇidhāna*) extensive and pray for the attainment of enlightenment. Have the Great Enlightenment (*mahā-bodhi*) as the object of all your actions. //36

Tāntrika or mystical vow. We find also priestly vows, the vows of a *dāna-pati* (alms-giver) and the vows of a physician. D-TED 722.

4. '*khor-gsum*, literally three circles, Sanskrit *tri-maṇḍala*. Schmidt—"everything that belongs to archery." More correctly, arrow, knife and spear. J-TED. 58. The precept 'to keep these pure' perhaps refers to the practice of *ahiṃsā*—i.e. not to allow these to be tainted by blood.

5. "The seven kinds of offerings : flowers, incense, scent, light from butter-lamp, edibles such as cakes, fruits, etc., and other acceptable objects with which he may worship. In the work called *Kun-bzañ-spyod-pa'i-smon-lam*, seven methods of making worship are mentioned : 1) salutation, 2) making offerings, 3) confession of sins, 4) rejoicing, 5) invocation or exhortation, 6) making of prayers for blessings or favour irrespective of what can be claimed owing to one's moral merits, with or without deserving it, 7) prayers for a blessing based on moral merits. These all belong to the Mahāyāna school. In the Hīnayāna, only three kinds of prayers are observed : 1) salutation, 2) recitation of *sūtra*-s etc., 3) asking for benediction."—S. C. Das in JBTS I. i. 45n.

*6. The three aggregates, probably, referring to the aggregates of the mental, moral and material substances.

*Always take vows and remain careful of their fulfilment. You will thus fulfil the two *varga-s*⁷ and will remove the two *āvaraṇa-s*. //37

Make your human life worth-while and lead your sight towards *nirvāṇa*. Work for the welfare of yourself and of others. Attain nobility. //38

Perhaps my words are not like the sweet notes of the cuckoo of the early summer or that of the young peacock. [Moreover, all these] are already said by many a learned men. Nevertheless, I am writing in order to remove the king's distress. //39

Give careful consideration to these words inspired by the thought of your welfare. Why accuse others of being sceptical ? Always meditate on the six deities (*ṣaṭ-deva*) and keep the vows (*saṃvara*) pure. Rule the kingdom according to the principles of *dharma* and remain yourself full of forgiveness. //40

Here ends *Vimala-ratna-lekha-nāma*, sent by *sthavira mahā-ṣaṇḍita* Dipaṃkara-śrī-jñāna to *rājā* Nirapāla.

7. viz. the *jñāna-varga* and the *puṇya-varga*.

Section 6

Bodhi-patha-pradīpa

In Indian language it is called *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*, in Tibetan *Byañ-chub-lam-gyi-sgron-ma*.

Salutation to Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta. On the request of my good disciple Byañ-chub-'od (Bodhiprabha), I shall, after worshipping with profound respect all the *Jinas* of the three times¹ along with their *dharma* and *saṅgha*,² expound the *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*.

1. "*jina* (victor). In the *Sūtra* it is mentioned : 'I am victorious over all *pāpa-dharma* (sinful things). Having overcome them all, I have become Conqueror—*jina*.' Hence, this title is applicable to Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Arhats, etc., whoever has overcome the *hetu* (cause), that is sin itself, and its legions represented by Māra, the result of fruit of all sin." "The three times—past, present and future. The Buddhas of all these times are to be revered and adored conjointly, for they form the commonwealth of the Buddhas." S. C. Das, J B T S, I. i. 39 n.

2. "*saṅgha*—literally meaning one devoted to virtue, but religiously signifies the entire body of the Bodhisattvas, Arhats and Pratyeka Buddhas, together with those who have attained the eight saintly conditions or stages and have fully understood and comprehended the value of taking refuge in the *tri-ratna* and know what is really good, have imbibed true faith in *dharma* and lastly are entirely devoted to it so as *never to turn away from it*. The eight conditions evidently apply to the life of genuine and earnest *bhikṣu*-s and *bhikṣuṇī*-s." *Ib.*

*Puruṣa*³ is to be known as [belonging to either of the] three [types, viz.] : *adhama* (inferior), *madhyama* (mediocre) and *uttama* (superior). The characteristics of each are very clear. Therefore, I shall write the distinguishing features of each. //1

By the *adhama puruṣa*⁴ is to be known one who, in one's own interests, acts in every way for the worldly pleasures only (*saṃsāra-sukha-mātra*). //2

One who, indifferent to the pleasures of birth (*bhava-sukha*) and by nature opposed to sinful acts, works for oneself alone, is to be known as the *madhyama puruṣa*.⁵ //3

3. The word *skyes-bu* literally means *jana* (? *jāta*) or anything born. However, it is taken here in the following special sense : “*puruṣa* that does or works having certain ends, or has the ability to do a thing. Hence *puruṣa* is one who is possessed of the ability of working in the cause of humanity or the world, the effect of which will be carried to a future existence.” *Ib.* 40n.

4. In dealing with the three *puruṣa*-s, the Tibetan writers speak only of the followers of the Buddha and the *adhama puruṣa* is generally taken to mean the lay devotee or *upāsaka*, who is moreover a follower of the Mahāyāna. “The chief act in the religious career of an *upāsaka*, the model ‘Inferior Puruṣa’, is to find out his own *guru* or spiritual instructor, who will implant in him the primary Buddhist ideas, and then lead him to higher conceptions of Buddha’s doctrines.” *Ib.* 41n.

5. The *madhyama puruṣa* is generally taken to mean the follower of the Hīnayāna school. “The chief points of difference wherewith to distinguish the *madhyama puruṣa* from the other two lie in the means he adopts for attaining to his own emancipation, by having regard to his personal interests only. He, therefore, properly belongs to the Hīnayāna school.....

The followers of the Mahāyāna school seem to be divided in their opinion regarding the question whether the *madhyama puruṣa*, belonging as he does generally to the Hīnayāna, at all gets final emancipation from the miseries of *bhava*, i.e....to

One who always wishes to remove all the sufferings of others by his own sufferings is the *uttama puruṣa*.⁶ //4

To the noble being (*parama-prāṇī*), who is desirous of the highest enlightenment (*uttama-bodhi*),⁷ I shall explain the best means⁸ as preached by the teachers.⁹ //5

Offer flowers, incense, etc., whatever you may obtain to

reach the state of *nirvāṇa*. Some dogmatically hold that he does not, while others more liberal in their views say that he does reach to *nirvāṇa*." *Ib.*, 42n.

6. The *uttama* (or *parama*) *puruṣa* means an absolute believer of the Mahāyāna doctrines. "He who becomes sincerely compassionate to all living beings that have been roving in the wide ocean of worldliness and who are being tormented in the intolerable fire of the world by sufferings, as if he himself had been afflicted like them with the miseries of recurring existence, who, earnestly concerned in the well-being and miseries of others, works for their deliverance, eradicating the causes and consequences of their sufferings in such a manner so that they may not take root again—who acquires the precious mind of a Bodhisattva and thereby practises all kinds of duties which belong to Jīnaputra is the *parama puruṣa*." *Ib.* 43n.

7. By "the *parama prāṇī* desirous of *uttama bodhi*" Atiśa perhaps referred to king Bodhiprabha, in response to whose request he wrote the *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*.

8. *Samyak-upāya*—"the perfect and entire means for attaining to supreme enlightenment. They are of two kinds : perfected moral and psychic development and acquisition of occult powers and concentration."— *Ib.* 44n.

9. *bla-ma-rnams*, literally *guru-jana-s* or the elders. Po-to-ba reads the following significance in the use of this word : "In this manner Atiśa has set forth the importance of a spiritual instructor, that is one should bear in mind that the extent of his spiritual progress and prosperity depends a good deal on the kindness of his spiritual instructor." *Ib.* 44n.

the picture¹⁰ of the Samyak-sambuddha [Buddha, the all-perfect], the *caitya*¹¹ and the scriptures.¹² //6

Kneeling down and with folded hands, first repeat the *śaraṇa-gamana*-s thrice. Until the final attainment of the essence of *bodhi* (*bodhi-sāra*), revere the *tri-ratna*-s with a mind that never turns back. Also perform the seven forms of worship as mentioned in the *Samanta-bhadra-caryā*. //7 & 8

Then the first thing to do is to establish empathy (*maitrī-citta*) with all living beings, inclusive of the three kinds of beings with degraded births (*tri-duḥgati-jātāni*),¹³ suffering from both birth and death, etc. Look at all living beings as suffering from miseries and arrive at the firmest determination (*citta-utpādana*) to work with the resolution of never turning back (*anivṛtta-pratijñā*) for liberating all living beings from the miseries that are born of miseries. //9 & 10

The qualities of *praṇidhāna-citta-utpādana* are explained by Maitreya-nātha in the *sDoṅ-po-bkod-pa'i-mdo*. Read it or listen to it from the *guru*. Thus it should be known that the qualities of *sambodhi-citta* are unlimited. Therefore, practise this repeatedly. // 11 & 12

The *punya* of that (*bodhicitta*) is well-explained in the *Vīra-datta-paripṛcchita-sūtra* etc... I shall write (about it) only in three brief verses //13

10. "Representations of Buddha, in drawing, in relief or molten and clay images of the same called 'representative symbol' to represent him as in life." *Ib.*

11. "Tombs or tomb-like structures wherein relics or images and scriptural writings are deposited, these are called the 'commemorative symbols'." *Ib.*

12. "The sacred Buddhist Scriptures, together with their twelve expositions, come under the name of 'symbol of the precepts'." *Ib.*

13. The three kinds of beings with degraded birth are : 1) beasts, birds, insects, worms, reptiles, etc., 2) the *preta*-s or those in the *tantalus*, the manes of the dead, and 3) those in hell.

If the *punya* of *bodhicitta* had visible form (*rūpa*), it would have filled the whole firmament (*antarikṣa*) and yet remain unexhausted. // 14

The offerings of one, who, with folded hands bows down in mind to the *bodhicitta*, being boundless, are far greater than those of one who fills the *buddha-kṣetra*-s,¹⁴ numbering as many as the grains of sand on the bank of the Ganges, with jewels offered to Lokanātha (the Buddha). //15 & 16

After the *prañidhāna-citta-utpādana* for *bodhi*, try always to increase it with great care. Preserve for remembrance even in the next life the *śikṣā*¹⁵ as explained (*yathā-ukta*). //17

The perfect *prañidhāna-citta-utpādana* cannot be increased without having within oneself the vow (*saṃvara*) of *avatāra-citta-utpādana*. Desirous of increasing the vow of perfect enlightenment (*sambodhi saṃvara*), one must acquire it [i.e. the vow of *avatāra-citta-utpādana*] with great care. //18

One can always have the seven kinds of *pratimokṣa saṃvara*. However, without being [specially] fortunate one cannot have the vow of *bodhisattva*. //19

As preached by the Tathāgata, the glory (*śrī*) of *brahmacharya* is the noblest of the seven kinds of *pratimokṣa* vows. That is intended to be the vow of the *bhikṣu* //20

According to the principles (*vidhi*) regarding 'the [ten] stages of saintly perfection of a Bodhisattva' (*bodhisattva-bhūmi*),¹⁶ as explained in the *śīla-adhyāya*, one should receive

14. "The fancied sphere of a particular Buddha or Bodhisattva; e.g. Sukhāvatī is the sphere of Amitābha Buddha, Tibet the chosen land of Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva." D-TED 1265.

15. The three *śikṣā*-s are enumerated as : a) *adhi-śīla-śikṣā*, i.e. training in higher conduct, b) *adhi-samādhi-śikṣā*, i.e. training in higher meditation and c) *adhi-prajñā-śikṣā*, i.e. training in higher wisdom. D-TED 1323.

16. The ten stages or degrees of saintly perfection, called *daśa-bhūmi*, are : 1) beatitude (*pramuditā*), 2) spotless purity (*vimalā*), 3) enlightenment (*prabhākara*), 4) illumination (*arciṣmatī*),

the *saṃvara*-s from a *sad-guru* with appropriate accomplishments (*samyak-lakṣaṇayukta*). //21

One is to be known as the right *guru* who is with pure *saṃvara* [in oneself], has full mastery over the rules of *saṃvara* (*saṃvara-vidhi*) and has kind forgiveness for those that are fallen from *saṃvara* (*saṃvara-patita*). //22

To those that have failed to find such a *guru* in spite of various efforts, I shall explain the principles of 'taking the pure vow.' //23

As explained in the *Mañjuśrī-buddha-kṣetrālaṅkāra-sūtra*, when, in the past, he was born as Amba Rāja,¹⁷ Mañjuśrī got initiated into the *bodhicitta*. This will be clearly noted down.¹⁸ //24

He [Mañjuśrī] attained the supreme enlightenment (*samyak sambodhi citta*) in the presence of the Nāthas and invited all the living beings to the freedom from the cycle of births (*bhava-cakra*). //25

From then on until the attainment of the final enlightenment (*uttama-bodhi*), never allow the mind to be polluted by ill-will, anger, miserliness and envy. //26

By the adherence to *brahmacarya* and the avoidance of sin

5) unconquerable (*sudurjayā*), 6) salvation (*abhimukti*), 7) far-reaching (*duṛaṅgamā*), 8) immovable (*acalā*), 9) righteousness (*sādhumati*) and 10) spiritual cloud (*dharma-meghā*). D-TED 1257.

17. "Anciently, when there was no measure of time, Mañjuśrī was born as the Cakravartī Rājā called Amba Rāja (Heaven King); how in the presence of the Tathāgata called Meghanāda Rāja he took the vow of (becoming) a Bodhisattva has been described in the work *Mañjuśrī-buddha-kṣetrālaṅkāra-sūtra*. The devotee should observe the ceremonies mentioned therein." S. C. Das in JBTS I. i. 48n.

18. As S. C. Das (in JBTS I. i. 48n) points out, the next six *śloka*-s, i.e. *śloka*-s number 25 to 30, are quoted from the *Mañjuśrī-kṣetrālaṅkāra-sūtra*.

and lust and by remaining content with the *śīla-saṃvara*, one follows the precepts of the Buddha. //27

Do not be anxious to attain quick enlightenment (*bodhi*) for yourself. Live up to the end [of the *saṃsāra*] for the sake of even a single living being. //28

Purify the boundless and unthinkable [number of] *kṣetra*-s and live for [the emancipation of] each individual by name that exists in all the ten directions. //29

Purify all your actions,—physical, oral and mental,—and never indulge in any sinful act (*akuśala-karma*). //30

By your own purified body-speech-mind, you will place yourself in the *saṃvara* of *avatāra-citta* ; you will thus have high reverence for the three *śikṣāpada*-s of *śīla* [moral courses] that you have acquired. //31

By that [viz. purification, etc. mentioned above] and by being careful of the pure *sambodhi-sattva-vow*¹⁹ among [all] vows, one's enlightenments (*sambodhi-saṅgha*) will be attained. //32

As shown by all the Buddhas, the acquirement [*utpādana*, literally production] of *abhiññāna* alone is the cause of the fulfilment of the essence (*svabhāva*) of all the *puṇya*-s and all the *jñāna*-s. //33

One without the power of *abhiññāna* cannot work for the sake of the living beings, just as a bird with unfledged wings cannot fly in the sky. //34

The *puṇya* that can be acquired by one with *abhiññāna* in only a day-and-night, cannot be acquired by one without *abhiññāna* even in one hundred lives. //35

One who wants to attain quickly the full perfection of supreme enlightenment can succeed not by idleness but by working hard with the help of *abhiññāna*. //36

Abhiññāna cannot be attained without tranquillity (*śamatha*)²⁰ ; therefore, one should work again and again to reach *śamatha*. //37

19. the vow for perfect enlightenment.

20. *śhi-gnas* or *śamatha* “implies an absolute inexcitability of

One who loses even a single component of the state of tranquillity (*śamatha*) cannot, even by hard meditation for thousands of years, reach *samādhi*. //38

Therefore, firmly adhere to the components [of *śamatha*] as explained in the chapter on the *samādhi-vaiga*. Whatever may be the object of your meditations, direct the mind always to *punya*. //39

Abhijñāna cannot be attained without the *yoga-śamatha* state being accomplished. Without *prajñāpāramitā*, *āvaraṇa*²¹ cannot be dispelled. //40

Therefore, for fully abandoning the *kleśa-vṛti* and *jñeya-vṛti*, the *yogī* should constantly meditate on *prajñā-pāramitā* along with the *upāya*-s. //41

Prajñā without *upāya* and *upāya* without *prajñā* are said to be unfree [lit. “tied”, i.e. one by itself cannot act] Therefore, do not ignore any [of them]. //42

mind, and a deadening of it against any impressions from without, combined with an absorption in the idea of Buddha, or which in the end amounts to the same thing, in the idea of emptiness and nothingness. This is the aim to which the contemplating Buddhist aspires, when, placing an image of Buddha as *rten* (a statue or figure of Buddha or of other divine beings, which the pious may take hold of and to which their devotions are more immediately directed) before him, he looks at it immovably, until every other thought is lost, and no sensual impressions from the outer world any longer reach or affect his mind. By continued practice he acquires the ability of putting himself also without *rten* merely by his own effort, into this state of perfect apathy and of attaining afterwards even to ‘the supernatural powers of a saint’.” J-TED 474.

21. “The two kinds of moral and mental obscurations are : 1) defilement of misery that caused by habits, etc. (*kleśa-vṛti*) and 2) the sin produced from the objects of cognition (*jñeya-vṛti*). According to the Mahāyāna doctrine, these two sins vanish as soon as one has attained to the eight stages of Bodhi-sattva perfection.” D-TED 333.

For removing doubts as to what is *prajñā* and what is *upāya*, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between *prajñā* and *upāya*-s. //43

As said by the Jinas, except the *prajñā-pāramitā*-s all the *kuśala-dharma*-s like the *dāna-pāramitā*-s etc. are the *upāya*-s.²² //44

One quickly attains enlightenment (*bodhi*) not by mere meditation on the void (*nairātmya*) but by [first] acquiring in oneself the mastery of the *upāya*-s (*upāya-abhyāsa*) and [then] by meditation on *prajñā*. //45

As it is well-explained [in the scriptures], *prajñā* is that knowledge which is the realisation of the intrinsic nature of the void (*svabhāva-śūnyatā*),—of the *skandha-dhātu*-s²³ and of the *āyatana*-s²⁴ being unborn (*ajāta*). //46

That which exists by nature cannot come into being. Again that which is by nature non-existing is like the sky-flower. Both [alternatives], implying fallacy (*doṣa*), both are unreal [literally, belong to the category of non-being]. //47

Things (*bhava*) can be born neither of themselves, nor of others, nor of both. These cannot be without cause either. Hence, they are by nature natureless (*svabhāvena niḥ-svabhāva*). //48.

Again, the nature of all things (*dharma*-s), examined either

22. Six *pāramitā*-s are generally enumerated. These are : 1) *dāna-pāramitā* (charity), 2) *śīla-pāramitā* (morality), 3) *kṣānti-pāramitā* (forgiveness), 4) *vīrya-pāramitā* (assiduity), 5) *dhyāna-pāramitā* (meditation) and 6) *prajñā-pāramitā* (wisdom). According to Atīśa, therefore, the first five *pāramitā*-s constitute the *upāya*-s.

23. i.e. the aggregates of the elements.

24. “The five (or six) seats, i.e. organs, of the senses (the sixth is *manas*, the inner sense); the senses themselves; this conception, however, has been greatly altered and varied by the fanciful theories of medical and philosophical authors.” J-TED 28.

as unities or as compounds, cannot be determined. Therefore, it is certain that they are void. //49

In the *Śūnyatā-saptati-vidyā*, *Mūla-madhyamaka*, etc. the nature (*svabhāva*) of things is emphatically asserted to be void (*śūnyatā*). //50

This text [if all these are explained here in details] will be voluminous. Therefore, [all these details] are not explained here. Only the doctrine (*siddhānta*) already proved (*siddha*) is clearly stated here for contemplation. //51

Therefore, the nature (*svabhāva*) of everything is unsupported [*anālambana*, lit. not proved by any *pramāṇa*]. So to meditate on the void (*nairātmya*) is to meditate on *prajñā*. //52

The nature (*svabhāva*) of everything, as seen by *prajñā*, is invisible [i.e. *prajñā* sees no *svabhāva* in anything]. This *prajñā* is demonstrated by logic. Therefore, meditate on *prajñā* without any doubt [*vikalpa*, delusional thought]. //53

This world (*bhava*), arising out of delusional thought (*vikalpa*) is itself delusional (*vikalpātmaka*). Therefore, *nirvāṇa* is best because it is completely free from *vikalpa*. //54

As said by the Tathāgata, *vikalpa* is the Great Ignorance (*mahā-moha*). It causes one to fall in the ocean of *samsāra*. (Therefore), be firm on the *a-vikalpa samādhi* [contemplation without any disturbing reflection], (which is) as pure as the *ākāśa*. //55

As said in the *Nirvikalpa-avatāra-dhāraṇī* also, if the Jina-putra (Bodhisattva) takes his stand on the Real Doctrine (*satya-dharma*) by meditating on the *nirvikalpa*, he will, by overcoming the difficult *vikalpa*-s, gradually attain the *nirvikalpa*. //56

With the help of the scriptural instructions and logical thinking know it for certain that everything is non-born (*ajāta*) and nature-less (*a-svabhāva*). Then meditate on the (*nirvikalpa*). //57

Then, meditating thus, one can gradually reach the stage of *uṣṇa* etc. and then move on to the stage of *pramuditā* etc. . After that, the Buddhahood would be quite near. //58

If one wants easily (*sukhena*) to complete the *bodhi* by the

rites²⁵ like *śānti* and *vistara* with the power of spells (*mantra*) and also with the power of *aṣṭa-siddhi* resulting from the rites of Bhadra-kumbha etc., or, if one wants to follow the path of the Guhya-tantra by performing the practices (*kriyā*) and rites (*caryā*) prescribed in the Tantras, then, for the sake of being properly initiated by the *ācārya*, offer jewels etc. to him by way of serving him and please him by obeying him in every way. //59-61

When the *guru*, being fully pleased, confers the initiation that purifies all sins, he [the initiate] becomes a fit receptacle for the *siddhi*-s. //62

The *brahmacārī* cannot receive *guhya-jñāna-abhiṣeka*, for it is strongly prohibited in the *Ādi-buddha-mahātantra*. //63

For the *brahmacārī* receiving this initiation means the violation of the prohibitions and hence a fall from the *tapas saṃvara*. Such a *vratī* will suffer great sin (*mahā-pātaka*) and will certainly fall among the low-born. He will never attain *siddhi*. //64 & 65

But there is nothing wrong about that *abhiṣeka* for him who has learnt and can explain the Tantras, offers the right kind of fire offerings, has received the proper initiation from his *guru* and has the real understanding of all these. //66

The explanation of *bodhi-patha*, based on *sūtra*-s etc., is here presented in a condensed form by *ācārya* Dīpaṃkara-śrī to Bodhiprabha at his request. Here ends the *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa* by mahā-ācārya Śrī-dīpaṃkara-jñāna. Translated, revised, and established by the Indian *ācārya* Dīpaṃkara-śrī-jñāna and the Tibetan lo-tsā-ba bhikṣu Śubhamati. *maṅgalam*.

Written by mahā-ācārya Śrī-dīpaṃkara-jñāna. Translated by the same Indian *paṇḍita* and the great lo-tsā-ba Śubhamati. This book is written in the Tho-lhā temple of Shañ-shuñ.

25. Certain Tāntrika rites, like *śānti*, *vistara*, *aṣṭa-siddhi*, *bhadra-kumbha*, etc.—supposed to lead to enlightenment quickly—are referred to here; Atīśa's main point, however, is that these rites can be performed only after being properly initiated by a *sad-guru*.

Section 7

Sayings of Añña : A

[Fol. 6. a]...After spending two years in mÑa'-ris, during which time Jo-bo-rje delivered many *upadeśa*-s to Devaguru Bodhiprabha (Byañ-chub'-od) and to others, he once thought of returning to India and was about to enter the way back to India. At that time, Bodhiprabha requested him saying, "Please give me one more *upadeśa*." Jo-bo said that he had already delivered many *upadeśa*-s on previous occasions. Bodhiprabha insisted on having another *upadeśa*. So the following was delivered [by Jo-bo-rje].

[Fol. 6. b] Oh ! Being unreliable because of my [own] inferior knowledge, it is improper for me to deliver sermons to you, already in possession of high knowledge and extremely clear thinking. Nevertheless, being inspired by you, my dearest friend—dearer than my heart—I am leaving this advice for you. //1

Friends, till the attainment of enlightenment the *guru* is indispensable. Therefore, rely on the *sad-guru*. It is necessary to listen to the teachings of the *guru* till you reach the final understanding. Listen, therefore, to the *guru*'s teachings. Mere knowledge of the Doctrine is not enough for attaining the Buddhahood. It is necessary, moreover, to practise virtue. Therefore, keep away from the place that may cause harm to your mind and stay where virtue increases. //2

[Fol. 7. a] Noise is harmful until the attainment of firmness. Therefore, take shelter in the silence of the forest life. Avoid those friends that add to your *kleśa* and stick to those that increase your *punya*. Keep your mind under control.. The worldly affairs have no end. So leave these and keep

yourself free. Accumulate *punya* day and night and always keep watch on your own mind. //3

Meditation on the mere basis of advice is not possible. Whenever you act and whatever you do, do according to and with reverence for the words of the *guru*. This is the way of attaining fulfilment swiftly and certainly. The law is that one who acts with whole-hearted *dharma* is not bothered by the problems of livelihood. Friends, desire cannot be satisfied as thirst cannot be quenched with salt water. It is vain to try to satisfy the desire. //4

[Fol. 7. b] Crush the mind inflated with arrogance and pride. Be peaceful and disciplined. Even that which is [vulgarly] called *punya*¹ is no more than [mere] noise and as such an obstacle to *dharma*. Therefore, renounce [even] that. Gain and honour are like the devil's snare [lit, the *pāśa*-s of Māra]. Remove these as you remove the boulders from the road. The words of praise and fame are but deceptions. So throw these out in the way you spit. //5

Happiness, prosperity and friendship of the present are but momentary. Discard these in the way you throw out the spittle. The future lives longer than the present one. Save that wealth [viz. *punya*] ; that alone will provide you when you make the journey to the next world. One will eventually have to abandon everything and depart. Nothing will go with one. Therefore, have no craving. Love the lower people. Do not injure or insult them. //6

[Fol. 8. a] Love the enemy and the friend equally ; have no partiality. Have no jealousy for those with good qualities but have respect for them and cultivate their qualities in you. Do not examine the faults of others ; examine those of your own and leave those in the way in which you shed off your

1. *bsod-nams*, *punya* belonging to the world of desires and is subject to decay. This is contrasted with *dge-ba*, i.e. *punya* or *kuśala* which is undestructible, consisting of the enduring works of piety performed by saints belonging to the superior states of existence. D-TED 269.

poisonous blood. Do not think of your own *punya* ; think of the *punya* of the others. Respect others and serve them. //7

Have the same feeling for the living beings as the parents have for their son. Have always a smiling face. Avoid anger and speak softly with a loving heart. Be careful of your words and speak simply, for too much of unnecessary words are bound to contain errors. Too much of unnecessary action spoils [Fol. 8. b] the *punya* ; let not be your actions tainted by *adharma*. //8

There is no sense in getting tired with useless actions. Everything being determined by past actions, nothing happens by mere wish. Therefore, keep yourself free and be happy. Listen ! For a noble person death is better than shameful acts. So, be straight and steady. The pleasures and pain of this life are but the results of the actions of the past lives. Therefore, do not blame anybody for these. //9

[Fol. 9. a] All happiness comes from the blessings of the *guru*. One must, [therefore], be grateful to him. You cannot control others unless you can control yourself. Therefore, control yourself first. You cannot help others to be successful without [yourself] attaining *abhiññāna*. Therefore, work hard for the *siddhi*. One will have to leave the savings behind. This is sure. Therefore, do not accumulate sin in the name of wealth. //10

Enjoyment and distraction have no substance. Therefore, enrich yourself with *dāna*, the (only) wealth. You will thereby become beautiful in this life and happy in the next. Always uphold *viśuddha-śīla*. Anger is specially powerful in the *kali-yuga*. Therefore, protect yourself with the armour (*varma*) of forgiveness. Do not lag behind under the influence of laziness. Kindle the fire of courage for attaining *siddhi*. //11

Human life is being wasted by distractions. Therefore, care for meditation. Truth is not realised under the spell of ignorance. Therefore, be careful of the meaning of truth. Friends ! Do not sink into the mire of *saṃsāra*. [Fol. 9. b] Reach the dry land of *mokṣa*. Try to understand properly

the precepts of the *guru*. Meditate on *saṃsāra* as but the river of misery. //12

These are not empty words. You should listen to these with care and place these in the depth of your heart. If you act thus then you will make yourself as well as others happy. This is my humble precept. And I pray that you listen to it. Devaguru Bodhiprabha was thus advised by the only god (*eka-deva*) Jo-bo-rje. //13

Section 8

Sayings of Atiśa : B

[Fol. 9. b] Jo-bo, when he was staying at Yer-pa-brag, gave this *upadeśa* to Ye-śes-'bar-ba of 'Ol-rgod.

Salutation to *bhagavatī ārya Tārādevī*. Salutation to the good *guru-s*.

[Fol. 10. a] Oh *kulaputra*, consider carefully these words of mine. Man's life in this *kali-yuga* is generally short while the objects of knowledge are numerous. One is uncertain about how long one is going to live. Hasten to curb your desires with care. Do not say : "I am a *bhikṣu*", so long as you care for material wealth and livelihood, with which the householder is concerned. You may be living in a monastery, but do not say, "I am a *bhikṣu*, I live in the monastery", etc., so long as you are affected by worldly affairs. Do not say, "I am a *bhikṣu*, I live in the monastery" etc., so long as you harbour worldly wishes or any thought of injuring others.

You may be living in the monastery, but do not say, "I am a *bhikṣu*, I live in the monastery", etc., so long as you [Fol. 10. b] do not renounce the company of the householders and you continue to stay with them and waste your time by indulging in romantic and worldly gossips. Do not say, "I am a *bhikṣu*, a *bodhisattva*", etc., if you cannot bear even a little injury by others or help others even a little. If you say anything like that, you will thereby tell a great lie to the householders. The *gṛhastha* may be deceived by you, But, first of all, it is impossible to deceive those whose eyes see everything, Secondly, you cannot prevent the effects of such deceptions from recoiling back on you.

[Fol. 11. a] Thirdly, you cannot deceive men that are related to and united with *dharma*. Again, remember now what you

promised before the gods and the *guru*-s at the time of the *bodhicitta-utpādana*. When you come across those that deserve to be forgiven, never say that it is difficult to forgive. Remember [that at the time of taking the vow you promised] not to refuse even that which is difficult. At the time of taking the vow you should have already ascertained if it was easy or difficult. It will be deceiving god and *guru* if, after taking the vow, you fall from it. Therefore, remember that you cannot refuse even that which is difficult.

Again, the purpose of living in the monastery is to stop [Fol. 11. b] having intercourse with the householders, to renounce partiality for the relatives and to avoid the causes of distractions provoked by the sexual and other desires. Watch the great treasure of your *bodhicitta*. Do not allow the mind to get troubled by worldly worries even for a moment.

The *vikalpa* of *saṃsāra* becomes particularly powerful because of being repeatedly provoked by the non-attachment to *dharma* in the past and because of the feebleness of the intellect due to habit. Therefore it is meaningless to live in the monastery if strong measure is not taken against these. Otherwise, [you will be] like the birds and beasts that live there.

[Fol. 12.a] Never say, "It is difficult to do it now, so I will do it later." If there is a hole [of some weakness] in what you think, then the Māra of *kleśa*-s¹ will enter through it. If it thus enters then there will be obstacle to *bodhicitta*. If there is this obstacle, not to speak of helping others, there will be nothing but *durgati* for yourself. Remember this. Even though you claim that you are performing *dharma*, your words would thus be empty and meaningless.

Oh, *kulaputra*, when at the end you die, do not be the cause of sorrow and suffering for the *guru*-s and the *deva*-s. Again, do not be the cause of regret and doubt to the pious householders.

1. D-TED 666 : one of the four devils.

Even if you say, "I am acting according to *dharma*", [Fol. 12. b] [in fact] *dharma* and the person [yourself] will remain separate if you do not repeatedly correct your own mind by comparing it with the scriptures and, at the time of death, rather than there being the slightest mark of the practice of *bodhicitta*, there will [only] be the mark of *durgati*. The only thing that it will lead to is what brings sorrow and sufferings for others.

Therefore, at the time of death do not remain empty-handed by destroying *dharma* with the arrogant claim, "I have spent a pious life." In short, there is no need for *dharma*, if in spite of living in the monastery you do not renounce *karma* in this life and turn your intellect and mind against the desires (*kāma*).

Your *dharma* will be miscarried if in spite of claiming to be aloof from *karma* you remain involved in it and, moreover, if you do not guard against fall in both the lives [i.e. in this life and in the next]. Such miscarried *dharma* will be *dharma* only in name. [Fol. 13. a] Therefore, friend, do not think in that way. Jewels once lost by the blind are not recovered.

While meditating, do not count the number of years and months [devoted to it]; rather, try to find out how much or how little self-knowledge you have acquired in your mind and how much or how little control you have acquired over your habits.

Look at the heaviness or lightness of *kleśa*. Always guard your own mind. Do not make yourself miserable, do not deceive yourself, do not deceive the god and the *guru*, do not allow yourself to fall or cause the fall of others. Whatever fall from *karma* has happened in this life has afterall happened [i.e. no use worrying over that].

Take this example. If there be a heap of dirt before you, you need quickly to clean it. Why get annoyed if it is cleared with the help of others? In the same way, [Fol. 13. b] all the *vikalpa*-s of this life—inclusive of one's own relatives—are to be directly abandoned. Why get annoyed if your *guru* and [good] friends help you to abandon these?

After promising before the gods and the *guru*-s to work for

the welfare of every living being, do not discriminate between the objects of your charity. There may be differences among the objects of charity ; but you cannot differentiate [among these] from your end. Because there are no differences among them from the point of view of one who practises the *bodhicitta*. Do not be angry with one even if one harms you. How can you meditate on forgiveness if you get angry with one who harms ? When there occurs any *kleśa* [anger, etc.] it is necessary to remember its antidote. What is the use of that *dharma* which is contaminated by *kleśa* ?

Therefore, while assuming the standpoint of the *bodhicitta*, which is most precious, if there be any gap in the form of the failure of meditation, then you should take refuge to the [Fol. 14. a] excellent words [i.e. the words of the *guru*]. Do not cultivate friendship with an evil companion. Live in unknown places. Do not allow defilement (*āsrava*) to accumulate [by living] in one place. Whatever you do, do according to *dharma*. Whenever you act, act for the suppression of *kleśa*. This is *viśuddha-dharma*. Strive after that. Have no egoism if you acquire good quality in one out of a hundred actions. If you do, you will be under the grip of Māra. Remain in a solitary place. Be peaceful and self-controlled. Curb the *kāma*-s and be self-content. Overlook your own virtues and do not find the faults of others. Avoid actions that bring fear and shame.

[Fol. 14. b] Do not multiply the *vikalpa*-s. Keep the mind clean. Keep your mind aloof from sexual pleasure. Think always of *dharma*. Accept defeat and avoid bragging. If you have any desire at all, have the desire for kindness. Be moderate about everything. Respect and serve others with ease. Run away from the *saṃsāri* persons as from wild beasts [? as wild beasts do]. One is not a *dhārmika* if one does not renounce the worldly affairs.

There is no *prabrajyā* without the renunciation of the four forms of *gṛhasthakarma*-s.²

2. *so-nams*, comprises husbandry, trading, tending and rearing up cattle, etc. D-TED 1282.

One who does not renounce *kāma* is not a *bhikṣu*. One who is without *maitrī* and *karuṇā* is not a *bodhisattva*. One who has not renounced *karma* is not a *mahā-dhyānī*. Do not get burnt³ in *kāma*.

[Fol. 15. a] In short, living in the monastery and meditating on *dharma* one should not allow one's *karma* to increase. Thus there will be no regret (*anutāpa*) at the time of death.

Thus said Dīpaṃkara himself. And he added,

This *kali-yuga* is not the time for smiling ; it is time to have courage. It is not the time for holding high positions ; it is time to hold humble positions.

It is not the time to live in the crowd. It is time to take shelter in solitude. It is not the time to guide the students ; it is time to guide oneself. It is not the time to follow mere words [of *śāstra*-s] ; it is time to meditate on their true significance. It is not the time to be drifted ; it is time to remain firm at one place.

Thus said.

3. *khol-pa*, lit. boiled. D-TED 155.

Section 9

Sanskrit restoration by Professor Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya
of the

Bodhi-patha-pradīpa

namo Mañjuśrīkumārabhūtāya Bodhisattvāya. kālātrayasya
jinebhyaḥ sarvebhyo dharmasaṅghābhyāṃ ca teṣāṃ mahatā
sambhrameṇa namaskṛtya śiṣyottamena Bodhiprabheṇa
prārthito Bodhipathapradīpaṃ prakarṣeṇa vivṛṇomi.

puruṣāstrividhā jñeyā uttamādhamamdhyaṃ /
vyaktaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ bhedaḥ pratyekantu vilikhyate // 1
yenopāyena sarveṇa sāṃsārikasukhāni vai /
svamarthameva kāmyante so'dhamāḥ puruṣaḥ smṛtaḥ // 2
bhavasukhādudāsīnaḥ svārthamātrārthikāstathā /
pāpakarmaviruddhātmā sa vai madhyama ucyate // 3
ātma-duḥkhena duḥkhānāmanyeshāmapī sarvathā /
icchatī saṃkṣayaṃ yo vā uttamāḥ puruṣo mataḥ // 4
jīveṣu paramo yo hi vāñchati bodhimuttamāṃ /
upāyaṃ sampravakṣyāmi tasmai sadgurudarśitam // 5
sambuddhacitracaityānāṃ saddharmāṇāṃ tathā puraḥ /
puṣpadhūpādīvastūni yathāprāptaṃ nivedayet // 6
kṛtvā jānūdvayaṃ bhūmau trirāḍau kuru sāñjaliḥ /
śaraṇagamaṇaṃ śraddhāṃ triratnāya samācara //
ālābhād bodhisārasya nivṛttiśūnyacetasā /
samantabhadracaryoktāḥ sapta-pūjāstathaiva ca // 7-8
sarvajīve tataścāḍau mṛtyujanmā-dipīdite /
durgatitrayajāte ca maitrīcittaṃ samānayet //
duḥkhaheṭoḥ parikliṣṭān dṛṣṭvā jīvānaśeṣataḥ /
duḥkhebhyo duḥkhaheṭubhyaḥ prāṇināṃ mokṣalipsayā /
bodhicittasamutpādaḥ kāryo'nivṛttasamvidā // 9-10

tathā ye ye praṇidhānacittotpāde guṇāḥ kila /
 proktāḥ sūtre drumavyūhe Maitreyena ta eva ca /
 sūtrasya tasya pāṭhena śravaṇenāthavā guroḥ /
 guṇān sambodhicittasyānantān vijñāya kṛtsnaśaḥ /
 tadbhāvena tataḥ kuryāccittotpādaṃ punaḥ punaḥ // 11-12
 proktaṃ sūtre tu tatpuṇyaṃ Vīradattasya prcchite /
 tribhireva tataḥ pādaiḥ samāseneha likhyate // 13
 puṇyaṃ ca bodhicittasya yadi rūpānviṭaṃ bhavet /
 ākāśaṃ pūrayitvāpi na hi niḥśeṣatāṃ vrajet // 14
 manasā bodhicittāya praṇato yaḥ kṛtāñjaliḥ /
 anantāstasya pūjāḥ syuriti ślāghyatarāḥ punaḥ /
 gaṅgāyāḥ siktāsaṃkhyairlokanāthasamarpitaiḥ /
 buddhakṣetram mahāratnaiḥ kurvāṇasyāpi saṃkulam //15-16
 praṇihitaṃ samutpādyā cittaṃ vahuprayatnataḥ /
 sadā varddhaya saṃrakṣa śikṣāṃ yathoktameva ca /
 yena syāt smaraṇaṃ tasyāḥ parasmīnnapi janmani // 17
 nātmani viṣayīkṛtyāvatāracittasamvaram /
 yathārthato bhavennaiva praṇidhānapravardhanam /
 sambodhisamvaravṛddhikāmastasmai yated dhruvam // 18
 sapta ca pratimokṣādisamvarāḥ sulabhāḥ sadā /
 samvaro bodhisattvasya bhāgyenaiva hi labhyate //19
 uttamā brahmacaryasya śrīḥ proktā ca tathāgataiḥ /
 saptasu protimokṣesu mato'sau bhikṣusamvarāḥ // 20
 śīlādhyāyoktavidhinā bodhisattvasya bhūmiṣu /
 samyaglakṣaṇayuktāt sadgurorgṛhṇīta samvaram // 21
 samvarasya vidhau prājñāḥ samvare ca svayaṃ sthitaḥ /
 kṣamākāruṇyayuktaśca samvarāt patiteṣvatha /
 asāveva ca vijñeyo gururnāma yathārthataḥ // 22
 yenāprapto gurustādṛk prayatnairvividhairapi /
 parasamvaralābhārthaṃ tasmai vyākhyāmyahaṃ vidhim //23
 Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetrālaṃkārasūtre yathā punaḥ /
 prokto Mañjuśrīyā pūrvam amvarājo yadābhavat /
 bodhicittasamutpādo likhyate vyaktam atra tat // 24
 sambodhicittamutpādyā nāthānāmeva sammukham /
 āhūtāḥ prāṇinaḥ sarve bhavacakrād vimuktaye // 25
 kāluṣyaṃ krodhakārpaṇye irṣyā vātaḥ paraṃ punaḥ /
 uttamabodhilābhādā citte kuryāt kadāpi na // 26

brahmacaryāṃ samācarya pāpaṃ kāmam tāthā tyajan /
 buddhaśikṣānuvṛttaḥ syāt santuṣṭaḥ śīlasamvare // 27
 svayaṃ ca satvaram prāptuṃ bodhiṃ mā bhūt samutsukaḥ /
 hetoḥ prāṇina ekasyāpyāsaṃsāram tathā vaset // 28
 kṣetrāṇyaparimeyānyacintyāni ca viśodhaya /
 daśasu samsthitānāṃ ca nāmagrāhaṃ diśāṃ vasa // 29
 vācikaṃ kāyikaṃ karma caittikaṃ ca viśodhaya /
 akuśalāni karmāṇi mā kadāpi samācara // 30
 vākkāyacittena viśodhitenāvatāracittasya nijasya samvare /
 samsthāpayannarjitaśīlaśikṣāpadatraye śraddhitamānoso
 bhavet //31

tena yatnena viśuddhasambodhisattvasamvare /
 samvareṣu samādhināṃ paripūrṇo gaṇo bhavet //32
 tattvasampūraṇe heturgaṇasya jñānapuṇyayoḥ /
 abhijñānotpāda eva sarvabuddhābhisammataḥ //33
 apūrṇapakṣapakṣi khe yathā noḍḍayate tathā /
 abhijñānavalāyuktaḥ prāṇino' rtham na sādhayet //34
 divārātramabhijñānayuktaḥ puṇyam yadarjayet /
 abhijñānaviyuktastu janmāśatair labheta na //35
 sīghram sambodhisamgham yaḥ sampūrayitum icchati /
 abhijñānena yatnena nālasya tu sidhyati //36
 asādhayitvā śamathamabhijñānam na sambhavet /
 śamathasya tataḥ siddhyai yatnam kuryāt punaḥ punaḥ //37
 śamathāṅgavināśe ca dhyānenāpi prayatnataḥ /
 sahasrairapi varṣāṇāṃ samādhirna hi sidhyati //38
 samādhivargādhyāokte tadaṅge bhava susthitaḥ /
 ekatame'pi lambānāṃ puṇyasamstham manah kuru //39
 yogaśamathasiddhau cābhijñānamapi sidhyati /
 prajñāpāramitāyogam vinā naśyati nāvṛtiḥ //40
 kleśajñānavṛtim tasmād yogi tyaktumaśeṣataḥ /
 upāyasahitāṃ dhyāyet prajñāpāramitāṃ sadā //41
 upāyarahitā prajñopāyaḥ prajñāṃ vināthavā /
 anubaddhamiti proktaṃ tadekamapi na tyajet //42
 kā prajñā ka upāyo vā śaṃkāmetāṃ nirāsitum /
 upāyānāṃ prajñāyāśca pravibhedam sphutam kuru //43
 prajñāpāramitāvarjam dānapāramitādayaḥ /
 sarve kuśaladharmāṇāmupāyāḥ kathitā jinaiḥ //44

upāyābhyāśavaśena prajñādhyanena cātmani /
 śighraṃ bodhiṃ prāpnuyānna nairātmyadhyānamātrataḥ //45
 skandhadhātoḥ samūhānāmajātāyatanaśya ca /
 svabhāvaśūnyatājñānaṃ prajñeti hi prakīrtitam //46
 anucītaṃ sadutpādo' sadapyākāśapuṣpavat /
 ubhaye doṣaprasaṅgādabhūtamubhayaṃ punaḥ //47
 svato na parato nāpi jāta ubhayato'pi na /
 aheturnāpi bhāvastat prakṛtyā niḥsvabhāvatā //48
 ekānekatayā vātha sarvadharmaparīkṣaṇe /
 svabhāvo labhyate neti niḥsvabhāvo' vadhāryate //49
 śūnyatāsaptatividyāmūlamadhyamakādīṣu /
 svabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvanām proktaṃ śūnyatvameva hi //50
 tenārthenādīkṣaṃ śāstraṃ bhavennehokta eva tat /
 siddhasiddhāntmātraṃ ca bhāvanārthaṃ pravakṣyate //51
 svabhāvo' śeṣadharmāṇāmanālanāmanameva tat /
 nairātmyabhāvamāmātraṃ prajñāyā bhāvanā bhavet //52
 prajñayā sarvadharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaḥ kvāpyadrṣṭavat /
 bhāvanīyāvikalpaṃ sā prajñā vidyaparīkṣitā //53
 vikalpātmaka evāyaṃ bhavo vikalpasambhavaḥ /
 vikalpāśeṣanirmukto nirvāṇaścottamo mataḥ //54
 mahāmohaśca saṃkalpaḥ proktaṃ iti tathāgataiḥ /
 saṃsārasāgare pātahetustāvat tato bhava /
 avikalpasamādhīstho' kalpavyaktaṃ yathā nabhaḥ //55
 Nirvikalpāvatāradhāraṇyāmapī—
 saddharmaṃ jīnaputraścāvikalpaṃ cintayan bhavet /
 nirvikalpaṃ prāptastīrtvā vikalpān durgamān kramāt //
 iti proktaṃ //56
 ajātā niḥsvabhāvāśca dharmā iti viniścītaḥ /
 śāstreṇa vidyayā caivāvikalpaṃ bhāvayet sadā //57
 tadbhāvena dhyānāt prāpta uṣmādikāṃ kramād bhavet /
 Pramuditādikāṃ cāpi syād buddhatvamathācirāt //58
 mantraprabhāvasiddhasya śāntivistarākarmaṇaḥ /
 kumbhabhadrādisiddhāṣṭasiddhyādervā valena ca //
 bodhisamūhasampūrṇakāmaḥ sukhena yo bhavet /
 guhyatantracaryāmicchet kriyācaryādināthavā //
 tantroktenābhiṣekārthaṃ sarvathā sadguroḥ sukham /
 sevayā ratnadānenotpādayecca nirantaram //59-61

siddhyai siddham bhavet pātram guroḥ prītāttu pūrṇataḥ /
 abhiṣekaṃ yadi prāptaḥ sarvapāpaviśodhakam // 62
 gubhyaprajñābhiṣekaṃ na grhṇīyurbrahmacāriṇaḥ /
 ādibuddhamahātāntre yanniṣiddham viśeṣataḥ // 63
 grahe tadabhiṣekasya niṣiddhācaraṇam punaḥ /
 tapaḥsamvarapatanaṃ bhaveddhi brahmacāriṇaḥ //
 mahāpātakapatanaṃ tasya ca vratino bhaved /
 durgatīpatanaṃ nūnam nāsti siddhiḥ kadācana // 64-65
 tantraṃ sarvaṃ śrutaṃ yena vyākhyātumapi śakyate /
 arcanāyajñādānādyācaryate vā yathāyatham //
 abhiṣekaṃ guroḥ prāpto vetti sarvaṃ tadeva ca /
 tadarthamabhiṣeko'sau nirdoṣa eva sammataḥ // 66
 Bodhiprabhānūtenācāryadīpaṃkaraśrīyā /
 sūtrādīdharmasamproktaṃ samālocay yathāsthitam /
 Bodhipathasya vyākhyānaṃ kṛtamatra samāsataḥ // 67

Mahācāryaśrīdīpaṃkarajñānakṛtabodhipathapradīpaḥ
 samāptaḥ

maṅgalam

Section 10

Photostat Reproduction of the Manuscript Containing The Sayings of Atīśa

The portion of the manuscript translated as "Sayings of Atīśa : A" begins with the words *Jo-bo-rje-ñid-dañ-po-mñā'-risu* ...occurring in line 2, Folio 6a.

The portion of the manuscript translated as "Sayings of Atīśa : B" begins with the words *bcom-ldan-'das-'phags-ma...*, line 5, Folio 9b. In the manuscript, the sub-title "*Jo-bo yer-pa'i-brag-la...*" of this passage occurs at the bottom of the folio.

ॐ

ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་སྤྲེལ་མ་ཆེན་ཉིད་མི་ལམ་གྱི་མ་ལུ་བུ་རྟེན་
 སྤྱི་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་གསུང་། རྟོག་མེད་དང་པོ་མངའ་ཤིས་བྱེད་པའི་རྟེན་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ལྟོག་པོ་ལྟོག་པོ་
 ལས་། ལྟ་བུ་རྒྱུ་ཆུབ་ཤིང་ཀྱིས་དུམ་མཛད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་གདམས་པ་མངའ་པོའི་གནད་ནས་བྱུང་ཤིང་གཞན་ཀྱི་
 པ་རྟོག་པོ་ལས་ལམ་ཏུ་བཞུགས་པ་བྱུང་བའི་ཀྱིས་དངུང་ཞལ་གདམས་ཅིག་ཏུ་བྱས་པས་རྟོག་
 ཞལ་ནས་སྤྲོད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཆོག་ས་ལག་ས་གསུང་ལ། ལྟོས་ཆེན་སྤྲོད་པས་གདམས་པ་ཀྱི་གནད་
 བཤོ། ། ཅེ་མའི་མཁའ་ལྟོན་པ་མ་ཐོའི་བྱུག་ས་དགོངས་ལོན་ཏུ་གསལ་བའི་བྱེད་པོ་ལ། རང་

དཔེས་མེད་པའི་བྱེད་པོ་དམན་བདག་གིས་མཆིང་བྱོས་གསལ་བར་མེད་ཀྱིས་བྱུང་བས་གཅེས་པ་གྱི་
 བྱུག་ས་པོ་དམ་པ་བྱིང་ལ་བདག་གིས་བསྐྱེད། བྱིས་པ་སྤྱོད་པ་བདག་གིས་བྱུག་ས་ཀྱི་བྱུག་ས་ལ།
 མཆིང་བྱོས་ཀྱི་ཀྱོང་པས་སོ། བྱུག་ས་དག་བྱུང་བྱེད་ཆུབ་མ་བྱོབ་པར་ཏུ་ལྟོས་པས་མ་སྟོན་པས་ཐུགས་གཅོད་
 དམ་པ་བསྐྱེད། གནས་ལུགས་མ་དོགས་པར་ཏུ་བྱོས་པས་བྱུགས་ཀྱི་གདམས་དག་།
 དེ་ནི། ཆོས་ལྟོགས་པ་ཅོམ་བྱིས་སངས་མི་བྱུང་བས་ལོགས་པས་མི་ཆོག་ལྟམས་སུ་ལོང་། ལོས་
 ལ་གཞོད་པའི་ཡུལ་དང་བྲག་བསྐྱེད་ས་རྒྱ་ཏུ་སྟོབ་ཀྱི་ལོགས་པར་སྤོང་། བདན་པ་མ་བྱོབ་པར་ཏུ་ཏུ

[illegible]

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རྒྱུད་པར་ཅན་ལ་བརྟེན། གྲོགས་ངན་པ་དང་མ་གྲོགས་གནས་ངེས་མེད་ཏུ།
 སྤོང་། གཞི་གཅིག་ལ་བྲག་པ་སྟོན་གནས་པ་ཏུ་ག བེ་ཕུར་ཆོས་དང་བསྐྱེད་ལ་གྱིས། ཅི་ཕུས་ནོན་
 མེས་པའི་གནོད་པ་འགོ་བྱ་བ་གྱིས། དེ་ལྟར་ཕུས་ནས་ཡེ་ཤུག་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་
 གཞི་ བརྒྱུད་པར་ཅན་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱིས་མ་རྟོག་ཅིག བཏུར་གྱི་རབ་ཏུ་གྱུ་ལོ། །
 མཐའི་གནས་སུ་གནས་ནས་བརྟག་འེན་ཞི་བ་དང་ཏུལ་པར་གྱིས། རྟོང་པ་ཆུང་པ་དང་ཆོག་ཞེས་པར་
 རྟེན་དང་གཡོན་ཏན་ལ་མ་ལྟ། གཞན་གྱི་སྒྲིབ་ལ་མ་ཆོམ། རྟོན་པ་པར་པ་ག་ཆ་བཟེང་པར་གྱིས

རྟེན་པར་རྟོག་པ་མ་ཆོག བསམ་པ་བཟང་པོ་གྱིས། ལོག་པ་ལ་མ་ཡོངས་པར་གྱུ་ཏུ་ཆོས་སོམས། །
 རྟེན་ནས་བཟུང་། བམ་ལ་ལོང་། ལུས་ཁ་སྐྱེས། རྟེན་དོན་གྲགས་བརྟེན་སོམས་བརྟུན། གང་ལ་ཡང་
 ཆོད་ཤིག་པར་གྱིས། མགུ་སྒྲུ་ཆེད་གསེས་པ་ཅིག་ཤོས། རི་ལྗས་ལྟར་འཛིན་དེ་ལ་ལྟོས་མི་ཆོས་
 མ་སྤྲེལ་མ་ཆོས་པ་མི་མོ་ནོ། སོ་མོ་མ་རྟེན་ལ་སྤྲེལ་ནས་ཏུ་ཕུར་བཟེན་ནོ། རྟོན་ལ་སྤྲེལ་
 སྟོན་སྤྲེལ་མི་མོ་ནོ། ཕུམས་སྤྲེལ་ཆོས་ལ་ཕུར་ཆུབ་སོམས་པར་མ་རོ། ཕུ་བ་མ་བོངས་མ་སྤྲེལ་ཆོས་
 མི་མོ་ནོ། རྟོང་པས་མ་ལོལ་ཅིག མཛེད་ལྟོན་པ་ར་གནས་ཅས་ཕུ་བ་མ་མཛེད་པར་ཆོས་།

The Tibetan Sexagenary Cycle

**R. N. Bhattacharya
&
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From the second quarter of the eleventh century A.D., the Tibetans adopted the system of reckoning years in terms of cycles of sixty years. In Tibetan, such a cycle is called the *rab-byun*, which is an equivalent of the Sanskrit word *prabhava*.¹ The European scholars usually refer to it as the Sexagenary Cycle. In the Tibetan calendar, after the completion of one such cycle begins another and an identical one.

Each cycle of sixty years is formed by combining the names of five elements with those of twelve animals. The elements, in the order in which they are repeated within each cycle, are : Iron, Water, Wood, Fire, Earth. The 12 animals, in the order in which they are repeated within each cycle, are : Monkey, Hen, Dog, Pig, Mouse, Ox, Tiger, Hare, Dragon, Serpent, Horse, Sheep. Thus, within the cycle, Earth is again followed by Iron and Sheep by monkey. But each of the 5 elements occurs twice in succession and are joined to two successive animals in the list. Thus, e.g., the following will be some of the successive years within a cycle :

Earth-Dragon
 Earth-Serpent
 Iron-Horse
 Iron-Sheep
 Water-Monkey
 Water-Hen,
 etc. etc.

As we shall presently see, a complete cycle begins with a Fire-Hare year and ends in a Fire-Tiger year. The next cycle starts again with a Fire-Hare year.

To the combination of the Element-and-Animal standing for the name of a year are frequently added also the words "Male" and "Female." Thus, e.g., the full designation of an Earth-Dragon year is Earth-Male-Dragon year, that of an Earth-Serpent year is Earth-Female-Serpent year. But these words Male and Female actually stand for what we call

1. *rab*=*pra* and *byun*=*bhava*. J-TED 524 : *rab-byun* is also the name of the first year of the cycle of sixty years.

“even” and “odd” numbers expressing the years. Each of the 5 elements, occurring as it does for two successive years, is alternatively termed Male and Female.

P. Pelliot,² to whose contribution is largely due a number of clarifications about the Tibetan Sexagenary Cycle, conjectures that it was basically inspired by the ancient Chinese calendar. His main ground is that the names of the animals and elements as occurring in the two calendars are closely similar.³ But Laufer⁴ vigorously rejects the conjecture and draws our attention to the difference between the two calendars. According to the accounts of the Tibetans themselves,⁵ the Sexagenary Cycle was originally invented in a country called Śambhala. From there it went to central India (*madhyadeśa*) and the Tibetans received it from the Indians. But modern scholars have not so far been able to arrive at any agreed view as to the identification of the country called Śambhala⁶ and Laufer's⁷ categorical assertion that it must have meant Turkestan is, in fact, no more than one of the many possible conjectures. In other words, at the present stage of historical researches, the question of the country where the Sexagenary cycle had its origin should preferably be left as an open one.

2. P. Pelliot in JA 1913. 633-667.

3. *Ib.* 660.

4. Laufer in *T'oung Pao* 1913. 587f. On the antiquity of the Chinese system, see T. L. Bullock & Louis H. Gray in ERE iii. 82: “The Chinese calendar, which was practically copied by the Japanese,... is scarcely so ancient as is generally supposed. It is true that at an early period the Chinese became acquainted with a twelve-year cycle of Jupiter, depending on that planet's progress through the twelve signs of the zodiac; but this cycle had in China only astrological significance, whereas in India it became part of the calendrical system.”

5. BA ii. 753f.

6. Waddell L 306 calls it a mythical country in the north.

7. Laufer in *T'oung Pao* 1913. 591-2.

What is not uncertain, however, is the history of this calendar from its Indian form to its adoption by the Tibetans. In its Indian form the calendar was known as the Kālacakra. Though what is called the Kālacakra Tantra is usually associated with a large overgrowth of esoteric theories and rituals,⁸ Laufer⁹ seems to be justified in asserting that, in essence, the Kālacakra or "The Wheel of Time" was nothing but a designation of the Sexagenary Cycle and that this system was introduced into Tibet from central India by way of Kashmir.

For the modern student of Tibetan history and literature, the problem concerning the Sexagenary Cycle is above all a practical one. How are we to reduce its dates into those of the modern European (Christian) calendar and how, moreover, can we convert the latter into the former? The importance as well as the difficulty of the problem can be well appreciated when we remember that even veritable giants among modern European Tibetologists¹⁰ committed absurd mistakes in the matter of such conversions and that the correct conversion of even a single date had in the past been acclaimed¹¹ as some kind of real academic feat.

In solving this practical problem, however, the determination of a historical point is absolutely essential. What was the exact year of the adoption by the Tibetans of this Kālacakra

8. BA II. 753-839.

9. Laufer *op. cit.* 1907. 403.

10. e.g. Jaschke (J-TED 552) proposes to identify the Wood-Dog, Wood-Pig, Fire-Mouse and Fire-Ox years as A.D. 1834, 1835, 1836 and 1837 respectively. These years of the Christian calendar are in fact Wood-Horse, Wood-Sheep, Fire-Monkey and Fire-Hen years respectively of the Tibetan calendar.

11. e.g. the correct rendering by S. C. Das of A.D. 1901 as an Iron-Ox year in the joint communication of Schlagintweit and Rockhill to the Dalai Lama. See Laufer in *T'oung Pao* 1913. 577n for other examples.

system, which was also the year—according to them—from which their present calculation of the Sexagenary Cycle began. In other words, the year of their adoption of the Sexagenary Cycle is also the first year of their first cycle. Therefore, without a precise determination of this year, our idea of the entire cycle is likely to be wrong. This is well attested to by the fact that a large number of eminent Tibetologists were actually derailed in matters of Tibetan chronology by the erroneous assumption of Alexander Csoma that the year under consideration was A.D. 1026.¹² Thanks, however, to the work of P. Pelliot¹³ and others,¹⁴ it is now definitely ascertained that this year was rather A. D. 1027, the year in which the commentary on Kālacakra called the *Vimala-prabhā* was translated into Tibetan.¹⁵ From this year onwards, the Tibetans adopted the Sexagenary Cycle and hence this year is the first year of the first cycle as current among them.

This date, namely A.D. 1027, is crucial for our understanding of Tibetan chronology. Prior to this, the Tibetans calculated their dates only in terms of the twelve animals,¹⁶ as is evidenced by the historical and quasi-historical records of the earlier period.¹⁷ However, from A.D. 1027 onwards, the Tibetans learnt the advantage of using the new system, i.e. the system of dating by prefixing the Animal-name with that of an Element or of dating according to their present Sexagenary Cycle. The advantage of the new system once realised, even

12. Csoma de Koros, *Tibetan Grammar*, Calcutta 1834. This wrong date is accepted by Rockhill, Feer, Foucaux and others. See Laufer in *T'oung Pao* 1913. 576ff.

13. P. Pelliot in JA 1913. 633-667.

14. Laufer *op. cit.* 1913. 570 shows that Father A. Desgodins, as far back as 1899, proposed to fix the beginning of the first year of the Tibetan cycle at A.D. 1027.

15. Roerich *A Text-book of Colloquial Tibetan* 44. Cf BA ii. 754, 766.

16. Petech 41.

17. See Roerich *Intro.* to BA i. p. viii-ix.

the later historians began the work of back-calculation in order to re-state or re-construct the date of earlier events in this new form. The most outstanding example of this is the stupendous historical work by 'Gos lo-tsa-ba.

The modern scholars also, after arriving at the definite conclusion that the Sexagenary Cycle was introduced into Tibet in A.D. 1027 and that this year was the first year of the first cycle current among them, found themselves on securer grounds in matters of Tibetan chronology. Important methods are already devised by them for converting Tibetan dates into those of Christian calendar and elaborate charts for the purpose are prepared by Pelliot¹⁸ and Pozdneev.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the existing charts are complicated and are not always easy to handle. Accordingly, efforts are made here to evolve some comparatively simpler methods of converting Tibetan dates into those of the Christian calendar and *vice versa*.

For this purpose, we propose to begin with the first complete cycle of the Tibetans, i.e. the cycle beginning with the year A.D. 1027, which in the Tibetan calendar is a Fire-Hare year, or more specifically, a Fire-Female-Hare year. This cycle is as follows :

<i>Tibetan Year</i>	<i>Modern Equivalents</i> <i>A D.</i>	<i>Tibetan Year</i>	<i>Modern Equivalents</i> <i>A D.</i>
Fire-Hare	1027	Earth-Tiger	1038
Earth-Dragon	1028	Earth-Hare	1039
Earth-Serpent	1029	Iron-Dragon	1040
Iron-Horse	1030	Iron-Serpent	1041
Iron-Sheep	1031	Water-Horse	1042
Water-Monkey	1032	Water-Sheep	1043
Water-Hen	1033	Wood-Monkey	1044
Wood-Dog	1034	Wood-Hen	1045
Wood-Pig	1035	Fire-Dog	1046
Fire-Mouse	1036	Fire-Pig	1047
Fire-Ox	1037	Earth-Mouse	1048

18. P. Pelliot in JA 1913. 664-667.

19. Pozdneev *Erdeni-yin erike*, St Petersburg 1883.

<i>Tibetan Year</i>	<i>Modern Equivalents A.D.</i>	<i>Tibetan Year</i>	<i>Modern Equivalents A.D.</i>
Earth-Ox	1049	Earth-Monkey	1068
Iron-Tiger	1050	Earth-Hen	1069
Iron-Hare	1051	Iron-Dog	1070
Water-Dragon	1052	Iron-Pig	1071
Water-Serpent	1053	Water-Mouse	1072
Wood-Horse	1054	Water-Ox	1073
Wood-Sheep	1055	Wood-Tiger	1074
Fire-Monkey	1056	Wood-Hare	1075
Fire-Hen	1057	Fire-Dragon	1076
Earth-Dog	1058	Fire-Serpent	1077
Earth-Pig	1059	Earth-Horse	1078
Iron-Mouse	1060	Earth-Sheep	1079
Iron-Ox	1061	Iron-Monkey	1080
Water-Tiger	1062	Iron-Hen	1081
Water-Hare	1063	Water-Dog	1082
Wood-Dragon	1064	Water-Pig	1083
Wood-Serpent	1065	Wood-Mouse	1084
Fire-Horse	1066	Wood-Ox	1085
Fire-Sheep	1067	Fire-Tiger	1086

The first year of the next cycle is a Fire-Hare year which is equivalent to A.D. 1087. This is followed by an Earth-Dragon year, which again is followed by an Earth-Serpent year—and so on—the next cycle.

Several facts and some simple rules can be discovered on close examination of the above cycle. Starting with the first year of the cycle as reproduced, we note that $1027 = 17 \times 60 + 7$. This shows that 1027 was the seventh year after the completion of 17 previous cycles which we get by back-calculation. The Tibetan name of this year is Fire-Hare. Consequently, the year A.D. 7 was also Fire-Hare and counting from the bottom of the above cycle we find that the Fire-Hare year occupies the 7th place, i.e. if one starts counting from the Iron-Hen year. Thus one finds that *the year A.D. 1 was Iron-Hen*. This is the first important fact discovered on close examination of the cycle.

The name of a year in Tibetan calendar has two parts—the name of an animal and that of an element. There are 12 animals appearing cyclically in the following order : Monkey, Hen, Dog, Pig, Mouse, Ox, Tiger, Hare, Dragon, Serpent, Horse, Sheep. These animals will henceforth be numbered as : 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 respectively.

Next we write down multiples of 12 :

12, 24, 36, 48, 60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 120, 132, 144, 156, 168, 180, 192, 204, 216, 228, 240, 252, 264, 276, 288, 300 ;

312, 324, 336, 348, 360, 372, 384, 396, 408, 420, 432, 444, 456, 468, 480, 492, 504, 516, 528, 540, 552, 564, 576, 588, 600...

That 300 is the first round number (with two zeros at the end) which is the multiple of 12 is the second important fact and leads to the first simple but important rule in this discussion :

All multiples of 12 form a periodic cycle with period 300.

After obtaining this rule, the figures in the second numerical paragraph above (312, 324, etc.) may be dispensed with, for the numbers in this paragraph can be written down from those in the first paragraph by adding 300 to each of them. In fact, all subsequent multiples of 12 can be written in a similar way from the first paragraph by adding 300 or any multiple thereof.

We now turn to the five elements in the nomenclature of the Tibetan calendar. These elements are : Iron, Water, Wood, Fire and Earth, appearing in that order. The Sexagenary Cycle shows that each element is repeated twice before being followed by the next element, so that these form a cycle of ten. Let us take a pair of consecutive Iron years—say A.D. 1030 and 1031. Addition or subtraction of 10 or any multiple thereof will always give Iron years. Thus : 1030, 1031 ; 1040, 1041 ; 1050, 1051 ; 1060, 1061 ; 1070, 1071 ; 1080, 1081 etc. are all Iron years. Also, subtraction of 1030, which is equal to 103×10 , shows that the following years of the Christian era are also Iron years : 0, 1 ; 10, 11 ; 20, 21 ; 30, 31 etc.

For mathematical convenience, we have denoted here by

A.D. 0 the year preceding A.D. 1, though it is more conventional to denote that year as 1 B.C.

Inspection reveals the second simple rule in this discussion : *A.D. numbers ending in 0 or 1 correspond to the element Iron of the Tibetan calendar.*

Since in the Sexagenary Cycle, the Iron-pair is followed by Water-pair, Wood-pair, Fire-pair and Earth-pair, in that order, we also get the following corollary to the second rule :

A.D. numbers ending in 2 or 3 correspond to Water ; those ending in 4 or 5 correspond to Wood, those ending in 6 or 7 to Fire, and those in 8 or 9 to Earth.

In the Tibetan calendar, some distinction or anti-thesis is introduced between the two repetitions of each element. As we have already seen, the first appearance of an element is regarded as Element-Male and its repetition as Element-Female. In our system, it will be observed that *even*-A.D. numbers correspond to Elements-Male and *odd*-A.D. numbers to Elements-Female. As already pointed out, the year A.D. 1 was Iron-Hen or more specifically Iron-Female-Hen.

The correspondence between the last digits of the A.D. numbers and the elements may be set out in the form of a table.

Table I

0	Iron-Male
1	Iron-Female
2	Water-Male
3	Water-Female
4	Wood-Male
5	Wood-Female
6	Fire-Male
7	Fire-Female
8	Earth-Male
9	Earth-Female

Further, if one applies to the Sexagenary Cycle the rule that *even* last digits correspond to Elements-Male and *odd* last digits to Elements-Female, then one finds that the Animals

Monkey, Dog, Mouse, Tiger, Dragon and Horse always go with Elements-Male, whereas Hen, Pig, Ox, Hare, Serpent and Sheep always go with Elements-Female. Referring to the numbers associated with these animals in our scheme, it will be observed that animals numbered *even* go with Elements-Male and those numbered *odd* go with Elements-Female.

We can now prepare the following Table of animals.

Table II

<i>Elements-Male</i>		<i>Elements-Female</i>	
0	Monkey	1	Hen
2	Dog	3	Pig
4	Mouse	5	Ox
6	Tiger	7	Hare
8	Dragon	9	Serpent
10	Horse	11	Sheep.

Firally, we prepare the following Table of the multiples of 12 not exceeding 100 :

Table III

12, 24, 36, 48, 60, 72, 84, 96.

How to use the Tables

With the help of Tables I, II and III, we can solve the problem of conversion of the Christian calendar to the Tibetan calendar and *vice versa*.

A) Conversion of the Christian Calendar to Tibetan Calendar :

Take a number representing any year of the Christian era. The last digit of the number will, in accordance with Table I, give the name of the Element, indicating also Male or Female. The remainder, after division of this number by 12, will give the name of the Animal from Table II. Thus one gets the names of both Element and Animal of the year in the Tibetan calendar.

• Illustrations :

1. Take the year 1043 A.D. The last digit being 3, the

required Element is Water-Female (Table I). Next

$$1043 = 12 \times 86 + 11.$$

The remainder 11 corresponds to Sheep (Table II). Therefore, the required year in the Tibetan calendar is Water-Female-Sheep. If the word Female is dropped, the identification is still unique, for according to Table II, Sheep can go with element Female only.

2. Take, again, the year A.D. 1966. The last digit 6 shows that the required element is Fire-Male (Table I). Now, $1966 = 12 \times 163 + 10$. The remainder 10 corresponds to Horse. The required year is Fire-Male-Horse or simply Fire-Horse.

B) Conversion of the Tibetan Calendar to Christian Calendar :

Take any Tibetan year, say Earth-Tiger. Since Tiger can go only with Element-Male (Table II), the fuller name of the year must be Earth-Male-Tiger. By Table I, the element Earth-Male shows that the last digit of the required Christian year must be 8. Now, in Table II, the animal Tiger is numbered 6. Go on adding to this number 6 all multiples of 12 (Table III) until a number ending in 8 is obtained. Thus : $6 + 12 = 18$. The earliest Earth-Tiger or Earth-Male-Tiger year of the Christian era is A.D. 18.

Now, go on adding to 18 the number 60 and its multiples not going beyond 300. Thus : A.D. 18, 78, 138, 198, 258 are all Earth-Tiger years. Other Earth-Tiger years are obtained by adding 300 and its multiples to those. Such are :

A.D. 318, 378, 438, 498, 558,
618, 678, 738, 798, 858,
918, 978, 1038, 1098, 1158, etc.

Take another illustration : Wood-Serpent. In Table II, Serpent is numbered odd (9) and must go with Element-Female. In Table I, Wood-Female corresponds to 5. We are to add to 9 the numbers of Table III until we get a number ending in 5.

$9 + 12 = 21$; $9 + 24 = 33$; $9 + 36 = 45$. So 45 is one of the required numbers. Other required numbers are obtained by adding 60 and its multiples to 45. Thus : 45, 105, 165, 225, 285. Still other required numbers are obtained by adding 300

and its multiples. Thus, Wood-Serpent or Wood-Female-Serpent years of the Tibetan calendar corresponds to any one of the following years of the Christian calendar :

A.D. 45, 105, 165, 225, 285
345, 405, 465, 525, 585
645, 705, 765, 825, 885
945, 1005, 1065, 1125, 1185, etc.

It should be noted that Table III needs be used only in the problem of converting the Tibetan calendar to the Christian calendar and not in the other problem.

Further, the Tibetan equivalents of the Christian years obtained by the above methods are always categorical, whereas when the Tibetan year is mentioned without specifying the cycle (*rab-byun*), we get only a number of possible equivalents in terms of the Christian calendar but not the specific year. When, however, the cycle is specified, it is possible to get the specific equivalent. Thus, the Tibetans say that the present cycle is the sixteenth cycle (i.e. beginning with the cycle starting from A.D. 1027). It is possible, therefore, to find the exact equivalents of the years mentioned in this cycle. The Fire-Hare year of this cycle, e.g., is A.D. 1927. The Farth-Dragon year of this cycle, again, is 1928.

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Apart from the continuation of the *Studies in the Nibandha-s* and the translation of the *Nyāyadarśana*, the present issue contains two articles.

One of these is on the *Slave Trade in Ancient India* by Dr. Sandhya Mukerjee, Lecturer, Department of Ancient Indian History, Allahabad University, Allahabad. The other is on *The Poetry of the Weavers and Tanners* by Dr. Igor D. Serebriakov of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, USSR. Dr. Serebriakov wants me to add the following note to his article :

The present article forms part of a book on the Punjabi Literature, published in Russian, Moscow 1963. The English version of the book is shortly to be published by the Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow. The book is originally intended to present to the Soviet readers a general picture of the growth of the literature of the Punjabi people. The author has used some translations of the Punjabi literature from well-known works like *A History of the Sikhs* by J. D. Cunningham (London 1894, reprinted Oxford 1918), the translation of the *Guru Grantha Sahib* by Dr. Gopal Singh Dardi, etc. Full acknowledgement to the works to which he is indebted is to be found in the forthcoming English edition of the book.

NYĀYADARŚANA

Literal Translation of
G a u t a m a 's N y ā y a - s ū t r a
&
V ā t s y ā y a n a 's B h ā ṣ y a
along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by
Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya

Bhāṣya

The probans for the inference of mind are recollection (*smṛti*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal knowledge (*āgama*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), intuition (*pratibhā*, i.e. a form of internal knowledge independent of any instrument of valid knowledge), dream-experience (*svapna-jñāna*), hypothetical argument (*ūha=tarka*), perceptions of pleasure, desire etc. and desire etc. These probans apart, this also [namely,]—

Sūtra 16

The absence of the occurrence of 'simultaneous cognitions' (*yugapat-jñāna*) is a proban for [the inference of] the mind. // i. 1. 16 //

Bhāṣya

Recollection etc., which are independent of the instrumentality of the (external) senses, should be due to the instrumentality of something else. In spite of the simultaneous contact of the olfactory and other senses with smell etc., the resulting cognitions do not simultaneously occur. From this is inferred that there is 'another auxiliary cause' (*sahakāri-nimittāntara*), which has contact with each of these senses and which is 'unpervading' (*avyāpi*) [i.e. atomic in magnitude and therefore without parts, and as such can have contact only with one sense at a time]. In the absence of a contact with this there is no cognition, while there is cognition in the presence of a contact with this. If independent of the contact with mind, sense-object contact alone could result in cognition, then there would have been simultaneous cognitions.

Elucidation

The Naiyāyikas conceive mind (*manas*) — the sixth *prameya*—as the 'internal sense' (*antaḥ-karaṇa*: the word *karaṇa* is here taken in the sense of an instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, i.e. a sense-organ) which is 'atomic in magnitude' (*aṇu-parimāṇa*). From this follows that it is eternal (*nitya*), for in the Nyāya view creation and destruction mean nothing but conjunction and disjunction of parts whereas the atom is partless.

According to Gautama, mind is inferred from the fact of the absence of simultaneous cognitions. The different sense-organs can come in contact with different objects at the same moment. Still, a number of different perceptual cognitions do not arise simultaneously. From this is inferred that over and above the contact with the senses, there

must be some auxiliary cause, the contact with which is necessary for the occurrence of knowledge. Such an auxiliary cause must, moreover, be partless, so that the possibility of its different parts coming in simultaneous contact with different senses is excluded. This partless or atomic auxiliary cause is the mind. Thus, though there can be simultaneous contacts of the different senses with different objects, there arises perceptual knowledge only through that sense which comes in contact with the mind—a fact which is particularly overt in the case of inattention (*vyāsaṅga*). Apparently we may have the impression of having simultaneous perceptions of different objects through different senses. According to Gautama, however, these are as a matter of fact different perceptions resulting from different contacts of the mind with the different senses taking place at different moments. They only appear to be simultaneous because of the extremely swift fluctuations of the mind, as a result of which it comes in contact with the different senses in rapid succession. This will be further discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 58.

The absence of simultaneous cognitions, on the evidence of which Gautama proves the existence of the mind, would not be acceptable to those who do not conceive mind as atomic in magnitude. Kumārila, e.g., views mind as all-pervasive (*vibhu*), which therefore can come in simultaneous contacts with different senses. That is why, while introducing the *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana mentions a number of other probans for the inference of the mind, which would be acceptable to the other philosophers as well. One of these probans is *pratibhā* or intuition, the nature of which will be discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 33.

Bhāṣya

Coming next in order—

Sūtra 17

Motivation (*pravṛtti*) is the conation (*ārambha*)
through speech (*vāc*), mind (*buddhi*) and body.
// i. 1. 17 //

Bhāṣya

The word *buddhi* in this *sūtra* means mind. It is [called] *buddhi* because 'one understands by it' (*buddhyate anena*).

Now this conation (*ārambha*), which is through body, speech or mind and which results in virtue (*puṇya*) or vice (*pāpa*), is ten-fold. All these are already explained under the second *sūtra*.

Sūtra 18

Evils (*doṣa*) are those that have for their probans
(*lakṣaṇa* : inferential ground) the [characteristic
of] 'being the cause of motivation' (*pravartanā*).
// i. 1. 18 //

Bhāṣya

Pravartanā means the characteristic of being the cause of motivation. Attachment (*rāga*), etc. engage the knower to virtue or vice. Where there is 'false knowledge' (*mithyā-jñāna*), there is attachment or aversion.

[Objection :] These evils are perceptible to each individual self. Why then are these referred to by their inferential ground ? [Answer :] That a person is under the influence of attachment, aversion or ignorance is known by his activities, for only a person under the influence of attachment engages himself to the activity by which he obtains pleasure or suffering. Similar is the case of one under the influence of aversion or under the influence of ignorance. All these additional significances cannot be conveyed only by saying that attachment, aversion and ignorance [are the evils].

Elucidation

Evil, the eighth *prameya*, which leads to motivation and therefore ultimately results in virtue or vice, is three-fold; these are attachment, aversion and ignorance. Of these evils, ignorance is fundamental. A person without ignorance has neither attachment nor aversion. Gautama also says this in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 6.

In the *sūtra*, the word *lakṣaṇa* has also the significance of a proban. In this sense of the word *lakṣaṇa*, the *sūtra* means that the three-fold evil is inferentially proved by the resulting motivation. As against this, Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection. The three-fold evil is internally perceived by each individual self. Since it is known by perception, its inferential proof is redundant. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa reads the following implication in Vātsyāyana's answer to this objection. Only in the case of one's own self these evils are perceptible. In the cases of others, however, these can only be ascertained inferentially. Finding a person engaged to activity that results in pleasure or pain, it is inferred that he is working under the influence of attachment, aversion or ignorance, for otherwise none can be engaged to activity.

Sūtra 19

Rebirth (*pretyabhāva*) means being born again.
// i. 1. 19 //

Bhāṣya

Rebirth [the ninth *prameya*] is being born again after death for one previously born (*utpanna*) in 'any form of organism' (*kvacit-sattva-nīkāya*). 'Being born' (*utpanna*) means coming into relation. The relation [referred to] is with body, sense, consciousness (*buddhi*) and feeling (*vedanā*). Being born again means being related over again to body etc. The word *punaḥ* (again) is used to signify recurrence. After abiding in an organism, when a self leaves this previously acquired body etc., it is said to depart. When it assumes other body etc., of similar or dis-similar organisms, it is said to be born. Rebirth [therefore] means the birth again after death. Now this rebirth, which is but the continuous cycle of births and deaths, is to be viewed as without a beginning but ending in liberation.

Sūtra 20

Result (*phala*) is the object (*artha*) produced by motivation and evil. // i. 1. 20 //

Bhāṣya

Result means the feeling of pleasure and suffering. Action leads to either pleasure or suffering. Such a feeling, again, is possible only when there exist body, senses, objects of knowledge and mind (? *buddhi*) and, therefore, result is intended to include also body etc. All these are thus included in result, which is an object produced by motivation and evil. This result is discarded after being accepted again and again and it is accepted after being discarded again and again. There is no limit to or end of the acceptance or rejection of this result. All the living beings are being swept by this stream of the acceptance or rejection of this result.

Elucidation

Result, the tenth *prameya*, may be primary (*mukhya*) or secondary (*gauṇa*). The primary result is the feeling of pleasure or pain. The body, senses, etc., which are the auxiliary causes of this feeling, are the secondary results. Gautama refers to both the results in the *sūtra*.

Bhāṣya

Now, all these are—

Sūtra 21

Suffering (*duḥkha*) which is of the nature
of pain (*vādhanā*). // i. 1. 21 //

Bhāṣya

The word *vādhanā* is a synonym for *piḍā* and *tāpa*. All these things, like body etc., being connected with suffering, are but sufferings. For these are permeated by or embedded in or invariably attended with suffering. One finding everything thus permeated by suffering desires to avoid suffering and finding birth to be suffering attains the 'state of indifference' (*nirveda*). The indifferent [person] becomes non-attached and the non-attached [person] is liberated,

Elucidation

Suffering—the eleventh *prameya*—is discussed immediately before the twelfth, namely *apavarga* or liberation. In the list of *prameya*-s, body occurs as the second and result as the tenth. According to Vātsyāyana, all the nine *prameya*-s from body to result are to be viewed as suffering for which he uses three synonyms, namely *vādhanā*, *piḍā* and *tāpa*. Suffering is something well-known, because it is felt by everybody. In the *sūtra*, however, the word suffering includes all the auxiliary causes of it. These auxiliary causes like body etc. are viewed as suffering, because these are universally related to suffering.

Bhāṣya

Where there is the end and where there is the final cessation [of suffering] is this—

Sūtra 22

Liberation, which is the absolute
deliverance from suffering. //i.1. 22//

Bhāṣya

The absolute deliverance from it, i.e. from suffering—and therefore from birth—is liberation. What is meant by it? The giving up of the birth which has already taken place and the non-acceptance of another [birth]. Such a state when

continued eternally, is known as liberation to 'those who have special knowledge of liberation' (*apavarga-vit*). It is the state of fearlessness, without decay and death ; it is [what the scriptures call] *brahman* and it is the attainment of the highest good.

Elucidation

The state of 'cosmic dissolution' (*pralaya*), though without suffering, is only temporarily so, because it is followed by 'cosmic creation' (*sr̥ṣṭi*) and hence suffering. It is thus different from liberation which is absolute deliverance from suffering.

By characterising liberation as a state of fearlessness and as without decay and death, Vātsyāyana points to its close similarity with *brahman*, for these characteristics hold good for both liberation and *brahman*. As Vācaspati Miśra explains, liberation is freedom from the fear of worldly existence and hence it is a state of fearlessness ; *brahman* also is repeatedly characterised by the scriptures as fearless. As against those who conceive the world to be a real modification of *brahman*, Vātsyāyana uses the epithet *ajara*, i.e. without modification or decay : the eternal and unchanging *brahman* suffers no modification, and so is liberation which is a changeless state. As against those who conceive liberation as the final destruction of mind (*citta*)—just as the blowing off of the lamp—he says that liberation is *amṛtyupada*, i.e. is not the abode of death. In other words, liberation is not the annihilation of the self ; it is eternal like *brahman*.

Gautama's conception of liberation is further discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 62ff.

Bhāṣya

According to some, in the state of liberation is manifested the eternal bliss of the self, like its all-pervasive magnitude, and by this manifested bliss the absolutely liberated self becomes full of bliss. This view being without proof is unacceptable. There is no perceptual, inferential or scriptural ground to prove that in the state of liberation is manifested the eternal bliss of the self, like its all-pervasive magnitude.

Elucidation

After explaining his view of liberation, Vātsyāyana mentions another view according to which just as the all-pervasive magnitude of the self remains unmanifested during the state of 'worldly existence' (*saṃsāra*), so also the eternal bliss abiding in the self remains unmanifested during this state ; in liberation both become manifest. Therefore, according to this view, from liberation onwards the self enjoys eternal bliss. Vācaspati Miśra seeks to explain this view as implicit in the scriptural text : "Brahman is consciousness

and bliss" (*viññānam ānandaṃ brahma*—*Br. Up.* iii. 9. 28). 'The eternal bliss of the self' here means that the self *is* eternal bliss.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, does not accept this interpretation of Vācaspati. According to the view referred to by Vātsyāyana, the self is not itself eternal bliss ; eternal bliss is only a characteristic of the liberated self. But who held such a view ? According to some, it was held by Kumārila. According to others, it was held by an earlier Mīmāṃsaka called Tutātabhaṭṭa. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa thinks that this view of liberation was possibly maintained by a section of earlier Naiyāyikas, like Bhāsarvajña and others. Under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 64, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa will return to discuss this question elaborately.

Bhāṣya

Manifestation (*abhiṣyakti*) of eternal bliss is but its awareness (*samvedana*). Its cause should be mentioned. Manifestation of eternal bliss is its awareness, i.e. its knowledge ; its cause, namely that from which it originates, is to be mentioned. If [this awareness] is [said to be] eternal, like the bliss itself, then there will be no difference between the self 'in its state of worldly existence' (*samsārastha*) and 'in its state of liberation' (*mukta*). Just as the liberated [self] is characterised by the bliss and its awareness, which are eternally present, so must also be the self in its state of worldly existence, because both [viz. the bliss and its awareness] are eternal. [The upholders of the view that liberation is the manifestation of eternal bliss will have to postulate the cause of its awareness. To avoid this difficulty, if it is assumed that the said awareness also is eternal, and therefore is not in need of any cause, then there would be no scope to differentiate the self in liberation from that in bondage. In both the states of liberation and bondage, the self would not only be characterised by eternal bliss but also by its awareness, both being assumed as eternal.]

If even this is admitted, then there would be the coexistence or simultaneity of the results of virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*). In that case, there would have been the coexistence or simultaneity of the awareness of eternal bliss with the awareness of the results of virtue and vice, namely pleasure and suffering, which are [as a matter of fact] successively experienced [by the self] in the realms of worldly existence. There can be absence neither of the bliss nor of its awareness, both being [assumed to be] eternal.

If [the awareness of the eternal bliss is assumed to be] non-eternal, its cause must be mentioned. Now, [if it is assumed] that the awareness in the state of liberation of the eternal bliss is non-eternal, then the cause from which it originates must be specified. Let this cause be the conjunction of the self with mind along with other [auxiliary] causes. If the conjunction of the self with mind is admitted to be the [main] cause, even then an auxiliary cause assisting

this conjunction is to be mentioned. [The opponent may argue that virtue (*dharma*) is the auxiliary cause. Vātsyāyana answers :] Then the cause of virtue is to be specified. If virtue is [assumed to be] the auxiliary cause, then its cause [i.e. of virtue itself] from which it originates is to be mentioned. [The opponent may argue that the cause of virtue is *yoga-samādhi*. To this Vātsyāyana answers :] The virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* being destroyed due to its incompatibility with the fulfilment of the result [produced by virtue], there would be the cessation of the awareness [of that eternal bliss]. If virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is assumed to be the auxiliary cause, then it [virtue] being destroyed [after producing its specific result], because of its incompatibility with the fulfilment of the result, the awareness also will cease to exist. If there is no awareness of it [i.e. of the bliss] then it will be hardly distinguishable from the non-existent. If the awareness ceases due to the destruction of virtue and the eternal bliss is not experienced, then there would be no inference to prove either of the alternatives, namely 'it is not perceived though existent' and 'it [is not perceived] because [it is] non-existent'.

[The upholders of the view that liberation is the manifestation of eternal bliss may admit that its awareness is non-eternal and this awareness has for its cause the conjunction of the self with mind assisted by virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi*. To this Vātsyāyana answers that this assumed auxiliary cause, namely virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi*, must come to its end with the production of its own result. At that stage, the auxiliary cause being absent, there would be no awareness of eternal bliss and in default of its awareness the assumption of its existence would be as good as admitting its non-existence.]

The indestructibility of virtue cannot be inferentially proved, because it has the characteristic of being produced. There is no inference to prove that virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is not destroyed. There is rather the inference to the contrary that whatever has the characteristic of being produced is non-eternal. Those, according to whom there is no cessation of the awareness [of the eternal bliss] [must admit] that therefore it is inferentially proved that the cause of this awareness is eternal ; but it has already been shown that in the case of it being eternal there is no distinction between the liberated self and the self in worldly bondage. Just as for the liberated self there is eternal bliss along with the cause of its awareness and there is no cessation of the awareness, its cause being eternal, so also is for the self under worldly bondage. And in that case there would have been the simultaneity of the awareness of pleasure and of suffering, which are [respectively] the results of virtue and vice.

It cannot be argued that the connection with body etc. is the cause of obstruction [of the awareness of the eternal bliss on the part of the self], because the very function of the body etc. is to facilitate enjoyment [for the self] and moreover there is no inference to the contrary [viz. that the self without being connected with a body can experience any pleasure or pain].

One may argue that for the self in worldly bondage the connection with body etc. obstructs the cause of the awareness of eternal bliss and therefore the difference between the two [viz. self in liberation and in bondage] is not denied. But this is illogical. Body, etc. are for the purpose of enjoyment and therefore it is absurd [to argue] that they obstruct enjoyment. There is moreover no inference that the bodiless self has any enjoyment.

Nor can it be argued that one is motivated by the attainment of the desirable [*iṣṭa*, viz. the bliss eternal], because [one may as well be motivated by] the avoidance of the undesirable. [The opponent may argue :] Here is my inference : The injunction for liberation is for the attainment of the desirable and hence is the motivation of those who are desirous of liberation. Therefore, neither of the two [viz. the injunction for liberation and the motivation for it] is meaningless. But this is illogical. The injunction for liberation is for the avoidance of the undesirable and hence is the motivation of those that are desirous of liberation. Nothing that is desirable is unaccompanied by the undesirable and, as a result, even the desirable amounts to the undesirable. One trying to reject the undesirable also rejects the desirable, because selective rejection is impossible.

Surpassing the palpable [*dr̥ṣṭa*, literally the visible] is equally applicable to the cases of body etc. [If it is argued that the self] strives for eternal pleasure after discarding the temporal and palpable one, then it will have to be further admitted that the liberated self acquires an eternal body, sense and consciousness after discarding the temporal body, sense and consciousness. Thus is better conceived the 'nature of the liberated self' (*aikāntya*).

If this [assumption of eternal body etc.] is said to be an absurdity (*upapatti-viruddha*), then equally so [is the opponent's assumption of eternal bliss]. The view that body, etc. are eternal is 'utterly illogical' (*pramāṇa-viruddha*) and therefore inconceivable. The same is true of the opponent, i.e. the view that "bliss is eternal" is utterly illogical and therefore inconceivable.

Even though there exists scriptural texts [that eternal bliss is manifested in liberation], there is no contradiction [with our view], because by bliss is meant in these [scriptural texts] the absolute non-existence of mundane suffering. There may be a scriptural text that the liberated self enjoys absolute bliss. But it can be explained that the word bliss in such a text is used in the sense of absolute non-existence of suffering. In ordinary discourse also the word pleasure is frequently found as used in the sense of the absence of suffering.

There can be no liberation without a surrender of the attachment for eternal bliss, for attachment is characterised as a bondage. If one strives after liberation being attracted by the desire for eternal bliss under the idea that eternal bliss is manifested in liberation, one can neither attain liberation nor deserve it, for attachment

‘ is characterised as a bondage and it is not logical that one is liberated in spite of bondage.

[The opponent may argue that] the attachment for eternal bliss, which is eventually surrendered, is not detrimental to liberation. One’s attachment for eternal bliss is [eventually] surrendered and if surrendered one’s attachment for eternal bliss cannot be detrimental to liberation. [Vātsyāyana answers:] Even assuming this, one’s attainment of liberation is beyond doubt irrespective of the alternative possibilities, namely, the liberated enjoys eternal bliss and it does not.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana refutes the view that in liberation there is manifestation of eternal bliss.

Manifestation of something eternal means its awareness. What can be the cause of the awareness of the eternal bliss for the liberated self? It may be answered that like the bliss itself this awareness also is eternal. As such, it is not produced by any cause. But this leads to the assumption that all the selves under bondage are equally entitled to the enjoyment of the same eternal bliss. Such an assumption implies that the selves under bondage should at the same time enjoy this eternal bliss as well as the mundane pleasures or sufferings caused by virtue or vice. But the fact is that they do not simultaneously enjoy both.

Therefore, the said awareness of eternal bliss must be considered non-eternal or temporal. What, then, is its cause? It may be answered that its cause is the conjunction of the self with mind, which operates along with the auxiliary cause in the form of virtue produced by *yoga-samādhi*. But virtue is exhausted after producing its specific result, e.g. the virtue of the performance of the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice is exhausted—i.e. ceases to have any further efficacy—after producing its result in the form of the enjoyment of heaven. Similarly, the virtue produced by *yoga-samādhi* must eventually be exhausted and therefore the awareness of the eternal bliss must come to its end. In such a state when there is no awareness of the bliss, there will be the doubt whether there is no awareness of the bliss in spite of its existence or whether the want of awareness is because of the non-existence of the bliss itself. There being no proof for either of the alternatives, the existence of the bliss of which one is unaware remains unproved.

Neither can it be proved that the virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is never exhausted. For this virtue has an origin and everything having an origin must ultimately perish.

However, those that maintain that this awareness of eternal bliss never ceases to be will have to admit that the cause of this awareness is eternal. But assuming this cause to be eternal, one will have to admit that its effect, namely the awareness, must also be eternal. This leads to the absurd position that the self, even during the state of its bondage,

must have the awareness of the eternal bliss. In other words, there would be no difference between the self in bondage and the self in liberation.

If it is argued that in the state of bondage there is no awareness of the eternal bliss because of the obstruction created by body etc., the answer is that body etc., are the very means of enjoyment for the self and as such it is absurd to conceive them as obstructions. The self without body etc. can never enjoy.

It may be argued that the injunction for liberation and the striving after it prove the existence of eternal bliss. This injunction aims at the attainment of the desirable (*iṣṭa*) and the striving after something means striving after the desirable. Eternal bliss being the highest desirable, the striving after liberation points to the existence of something desirable in the state of liberation and such a desirable object is the eternal bliss. But this argument is futile. An injunction is not necessarily an injunction for the attainment of the desirable ; it may as well be for the avoidance of the undesirable. One who strives after liberation realises that the so-called pleasures are after all sufferings and thus one's ultimate goal is freedom from all sufferings.

The claim that one who strives after liberation renounces the temporal pleasures in favour of the eternal bliss will entail the further assumption that one seeks to renounce the temporal body in favour of an eternal one. This amounts to the assertion that the self in liberation enjoys eternal bliss with an eternal body. Such an absurdity is perhaps a shade better than the other assertion, viz. that in liberation the dis-embodied self enjoys eternal bliss.

The assumption of an eternal body, it will be argued, is absurd, there being no proof in favour of it. Vātsyāyana answers that the assumption of eternal bliss is equally so, for there is no proof for it either.

The opponent will certainly argue that there is definite proof in the form of scriptural evidence that the liberated self enjoys eternal bliss. Bṛāhasarvajña, towards the end of his work *Nyāyasāra*, claims that from the scripture it is known that the liberated self enjoys bliss. For the scripture declares : "This eternal bliss is 'internally realised' (*buddhi-grāhya*) and is beyond the range of external senses. Know that to be liberation. It is unattainable by the imperfect (*akṛtātman*)."
Again, "Brahman is of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*) and it is manifested in liberation." Further, "Brahman is but consciousness (*vijñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*). (*Br. Up. iii. 9. 28*)."

Though Vātsyāyana seeks to prove inferentially that eternal bliss is impossible, he himself admits that no inference contradicted by the scripture can be valid. That is why he proceeds to show that there is no contradiction between his view denying eternal bliss in liberation and the scriptural texts cited. Accordingly he argues that in these scriptural texts eternal bliss is to be taken in a secondary sense, i.e. as the total annihilation of suffering. Even in common parlance, relief from suffering is referred to as pleasure. Thus, e.g., one carrying a heavy load feels pleasure when relieved of it.

' In defence of his own position, Bhāsarvajña argues that a secondary meaning (*upacāra* or *lakṣaṇā*) is to be resorted to only when the primary meaning (*mukhya-artha*) is unacceptable. In the scriptural texts quoted, however, the primary meaning of the word *ānanda* (bliss) is not unacceptable and as such it is not necessary to resort here to its secondary sense as the absence of suffering.

Phañibhūṣaṇa proposes to defend the position of Vātsyāyana and says that it is already shown that the awareness of eternal bliss in liberation can be neither eternal nor temporal and is therefore fictitious (*alīka*). Since the scripture cannot speak of something fictitious, words like *ānanda* and *sukha* in the scripture cannot be taken in their primary senses.

Vātsyāyana finally says that one striving after liberation cannot be liberated so 'long as one has attachment for eternal bliss, because absolute detachment is the pre-condition for liberation.

The opponent will argue that though to begin with one may be driven by the attraction for eternal bliss, it is eventually discarded because of the extreme aversion for everything that gradually grows into one. When one thus becomes completely detached, there remains no longer any impediment to liberation. Vātsvāyana answers that this detachment amounts to indifference to eternal bliss itself and thus liberation has nothing to do with eternal bliss.

Phañibhūṣaṇa concludes by pointing out that though Vātsyāyana's view is generally accepted by the later Naiyāyikas, the view of Bhāsarvajña was current even in an earlier period and it remained accepted even in later times in a section of the Naiyāyikas. Hence it is sometimes referred to as 'the view of a section of Naiyāyikas' (*nyāya-ekadeśi-mata*). In defence of this view, Bhāsarvajña argues that there is nothing to prevent the acceptance of the primary meaning of the words like *sukha* or *ānanda* in the scripture quoted in favour of his view. The awareness of this bliss is as eternal as the bliss itself. Still, there is no difficulty in differentiating the liberated self from the self in bondage. During the state of bondage, though both the eternal bliss and its eternal awareness are present, there is no 'subject-object relation' (*viśaya-viśayi-bhāva*) between the two. As for example, in spite of the visual sense and the presence of its object, the former cannot come in contact with the latter because of some obstruction like the wall ; but they come in contact when the obstruction is removed. Similarly, in spite of the eternal presence in the self of the eternal bliss and its eternal awareness, there is no subject-object relation between the two during the state of bondage, because of the obstruction in the form of vice. However, the subject-object relation between the two is established during liberation, when all obstructions to it are removed. This subject-object relation between the awareness of eternal bliss and the eternal bliss itself, though 'with an origin' (*janya*) can never be destroyed, because there is no cause for its destruction. Nor can it be argued that this relation, since it has an origin, must be eventually destroyed. There is no rule that whatever has an origin must have eventual destruction. Destruction (*dhvaṃsa*), e.g., though

having an origin is never further destroyed. Therefore, concludes Bhāsarvajña, by liberation is meant the absolute cessation of suffering and the attainment of eternal bliss.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON
THE DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

(*prameya-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Now, in accordance with the order [of the first *sūtra*], the definition of doubt (*saṃśaya*) is to be given and, therefore, it is said—

Sūtra 23

Doubt (*saṃśaya*) is the ‘contradictory apprehension about the same object’ (*vimarśa*), which, ‘depends on the remembrance of the unique characteristic of each’ (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). This [doubt] may be due to : 1) the ‘apprehension of common characteristics’ (*samāna-dharma-upapatti*), 2) the ‘apprehension of the unique characteristics’ (*aneka-dharma-upapatti*), 3) ‘contradictory assertions about the same object’ (*vipratipatti*), 4) the ‘irregularity of apprehension’ (*upalabdhi-avyavasthā*) and 5) the ‘irregularity of non-apprehension’ (*anupalabdhi-avyavasthā*). // i. 1. 23 //

Elucidation

The word *saṃśaya* in the *sūtra* stands for what is defined and the word *vimarśa* [i.e. contradictory apprehensions of the same object] gives the general definition. The word *viśeṣāpekṣa* is used to signify that, on the one hand, the perception of the ‘specific characteristic dispels doubt, while, on the other hand, its recollection is a necessary pre-condition for doubt. The remaining words in the *sūtra* refer to the five forms of doubt, each having its special cause.

Vātsyāyana says that doubt is *anavadhāraṇa-jñāna*, i.e. indecisive cognition. It is indecisive not in so far as the cognition points to something as barely “that” (*idam*). But it is indecisive in so far as which of the alternatives (*koṭi*) stating its nature is appropriate for it. Therefore, doubt cannot be defined as knowledge other than the decisive one. Though a piece of unitary knowledge, doubt is composite in nature. It is not indecisive

in so far as it points to something as barely "that". It is indecisive in so far as the alternative characteristics of the object are concerned. Śaṅkara Miśra, in his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ii. 2. 17 explains this and this is also indicated by the etymological analysis of the word *vimarśa* : *vi* meaning contradiction and *marśa* meaning knowledge. Thus *vimarśa*, literally contradictory knowledge, means here contradictory knowledge of the same object.

Some of the representatives of Navya-nyāya argue that in the case of doubt one of the alternatives is necessarily negative (*abhāva-koṭi*) and the other positive (*bhāva-koṭi*). One may, e.g., doubt : Is it not a pillar ? In this case the two alternatives are : 1) This is not a pillar and 2) This is a pillar. There is, thus, no doubt without both the negative and positive alternatives. According to the older Naiyāyikas, however, there are cases of doubt where all the alternatives are positive. Thus, e.g., one may doubt : Is it a pillar or a person ? The two alternatives here are : 1) This is a pillar and 2) This is a person. Both the alternatives are positive. [The said Navya-naiyāyikas would claim that in this example there are as a matter of fact four alternatives, two of which are negative and two positive. These are : 1) This is a pillar, 2) This is not a pillar, 3) This is a person and 4) This is not a person.] Phaṇibhūṣaṇa cites the example of the doubt of king Duṣyanta in *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*, where there are more than two alternatives and all the alternatives are necessarily positive. The king doubts : Is this a dream, or a magical creation or a phantom of imagination (*svapno nu māyā nu matibhramo nu*) ?

Bhāṣya

[Vātsyāyana explains the five forms of doubt mentioned in the *sūtra*. The first form of doubt is] the 'contradictory knowledge' (*vimarśa*) about the same object due to the apprehension of 'common characteristics' (*samāna-dharma*) and which 'depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). Somebody perceives the common characteristics of a pillar and a person [in an object], viz. a certain height and breadth ; he becomes desirous of ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic of each as previously perceived ; he fails to affirm definitely either of the alternatives and [has the cognition in the form] : What is it ? [That is, Is it a pillar or a person ?] Such an indecisive cognition is doubt. Such a doubt has for its cause the knowledge in the form : 'I apprehend the common characteristics of the two [viz, the pillar and the person] but do not apprehend the distinguishing characteristic of each.' Therefore, [it is concluded that doubt in its first form is] the contradictory knowledge about the same object depending on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each.

[The second form of doubt is] due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many [objects]. By many is here meant objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. [Doubt is due to] the apprehension of the characteristics

of, such manifold objects the unique characteristic being perceived in both [types of objects i.e. both similar and dissimilar]. [By the unique characteristic] the objects are differentiated from others, both similar and dissimilar.

[Vātsyāyana first illustrates what is meant by the unique characteristic differentiating an object from other objects, both similar and dissimilar.] The unique characteristic of earth [which is a substance] is smell, which differentiates it [on the one hand] from water etc. [i.e. other substances or similar objects] and [on the other hand] from quality and action (i.e. dissimilar objects). [Vātsyāyana now proceeds to illustrate the second form of doubt.] The unique characteristic of sound is 'being caused by disjunction' (*vibhāgajātva* : e.g. sound is produced when the bamboo is split into two parts). One doubts whether such a sound is a substance or a quality or an action. Because the unique characteristic is perceived in both ways [i.e. as differentiating the object from both the similar and dissimilar ones]. [One thus wavers among the alternatives :] Is it, being a substance, differentiated from quality and action ? Or, is it, being a quality, [differentiated from substance and action] ? Or, is it, being an action [differentiated from substance and quality] ? By the dependance on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic is meant the cognition [in the form] : I cannot ascertain any characteristic to establish definitely any of them. [I only perceive the characteristic of being produced by disjunction, which is a unique characteristic of sound. But in such a sound I perceive neither the characteristic of a substance nor of quality nor of action. Hence arises the doubt : Is it a substance or a quality or an action ?]

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana explains and illustrates the first two forms of doubt.

The first form of doubt is due to the perception of common characteristics. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains how such a doubt arises. In the insufficient light of the evening, the visual sense of somebody comes in contact with either a person standing still at a distance or a similar-looking post. He fails to perceive in it the distinguishing mark either of a person or of a post, but simply perceives the characteristics common to both, namely, a certain height and breadth. He, therefore, has the doubt about the object before him : Is it a person or a pillar ? The specific cause of such a doubt is the perception of the merely common characteristics of the two.

While explaining the example of the first form of doubt, Vātsyāyana adds the expression 'desirous of ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic' (*viśeṣaṃ bubhutsamānaḥ*). Vācaspati Miśra takes this as an explanation of the expression 'depending on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*) of the *sūtra*. This interpretation of Vācaspati implies that the desire for ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic of each is the cause of doubt. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa rejects this suggestion and

argues that such a desire only follows doubt and never precedes it. That is why Vātsyāyana specifically explains *viśeṣāpekṣa* as 'the knowledge in the form : I apprehend the common characteristics of the two [viz. the pillar and the person] but do not apprehend the distinguishing characteristic of each.' The real point of Vātsyāyana is that in no case of doubt there can be the perception of specific characteristic, though in all cases of doubt there must be the remembrance thereof.

Vātsyāyana next proceeds to explain the second form of doubt, which is doubt due to the apprehension of the unique 'characteristics of many objects' (*aneka-dharma*). The first question concerning it is : What is meant by 'the characteristics of many objects' ? Vātsyāyana says that by this is meant the unique characteristic of an object which differentiates it from other objects, both similar and dissimilar. Thus, e.g., the unique characteristic of the substance earth is smell. By this it is distinguished from other substances like water etc., as well as from other categories like quality etc.

Explaining thus the meaning of unique characteristic, Vātsyāyana proceeds to illustrate the second form of doubt proper. The unique characteristic of sound is 'being caused by disjunction' (*vibhāgatva*). From the perception of this unique characteristic there arises the doubt : Is sound a substance or a quality or an action ?

How is it that the unique characteristic of sound is 'being produced by disjunction' ? Sound is produced at the time of splitting a bamboo or tearing a piece of cloth. The 'inherent cause' (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of this sound [as of all sounds] is empty space. The disjunction of the two parts of the bamboo along with the disjunction of the empty space from these two parts is the 'non-inherent cause' (*a-samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of the sound. The person who splits the bamboo or tears the cloth is the 'efficient cause' (*nlmitta-kāraṇa*) of the sound. Thus, in the sense of having disjunction as the non-inherent cause, sound has the unique characteristic of being caused by disjunction. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that disjunction may as well be produced by another disjunction and as such 'being caused by disjunction' cannot be the unique characteristic of sound. But Uddyotakara argues against the possibility of disjunction being produced by another disjunction. Disjunction is always the result of movement.

But perceiving this unique characteristic of sound, namely being produced by disjunction, the doubt arises whether it is a substance or a quality or an action, for sound may possess this unique characteristic in the capacity of a substance or a quality or an action. In his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1 5, Vātsyāyana has already shown how by a *śeṣavat* inference sound is ascertained to be a quality and the doubt under discussion is dispelled.

Bhāṣya

Now is explained [the third form of doubt, which is] due to contradictory statements about the same object' (*vipratipatti*). The word *vipratipatti* means

contradictory assertions [*darśana*, lit. perception, but here used in the sense of a statement] about the same object. By contradictory is meant opposition (*virodha*), i.e. the 'impossibility of coexistence' (*a-saha-bhāva*). [Thus, e.g.,] there is an assertion: the self exists. And there is the other: the self does not exist. The coexistence of existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus. Nor is there any ground [for the listener of the two theses] proving either of the alternatives. In such a circumstance, the failure to ascertain the truth takes the form of doubt.

[Next is explained the fourth form of doubt.] [Doubt may be] also due to the irregularity of apprehension. One apprehends water in the tank etc., where it actually exists. One also apprehends water in the mirage where it does not actually exist. Therefore, after apprehending an object somewhere and in default of any proof determining the existence or non-existence of the object, one doubts whether the object apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

[The fifth form of doubt is explained next.] [Doubt may be] also due to the irregularity of non-apprehension. Though actually existing [under the ground], the root, the peg (*kilaka*) and water are not perceived. Again, though actually non-existing, the object which has not come into being or which is destroyed is not perceived. Therefore, after non-apprehending somewhere one doubts whether the object non-apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

The dependance on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristics of each is as before. The common characteristics and the unique characteristic mentioned first belong to the objects known, while apprehension and non-apprehension belong to the knower. Because of this difference, these (i.e. the fourth and the fifth forms of doubt) are mentioned over again. Doubt (*vimarśa*) originates from the perception of the common characteristics, i.e. from the ascertainment of the common characteristics and presupposes the remembrance of the unique characteristic (of each).

Elucidation

Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting this *sūtra* and claims that there are as a matter of fact only three forms of doubt, namely, those due to 1) the apprehension of an object with common characteristics, 2) the apprehension of an object with a unique characteristic and 3) the apprehension of contradictory statements. Gautama uses the expression 'due to the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension' (*upalabdhi-unupalabdhi-avyavasthātāḥ*) to characterise all these three forms of

doubt rather than to indicate any fourth or fifth form of doubt. This expression really means the absence of any definite proof to establish or to reject any of the alternatives comprising the doubt.

Kaṇāda says, "Doubt is due to the apprehension of common characteristics, the non-apprehension of the unique characteristic and the remembrance of the unique characteristic" (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ii. 2. 17). Though Uddyotakara tries to explain it as inclusive of the second form of the doubt mentioned by Gautama, Śaṅkara Miśra categorically asserts that according to Kaṇāda doubt has neither three nor five forms ; it has only one form. Apart from doubt, Praśastapāda mentions a form of knowledge called *anadhyavasāya* (indefinite cognition) which is also produced by the apprehension of unique characteristics. Śaṅkara Miśra says that this corresponds to the second form of doubt mentioned by Gautama. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, comments that from Kaṇāda's *sūtra* it is clear that according to him doubt is only of one form. Further, argues Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, from the detailed examination of doubt in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 1ff, where Gautama clearly discusses the five forms of doubt, it is obvious that according to him doubt has five forms.

Bhāṣya

The definitions [of the categories] are uniformly given according to their serial order [in the first *sūtra*].

Sūtra 24

Incentive (*prayojana*) is the object 'pursuing' (*adhikṛtya*) which one is led to activity. //i. 1. 24//

Bhāṣya

By incentive is to be understood an object for the attainment or avoidance of which one adopts the means after ascertaining it to be desirable or avoidable. Pursuit (*adhikāra*) is the ascertainment that "I shall either attain or avoid this object", because this ascertainment is the cause of activity. An object thus ascertained 'is pursued' (*adhikriyate*).

Elucidation

Incentive is two-fold, primary and secondary. When one strives after something for its own sake it is called the primary incentive, e.g., the attainment of pleasure and the

cessation of suffering. Secondary incentives are those for which one strives not for their own sake, but ultimately for the sake of the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain.

Sūtra 25

Corroborative instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) is an object in respect of which the notions of the layman (*laukika*) as well as of the expert (*parīkṣaka*) are not in conflict. // i. 1. 25 //

Bhāṣya

Laymen are those who have not surpassed the standard of ordinary men and who have not attained sharp intellect either by nature or by studying the scripture. Experts are the contrary. They are capable of examining an object with the help of 'hypothetical argument' (*tarka*) and the instruments of valid knowledge. An object is considered to be a corroborative instance when it is viewed by the expert in the same way as it is viewed by the layman. By pointing to the defect (*virodha*) in the corroborative instance, the opponents can be silenced. By establishing the soundness (*samādhi*) of the corroborative instance, one's own position can be established. Among the inference-components (*avayava*), it can be used as the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*).

Elucidation

Though Vātsyāyana says that corroborative instance is an object about which there is full concordance of the notions of the layman as well as the expert, still there are cases where the corroborative instance offered is too technical to be comprehended by the layman. Vācaspati Miśra therefore proposes to take corroborative instance in the sense of an object proved by a *pramāṇa* (*Bhāmānī* on *Śāstraka-bhāṣya* ii. 1. 14).

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON
THE PREREQUISITES OF NYĀYA

(*nyāya-pūrvāṅga-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Next [is discussed] 'proved doctrine' (*siddhānta*). The word *siddha* stands for objects that are proved as being such and such and having such and such nature. The establishment (*saṁsthiti*) of the *siddha* is *siddhānta*. Establishment is the determination of the exact character of an object, i.e. the 'specification of its true nature' (*dharma-niyama*) and this—

Sūtra 26

[This *sūtra* is interpreted in two ways. First interpretation :] Proved doctrine (*siddhānta*) is either 'establishment on the basis of a branch of learning' (*tantra-saṁsthiti*) or 'establishment on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhi-karaṇa-saṁsthiti*) or 'establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent's thesis]' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*).

[The alternative interpretation :] Proved doctrine is the establishment on the basis of the admission of objects proved by *pramāṇa*-s

// i. 1. 26 //

Elucidation

In the next *sūtra* Gautama says that proved doctrine is of four kinds. But the present *sūtra* apparently neither defines proved doctrine nor gives a classification of it, as is evident from its alternative meanings. Therefore, even in earlier times, the doubt arose that either of the two *sūtra*-s was irrelevant. Uddyotakara, however, argues that it is not so. The present *sūtra* defines proved doctrine and its classification is given in the next one.

How does the present *sūtra* define proved doctrine? Uddyotakara answers that according to the present *sūtra* proved doctrine is the determination of the true nature of the objects as admitted by a 'branch of learning' (*tantra=śāstra*). But Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa take the word *tantra* in the sense of *pramāṇa*. According to them, therefore, the *sūtra* defines proved doctrine as the determination of the true nature of the objects as established by the *pramāṇa*-s. Of course, the two participants in a debate have their respective *siddhānta*-s, both of which cannot be equally established by

pramāṇa-s. But each of the two is under the conviction that his own *siddhānta* is established by *pramāṇa-s*.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa understands by proved doctrine the *object itself*, which is established by the *pramāṇa-s* and possesses both general and specific characteristics. Vātsyāyana also, in his commentary on the first *sūtra*, says, "Proved doctrine means the object admitted in the form : It exists." Further, from Gautama's own *sūtra-s* (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 28f) in which are given the definitions of the different forms of proved doctrine, we find that proved doctrine is taken in the sense of the object admitted. But Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra say that the *admission of the object* is also to be considered as the proved doctrine. Thus the question is : Are we to understand by proved doctrine the object itself or its admission ? Udayana answers that it depends upon the emphasis put on either of the two. One may choose to put the emphasis on the object itself or on its admission and accordingly proved doctrine may mean either of the two.

Bhāṣya

'Establishment on the basis of a branch of learning' (*tantra-saṁsthiti*) means the 'establishment of an object as admitted by a branch of learning' (*tantra-artha-saṁsthiti*). *Tantra* is a discourse on inter-connected themes [*artha*, lit. objects], i.e. a 'branch of learning' (*śāstra*). 'Establishment on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṁsthiti*) is the establishment of an object which 'is consequential to' (*anuṣakta*) 'another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa*). 'Establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent's thesis]' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*) is the acceptance of an object not critically examined. 'Proved doctrine on the basis of a tentative assumption' (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*) is for the purpose of determining the specific nature of an object.

However, because of the 'difference of the branches of learning' (*tantra-bhedāt*)—

Sūtra 27

Because of the 'differences in the modes of establishment' (*saṁsthiti-arthāntara-bhāvāt*), it is four-fold : 1) 'establishment on the basis of the [unanimity] of all the branches of learning' (*sarva-tantra-saṁsthiti*), 2) 'establishment on the basis of one's own branch of learning' (*prati-tantra-siddhānta*), 3) 'establishment as the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṁsthiti*)

and 4) 'establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent]' (*abhyupagama-saṁsthiti*). // i. 1. 27 //

Bhāṣya

Now, these four modes of establishment are different from one another.

Elucidation

The first form of proved doctrine mentioned in the first interpretation of the previous *sūtra*, viz. establishment on the basis of a branch of learning is sub-divided into two forms, namely establishment on the basis of the unanimity of all the branches of learning and establishment on the basis of one's own branch of learning. This is due to, as Vātsyāyana points out, 'differences among the branches of learning' (*tantra-bheda*).

Bhāṣya

Of these—

Sūtra 28

Proved doctrine on the basis of [the unanimity of] all the branches of learning is an object 'not contradicted by' (*a-viruddha*) any of the other branches of learning and admitted in one's own branch of learning. // i. 1. 28 //

Bhāṣya

As for example, 1) the senses like the olfactory etc., 2) the objects of the senses like smell etc., 3) the elements like earth etc. and 4) the obtainment of valid knowledge of an object by the *pramāṇa*-s.

Elucidation

The expression 'not contradicted by' (*aviruddha*) in the *sūtra* is used to signify that an object, though not mentioned by all the branches of learning and yet not specifically rejected by them, is to be regarded as the proved doctrine based on all the branches of

learning, if it is admitted by one's own branch of learning. Thus, e.g., the illegitimacy of the use of *chala* and *jāti* in a debate is admitted only in the Nyāya system and not specifically rejected by any other system ; thus it is a *sarva-tantra-siddhānta*.

Sūtra 29

'Proved doctrine on the basis of one's own branch of learning' is an object which is accepted in 'one's own allied branch of learning' (*samāna-tantra*) but not accepted in other branches of learning' (*prati-tantra*). // i. 1. 29 //

Bhāṣya

For example, (the *pratitantra-siddhānta*-s) of the Sāṃkhyas are : the non-existent never comes into being, nor is the existent absolutely destroyed ; the conscious [selves] are without modification ; modification occurs in body, senses and mind, in the objects and their causes [i.e. *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and the five *tanmātra*-s]. [The *pratitantra-siddhānta*-s] of the followers of Yoga are : the creation of the material world is due to *karma* (i.e. *adṛṣṭa*); evils (*doṣa*) and motivation (*pravṛtti*) are the causes of *karma*; the conscious [selves] are characterised by their respective qualities [i.e. knowledge, desire, aversion] ; the non-existent comes into being and the existent is absolutely destroyed.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana mentions a number of theses maintained by 'the followers of Yoga' (*yogdñām*). The word *yoga*, when derived by adding the suffix *ac* in the sense of 'having', means the followers of Yoga. But whom does Vātsyāyana refer to as the followers of Yoga ? They cannot obviously be the followers of the well-known Yoga system, closely allied to the Sāṃkhya, because the theses mentioned are quite contrary to the doctrines held by them. Therefore, by the followers of Yoga are to be understood here the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, who are traditionally known as the Śaiva *yogin*-s. The theses mentioned by Vātsyāyana as the *pratitantra-siddhānta* of the followers of Yoga are characteristic of both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. From a remote antiquity they had their own methods and practices of *yoga*, which came down through their line of preceptors. The Naiyāyikas were known as *yogin*-s belonging to the Śaiva and the Pāśupata sects. This is evident from the statement of the Jaina philosopher Guṇaranta (*Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*, p. 51).

In any case, the Vaiśeṣika system was known as *Yoga* even in ancient times and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were accordingly characterised as the 'followers of *yoga*'. The Jaina philosopher Vidyānanda Svāmi, in his work *Patraparīkṣā*, quotes a *sūtra* of Kaṇāda (viz. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv. 1. 1.) and adds, "As it is said by the followers of *yoga*". Further, Guṇaratna opens his discussion of the Nyāya view with the words: "The Naiyāyikas, also known as the *yauga-s*". Therefore, according to the ancient tradition, Vātsyāyana mentions the theses of the Vaiśeṣikas as characteristic of the followers of *yoga*.

Praśastapāda says that Kaṇāda received insight into the Vaiśeṣika doctrines as a result of pleasing Maheśvara by the 'supernatural power' (*vibhūti*) attained through the practice of *yoga*. However, it needs to be remembered further that these Vaiśeṣika doctrines are also the doctrines of the Naiyāyikas. Uddyotakara also says that the *pratītantra-siddhānta* of the followers of *yoga* is that the senses are 'made of material elements' (*bhautika*), while that of the followers of the Sāṃkhya is that the senses are not made of the material elements. The thesis referred to here as that of the follower of *yoga* is shared alike by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore, the theses under discussion are not exclusively those of the Vaiśeṣikas. By the followers of *yoga* are thus to be understood the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa suggests that the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines are called the followers of *yoga* in the following sense. The word *yoga* also means *saṃyoga* or conjunction. Both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are followers of *yoga* because both subscribe to the doctrine of creation through the conjunction of atoms.

Sūtra 30

'Proved doctrine as the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*) is the object which, when proved, also proves certain other objects. // i. 1. 30 //

Bhāṣya

When, an object being proved, there follows [the proof of] other objects and the existence of which is not proved without the latter—the basis on which depends [the proof of these other objects] is the 'proved doctrine as the basis of another proved thesis'. For example, the knower [i.e. the self] is distinct from the senses, because the same object is perceived by the visual as well as the tactual sense [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii 1. 1]. Here the correlated theses are : the multiplicity of the senses ; the senses have fixed objects ; the probans for the inference of the senses are the perceptions of their respective objects ; the senses are the aids to knowledge for the knower ; the substratum of quality is substance which is itself different from the

qualities like smell etc. and the conscious [selves] are not restricted to fixed objects. These theses are proved when the aforementioned thesis [viz. that the self is distinct from the senses] is proved. Without these, again, that cannot be established.

Elucidation

Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta is interpreted in two ways. First, it means the admission of such an object which, when proved, also proves a number of correlated objects. Secondly, it means the correlated objects themselves which are proved as a consequence of the proof of another object. The first interpretation is upheld by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra, the second by Uddyotakara.

Sūtra 31

‘Proved doctrine on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent’s thesis]’ (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*) is the object which is accepted without proof for the purpose of examining its specific character. // i. 1. 31 //

Bhāṣya

When an object is accepted without examination [for the purpose of determining its specific character, it is called *abhyupagama-siddhānta*]. Thus, e.g., one may say : Let sound be admitted to be a substance; but is it eternal or non-eternal ? Thus, admitting it to be a substance, its specific character, namely its eternality or non-eternality, is examined. This *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is employed for demonstrating the excellence of one’s own intellect and for the condemnation of other’s intellect.

Elucidation

• *Abhyupagama-siddhānta* also is explained in two ways. First, as Vātsyāyana explains, it is the tentative admission of a thesis of the opponent for further critical examination of the opponent’s claim as to its specific nature. For example, according to a section of the Mīmāṃsakas [later represented by Kumārila], sound is a substance and it is eternal. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, view sound as a quality and as non-eternal. But the Naiyāyika may tentatively grant that sound is a substance ; even

admitting this he proceeds to show that it cannot be eternal. This tentative admission of the opponent's thesis is thus designed eventually to prove the superiority of his own thesis and the unacceptability of the Mīmāṃsā view that sound is eternal.

According to Uddyotakara, however, *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is the acceptance of a thesis which is implicitly admitted, though not stated in so many words, by the discussion of the nature of the object in the basic treatise of one's own system. Thus, e.g., the *Nyāya-sūtra* does not state in so many words that mind is a sense. But from the critical discussions about the nature of mind in this treatise, it is clear that mind is admitted to be a sense. The acceptance of mind as a sense on the part of the Naiyāyika is an *abhyupagama-siddhānta*. Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana also follow this interpretation.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, argues that from the point of view of Vātsyāyana the admission of mind as a sense would be an example of *sarva-tantra-siddhānta*, because it is contradicted by no other system.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF PROVED DOCTRINE BASED ON NYĀYA

(*nyāyāśraya-siddhānta-lakṣaṇa prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Now are discussed the inference-components.

Sūtra 32

The inference-components (*avayava*) are : 'the preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), the proban (*hetu*), the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*). // i. 1. 32 //

Elucidation

This section, in which Gautama discusses the five inference-components, is known as the 'section on *nyāya*' (*nyāya-prakaraṇa*). The term *nyāya* means the statement of the five inference-components in the order as specified in this *sūtra*. Vātsyāyana has already said (on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 1), "This is *nyāya par excellence*."

Inference is generally divided into two forms, *svārtha* and *parārtha*. By the former is meant inference for the sake of determining truth for one's own sake. The statement of the five components is not a precondition for such an inference. *Parārtha-anumāna* or an inference for the sake of others, however, presupposes the explicit statement of these components, i.e. the employment of *nyāya par excellence*.

In a debate, the two contestants offer contradictory theses. Somebody listening to both these gets perplexed as to which of the two theses is correct. For the purpose of convincing him, both the contestants explicitly state the inference-components in favour of their respective theses. Hence is the need of *nyāya*. As Gaṅgeśa says, the application of *nyāya* is a precondition for the inference for others.

The very possibility of inference for others was questioned by some. Inference means the cause of inferential knowledge or the inferential knowledge itself, while there is neither empirical nor textual ground to defend the possibility of such a cause or knowledge being for the sake of others. It may be answered that inference is said to be for the sake of others because the propositions expressing the inference are employed for the sake of others. But then propositions conveying a perceptual knowledge should as well be considered as perception for the sake of others. As against this view Śrīdhara argues that the propositions expressing the inferential process ultimately cause an inferential knowledge in others (i.e. the third party listening to the debate). That is why the inference is said to be for the sake of others.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, inference for others is nothing but the propositions conveying the inference-components in their totality. Gaṅgeśa, however, views these propositions as only causing the inference for others. Dharmakīrti, in his *Nyāyabindu*, says that the proposition expressing the proban with 'three marks' (*tri-rūpa*)¹, though actually the cause of the inferential knowledge, stands in a secondary sense also for its effect, viz. the inference for the sake of others.

As for the actual number of inference-components, there are different views. According to some there are ten such components while others admit only three. The Naiyāyikas hold the view that there are five inference-components and Uddyotakara argues that the present *sūtra* is designed to specify these. Vātsyāyana, however, only mentions and rejects the view of ten inference-components here.

Bhāṣya

'Some other Naiyāyikas' (*eke naiyāyikāḥ*) claim that the *nyāya* consists of ten components. [The additional five components are] enquiry (*jijñāsā*), doubt

1. The three marks of a valid proban are : 1) presence in the subject (*pakṣasattva*) 2) presence in an indisputable locus of the probandum (*sapakṣasattva*) and 3) absence in an indisputable locus of the absence of the probandum (*vipakṣāsattva*).

(*saṁśaya*), 'apprehension of the potency [of the *pramāṇa*-s to reveal the nature of the *prameya*-s]' (*śakya-prāpti*), incentive (*prayojana*) and 'dispelling of doubt' (*saṁśaya-vyudāsa*). [Now the question is :] Why, then, these are not mentioned?

Enquiry is that which provokes the desire for definite knowledge of an object 'vaguely known' (*a-pratīyamāna*). Why does one enquire about an object vaguely known? Because, after ascertaining the true nature of the object, I shall either avoid or accept or be indifferent to it. Thus, the result of ascertaining the true nature of the object is either the 'knowledge which produces aversion' (*hāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces attraction' (*upādāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces indifference' (*upekṣā-buddhi*). One is led to inquire for the sake of such a knowledge. However, such an enquiry does not prove the existence of any object [and as such, is redundant as an inference-component].

Doubt (*saṁśaya*), the basis of enquiry, is contiguous to right knowledge because it is the perception of two contradictory characteristics. Of these two contradictory characteristics, one is proved to be correct. Though separately mentioned [by Gautama], it [doubt] does not prove any object [and as such is redundant as an inference-component].

Apprehension of potency is [the determination] for the knower that the *pramāṇa*-s are capable of revealing the *prameya*-s. It is not related as a component to the 'propositions proving a thesis' (*sādhaka-vākya*—inference-component), as are the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), etc.

Incentive [for the application of *nyāya*] is the determination of truth (*tattva*). It is the result arrived at by the propositions proving a thesis and not a component part [of this group of propositions].

Dispelling of doubt is the demonstration of the defect in the opponent's thesis. It serves the purpose of arriving at the knowledge of truth by negating it [i.e. the opponent's view]. But it is not a component part of the group of propositions proving a thesis.

In a debate, enquiry etc. are useful in so far as they help in proving the thesis under consideration. However, as having [direct] efficacy in proving a thesis, [only] *pratijñā* etc. become the divisions or parts or components of the group of propositions proving a thesis.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana refers to some ancient Naiyāyikas according to whom the inference-components are ten in number. From a passage in the *Yuktiṭīpikā* [a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*], it appears that a section of Sāṃkhya philosophers held such a view. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that the view held by them is not exactly the same as referred to by Vātsyāyana.

The five additional components mentioned by them are enquiry etc. Though Vātsyāyana discards the claim that these additional five are actual inference-components, he does not reject their utility as such. Uddyotakara explains their real utility in the sense that these are the pre-conditions for a debate : without enquiry etc. the question of the application of *nyāya* does not arise.

Bhāṣya

Of the five inference-components as divided in the previous *sūtra*—

Sūtra 33

‘Preliminary statement of the thesis (*pratijñā*)
is the ‘specific mention of the probandum
(*sādhya-nirdeśa*). // i. 1. 33 //

Bhāṣya

Pratijñā is the specific mention of the probandum, i. e. the proposition stating a specified subject as qualified by the characteristic sought to be proved [of it], e.g. sound is non-eternal.

Elucidation

The word *sādhya* is used in two senses, viz. 1) the probandum and 2) the subject as characterised by the probandum (*sādhya-dharmī* or *pakṣa*). Vātsyāyana takes the word as used in the present *sūtra* in the second sense.

Sūtra 34

The proban (*hetu*) is the proposition stating the ‘cause of the establishment of the probandum (*sādhya-sādhana*) through the resemblance [of the subject or *pakṣa*] with the ‘instance cited’ (*udāharaṇa*). // i. 1. 34 //

Bhāṣya

The proban is the proposition conveying the proof for [the establishment of] the probandum [in the subject] through the resemblance [of the subject or *pakṣa*] with the instance cited. [In other words,] the proban is the specification of a characteristic as proving the probandum—a characteristic which is perceived in the subject in the same way in which it is perceived in the instance cited. For example, 'because it is something produced' [in the inference : sound is non-eternal]. It is found [in the instance of pot etc.] that whatever is produced is non-eternal.

Elucidation

Proban (*he'u*) is of two kinds—based on similarity (*sādharmya*) and based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*). The present *sūtra* defines the first kind of proban as that by virtue of the presence of which the subject resembles the instance cited. For example, in the inference "Sound is non-eternal", the subject "sound" resembles the instance cited, viz. "the pot", in "being something produced." Hence "being something produced" is the proban of the inference.

A characteristic perceived either in the instance cited alone or in the subject alone cannot be a proban for an inference. As perceived in the instance cited, it gives us the knowledge of co-existence of the characteristic with the probandum. Perceived over again in the subject, it becomes the ground for the inference of the probandum in the subject.

Bhāṣya

Is this alone the definition of a proban? The answer is in the negative. What then?

Sūtra 35

Similarly, [the proban is the proposition stating the cause of the establishment of the probandum] through the dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) [of the subject or *pakṣa* with the instance cited].
// i. 1. 35 //

Bhāṣya

[The second kind of] proban is the proposition conveying the proof for the

establishment of the probandum [in the subject] through the dis-similarity [of the subject] with the instance cited. How? Sound is non-eternal, because it is something produced. Whatever is not-produced is eternal, e.g., substances like the self etc.

Elucidation

The second form of proban, viz. proban based on dis-similarity, is explained here. Just as a proban based on similarity implies an instance similar to the subject in possessing the same characteristic, so also a proban based on dis-similarity implies an instance which is dis-similar to the subject in possessing a contrary characteristic. That is why Vātsyāyana mentions for the same inference an instance with a contrary characteristic, namely the self, which is not produced.

Uddyotakara, however, says that the example given by Vātsyāyana of the proban based on dis-similarity is not acceptable. In this example, the proban remains as a matter of fact the same as that of *sādhurmya-hetu*; what is different is only the mode of expression, which difference, again, is due only to the difference of the instance cited. A proban genuinely based on dis-similarity is called for only in an inference where there is no agreed instance based on similarity. Thus, e.g., while arguing against the deniers of the self that “the living body possesses a soul, because it is characterised by vital breath”, it is not possible to find an agreed instance based on similarity, because according to the deniers of the soul no living body possesses it. Failing to find an instance based on similarity, an instance dis-similar to the subject—e.g. the pot—is to be resorted to. Thus the inference would be : “The living body must possess a soul, because it is characterised by vital breath. What does not possess a soul is not characterised by vital breath, e.g. the pot.” The proban “being characterised by vital breath” is based on dis-similarity, because, according to both the parties, the subject, viz. the living body, possesses the vital breath, whereas the instance cited—viz. the pot—does not possess it. Gaṅgeśa also accepts this instance cited by Uddyotakara.

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that Vātsyāyana takes the real purport of these two *sūtra*-s as that the two forms of proban differ from each other due to the difference in the instance cited. When the instance cited is similar to the subject, the proban is one based on similarity. When the instance cited is dis-similar to the subject, the proban is one based on dis-similarity. There is no rule that the proban based on dis-similarity is to be taken only when an instance based on similarity is not possible.

In explaining these two *sūtra*-s, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that the primary purpose of Gautama is to give a general definition of proban as that ‘which proves the existence of the probandum in the subject’ (*sādhya-sādhana*). Without such a general definition, neither the second inference-component, viz. the statement of the proban or *hetu*, nor the subsequent discussion of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) can be legitimate. Jayanta claims

that over and above offering the general definition of proban, these two *sūtra*-s define the two forms of proban, namely 1) the proban 'having agreement in presence as well as agreement in absence' (*anvaya-vyatirekī*) with the probandum and 2) the proban having only 'agreement in absence' (*vyatirekī*) with the probandum.

Jayanta refers to another interpretation offered by others according to which these two *sūtra*-s are to be understood together as referring to only one form of proban, namely 'a proban based on both similarity and dis-similarity' (*sādharmya-vaidharmya-hetu*). According to this interpretation, therefore, every inference must have in its favour two instances, one similar and the other dis-similar to the subject.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that this other interpretation cannot be accepted. Gautama would not have felt the need of two separate *sūtra*-s if his real purpose were to define only one form of proban. Nor is the proban based on both similarity and dis-similarity the only form of proban, because there may be a proban based on similarity alone. Further, Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 39 clearly asserts that probans have two forms according to the nature of the instances cited.

Though admitting that a general definition of proban is implied in the previous *sūtra*, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues against Jayanta's view that such a general definition is the primary purpose of the two *sūtra*-s. Gautama, as a matter of fact, designs this section to discuss the five inference-components and as such his main objective here is to mention the second inference-component, namely the 'proposition stating the proban' (*hetu-vākya*). [Moreover, the grammatical peculiarity of the previous *sūtra* goes against Jayanta's view.]

Sūtra 36

Exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is a proposition stating an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) which being 'similar to the subject' (*sādhya-sādharmya*) 'possesses its characteristic' (*tat-dharma-bhāvi*).
// i. 1. 36 //

Bhāṣya

Similarity with the subject means possessing the same characteristic [as possessed by the subject]. An object becomes an instance by virtue of possessing the characteristic of it [i.e. of the subject] because of its similarity with the subject. The expression *tat-dharma* [of the *sūtra*] means 'the characteristic of it' and 'of it' means 'of the *sādhya*'. *Sādhya*, again, is of two kinds : 1) a characteristic as belonging to a subject (*dharmin*), e.g. non-eternality as belonging to sound and 2) a subject as qualified by a characteristic, e.g., sound is non-eternal [i.e. sound as

characterised by non-eternality]. Here, by mentioning the word *tat* [*tat*=*sādhya* in the expression *tat-dharma-bhāvi*], the second [kind of *sādhya*] is meant. Why? Because of the separate mention of the word *dharma* [characteristic]. [The word *tat* means the *sādhya*. *Sādhya* may mean either a characteristic or a subject. In the present context, *tat* or *sādhya* means only the latter, because in the expression *tat-dharma-bhāvi*, the word *dharma* or characteristic is mentioned over again.] *Tat-dharma-bhāva* means the presence of the characteristic of the subject. The instance in which there is a presence of this characteristic is an instance which being similar to the subject possesses its characteristic. And this is known as the exemplification. It is observed that the objects like the cooking pot etc., which have the characteristic of being produced, are non-eternal.]¹

Now, whatever is produced is said to have the characteristic of being produced. Again, it [i.e. the object with the characteristic of being produced] does not come into being as already existing [i.e. 'being produced' means 'being previously non-existing']. It discards its intrinsic nature [at the time of its destruction] and is completely destroyed. Thus it [i.e., whatever has the characteristic of being produced] is non-eternal. In this way, the characteristic of being produced is the proban and non-eternality is the probandum. This 'proban-probandum relation' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*) between two characteristics is found to exist somewhere [i.e. in some object], because of similarity [i.e. the similarity between the instance cited and the subject of inference]. Perceiving this proban-probandum relation in an instance, one infers it also in the case of sound. [Thus :] Sound is also non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced, e.g. the cooking pot etc. It is called exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), because by this is exemplified (*udāhriyate*) the proban-probandum relation.

Elucidation

The third inference-component is exemplification. It is of two kinds, based on similarity (*sādharmya-udāharaṇa*) and based on dis-similarity (*vaidharmya-udāharaṇa*). In this *sūtra* Gautama explains the former. Since, however, a general definition of exemplification is called for, Vātsyāyana adds it in the concluding sentences of his commentary by the etymological analysis of the word *udāharaṇa* itself. Thus, exemplification

1. Though not found in the available texts of the *bhāṣya*, Phanibhūṣaṇa adds within brackets this sentence to the *bhāṣya* under the impression that from Uddyotakara's explanation it appears that such a sentence might have originally belonged to the text of the *bhāṣya* and moreover, a sentence like this appears to be quite appropriate for the context.

is an instance by which is exemplified the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics.

Vātsyāyana explains as follows the first form of exemplification, namely that based on similarity. In the inference, "Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced", the cooking pot may be taken as the *udāharaṇa*. The characteristic of being produced exists in the cooking pot, and therefore it is non-eternal. It was non-existent before its production and it will be non-existent after its destruction. The same characteristic of being produced exists in sound also. The subject of the inference, viz. sound, and the instance cited, viz. the cooking pot, are thus similar. In the *udāharaṇa*, the two characteristics, viz. being produced and being non-eternal, are found to co-exist. This establishes the proban-probandum relation between these two. From the perception of this proban-probandum relation it is inferred that sound, which possesses the characteristic of being produced, also possesses the characteristic of being non-eternal.

As is evident from Vātsyāyana's illustration, the propositions stating the *udāharaṇa* should mention not only the proban-probandum relation but also a concrete instance in which the relation can be perceived. In the case of the inference under discussion, the proposition conveying the *udāharaṇa* is : Whatever possesses the characteristic of being produced has the characteristic of being non-eternal, e.g. the cooking pot. However, Gaṅgeśa thinks that the mention of a concrete instance in the proposition conveying the *udāharaṇa*, being casual, is not universally necessary. According to him, therefore, the *udāharaṇa-vākya* may simply be : Whatever possesses the characteristic of being produced has the characteristic of being non-eternal.

Sūtra 37

[Exemplification is also a proposition stating an instance which] 'being opposite in character to that' (*tat-viparyayāt*) [i.e. being dis-similar to the subject or *sādhya-dharmī*] is 'opposite in nature' (*viparīta*) [i.e. does not possess the characteristic of the subject.] // i. 1. 37 //

Bhāṣya

The expression that 'exemplification is an instance' [of the previous *sūtra*] is to be read along with the expressions of the present *sūtra*. Exemplification is also a proposition stating an instance which 'being dis-similar to the subject' (*sādhya-vaiddharmyāt*) 'does not possess the characteristic' (*a-tat-dharma-bhāvi*) of the subject. Sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced;

whatever is not-produced is eternal, e.g. the self etc. Now, the instance like that of the self, is dis-similar to the subject, because it has the characteristic of being not-produced; and hence it does not possess the characteristic of the subject. In other words, the characteristic of being non-eternal, which exists in the subject, is not present in it [i.e. in the instance]. Finding in the instance like that of the self, that being not-produced it cannot be eternal, one infers the contrary in sound. Having the characteristic of being produced, sound is non-eternal.

For a proban based on similarity, the exemplification is a proposition stating an instance which, being similar to the subject, possesses its characteristic. For a proban based on dis-similarity, the exemplification is a proposition stating an instance which, being dis-similar to the subject, does not possess the characteristic of the subject. One, finding the two characteristics as having proban-probandum relation in the instance mentioned first, also infers their proban-probandum relation in the subject. One, finding that of the two characteristics the absence of one is accompanied by the absence of the other in the instance mentioned second, infers in the subject the existence of one from the existence of the other. Now the pseudo-probans are not probans at all, because this [proban-probandum relation indicated by the instance cited] does not exist in the case of the pseudo-proban.

This potentiality of the proban and the exemplification, being extremely subtle and understood only with great difficulty, can be realised only by the accomplished.

Elucidation

The proban-probandum relation in the case of an 'exemplification based on dis-similarity' is the relation of the absence of one characteristic with that of another. Thus, e.g., in the instance of the self we find the absence of being not-produced as related to the absence of being non-eternal. Such an invariable relation between two cases of absence is known as *vyatireka-vyāpti*, for *vyatireka* means absence or *abhāva*. However, the form of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* incorporated in the illustration of exemplification based on dis-similarity as given by Vātsyāyana is characterised as illogical by Vācaspati Miśra. The proper form of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* is: Wherever there is the 'absence of the probandum' (*sādhya-abhāva*), there is the 'absence of the proban' (*hetu-abhāva*). But Vātsyāyana reverses the order and gives the form as: Wherever there is the absence of the proban, there is the absence of the probandum. Thus, the form of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* incorporated in the example given by Vātsyāyana is: Wherever there is the 'absence of being produced' there is the 'absence of being non-eternal'. But its proper form should have been: Wherever there is the 'absence

of 'being non-eternal', there is the 'absence of being produced'. Though in 'certain cases, the form of *vyatireka-vyāpti* given by Vātsyāyana may not create serious logical difficulty, in certain other cases it is clearly untenable. Thus, e.g., in the case of the inference of fire from smoke, the *vyatireka-vyāpti* cannot have the form : Wherever there is the absence of smoke, there is the absence of fire. Because in the case of the red-hot iron-ball, there is no smoke though there is fire. The correct form here, therefore, is : Wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke. Accordingly, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also interprets the *sūtra* in a different way. The expression *tat-viparyayāt* means 'from the absence of the probandum' and the expression *viparītam* means 'the absence of the proban.' In other words, Jayanta interprets the *sūtra* as meaning : the case for the exemplification based on dis-similarity would be a case where the absence of the proban is inferred from the absence of the probandum.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that there are, as a matter of fact, two types of *vyāpti*, called *sama-vyāpti* and *viśama-vyāpti*. The universal relation between the proban and the probandum, in other words, is of two kinds, viz convertible and non-convertible. In the former case, the relative position of the proban and the probandum can be interchanged, whereas in the latter this cannot be done. The example mentioned by Vātsyāyana is a case of *sama-vyāpti*, where the position of the proban and the probandum can be interchanged. Only in case of *viśama-vyāpti*, the form given by Vācaspati Miśra and others needs to be strictly maintained.

While explaining exemplification based on similarity, Vātsyāyana says, "One finding two characteristics as having proban-probandum relation in the instance...also infers their proban-probandum relation in the subject". Thus, Vātsyāyana's view amounts to this : While perceiving smoke and fire in the kitchen, one perceives the coexistence of that particular smoke with that particular fire. Afterwards, on perceiving smoke in the hill one perceives that this particular smoke is similar to the smoke perceived in the kitchen. From this one infers that this smoke also coexists with a particular fire, viz. the fire in the hill. Thus, in Vātsyāyana's view, the coexistence between smoke and fire perceived in the instance cited is but the coexistence of a particular smoke and a particular fire. Such a relation is generally called *viśeṣa-vyāpti* or an invariable relation between two particulars. From this is inferred the relation between smoke and fire in the hill.

But Vācaspati Miśra does not subscribe to such a view. Gaṅgeśa also argues that while perceiving smoke and fire in the kitchen, one perceives the coexistence of smoke in general with fire in general, because, while perceiving smoke and fire in the kitchen, one also perceives all cases of smoke and fire through an extraordinary sense-object contact called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* : a perception of smoke is also a perception of smokeness inhering in the smoke and this smokeness establishes an extra-ordinary contact with all cases of smoke with the sense concerned. Similar is the case of the perception of fire. This perception of the coexistence of all smoke with all fire leaves behind a reminiscent impression, which is revived when one perceives later

the smoke in the hill. One thus recalls that all cases of smoke are cases of fire and hence infers that this case of smoke in the hill is also a case of fire.

The problem of inference will be discussed further under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 37ff.

Sūtra 38

Application (*upanaya*) is the proposition which characterises the subject as 'this is similar' (*tathā*) [to the instance cited] or as 'this is not similar' (*na tathā*) [to the instance cited] 'according to the nature of the instance cited' (*udāharaṇāpekṣa*). // i. 1. 38 //

Bhāṣya

The expression *udāharaṇāpekṣa* means 'being determined by the instance cited' or 'being dependant on the nature of the instance cited' (*udāharaṇa-vaśa*). The expression 'being dependant on' (*vaśaḥ*) means potency. In the instance having similarity with the subject, it is found that the objects like the cooking pot, which have the characteristic of being produced, are non-eternal. [This leads to] the assertion of the characteristic of being produced regarding the subject [of the inference, viz.] sound : like the cooking pot sound has the characteristic of being produced. Again, in the instance having dis-similarity with the subject, it is found that the objects like the self, which have the characteristic of being not-produced, are eternal. [This leads to] the assertion of the characterisation of sound as being something produced, through the assertion which negates the characteristic of being not-produced in respect of sound : unlike the self, sound does not have the characteristic of being not-produced. These two forms of assertion result from the two forms of instance cited. This is called assertion (*upasaṃhāra*) because by this is asserted [the subject as characterised by the proban having an invariable relation with the probandum].

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, Gautama gives the general definition of application (*upanaya*) as 'the proposition which characterises the subject according to the nature of the instance cited'. Its two specific forms are mentioned by him by the expressions : 1) *tathā* or 'this is similar to the instance cited' and 2) *na tathā* or 'this is not similar to the instance cited.'

•Vātsyāyana illustrates the first form of application thus : One ascertains that sound has the characteristic of being produced, which is perceived in the instance of the cooking pot as invariably related to the characteristic of being non-eternal. This assertion, based on the instance of similarity, of the subject as possessing the proban which is invariably related to the probandum is the first form of application.

The second form of application is illustrated thus : One ascertains that sound does not possess the characteristic of being not-produced, which characteristic is perceived in the instance of the self as invariably related to the characteristic of being eternal. This assertion, based on the instance of dis-similarity of the subject as possessing the proban [i.e. the absence of the characteristic of being not-produced=the presence of the characteristic of being produced] which is invariably related to the probandum [i.e. the absence of the characteristic of being eternal=the characteristic of being non-eternal] is the second form of application.

Application in both these forms contains the *vyāpti* or the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum. In the first form of application the *vyāpti* is *anvayī*, i.e. based on the agreement in presence. In the second form of application the *vyāpti* is *vyatirekī*, i.e. based on the agreement in absence.

Gaṅgeśa defines application as a proposition which leads to the form of perception technically called 'the third perception of the proban' (*tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*) [See under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 5].

Bhāṣya

In spite of the proban being of two forms, the exemplification being of two forms and, consequently, the application being of two forms, that which remains the same is—

Sūtra 39

The conclusion (*nigamana*) which is the restatement (*punaḥ-vacana*) of the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*) 'along with the statement of the proban' (*hetu-apadeśāt*).
// i. 1. 39 //

Bhāṣya

After the statement of the proban based on similarity or dis-similarity in accordance with the nature of the instance cited, it is finally concluded : Therefore,

sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced. It is called *nigamana*, because by it the four propositions, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya* are made to 'converge into' (*nigamyante*) a single coherent meaning. By 'convergence into' is meant 'becoming efficacious' (*samarthyante*), i.e. 'being interrelated' (*sambadhyante*).

When the proban is based on similarity, the inference (*vākya*, i.e. *nyāya-vākya*) is the group of the five propositions, viz.

- 1) The preliminary statement of the thesis is : Sound is non-eternal.
- 2) The proban is : Because of having the characteristic of being produced.
- 3) The exemplification is : Objects like the cooking pot having the characteristic of being produced are non-eternal.
- 4) The application is : Similarly, sound also has the characteristic of being produced.
- 5) The conclusion is : Therefore, sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced.

When, again, the proban is based on dis-similarity :

- 1) Sound is non-eternal.
- 2) Because of having the characteristic of being produced.¹
- 3) Objects like the self, not having the characteristic of being produced, are found to be eternal.
- 4) But sound does not have the characteristic of being not-produced.
- 5) Therefore, sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced.

Elucidation

Vācaspati Miśra points out that the conclusion is not a mere repetition of the preliminary statement of the thesis. At the stage of the preliminary statement of the thesis, it is merely a tentative assertion and remains yet to be proved. At the stage of the conclusion, however, it is re-stated as already proved.

Bhāṣya

The instruments of valid knowledge [underlying the inference-components], which converge in such an inference consisting of the group of these components,

1. Though this proban seems to be identical with the proban based on similarity, in Vātsyāyana's view the real difference between the two probans is due to the difference between the two instances cited for them.

establish the thesis, being related with one another. This convergence* is [as follows].

The preliminary statement of the thesis is based on verbal testimony. Because the 'communication of a trustworthy person' (*āpta-upadeśa*) is 'established more firmly' (*pratisandhāna*) and because the trustworthiness of persons other than the seers [regarding super-empirical subjects or *alaukika-viśaya*¹] is not accepted. The proban is inference, because by perceiving [the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum] in the instance cited true knowledge [of the proban] is arrived at. This is explained in the commentary on exemplification [i.e. on *Nyāya-sūtra* I. 1. 36-7]. Exemplification is based on perception, because what is not perceived is proved by the perceived. Application is comparison (*upamāna*), because the assertion is in the form: 'This is similar' (*tathā iti*). Further, because even in the case of the assertion having the form 'this is not similar' (*na tathā iti*), the presence of an opposite characteristic* [in the subject] is verbally ascertained by negating the characteristic of the similar. The demonstration of the capability of all these [instruments of valid knowledge] to combine for the sake of establishing the central thesis is conclusion. Their [i.e. of the inference-components] interdependence is as follows. Without the preliminary statement of the thesis, the proban etc. become irrelevant and as such would have been useless. Without the proban 1) what is there to be taken as the ground [for establishing the thesis], 2) what is to be ascertained in the instance cited as well as the subject and 3) what is to be taken as that by stating which the preliminary statement of the thesis can be re-stated in the form of the conclusion? Without the exemplification, 1) the similarity or dis-similarity with which could be taken as the ground for establishing the probandum and 2) the similarity with which could make application possible? Without the application, the characteristic mentioned as the ground being not definitely ascertained as existing in the subject, cannot establish the probandum. Without the conclusion, what can lead to the knowledge of the convergence for the sake of a single thesis of *pratijñā* etc., for otherwise their inter-relation would have remained unknown.

Elucidation

After explaining the five inference-components, Vātsyāyana proceeds to show how these conclusively establish a thesis with the help of the four instruments of valid knowledge underlying them. This is already mentioned by him in the commentary on the first *sūtra*.

Vātsyāyana says that *pratijñā* is based on verbal testimony. In a debate the two

1. This is added by Phanibhūṣaṇa in his translation of the commentary presumably for reconciling the present statement of Vātsyāyana with those contained in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* I.1.7.

contesting parties state their own theses, which are already established through verbal testimony in the form of their respective authoritative works. Their purpose is to establish beyond all doubt their respective theses with the help of inference, and, when possible, finally with the help of perception.

Vātsyāyana says that proban is inference as an instrument of valid knowledge. In case of an inference, the 'proban is perceived for the first time' (*prathama-liṅga-darśana*) in an instance as invariably related with the probandum. The 'proban is perceived for the second time' (*dvitīya-liṅga-darśana*) as existing in the subject. This second perception of the proban leads to the recollection of its 'invariable relation with the probandum' (*vyāpti*) previously perceived in the instance, and hence the second perception of the proban becomes indirectly an instrument of valid inferential knowledge. The second inference-component, viz. the proban, is based on an inference in this sense of the second perception of the proban.

The exemplification, says Vātsyāyana, is based on perception. The significance of this is that without an ultimate or basic perceptual knowledge there can be no inference, for the knowledge of the invariable relation of the proban and the probandum, which is crucial for inference, must be perceptual in nature and this invariable relation is perceived in the instance cited.

The application, says Vātsyāyana, is based on comparison. In the case of comparison there must be a statement of an authoritative person pointing to the similarity between two objects, e.g., the *gavaya* is like the cow. The application resembles such a statement, because it also points to the similarity between two objects, e.g. between sound and the cooking pot [in so far as both are produced].

[Phañibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that in the present context *upamāna* or comparison as an instrument of valid knowledge is not taken in its usually accepted sense in the Nyāya philosophy, viz. that which leads to the valid knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by it. Vātsyāyana's justification for taking *upamāna* in a special sense in the present context seems to be that according to him *upamāna* may also have other objects though its primary object is the 'knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by it' (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha*).]

The special significance of *nigamana* or conclusion is that though the inference-components are separately mentioned, yet they form a coherent whole and converge to prove a central thesis.

• Vātsyāyana lastly shows the special relevance of each of the inference-components in an inferential process.

Bhāṣya

Next [is mentioned] the special purpose of [employing] each of the inference-components. The purpose of *pratijñā* is to state the subject as having the

characteristic sought to be proved of it. The purpose of *hetu* is to state how an object, by virtue of its similarity or dis-similarity with the instance cited, proves the characteristic sought to be proved. The purpose of *udāharaṇa* is to state the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics in the same locus. The purpose of *upanaya* is to indicate the coexistence [in the subject] of the two characteristics, which are the proban and the probandum. The purpose of *nigamana* is to exclude the contrary possibility of the absence of the probandum [i.e., the characteristic sought to be proved] in the subject, after the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics perceived in an instance is ascertained.

When *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are thus correctly stated, the possibility of a multiplicity of *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, resulting from a diversity of defects indicated on the basis of similarity and dis-similarity, is excluded. Because one resorting to *jāti* points to defects ignoring the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics perceived in an instance. When the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics is properly established and when it is perceived in the instance cited, the characteristic actually proving the probandum rather than mere similarity or dis-similarity will be taken as the proban,

Elucidation

When the *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are accurate, it is not possible for the opponent to point to defects in an argument by posing *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* against it. *Jāti* cannot be posed against an argument with an accurate *hetu*; it can be posed against an argument only when superficial similarity or dis-similarity is taken as the proban.

Different views regarding the number of inference-components: The Mīmāṃsakas claim that there are only three components of an inference. These are either *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* or *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. In the first of these two alternatives, the purpose of *upanaya* is served by *hetu* and the purpose of *nigamana* by *pratijñā*. In the second alternative, the purpose of *hetu* is served by *upanaya* and that of *pratijñā* by *nigamana*.

As against this view, Gaṅgeśa argues that without *upanaya* there can be no 'third perception of the proban' (*trtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*), the immediate cause of inferential knowledge. It may be objected that the third perception of the proban is redundant. Nevertheless, it must be admitted by all that the definite knowledge of the subject as possessing the characteristic or proban invariably related to the probandum is essential for an inference. *Upanaya* has special relevance by way of giving such a knowledge, which cannot be obtained from *hetu*, because *hetu* is the bare statement of the ground of the inference. Therefore, *upanaya* is as necessary as *hetu*. [Secondly, neither *pratijñā* nor *nigamana* can be considered redundant, for *pratijñā* represents the thesis as yet to be proved while *nigamana* represents it as already proved.]

After the statement of the proban (*hetu*) it is necessary to state the instance

(*udāharaṇa*), which shows the proban-probandum relation between the two characteristics, viz. the one sought to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*) and the other cited as the ground (*hetu*). According to the Jainas, however, the *udāharaṇa* is redundant. *Vyāpti* or the universal relation between the proban and the probandum may be of two kinds, called *antar-vyāpti* and *vahir-vyāpti*. The universal relation *as existing in the subject of an inference* between two characteristics is *antar-vyāpti*, while the same universal relation *as existing elsewhere* is *vahir-vyāpti*. Thus, in the case of inferring fire from smoke in the hill, the universal relation between smoke and fire as existing in the hill is *antar-vyāpti*, while the same universal relation existing elsewhere—e.g. in the kitchen—is *vahir-vyāpti*. The Jainas argue that if inference is at all possible, it can be so only on the strength of *antar-vyāpti* and thus *vahir-vyāpti* is unnecessary. Hence, *udāharaṇa*—which is but a statement of *vahir-vyāpti*—is redundant. Moreover, the purposes of *upanaya* and *nigamana* is already served by *pratijñā* and *hetu*. As such, *pratijñā* and *hetu* are the only two necessary components of an inference.

Some of the Buddhists, again, though defining *pratijñā*, do not consider it to be a necessary inference-component on the ground that it has no relevance for establishing the ultimate thesis. They further claim that *upanaya* serves the purpose of *hetu* and *nigamana* is just superfluous. According to them, therefore, there are only two inference-components, namely *upanaya* and *udāharaṇa*.

But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that the alleged *antar-vyāpti* is nothing but an application of *vyāpti* in general (or *sāmānya-vyāpti*) to a particular case and *udāharaṇa* points to this *vyāpti* in general. Thus, the relation between all smoke and all fire is *sāmānya-vyāpti*, while the alleged *antar-vyāpti* is nothing but an application of it, viz. the relation between the smoke as existing in the hill and the fire as existing in the hill. Thus, as a statement of the *sāmānya-vyāpti*, *udāharaṇa* cannot be redundant.

Phaṇḍibhūṣaṇa concludes by showing that *nigamana* is necessary over and above *pratijñā* because of two major considerations. First, it shows that the first four inference-components converge in establishing a central thesis. Secondly, it establishes the central thesis conclusively by way of negating the possibility of any contrary alternative.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON NYĀYA

(*nyāya-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Next should be stated the definition of *tarka*. Hence is said the following.

Sūtra 40

‘Hypothetical argmuent’ (*tarka*) is a form of deliberation (*ūha*) for determining the specific nature of ‘an object whose real nature is yet to be known’ (*a-vijñāta-tattve arthe*) by pointing out the real grounds [for it]. // i. 1. 40 //

Elucidation

The word *tarka* is used in various senses. According to some—e.g. the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists—it is a form of inference. However, as one of the sixteen categories enumerated by Gautama, it carries a technical sense. It means a form of deliberation (*ūha*) which acts as an accessory to a *pramāṇa*, without itself being a *pramāṇa*. The purpose of such a deliberation is the attainment of ‘the right knowledge of an object’ (*tattva-jñāna*). How can it lead to such a knowledge? Because it points to the real grounds or proofs in favour of the knowledge. But what is the nature of the object for which such a deliberation is appropriate? It has relevance for an object which is known in general but whose specific nature is not yet known. The question of such a deliberation does not arise in case of an object which is completely unknown or the specific nature of which is already determined.

Bhāṣya

Regarding an object the specific nature of which is not yet known, there arises an enquiry in the form : “I should like to know it [i.e. its specific nature].” In respect of the object thus enquired, one separately considers [the possibility of] two contradictory characteristics [as belonging to it] : “Is this its specific nature ?” or “Is its specific nature not this ?” The enquirer ultimately ascertains one of the two characteristics thus doubted by way of providing proof [in its favour], i.e. because there is ground or proof or justification in favour of this alternative. As there is definite proof in favour of this alternative, the object must be of such nature and not otherwise. Here is an example.

* The enquiry takes the form : "I should like to know the exact nature of the knower that cognises the various objects known". The doubt takes the form : "Is this [knower] of the nature of something produced or of something not produced ?" One then asserts the specific characteristic in favour of which one finds definite ground in respect of the object [the specific nature of which is] doubted and the specific nature of which is unknown. [The assertion takes the following form :] Only when the knower is of the nature of something not produced [i.e. is eternal], it can enjoy the fruits of its own actions [i.e. can enjoy the pleasure or pain resulting from the actions of its previous births]. [Further], of suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge—each of the succeeding one causes the preceding one and on the removal of each succeeding one is removed the immediately preceding one, thus ultimately resulting in liberation. In this way, there can be worldly existence and liberation [only on the assumption that the knower is of the nature of something not produced]. On the assumption that the knower is of the nature of something produced, there can be [no explanation of] worldly existence and liberation. [If the knower is viewed as something produced, it will have to be considered as] being conjoined with body, senses, mind and awareness [only] at the moment it is produced and hence this [connection with body etc.] will not be the result of its own previous action. When something is produced, it is produced not as something previously existing and hence there can be no enjoyment of the fruits of the knower's own actions which are non-existing or completely destroyed. On the same ground, the same knower cannot have connections with various bodies [in its different births] nor can it have absolute cessation of connection with body [during liberation]. The alternative, for which no adequate ground is ascertained, is not asserted. Deliberation of this nature is known as *tarka*.

Why is it (*tarka*) considered an accessory to [the attainment of] right knowledge and not right knowledge as such ? Because it does not [by itself] establish [one of the alternatives] definitely. It simply asserts one of the characteristics by pointing to the real grounds but does not [by itself] ascertain or establish or demonstrate in the form : "The object *must be* of such nature."

How, then, can it be an accessory to true knowledge ? It can be an accessory to true knowledge because such a deliberation, by asserting the grounds in favour of true knowledge [i.e. in favour of the correct alternative], strengthens the efficacy of the instrument of valid knowledge [and from this enhanced efficacy] results right knowledge.

Tarka, which thus is an accessory to the instruments of valid knowledge, is mentioned in the *sūtra* defining *vāda* (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 42) conjointly with *pramāṇa*, because it lends support to *pramāṇa*.

In the expression 'an object whose real nature is yet to be known' (*avijñāta-tattve arthe*), 'real nature' (*tattva*) means the identity of the object as it is rather than its contrary, i.e. its absolute sameness.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana begins with a reference to the situation that calls for *tarka*. First, there arises an enquiry into the exact nature of an object. This is followed by a doubt provoked by the possibility of contradictory alternatives as to its real nature. *Tarka* dispels this doubt by way of pointing to the ground in favour of one of these alternatives.

Vācaspati, however, points out that generally speaking an enquiry into the exact nature of an object takes place after there is a doubt as to its exact nature, though there are cases of doubt following the enquiry, in which cases alone *tarka* has its efficacy. Accordingly, Vātsyāyana says that enquiry is followed by doubt, which is settled by *tarka*.

Vātsyāyana next explains and illustrates how *tarka* dispels the doubt and helps the attainment of right knowledge. Though *tarka* by itself does not produce certain knowledge, it enhances the efficacy of the instruments of valid knowledge and by way of dispelling the possibility of doubt helps the instrument of valid knowledge to have unfettered efficacy in ascertaining the true nature of an object.

However, Udayana—and following him Varadarāja—define *tarka* as *aniṣṭa-prasaṅga*, literally [a form of argument which imposes on the opponent] an admission of 'the illogical' (*aniṣṭa*). The illogical or *aniṣṭa* may be either the rejection of what is well-proved or the acceptance of the unproved. Thus, e.g., if one asserts that water cannot quench thirst, it will be objected that no thirsty person should drink water. But this will be an admission of the illogical, because the quenching of thirst by water is well-proved. Again, if one asserts that water causes internal burning, it will be objected that by drinking water I should also suffer from internal burning. But this will be an admission of the illogical, because the possibility of water producing internal burning is unproved.

The followers of Navya-nyāya explain *tarka* in strict inferential terminology. *Tarka*, according to them, is the wrong attribution of the pervader (*vyāpaka*) resulting from the wrong attribution of the pervaded (*vyāpya*) in an object where the absence of the pervader is already established. Thus, e.g., in the fire-smoke relation, fire is pervader and smoke is pervaded and it is well-established that fire does not exist in water. If, however, somebody wrongly attributes smoke to water, the following *tarka* could be posed against him: If the water contains smoke, it should as well contain fire. The function of such a *tarka* is two-fold. First, it helps to 'ascertain the right nature of an object' (*viṣṭaya-pariśodhaka*),—e.g. the absence of smoke in water. Secondly, it helps to 'ascertain the invariable relation between two terms' (*vyāpti-grāhaka*) by negating the possibility of any doubt about it, e.g. the possible doubt about the universal relation existing between smoke and fire is dispelled by the *tarka* that if there is no such universal relation between the two, then there should be between them no causal connection either. *

Udayana classifies *tarka* under five heads, viz. 1) *ātmāśraya* or self-dependence, 2) *anyonyāśraya* or reciprocal dependence, 3) *cakrākāśraya* or vicious circle, 4) *anavasthā*

or infinite regress and 5) *aniṣṭa-prasaṅga* or the acceptance of the illogical. But Phaṇi-bhūṣaṇa comments that the essential nature of *tarka* is the acceptance of the illogical, though Udayana mentions all these forms for the sake of a detailed and comprehensive understanding of it.

As Udayana, Varadarāja, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (Mīmāṃsaka author of *Mānameyodaya*) and others show, *tarka* is an accessory not only to inference but also to the other instruments of valid knowledge and thus it helps the attainment of right knowledge.

Bhāṣya

In the context of such *tarka*,

Sūtra 41

‘Final ascertainment’ (*nirṇaya*) is the determination (*avadhāraṇa*) of [the right nature of] an object (*artha*) ‘after having an initial doubt’ (*vimṛśya*) [about it] through [the establishment] of the thesis (*pakṣa*) and [the refutation of] the anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*). // i. 1. 41. //

Bhāṣya

Sādhana means ‘establishing [one’s own thesis]’ (*sthāpanā*) and *upālabha* means ‘refuting [the opponent’s thesis]’ (*pratiśedha*). These—*sādhana* and *upālabha*—are referred to by [the words] thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) [in the *sūtra*], because these two depend on and are related to the thesis and anti-thesis and are employed for ultimately establishing one of the alternatives [i.e. the thesis]. One of these two must ultimately be rejected and the other established. Thus, final ascertainment is the determination of the contention of that which is established.

[Objection :] This determination of the right nature of an object is not possible through thesis and anti-thesis. [Of the two contestants in a debate] the first establishes his intended thesis by showing the grounds for it and refutes the objections raised by the other against it. The other [contestant] refutes the grounds offered [by the first] for establishing the position of the first and recovers the objections [raised against the position of the first] by refuting the replies [offered by the first against these objections]. This process [of argumentation eventually

leads to a stage where the grounds and objections raised by one of the contestants come to an end. After [the grounds and objections of] one come to an end, those [grounds and objections] which remain [unrefuted] lead to the determination of the right nature of an object, which is the final ascertainment. [Thus the main point of the objection is that final ascertainment is not due to both thesis and anti-thesis ; it is due only to the grounds etc. offered by one of the contestants, i.e. by one who becomes finally victorious].

[Answer : This is not so. As Gautama] says, the determination of the right nature of an object is due to both. On what ground ? The legitimacy of one [i.e. of the grounds offered by the contestant who becomes finally victorious] and the illegitimacy of the other [i.e. of the objections raised against these by the other contestant]—these legitimacy and illegitimacy conjointly dispel the doubt. But the doubt is not dispelled in the case of the legitimacy of both or of the illegitimacy of both.

The word *vimṛśya* [in the *sūtra*] means 'after having an initial doubt'. This doubt is mentioned here because, by clearly posing the thesis and anti-thesis, it [i.e. doubt] necessitates the application of *nyāya*. But by this [doubt] is to be understood the knowledge of two contradictory characteristics about the same object. Where, however, two opposite characteristics can be logically attributed to the 'subject taken in its general aspect' (*dharmi-sāmānya*), it will be a case of juxtaposition (*samuccaya*), because the subject is logically found to be of such nature.

Thus, e.g., in the definition [of a substance given by Kaṇāda in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* i. 1. 15], namely substance is the substratum of action,—that substance which can be proved as having relation to action is the substratum of action [e.g., the body which moves], while that which cannot be proved to be so is not the substratum of action [e.g. the self which does not move]. [Here, the form of juxtaposition is the knowledge : "Substance in general both is and is not a substratum of action"].

[The knowledge of] two opposite characteristics in the same subject not simultaneously subsisting is 'temporal contrariety' (*kāla-vikalpa*). The same substance is the substratum of action so long as there is actual movement in it, while so long as movement is not produced in it or the movement [previously produced in it] has ceased to be, it is not the substratum of movement.

There is no general rule that in all cases of final ascertainment there will be the determination of the right nature of an object through thesis and anti-thesis after having an initial doubt. [That is, doubt is not an essential pre-condition for final ascertainment]. Thus, in perception resulting from sense-object contact final ascertainment is [merely, i.e. without any initial doubt] the determination of the right nature of an object. Only in the case of a debate (*parīkṣā*), final ascertainment is the determination of the right nature of an object through thesis and anti-thesis

after having an initial doubt. Final ascertainment through *vāda* [see the next *sūtra*] and 'textual study' (*śāstra*) is without any initial doubt.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST ĀHNIKA (lit. discourse of a day)
OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF VĀTSYĀYANA'S
COMMENTARY ON THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA

Elucidation

After discussing 'hypothetical argument' (*tarka*), Gautama passes on to explain the nature of 'final ascertainment' (*nirṇaya*) and with this he concludes the first *āhnika* of the first chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. This is done because final ascertainment is the culmination of *nyāya* and is usually preceded by *tarka*. *Tarka* generally presupposes doubt. But how can one, while listening to a debate, overcome this doubt and have the final ascertainment? Gautama answers that this is done through thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*prati-pakṣa*). But *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* literally mean two contradictory characteristics alleged by the two contestants in a debate as belonging to the same object. Thus, e.g., in a debate one contestant claims that sound is eternal, while the other claims that sound is non-eternal. Here eternity and non-eternity as characterising sound are the *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa*. Obviously, however, the right nature of the object cannot be determined by two such contradictory characteristics. Hence *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* cannot be taken here in their literal or primary senses. Vātsyāyana, therefore, explains the secondary senses in which these two are to be taken in the present context. These secondary senses are *sādhana* and *upālambha* respectively. By *sādhana* is meant the arguments which establish one's own thesis and *upālambha* means the refutation of the arguments advanced in support of the opponent's thesis. But, then, the question is : Why does Gautama use the words *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* when he actually means *sādhana* and *upālambha*? In answer it is said that final ascertainment results only after both the contestants have offered their *sādhana* and *upālambha* for their respective positions, namely, the *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa*. The mere use of the words *sādhana* and *upālambha* could not have conveyed this implication. Of course, the debate can culminate in final ascertainment only when the *sādhana* and *upālambha* offered by one of the contestants are finally rejected in favour of those offered by the other. Therefore, by *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* are meant in the *sūtra* the *sādhana* and *upālambha* offered by the two contestants in a debate, of which the *sādhana* and *upālambha* of one are ultimately established.

It may be objected that final ascertainment is due not to the *sādhana* and *upālambha* of both the contestants but to those of only one, i.e. of the contestant who becomes finally victorious. Hence the statement that final ascertainment is due to both *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* cannot be accepted. Vātsyāyana answers that final ascertainment is achieved

through the *sādhana* and *upālambha* of both the contestants. How is it so ? One of the two contestants will have to defend his own *sādhana* and demolish the *upālambha* of the other. Final ascertainment is reached only after this and as such it cannot be due to the mere *sādhana* and *upālambha* of one of the contestants.

Gautama uses the word *vimṛśya* to indicate an initial doubt, which is usually a pre-condition for the eventual attainment of final ascertainment. Though both the contestants are convinced of the validity of their respective positions, yet one listening to the contradictory claims of the two contestants has a doubt as to the right nature of an object. In other words, such a doubt is but the presentation of the two contradictory alternatives about the same object and final ascertainment results only when one of these two alternatives is rejected in favour of the other. This doubt, as Vātsyāyana shows, is to be differentiated from juxtaposition (*samuccaya* : the knowledge of two opposite characteristics which can be logically attributed to a subject taken in its general aspect) and 'temporal contrariety' (*kāla-vikalpa* : the knowledge of two opposite characteristics not simultaneously subsisting in the same subject).

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF NYĀYA

(*nyāya-uttarāṅga-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

THE FIRST AHNKA OF THE FIRST CHAPTER ENDS

Adhyāya I

Āhnika 2

Bhāṣya

Debate (*kathā*) is of three forms : 'discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*), 'debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) and 'destructive criticism' (*vitaṇḍā*). Of these—

Sūtra 1

Vāda is [the form of debate in which the two contestants] 'uphold the thesis and anti-thesis' (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraha*) by substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*, 'without being contradicted by proved doctrine' (*siddhānta-aviruddha*) and 'employing the five inference-components' (*pañca-avayava-upapanna*). // i.2.1//

Elucidation

The first three *sūtra*-s of the second *āhnika* discuss debate (*kathā*) in three forms. These constitute the 'section on debate' (*kathā-prakaraṇa*). Though there are various meanings of the word *kathā*, it is used by Vātsyāyana in the technical sense of debate, which is done also by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 19 and v. 2. 23. Gautama defines the three forms of debate, but does not offer any general definition of it. Later Naiyāyikas, therefore, found it necessary to find a general definition of debate. According to Vācaspati Miśra and Varadarāja, debate consists in the statements and counter-statements on the part of more than one contestants relating to a central theme. Viśvanātha adds that these statements and counter-statements should moreover be in accordance with the principles of logic and should have for their end either the attainment of right knowledge or victory over the opponent.

Of these three forms of debate, though *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* may in rare cases lead to the 'attainment of right knowledge' (*tattva-nirṇaya*), their primary purpose is 'victory over the opponent' (*viḥaya*). By contrast, *vāda* has for its primary purpose the attainment of right knowledge. *Vāda par excellance* is the discussion between the perceptor and disciple leading to right knowledge.

Bhāṣya

Two contradictory characteristics attributed to the same subject [by the two contestants], because of their mutual exclusion, constitute the thesis (*prākṣa*) and anti-thesis (*prati-pākṣa*), e.g., [one claims that] the self exists, [while the other contends that] the self does not exist. [Thus, the thesis is the attribution of existence to self, while the anti-thesis is the attribution of non-existence to self.]

Two contradictory characteristics attributed to different subjects do not constitute thesis and anti-thesis, e.g. "The self is eternal" and "Knowledge is non-eternal".

Upholding (*parigraha*) means regulation (*vyavasthā*) regarding adherence [to a thesis].

Vāda is the upholding of such thesis and anti-thesis. It is qualified [in the *sūtra*] by the adjective *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālabha*, which is to be understood as 'substantiation with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*' (*pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana*) as well as 'refutation with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*' (*pramāṇa-tarka-upālabha*). [In other words] in the case of *vāda*, both substantiation and refutation are done with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*. *Sādhana* means substantiating [one's own thesis] and *upālabha* means refuting [the opponent's thesis]. These, *sādhana* and *upālabha*, are 'related to' (*vyatiṣakta*) both the contestants [i.e. both offer their *sādhana* and *upālabha*] and are adhered to (*anubaddha*), i.e. [are offered] so long as [the claim] of one is finally silenced and that of the other finally remains. That which is silenced is refuted and that which remains is established.

The application of 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahassthāna*), [being mentioned] in the case of *jalpa* [it follows that] it is not to be applied in the case of *vāda*. Though [in the case of *vāda*, the application of *nigrahassthāna* is] forbidden, the expression 'without being contradicted by proved doctrine' (*siddhānta-aviruddha*) is used [in the *sūtra*] to indicate [the legitimacy of] the application of a few forms [of *nigrahassthāna* even in the case of *vāda*]. In the case of *vāda*, the legitimacy of the point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) in the form of pseudo-proban (*hetvābhāsa*) is admitted, because [Gautama says,] "[The pseudo-proban called] *viruddha* means [a proban which] is in contradiction with it, i.e. one's own accepted thesis" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 6). [The word *viruddha* in the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* of the *sūtra*, is taken by Vātsyāyana, to mean pseudo-proban. Hence he argues that though, generally speaking, the use of *nigrahassthāna* is forbidden in the case of *vāda*, the use of pseudo-probans are not so, in spite of pseudo-probans being *nigrahassthāna*.]

The expression 'employing the five inference-components' (*pañca-avayava-upapanna*) [in the *sūtra*] is used to indicate the legitimacy of [the application of *nigrahassthāna*] in the forms of 'the deficient' (*nūna*), which consists in the omission of any of the five inference-components (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 12) and 'the redundant'

(*adhika*), which consists in the mention of more than one proban and more than one instance cited (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 13),

Though the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka* are already included in the inference-components, *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are also separately mentioned [in the *sūtra*] to indicate the relation of substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) with both the contestants. Otherwise, if [in a debate] both the contestants are motivated by the arguments for substantiation alone, [even such cases] would be called *vāda*, [That is, it will not be a case of *vāda* so long as both the contestants try merely to substantiate their own theses without also refuting each other.] The use of the words *pramāṇa* and *tarka* further implies that in a *vāda* substantiation and refutation may alternatively be effected with the help of those alone [i.e. only *pramāṇa* and *tarka*] without employing the inference-components, because it is found that the *pramāṇa*-s can prove a thesis without being connected with any inference-component. [Lastly] *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are separately mentioned to indicate that since it has been said that *jalpa* is a debate in which substantiation and refutation are made with the help of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna*, it is not to be understood that *jalpa* is without those forms of *nigrahassthāna* [which are legitimately employed in a *vāda*]. In other words, it should not be understood that in *jalpa* substantiation and refutation are effected exclusively through *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna*, while in *vāda* substantiation and refutation are effected through the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*.

Elucidation

Vāda is differentiated from *jalpa* and *vitandā* by the expression *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambha*, i.e. in which substantiation and refutation are effected with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*. This implies that in the case of *vāda*, one should not use *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* for substantiation and refutation, while *chala*, etc. are freely used in *jalpa* and *vitandā*.

But *tarka* is not a *pramāṇa*. How, then, can it be used for substantiation and refutation? Uddyotakara answers that *tarka* enhances the efficacy of *pramāṇa* and thereby helps substantiation and refutation.

• Since Gautama himself says that *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* are to be employed for substantiation and refutation in the case of *jalpa*, it follows that *nigrahassthāna* is not to be used in the case of *vāda*. Nevertheless, he recommends the use of certain specific forms of *nigrahassthāna* even in the case of *vāda*. Thus, the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* of the *sūtra* implies that *nigrahassthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban (*hetvābhāsa*) is to be used in *vāda* while the expression *pañca-avayava-upapanna* of the *sūtra* shows that Gautama recommends *nigrahassthāna* in the form of *nyūna* and *adhika* even in the case of *vāda*. But Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting the implications of these

two expressions of the *sūtra*. He admits that the use of *nigrahassthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban is recommended in a *vāda* by Gautama ; but this is done by the expression *pañca-avayava-upapanna* rather than by *siddhānta-aviruddha*. Employing the five inference-components means employing these in their correct form while the use of a pseudo-proban is but an incorrect use of an inference-component, i.e. the use of a pseudo-*avayava*. What, then, according to Uddyotakara, is the implication of the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* ? It is the recommendation in *vāda* of the *nigrahassthāna* in the form of 'vicious conclusion' (*apasiddhānta*), i.e. the acceptance of the conclusion which goes against one's own position (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 23).

Phañibhūṣaṇa, however, argues that it is not the intention of Vātsyāyana to exclude the recommendation in *vāda* of the *nigrahassthāna* in the form of *apasiddhānta*. Still Vātsyāyana is justified in reading the implication of *siddhānta-aviruddha* as the recommendation of *nigrahassthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban, inasmuch as the employment of the five inference-components is not an essential feature of all cases of *vāda*, whereas the use of *nigrahassthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban is essential for *vāda*. Therefore, it is better to take the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* as implying the use of *nigrahassthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban so that pseudo-probans are pointed out in all cases of *vāda* irrespective of their use of the five inference-components.

The primary implication of the expression *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambha* is to differentiate *vāda* from *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, where, over and above *pramāṇa* and *tarka*, *chala* etc. are employed for substantiation and refutation. However, this expression has also certain secondary implications, which are : 1) each of the participants is to use *pramāṇa* and *tarka* for substantiating his own position and refuting that of his opponent, 2) there may be cases of *vāda* even without the employment of the five inference-components and 3) *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are employed even in the case of *jalpa*.

Sūtra 2

Jalpa is [a form of debate] 'characterised by all the features as previously said' (*yathokta-upapanna*) [i.e. by all the features mentioned in the previous *sūtra* defining *vāda*] 'where substantiation and refutation are effected through *chala*, *jāti* and [all the forms of] *nigrahassthāna*' (*chala-jāti-nigrahassthāna-sādhana-upālambha*) [over and above]. // i. 2. 2 //

Bhāṣya

By the expression *yathokta-upapanna* is to be understood [the following] :

1) 'where substantiation and refutation are effected through *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*'; 2) 'not being contradicted by proved doctrine', 3) 'employing the five inference-components' and 4) 'upholding of the thesis and anti-thesis'. The expression *chala-jāti-nigrahassthāna-sādhana-upālabha* means that in it [i.e. *jalpa*] substantiation and refutation are effected through *chala*, *jāti* and [all the forms of] *nigrahassthāna* [over and above]. [A debate] characterised by all these features is *jalpa*.

[Objection :] Substantiation of a thesis by *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* is not possible. These are found to be 'merely destructive in nature' (*pratiṣedhārthatā*) [in the *sūtra*-s] giving their general as well as specific definitions. Thus, e.g., [as in the case of the definitions] "*Chala* is the rebuttal of the words [or arguments] of the opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 10); "*Jāti* is a futile rejoinder based on superficial similarity and dis-similarity" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 18); "*Nigrahassthāna* means [the demonstration] of contradictory knowledge or ignorance [of any of the contestants]" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 19). And in the cases of specific definitions as well [is found their same essential destructive character]. Nor can it be argued that these substantiate one's own thesis because of their destructive nature [i.e. because these destroy the arguments of the opponent], for this could have been conveyed simply by saying that *jalpa* [is a form of debate] where refutation (*upālabha*) is effected through *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna*. [In other words, in that case the word *sādhana* or substantiation would have been superfluous in the *sūtra*.]

[Answer :] *Chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* act as the auxiliaries in the cases of substantiation and refutation effected with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, because these defend one's own position [by negating the counter-arguments of the opponent]: by themselves, however, these have no efficacy in substantiating [any thesis]. [In other words, when a thesis is substantiated with the help of *pramāṇa*-s, these *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* have the function of auxiliaries as these defend one's own thesis—when employed, these defend one's own position by demolishing that of the opponent. As is said [by Gautama,] "*Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are [employed] for the purpose of defending the knowledge well-ascertained, just as the fence of thorny branches is for the protection of the sprout." (*Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 50). Further, when there is the refutation of the opponent with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, these *chala* etc. being employed have the function of auxiliaries, because these demolish the refutation [advanced by the opponent].

In *jalpa*, these *chala* etc. are employed in the capacity of auxiliaries and these have no independent efficacy [in substantiating a thesis]. In case of refutation, however, they have independent efficacy.

Elucidation

Though Vātsyāyana claims that *chala* etc., in spite of being merely destructive in

nature, are ultimately conducive to the substantiation of a thesis, Uddyotakara does not agree to this. *Chala* etc. are but vicious tricks in argumentation and are used for silencing the opponent at any cost. As such, these can never positively establish anything. Being unable to refute an opponent properly, one employs these to silence him being prompted by the desire for victory in the debate. But even if the opponent is thus silenced, *chala* etc. can never establish one's thesis.

In defence of Vātsyāyana, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that from Gautama's own statement (*Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 50) it is clear that though *chala* etc. cannot directly substantiate any thesis, these can act as auxiliaries to the *pramāṇa*-s which substantiate a thesis. At the same time, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes by pointing to the essential characteristic of *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā* : *vāda* is a debate prompted by the desire for the attainment of right knowledge, *jalpa* is a debate prompted by the desire for victory and *vitandā* is a debate prompted by the desire for victory where the opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own.

Sūtra 3

This [i.e. *jalpa* mentioned in the previous *sūtra*] becomes *vitandā* when the 'opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own' (*pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīna*). // i. 2. 3 //

Bhāṣya

This *jalpa* becomes *vitandā*. But being characterised by what? Being without any care for establishing a counter-thesis by the opponent. One who employs *vitandā* does not bother to establish either of the two contradictory characteristics called thesis and anti-thesis, which are alleged [by the contestants] to characterise the same object. [Instead of this, one employing *vitandā*] proceeds simply by refuting the position of the other. [Objection :] But, then, why not define *vitandā* as that [i.e. *jalpa*] which is 'without any anti-thesis' (*pratipakṣa-hīna*)? [Answer : This cannot be so defined, because] the propositions put forward for the refutation of the other's position constitute the anti-thesis of the person employing *vitandā*. But he does not substantiate any thesis after declaring it to be his position. Therefore, the wording of the *sūtra* should be left as it is.

Elucidation

Though the words *jalpa* and *vitandā* are generally used in a derogatory sense, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa shows that even these two forms of debate were not lawless altercations.

There were definite rules governing even these. These rules related to the two contestants, a jury to whom the contestants explained their arguments and a presiding head who, on the verdict of the jury, declared one of the contestants as being finally victorious.

The Jaina philosopher Hemacandra refuses to admit *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as forms of debate and claims that debate or *kathā* has only one form, namely, *vāda*. Vādidevasūri, however, admits that *vāda* may be motivated by the desire for attaining either victory or right knowledge. The Buddhist philosopher Vasuvandhu also recognises debate only in one form, namely *vāda*, though, according to him, it may be prompted by the desire for the attainment either of right knowledge or of material gain. But the Naiyāyikas clearly differentiate between the three forms of debate according to the desires motivating these.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON DEBATE

(*kathā-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Those which are not real probans because of not possessing the real characteristics of a proban, but which appear as probans because of their similarity with the proban, are—

Sūtra 4

The pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*), namely 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*), 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*), 'the counter-acted' (*prakaraṇasama*), 'the unproved' (*sādhyaśama*) and 'the mistimed' (*kālānta*). // i. 2. 4 //

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana shows that the general definition of *hetvābhāsa* (pseudo-proban) is suggested by its very etymology and as such Gautama does not offer any general definition of it. The pseudo-proban resembles the proban in possessing certain characteristics of the proban but not all the characteristics thereof. What, then, are the real characteristics of a proban? Already in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 34, Gautama, by defining *hetu* as that which proves the probandum (or the characteristic sought to be proved in the subject), has indicated that the proban is a mark which can 'prove the existence of the characteristic sought to be proved in a subject' (*sādhya-sādhana*). But when does a mark prove the probandum? By enumerating the five-fold pseudo-proban, Gautama indicates that to be a real proban a mark must possess five characteristics in default of any of which it becomes a pseudo-proban. These five characteristics, as clearly explained by the later Naiyāyikas, are :

- 1) 'presence in the subject' (*pakṣa-sattva*),
- 2) 'presence in an indisputable locus of the probandum' (*sapakṣa-sattva*),
- 3) 'absence in an indisputable locus of the absence of the probandum' (*vipakṣa-asattva*),
- 4) 'having no counter-argument' (*a-satpratipakṣitatva*), and
- 5) 'being uncontradicted' (*a-vādhitatva*).

By *pakṣa* is meant something where the presence of the probandum is yet to be proved. Presence in such a subject is *pakṣa-sattva*.

By *sapakṣa* is meant something where the presence of the probandum is already proved. Presence in such an indisputable locus is *sapakṣa-sattva*.

By *vipakṣa* is meant something where the absence of the probandum is already proved. Absence in such an indisputable locus is *vipakṣa-asattva*.

Thus, e.g., in the inference of fire from smoke in the hill, the hill is the *pakṣa*, the kitchen *sapakṣa* and water *vipakṣa*. The mark, namely smoke, being present in the hill as well as in the kitchen and being absent in water, has the first three characteristics of a valid proban, viz. *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *vipakṣa-asattva*. Further, as there is no counter-mark equally powerful and as the absence of fire in the hill is not already proved by any stronger ground, this mark, namely smoke, has also the characteristics of *a-satpratipakṣitatva* and *a-vādhitatva* respectively. Thus, in short, smoke becomes a real mark for the inference of fire in the hill as it possesses all the five required characteristics of a proban.

The lack of any one of these five characteristics makes a mark a pseudo-proban. Thus :

- 1) The absence of the first characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the unproved' (*sādhya-sama*).
- 2) The absence of the second characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*).
- 3) The absence of the third characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*).

4) The absence of the fourth characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the counter-acted' (*prakaraṇasama*).

5) The absence of the fifth characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the mistimed' (*kālāṇṭa*).

Bhāṣya

Of these—

Sūtra 5

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the irregular' (*avyabhicāra*) [is a mark] which is 'not [exclusively] concomitant with any one [i.e. not exclusively concomitant with the presence of the probandum]' (*anaikāntika*) // i. 2. 5 //

Bhāṣya

Vyabhicāra means 'not being restricted to one' (*ekatra avyavasthiti*). *Sa-vyabhicāra* means 'being characterised by such *vyabhicāra*'. Example—"Sound is eternal, as it does not possess the quality of touch. The jar, which has the quality of touch, is found to be non-eternal. But sound is not similarly characterised by touch. Therefore, sound, because of not having the quality of touch, is eternal." In the instance [of the jar] cited for this inference, the two characteristics, viz. 'having the quality of touch' and 'being non-eternal' cannot be accepted as having proban-probandum relation, because the atom, in spite of having the quality of touch,¹ is eternal. Even in the instances of the self etc., the mark 'not having the quality of touch'—which is taken as the proban according to the *sūtra*: "The proban is the cause of the establishment of the probandum through the resemblance of the subject or *pakṣa* with the instance cited" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 34),—is irregularly connected with eternality, [because] knowledge, in spite of not having the quality of touch, is non-eternal. Thus, there being irregular connection in both the instances cited, there is no proban-probandum relation [between 'not having the quality of touch' and 'being eternal']. Therefore, [the characteristic 'not having the

1. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, the atoms of earth, water, fire and air possess the quality of touch (*sparsa-guṇa*).

quality of touch'] is a pseudo-proban, because it does not possess the characteristic of a real proban. There is eternality on the one end (*anta*) and there is non-eternality on the other end. *Anaikāntika*, as the opposite of this, is that which is irregularly related to both the ends.

Elucidation

The first form of pseudo-proban, called 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*), is also known as the *anaikāntika* (or *anekānta*). Gautama uses the word *anaikāntika* to define *savyabhicāra* and Vātsyāyana shows that the two words have identical significance. *Vyabhicāra* means irregular connection and a mark is called *savyabhicāra* (i.e. characterised by *vyabhicāra*) when it has irregular connection with both *sapakṣa* (i.e. an indisputable locus of the probandum) and *vipakṣa* (i.e. an indisputable locus of the absence of the probandum). *Sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, being conceived as the two ends (*anta*), *anaikāntika* (literally, not exclusively connected with any *anta*) also means a mark irregularly connected with both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.

Vātsyāyana illustrates 'the irregular' with the following inference :

"Sound is eternal, because it does not possess the quality of touch."

In this inference, 'absence of the quality of touch' is alleged to be the proban and 'eternality' the probandum. Thus, the proban-probandum relation (*vyāpti*) is here :

Positively : 'The absence of the quality of touch' is invariably related to eternality, as in the instance of soul. Here, soul is the instance based on similarity or *sādharmya*.

Negatively : The absence of 'the absence of the quality of touch' (i.e. the presence of touch) is invariably related to the absence of 'eternality', i.e. the presence of non-eternality, as in the instance of the jar. Here jar is the instance based on dis-similarity or *vaidharmya*.

But this *vyāpti*, in both the forms, is untenable because the alleged proban is irregularly connected with the probandum, its absence being found as related to the presence of the probandum and its presence being found as related to the absence of the probandum. Thus—

1) The atom, though possessing the quality of touch, i.e. though related to the absence of 'the absence of the quality of touch', is eternal.

2) Knowledge, though not possessing the quality of touch, i.e. though related to 'the presence of 'the absence of the quality of touch', is non-eternal.

According to the later Naiyāyikas, the pseudo-proban called 'the irregular' is of three forms, viz. *sādhāraṇa* (ordinary), *asādhāraṇa* (extra-ordinary) and *anupasaṃhārī* (inconclusive). Vātsyāyana's interpretation of 'the irregular' corresponds to the first of these.

'The irregular', in the form of *asādhāraṇa*, is a mark which is present neither in the *sapakṣa* nor in the *vipakṣa* ; it is present only in the *pakṣa* (subject). Thus, e.g. "Sound is eternal, because it possesses sound-ness". Sound-ness (*śabdatva*) exists only in sound

(which is the *pakṣa*) and is found neither in anything eternal (i.e. *sapakṣa*) nor in anything non-eternal (i.e. *vipakṣa*).

'The irregular', in the form of *anupasaṃhārī*, occurs when there is no instance based either on similarity or on dis-similarity for the inference. Thus, e.g., "Everything is knowable, because of being objects of valid knowledge". No instance can be cited for this inference, for anything cited as an instance would be included in the subject viz. 'everything'. But the subject or *pakṣa* cannot be cited as an instance, because the presence of the probandum is yet to be proved in the *pakṣa* whereas an instance cited is something in which the presence of the probandum is already proved.

Sūtra 6

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*) means [a mark which] 'is in contradiction with it' (*tat-virodhī*), [i.e. with] 'one's own accepted thesis' (*siddhānta*). // i. 2. 6 //

Bhāṣya

The expression *tat-virodhī* means that which contradicts it. [In other words] it contradicts the thesis accepted. Thus, e. g., [as claimed in the Sāṃkhya philosophy] " 'the transformed' (*vikāra*, viz. the 23 Sāṃkhya principles like *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra*, the five *tanmātra*-s, etc.) ceases to have manifestation (*vyakti*), because of the absence of eternity, i e. the transformed as eternal is not logical. But though not manifested, the transformed remains, because of the absence of destruction."

Now, this proban, viz. 'because of the absence of eternity' comes in contradiction with the accepted conclusion [of the Sāṃkhyas], namely, though not manifested the transformed remains.

* How ? Manifestation (*vyakti*) means 'the attainment of the specific nature' (*ātma-lābha*) [i.e. on the part of the transformed]. Cessation (*apāya*) means 'the surrender of the specific nature' (*pracyuti*). If [it is claimed] that the transformed persists in spite of the surrender of the specific nature attained, it is not logical to deny their eternity, because eternity is but the existence of the transformed even after the surrender of the specific nature. [On the other hand,] the denial of eternity amounts to the surrender by the transformed of the specific nature attained. That which surrenders its specific nature attained is found to be non-

eternal and that which exists does not surrender its specific nature attained. The two contradictory characteristics, namely existence and the surrender of the specific nature attained, cannot co-exist. Thus, the proban contradicts the very thesis on the basis of which it is advanced.

Elucidation

The pseudo-proban called 'the contradictory' is a mark which contradicts one's own established thesis. Vātsyāyana illustrates this with a Sāṃkhya thesis.

According to Sāṃkhya, the 23 principles like *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, etc., called 'the transformed' (*vikāra*), are conceived as non-eternal. At the same time, according to the established thesis of Sāṃkhya, these exist in *prakṛti* even before attaining the transformed form. This amounts to the admission that they *always* exist, whether as transformed or not, i.e. are eternal. Thus, when Sāṃkhya conceives the transformed as non-eternal, it contradicts its own established thesis.

The Sāṃkhyas, subscribing as they do to the theory of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause (*satkārya-vāda*), deny total destruction and as such the 23 principles are non-eternal in the sense that these are sometimes manifested and sometimes latent within *prakṛti*. Thus, these 23 principles are non-eternal only in their aspect of being manifested; but these can be conceived also as eternal, for in the unmanifested state these are identical with *prakṛti*. From the Sāṃkhya point of view, therefore, there is no contradiction in conceiving these principles as both eternal and non-eternal.

From the point of view of the theory of the absence of the effect in the cause (*asatkārya-vāda*), the Naiyāyikas claim that destruction means total annihilation. As such, there is no sense in saying that the 23 principles remain latent even after destruction. Therefore, attributing to these both eternity and non-eternity is a case of flat contradiction.

Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting this *sūtra*. According to him all forms of pseudo-proban are essentially 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*), because no pseudo-proban can prove the thesis it intends to prove,—i.e. all pseudo-probans result in contradicting the thesis intended. Incidentally, it may be noted that Vātsyāyana, while interpreting *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 1, quotes the definition of *viruddha* given in this *sūtra* as referring to pseudo-probans in general.

Later Naiyāyikas, however, define the pseudo-proban called 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*) as a mark invariably related to the absence of the probandum. E.g., "Sound is eternal, because it is something caused". This mark, namely 'being something caused', is invariably related to 'being non-eternal', i.e. to the absence of the *sādaya* or the probandum of the inference. Viśvanātha deduces this definition of 'the contradictory' by interpreting the word *siddhānta* in the present *sūtra* to mean 'the characteristic sought to be proved', i.e. the probandum.

Sūtra 7

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the counteracted' (*prakaraṇasama*) is a mark which, 'when employed for final ascertainment' (*nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭa*), gives rise to the suggestion (*cintā*) of 'doubtful alternative possibilities' (*prakaraṇa*).
// i. 2. 7 //

Bhāṣya

Prakaraṇa means both thesis and counter-thesis, which are equally doubtful and equally unascertained. The suggestion (*cintā*) of such *prakaraṇa* is the consideration beginning with doubt and continuing to the stage prior to final ascertainment. That [i.e. the mark] which gives rise to such a suggestion, when employed for the purpose of final ascertainment, becomes *prakaraṇasama*, because 'being equally possible in the cases of both the alternatives' (*ubhaya-pakṣa-sāmyāt*), it fails to overcome either the thesis or the counter-thesis [i.e. the *prakaraṇa*] and thus it can never lead to final ascertainment.

Its example is like this : "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc."

When a similar characteristic, which causes doubt, is used as a proban, it 'leads to a state of indecision' (*saṁśaya-sama*) and is a case of 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*). But the 'dependence on the remembrance of the unique characteristic' (*viśeṣāpekṣitā*) and the want of the perception of the unique characteristic in either of the alternatives, lead to thesis and counter-thesis [i.e. to *prakaraṇa*]. As for example, the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in sound and so also [is not perceived] the characteristic of anything non-eternal. The want of the perception of the unique characteristic in either of these alternatives leads to the suggestion of the thesis and counter-thesis. How ? Otherwise, [i.e. in case of the unique characteristic of either of the alternatives being perceived], there is the cessation of the *prakaraṇa* [i.e., the rejection of either the thesis or the counter-thesis]. If, e.g., the characteristic of something eternal is specifically perceived in sound, there can no longer be both the thesis and counter-thesis. If, on the other hand, the characteristic of something non-eternal is specifically perceived in sound then also there can no longer be both the thesis and counter-thesis. Thus the proban

under consideration, leading as it does to two alternatives, cannot finally establish either.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana defines *prakaraṇa* as the pair of thesis and counter-thesis. A mark becomes a pseudo-proban called *prakaraṇasama* ('the counteracted') when it results in an 'unsettled enquiry' (*jijñāsā*) concerning the alternative possibilities of both thesis and counter-thesis, without being able to establish either definitely.

The example of this pseudo-proban found in the present version of Vātsyāyana's commentary is : "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc."

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the example of this pseudo-proban, with the addition of an explicit mention of the counter-thesis suggested—as found in some other available versions of the commentary—is more appropriate. It is : "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc. At the same time, sound is eternal, because the characteristic of anything non-eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything not-eternal is found to be eternal, like 'empty space' (*ākāśa*), etc."

Thus, if the Naiyāyikas, with their view of the non-eternality of sound, propose to prove their thesis by the mark 'absence of the perception of the characteristic of anything eternal' in sound, it will leave scope for the Mīmāṃsakas to argue for their counter-thesis, viz. sound is eternal, by the mark 'absence of the perception of the characteristic of anything non-eternal' in sound. In other words, the first mark leaves scope for an equally strong alternative mark proving the counter-thesis and as such is a pseudo-proban in the form of 'the counteracted'. In such a case, neither the thesis nor the counter-thesis is definitely established and the listener to the debate is left only in the stage of an unsettled enquiry.

Vātsyāyana also shows how *prakaraṇasama* differs from *savyabhicāra* : the former leads to an unsettled enquiry whereas the latter results in a doubt.

[It may be pointed out that in the case of *savyabhicāra*, the same mark, being irregularly connected with both the probandum as well as the absence of the probandum, results only in the doubt concerning the presence or absence of the probandum in the subject. In the case of *prakaraṇasama*, however, the mark leaves scope for an equally strong alternative mark proving the absence of the probandum in the subject and as such the two alternative marks give rise to an unsettled enquiry concerning two contradictory possibilities, viz. the thesis and counter-thesis, i.e. the presence or absence of the probandum in the subject.]

Different writers express different views on the nature of *prakaraṇasama* and some of them are inclined to call it a form of *savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika* resulting only in a doubt. In later Nyāya *prakaraṇasama* is better known as *sat-pratipakṣa*, i.e. a pseudo-proban having a counter-proban.

Sūtra 8

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the unproved' (*sādhya-sama*) [is the mark which] 'being yet to be properly established' (*sādhyaivāṇi*) is 'not different' (*a-viśiṣṭa*) from 'the characteristic sought to be proved' (*sādhya* or probandum).

// i. 2. 8 //

Bhāṣya

In the inference, "Shadow is a substance", the proban, "being characterised by movement" is [a pseudo-proban in the form of] 'the unproved', because, it [i.e. the alleged movement of the shadow] being yet to be proved, has no difference [in logical status] from the characteristic sought to be proved. [The movement characterising the shadow is *as unproved as* the substantiality of shadow.] This proban also, being not yet proved, remains to be established like the probandum itself. What needs to be proved here is : Does the shadow move like the person ? Or, is it only the series of the absences of light due to the series of obstructions [of light] caused when the object obstructing it moves ?

The continuous series of the absence of those parts of light which are obstructed by a moving substance is perceived [as the moving shadow]. Obstruction means blocking of the connection.

Elucidation

•

A proban, to be genuine, must itself be something already proved. Therefore, when something itself unproved is used as a mark, it will be a pseudo-proban. Such a pseudo-proban is called *sādhya-sama*, literally 'similar (in logical status) to the *sādhya* or the characteristic sought to be proved'. In other words, the *sādhya* is something yet to be proved and if the mark also is equally unproved it has the same status as that of

the *sādhya*. Thus, e.g., when one argues, “shadow is a substance, because it moves”, the mark, viz. the alleged movement of the shadow, will be a pseudo-proban called *sādhya-sama*, because it is as unproved as the probandum, viz. the substantiality of the shadow. Vātsyāyana gives this example because, though the Mīmāṃsakas consider shadow to be a substance, the Naiyāyikas consider it to be nothing but the absence of light and the apparent movement of the shadow is only because of the movement of the object obstructing light.

Later Naiyāyikas generally use the name *asiddha* for this pseudo-proban and they mention several varieties of it. According to Uddyotakara, it has three forms, namely—

1) *svarūpa-asiddha* or the intrinsically unproved: E.g., the movement of the shadow (in the above inference) is itself an absurdity.

2) *āśraya-asiddha* or having an unproved substratum. E.g., it may be argued, “Shadow is characterised by movement, because it is perceived to occupy different spaces.” This will be a case of ‘having an unproved substratum’, because ‘being perceived as occupying different spaces’ proves movement only when this characterises a substance, whereas in the case of shadow the said perception does not characterise a substance, because shadow as a substance remains unproved.

3) *anyathā-asiddha* or being otherwise unproved. E.g., it may be argued, “Shadow is a substance, because it is perceived to occupy different spaces.” This will be a case of ‘being otherwise unproved’, because shadow, though otherwise known not to be a substance, is perceived as occupying different spaces.

Udayana mentions an additional variety of the *āśraya-asiddha*, called the *siddha-sādhana*, i.e. proving the well-proved. When the subject of an inference is already well-proved as having some specific characteristic, any mark used to prove it over again as possessing the same characteristic, would be a form of this pseudo-proban. [E.g. even after perceiving an elephant as an elephant, one infers: “It is an elephant, because it has a trunk.”]

From Gaṅgeśa onwards, the Neo-naiyāyikas mention three forms of ‘the unproved’, viz.

1) *āśryāsiddha* or having an unproved subject (*pakṣa*). E.g., “The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus.” The subject of this inference, viz. the sky-lotus, is something unreal.

2) *svarūpāsiddha* or a mark not related to the subject. [“Sound is non-eternal because it is visible.” Here visibility is never related to sound, the subject of the inference.]

3) *vyāpyatvāsiddha* or a mark having no proved concomitant with the probandum. E.g. “The hill contains fire, because it contains black smoke.” Here, “black smoke” is a pseudo-proban, because there is already a universal concomitance between smoke and fire and as such the addition of “black” to “smoke” is redundant.

According to some, this defect (*doṣa*) called *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* may occur in two ways. First, when there is a ‘redundant adjective’ (*vyartha-viśeṣaṇa*) added either to the proban

(e.g. in the instance just cited) or to the probandum (e.g. "The hill contains *golden* fire, because it contains smoke"). Secondly, when the concomitance of the proban with the probandum 'depends upon some extraneous condition' (*sopādhika*). E.g. "The hill contains smoke, because it contains fire". Here, the proban, viz. "fire", is concomitant with the probandum, viz. "smoke", only when there is the 'extraneous condition' (*upādhi*), viz. "the presence of wet fuel". Other Naiyāyikas, however, consider this second form, i.e. *sopādhika*, as but a form of 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika*).

According to the Vaiśeṣika view as interpreted by Praśastapāda, 'the unproved' (*asiddha*) has four forms, viz.

- 1) *ubhayāsiddha*, i.e. the mark whose absence in the subject is admitted by both the contestants, E. g. "Sound is eternal, because it is visible". Both the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, arguing for and against the eternality of sound, admit that visibility does not belong to sound.
- 2) *anyatarāsiddha*, i.e. a mark which is claimed as proved by only one of the contestants while considered as unproved by the other. E.g., "Shadow is a substance, because it has movement". Here, the mark, viz. the movement of the shadow, is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas as real, because they consider shadow to be a substance. To the Naiyāyikas, however, this movement is only apparent, because they consider shadow to be merely the absence of light.
- 3) *tadbhāvāsiddha*, i.e. a mal-observed mark. E.g., fog wrongly perceived as smoke and taken as a mark for the inference of the presence of fire.
- 4) *anumeyāsiddha*, i.e. where the subject of inference is unreal. E.g. "The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus." This corresponds to what is described above as *āśrayāsiddha*.

[In this connection, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa elaborately discusses the different theories in Indian philosophy regarding the ontological status of shadow and darkness].

Sūtra 9

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the mis-timed' (*kālātīta*) is a mark characterised by a peculiarity which is vitiated by 'the lapse of time' (*kālāryaya*). // i. 2. 9 //

Bhāṣya

When a mark, a peculiarity of which is separated by the lapse of time, is

used as a proban [and thus] becomes vitiated by the lapse of time, it is called 'the mis-timed' (*kālāṭīta*). Example : "Sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction, just as the colour". The colour, which exists both before and after being perceived, is manifested through the conjunction between the lamp and the jar. Sound also, similarly existing [i.e. before and after being perceived] is manifested through the conjunction between the drum and the beating stick, or through the conjunction between the wood and the axe. Therefore, sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction. This mark, [viz. 'being manifested through conjunction'], is a pseudo-proban, because it is vitiated by the lapse of time. The perception of the colour manifested [through conjunction] does not outlast [i.e. remains synchronised with] the time of the conjunction. [In other words, in the case of the colour, its perception and the conjunction through which it is manifested are simultaneous]. So long as the conjunction of the lamp [with the jar] persists there is perception of colour. As soon as the conjunction ceases, there is no perception of colour. But when the conjunction between the wood and the axe no longer exists, sound is perceived by a person at a distance even at the time of disjunction. Now, this perception of sound is not caused by the conjunction, because it outlasts the time of conjunction. Why not ? Because, in the absence of the cause there is the absence of the effect. [Conjunction is not the cause of the perception of sound, because the perception persists even after the conjunction ceases to be.] Thus, this mark [viz. being manifested through conjunction], because of the absence of similarity with the instance cited [i.e. colour] is incapable of proving the probandum and as such is only a pseudo-proban.

The violation of the order of mentioning the inference-components is not meant by the *sūtra* [i.e. the *sūtra* does not define *kālāṭīta* as a mark mentioned in violation of the proper order of mentioning the inference-components, or more specifically a proban mentioned after the exemplification]. Why ?

That which is connected by import with something else remains so connected in spite of being separated by time.

In spite of being mentioned in immediate succession, however, those unconnected by import do not convey any sense.

Because of such a precept, a proban, even when mentioned in violation of the proper order does not surrender its nature of a real proban, viz. the characteristic of proving the probandum through similarity or dis-similarity with the instance cited. Since it does not surrender its nature of a real proban, it is not a pseudo-proban. [Further, in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 11] it is said : "The 'point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) called *aprāptakāla* is the mention of the inference-components in violation of their proper order". Therefore, this [viz. the mention of the inference-components in violation of the proper order] is not the real meaning of the present

sūtra [defining *kālātīta*], since that makes the other *sūtra* [i.e. *Nyāya-sūtra* v.2.11]. redundant.

Elucidation

After explaining the definition and an example of 'the mistimed', Vātsyāyana passes on to criticise an alternative definition of this pseudo-proban, viz. a proban mentioned in violation of the proper order of mentioning the inference-components, or more specifically, a proban mentioned after the exemplification. From this it is clear that such an alternative definition was in circulation before Vātsyāyana's time. Vācaspati says that this alternative definition was offered by some Buddhist logicians. Vātsyāyana argues that this definition is untenable because of two considerations. First, a genuine proban does not cease to be genuine only because of being mentioned in an irregular order. Secondly, as Gautama himself says, the mention of the inference-components in an irregular order is a form of 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) rather than of pseudo-proban.

As against Vātsyāyana, the Buddhist logician Śāntarakṣita argues that an independent form of pseudo-proban called *kālātīta* is unacceptable. The example of it, as cited by Vātsyāyana, is, as a matter of fact, only a case of 'the unproved' (*asiddha*), because in this example is actually proved that the mark, "being manifested through conjunction", does not exist in the subject of the inference, viz. "sound". [In other words, it corresponds to what is already discussed as *svarūpāsiddha*.]

Even later Naiyāyikas, like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati Miśra, do not accept the example of the *kālātīta* given by Vātsyāyana. According to Vācaspati Miśra, when the absence of the characteristic sought to be proved is already well-established by any other stronger *pramāṇa*, there is no longer any doubt about the presence of the probandum in the subject and as such no longer any scope for any proban to prove it. In other words, the time for employing any proban to prove the probandum has elapsed and any proban mentioned after such a lapse of the appropriate time is a case of *kālātīta* or 'the mis-timed'. Thus, in short, *kālātīta* means a mark used to prove a probandum, the absence of which is already well-proved in the subject. Later Naiyāyikas, therefore, use for this pseudo-proban the name *vādhita*, i.e. contradicted by a stronger *pramāṇa*.

• Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes the discussion of pseudo-probans by reviewing the different views regarding the actual number of pseudo-probans. Of these, two trends are particularly prominent. First, as the Naiyāyikas generally claim, there are five forms of the pseudo-proban. Secondly, as claimed by the Buddhists and others, there are only three forms of the pseudo-proban, viz. *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *savyabhicāra* (or *anaikāntika*).

According to the second trend, it is not necessary to admit the *satpratipakṣa* (or *prakaraṇasama*) and *kālātīta* (or *vādhita*) as independent forms of the pseudo-proban.

As against the admission of *satpratipakṣa*, it is argued that, as a matter of fact,

in no case can both the probans advanced for the thesis and counter-thesis be equally strong. Granting such a possibility, the doubt can never be dispelled and final ascertainment cannot be reached. Therefore, one of the two probans must, in fact, be comparatively weak and as such there is no proper case of a *satpratipakṣa*.

To this it is answered that though one of the two probans is in fact weaker than the other, the persons listening to the debate may, for the time being, be unaware which of the two is actually so. During this time, therefore, both the probans may appear to them to be equally strong, i.e. these probans would be but pseudo-probans contradicting each other.

As against the admission of the *kālātīta* (or *vādhita*) as a separate form of pseudo-proban, it is argued that in all the cases cited as examples of this, the proban is already vitiated by some other defect, i.e. is already proved to be a pseudo-proban on some other ground. Thus, in the example, "Fire is cold, because it is a substance, just like water",—the mark is already a pseudo-proban in the form of *savyabhicāra*, because "being a substance" coexists with "coldness" as well as "the absence of coldness."

In answer to this it is pointed out that though in such examples there may be other defects as well, when the absence of the probandum in the subject is already proved by a stronger *pramāṇa*, this constitutes the most palpable defect of the mark used, as a result of which it is desirable to call the mark primarily a pseudo-proban in the form of the *vādhita* (or *kālātīta*). Besides, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that there may be examples of marks having exclusively the defect of being *kālātīta* or *vādhita*. Thus, e.g., "The hill in its peak region' (*śikhārāvacchinna-parvata*) contains fire, because it contains smoke." In this example, the proban has no other defect except that it is already proved that fire exists not in the peak of the hill but somewhere else below.

Thus, concludes Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, Gautama's view of five-fold pseudo-proban is to be accepted.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF PSEUDO-PROBANS

(*hatvābhāsa-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Next is discussed 'purposive distortion [of the opponent]' (*chala*).

Sūtra 10

Chala is the rebuttal of the words [or arguments] of the opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended. // i. 2. 10 //

Bhāṣya

It is not possible to cite an example of *chala* taking it in its general definition. The examples [will be cited when it is] classified under different forms. The classification is—

Sūtra 11

It [*chala*] is threefold : 1) 'purposive distortion by resorting to ambiguity' (*vāk-chala*), 2) 'purposive distortion by resorting to similarity' (*sāmānya-chala*) and 3) 'purposive distortion of the secondary sense' (*upacāra-chala*).

// i. 2. 11 //

Bhāṣya

Of these—

Sūtra 12

'Purposive distortion by resorting to ambiguity' (*vāk-chala*) is inventing a meaning opposite to what is intended by the speaker when [the speaker] employs ambiguous expressions. // i. 2. 12 //

Bhāṣya

It is asserted [by someone], “This boy is *nava-kambala*.” Here, the intention of the speaker is to mean, “This boy has a ‘new’ (*nava*) ‘blanket’ (*kambala*).” The expression [viz. *nava-kambala*], though same in its compounded form, acquires different forms when expounded. Here, somebody wanting to employ *chala*, invents a meaning different from the one intended by the speaker, thus [he accuses the speaker by saying :] “You have said that this boy has ‘nine’ (*nava*) ‘blankets’ (*kambala*).” Thus inventing [an opposite meaning] he refutes [the speaker] by pointing to an absurdity, [namely] : “He has only one blanket. Where do you find the nine blankets ?” This [is an example of] *vāk-chala*, because here distortion [is effected] by resorting to an ambiguous expression.

Its refutation is as follows. Since an ambiguous expression has various meanings, specific grounds need to be shown for the selection of any particular [meaning of it]. The expression *nava-kambala* has different implications, viz. “He has a new blanket” and “He has nine blankets.” When this expression is used [by the speaker], the selection of the meaning, viz. “He has nine blankets”, has been made by you [without mentioning any specific ground for your selection]. This is not permissible, for you have got to mention the specific ground for the selection of this particular meaning—a ground which restricts the expression to the specific [meaning], i.e. [which] determines that this particular meaning is intended by this expression. There is no such specific ground [mentioned by you] and as such it is only a false accusation.

The relation between a word and its meaning,—i.e. the rule regulating the use of a specific word for implying a specific sense—is well-established among the people. “This word expresses this meaning”—[such a relation between the word and the meaning] is a common one in the case of the same word having different meanings but is a different one in the case of a word having one specific sense. These words are used to indicate the meanings after these had previously been similarly used and not when previously unused. The employment of the words is for the purpose of understanding their meanings and practical activities proceed from this understanding of their meanings. Thus, words being employed for the understanding of meanings, there is restriction regarding the use of a word having different meanings, according to the capacity [of its conveying a specific meaning]. E.g., “Take goat to the village”, “Collect butter”, “Feed *brāhmaṇa*”—here [the words goat, butter and *brāhmaṇa*], though having different meanings [i.e., though meaning either the class or the individuals referred to by these words] are used to signify specific meanings [i.e., certain individuals rather than the classes] according to feasibility. They [i.e. the words goat, butter and *brāhmaṇa*] are employed in the sense in which the carrying out of the orders is possible. They [i.e. these words]

are not used in their generic senses [i.e. as meaning the classes], because otherwise the carrying out of the orders becomes impossible.

Similarly, the ambiguous expression *nava-kambala* is used to mean [only] what is plausible, viz. "He has a new blanket", but it is not used to mean what is not plausible, viz. "He has nine blankets." Thus, the refutation of the opponent's contention based on the invention of an illogical meaning is not possible.

Elucidation

After explaining, with an example, the nature of *vāk-chala*, Vātsyāyana shows how to expose it as a mere trickery of argument. The same word or expression may have a number of different meanings and the selection of a particular meaning is proper only when it is regulated by the nature of the context in which it is used and by long-standing usage. One deliberately distorting the position of the opponent disregards the regulation and selects a meaning at random. Therefore, objections raised on the basis of such deliberate distortions are futile.

Sūtra 13

'Purposive distortion by resorting to similarity' (*sāmānya-chala*) is 'inventing an absurd meaning' (*a-sambhūta-artha-kalpanā*) regarding the intended object by [taking advantage of] 'general characteristic being present in objects other than the one intended [by the speaker]' (*atisāmānya-yoga*). // i. 2. 13 //

Bhāṣya

On listening to the assertion [of somebody], viz. "This *brāhmaṇa* has the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned", someone else comments : "The accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is but natural for a *brāhmaṇa*". This [second] is refuted [by one employing *sāmānya-chala*] with the invention of a meaning opposite to the one intended,

i.e. by inventing an absurd meaning. Thus : “If the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is natural for *brāhmaṇa*, then this should be so even for a *vrātya* [i.e. a degraded *brāhmaṇa*] ; in other words, a *vrātya* also is a *brāhmaṇa* and [as such] he should also have the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned”.

By *atisāmānya* [in the *sūtra*] is meant a characteristic which is present in the object intended as well as in other objects. Thus, e.g., the characteristic of being a *brāhmaṇa* sometimes coexists and sometimes does not with the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned. This is called *sāmānyachala*, because it is due to ‘general characteristic’ (*sāmānya*).

Its refutation is as follows : [This second assertion, viz. “The accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is but natural for a *brāhmaṇa*”] is but a repetition of the theme [asserted first] with a view to praise only, and not for indicating a causal connection [between ‘being a *brāhmaṇa*’ and ‘having the accomplishment’]. Therefore, there is no scope for inventing the absurd meaning [viz. the causal connection alleged]. For example, [the statement] “In this field the *śāli* crop grows abundantly”, does not negate the growth of the crop from seeds nor is it intended [to convey that the crop grows in this field after the sowing of the seed] ; on the contrary, it is intended to be simply a praise of the field under discussion. It is but mentioning over again [something about] the field and not an injunction that the *śāli* crop should be cultivated in this field. Though it is a fact that the *śāli* crop grows from the seeds, [the statement under discussion] is not intended to point to this. Similarly, the statement, viz. “The accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is natural for a *brāhmaṇa*”, indicates that ‘being a *brāhmaṇa*’ is related to the accomplishment and not that it is the cause of the accomplishment. The cause is not meant here. It is only a case of restatement, because it is simply intended to be a praise, viz. the possession of the accomplishment is appropriate in the case of being a *brāhmaṇa*. A statement intended to be in praise of something does not negate the production of the effect in accordance with its cause. Hence, refutation of a statement by inventing an absurd meaning is not tenable.

Sūtra 14

‘Purposive distortion of the secondary sense’ (*upacāra-chala*) is refuting [the opponent] by taking resort to the primary sense ‘when the secondary sense is intended’ (*dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe*). // i. 2. 14 //

Bhāṣyā

Dharma [in the *sūtra*] means the use of a word in its proper sense [i.e. in the primary sense]. *Dharma-vikalpa* means the use of the word in a sense different from the one in which it is generally found [i.e. *dharma-vikalpa* means the use of a word in its secondary sense]. Thus, the expression *dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe* means “when a word is used in a secondary sense”. E.g., the statement, viz. “The platform calls” (*mañcāḥ krośanti*), is refuted by taking the primary sense [of the word “platform”] thus : “The persons on the platform call and the platform does not call”.

Where, in such a case, is the invention of the opposite meaning ? [The invention consists in] the attribution of a different meaning to a word used in some other sense,—that is, the attribution of the primary sense [when the word is actually] used in the secondary sense. It is called *upacāra-chala*, because it rests on *upacāra*. *Upacāra* means the figurative sense. [As explained in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 62], *upacāra* is conveying [by a word] a meaning in which it is not [primarily] used, because of the conditions like contiguity (*sahacaraṇa*) etc. [The conditions like contiguity etc. which make a secondary sense admissible are explained in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 62].

The solution here is this : In the cases of well-known expressions, the admission or rejection of words and their meanings should be in accordance with the implications intended by the speaker and not whimsically. The use of words in their primary senses as well as in their secondary senses is admitted by both [the contestants] as sanctioned by usage. In the cases of such sanctioned use, the words and their meanings are to be accepted or rejected in accordance with the intention of the speaker and not whimsically. If the speaker uses a word in its primary sense, it is to be accepted or rejected as it is [i.e. only in its primary sense] and not whimsically. If [a word is used in] a secondary sense [it is to be accepted or rejected] as expressing the secondary sense [alone]. When the speaker uses a word in its secondary sense and the other refutes it by taking up the primary sense, it results only in a refutation subjectively imagined and not in a proper refutation of the opponent.

Sūtra 15

[Objection :] The *upacāra-chala* is nothing but *vāk-chala*, because there is no difference [of this, viz. *upacāra-chala*] with it [viz. *vāk-chala*]. // i. 2. 15 //

Bhāṣya

Upacāra-chala does not differ from *vāk-chala*, because it has no difference [from *vāk-chala* both being] the invention of a meaning other than what is intended. Here [i.e. in the example of *upacāra-chala*, viz. "The platform calls"] also the refutation is effected by twisting the word [i.e. the word "platform"] used in its secondary sense, viz. "those on the platform", to imply the primary sense, viz. "the platform itself."

Sūtra 16

[Answer :] No. Because there is difference in the nature of the invention of meaning [in the two cases of *chala*]. // i. 2. 16 //

Bhāṣya

Upacāra-chala is not the same as *vāk-chala*, because its way of refutation with the help of the primary sense is different. From what? From the simple invention of a different [but equally primary] meaning [in the case of *vāk-chala*]. It is one thing to invent a different meaning and it is something else to refute with the help of the primary sense. [In other words, while employing *vāk-chala* one simply invents an alternative primary meaning; on the other hand, while employing *upacāra-chala* one replaces the intended secondary sense by the primary sense unintended].

Sūtra 17

[Further, if it is claimed] there is no difference between the two [viz. *vāk-chala* and *upacāra-chala*], then on the ground of partial similarity [among all the forms of *chala*], there is the possibility of the undue admission of only one form of *chala*. // i. 2. 17 //

Bhāṣya

Admitting *chala* to be two-fold, it is denied [by the opponent] on the ground of partial similarity [between *upacāra-chala* and *vāk-chala*] that *chala* is three-fold. This ground which rejects the view that *chala* is three-fold also rejects the view accepted by you [i.e. by the opponent] that *chala* is two-fold. Because, partial similarity also exists between the two forms of *chala* [admitted by the opponent]. Therefore, if claimed [by the opponent] that [the view], viz. *chala* is two-fold, is not negated on the ground of partial similarity, then the view that it is three-fold cannot also be negated [on the same ground of partial similarity].

Elucidation

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (*vimāna-sthāna*, *adhyāya* viii) refers to a view according to which there are only two forms of *chala*, viz. *vāk-chala* and *sāmānya-chala*. From this it is evident that such a view was current in ancient time and Gautama, in these three *sūtra*-s, refutes it in favour of his own view of three-fold *chala*. As Vātsyāyana explains, it is necessary to admit *upacāra-chala* as distinct from *vāk-chala*, because there is a significant difference between the two. In the case of *vāk-chala*, the meanings intended as well as invented are both primary, whereas in *upacāra-chala* the meaning intended is secondary while the meaning invented is primary.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF
PURPOSIVE DISTORTION

(*chala-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bkāṣya

After the definition of *chala* [is mentioned the definition of *jāti*].

Sūtra 18

‘Futile rejoinder’ (*jāti*) is refuting the opponent by [pointing to] superficial similarity and dis-similarity. // I. 2. 18 //

Bhāṣya

Jāti [literally] means an opportunity [for one of the contestants] born out of employment of a proban [by the other]. This opportunity is nothing but the refutation or rejection or demolition by pointing to superficial similarity or dis-similarity. The refutation of ‘the proban which proves the probandum through similarity with the instance cited’ (*sādharmya-hetu* : *Nyāya-sūtra* I. 1. 34) is to be effected by pointing to the dis-similarity with the instance cited. The refutation of ‘the proban which proves the probandum through dis-similarity with the instance cited’ (*vaidharmya-hetu* : *Nyāya-sūtra* I. 1. 35) is to be effected by pointing to the similarity with the instance cited. Because there is mutual contradiction [between similarity and dis-similarity]. *Jāti* is ‘that which is born’ (*jāyamāna*), i.e., the resulting refutation.

Elucidation

The different forms of *jāti*, along with their examples, will be discussed in *Nyāya-sūtra* V. 1. 1ff.

Sūtra 19

‘Point of defeat’ (*nigrahasthāna*) means [the demonstration] of ‘contradictory knowledge’ (*vipratipatti*) or ignorance (*apratipatti*) [on the part of any of the contestants] // I. 2. 19 //

Bhāṣya

‘Contradictory knowledge’ means either ‘erroneous’ (*viparīta*) or ‘crude’ (*kutsita*) knowledge. One with such contradictory knowledge becomes defeated. *Nigrahassthāna* means nothing but this point of defeat.

Ignorance (*apratipatti*), on the other hand, is the failure to play one’s own part [in a debate], i.e. [one suffering from ignorance] does not refute the position advanced by the opponent nor refutes the charges advanced against one’s own position.

Because of the absence of a compounded form [in the *sūtra* of the words *vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*] it is to be understood that these two are not the only forms of *nigrahassthāna*.

But, then, do *jāti* and *nigrahassthāna* have single form, as in the case of exemplification, or do they have different forms like [the different forms of] ‘the proved doctrine’? So is said,

Sūtra 20

Jāti and *nigrahassthāna* are of various forms, because of the manifold (*vikalpa*) forms [of refutation by pointing to superficial similarity and dis-similarity and, again, because of the manifold forms of contradictory knowledge and ignorance]. // i. 2. 20 //

Bhāṣya

Jāti is of various forms because of the manifold forms of refutation by pointing to superficial similarity and dis-similarity. *Nigrahassthāna* is of various forms because of the manifold forms of contradictory knowledge and ignorance. The word *vikalpa* means ‘various forms’ (*nānā-kalpa*) or ‘multiplicity of forms’ (*vividha-kalpa*).

[Of the twentytwo forms of *nigrahassthāna* mentioned by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 1], the following six,—called 1) *ananubhāṣaṇa* 2) *ajñāna* 3) *apratibhā* 4) *vikṣepa* 5) *matānujñā* and 6) *paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇa*,—belong to the class of *nigrahassthāna* known as ignorance (*apratipatti*) and the rest to the class called ‘contradictory knowledge’ (*vipratipatti*).

These sixteen categories, called *pramāṇa* etc., are first mentioned each by name. Each of these is defined next in the order in which these are mentioned.

These will be critically examined [in the subsequent chapters] according to their definitions. Thus is followed the three-fold procedure by the present system.

**HERE ENDS THE FIRST CHAPTER OF VĀTSYĀYANA'S
COMMENTARY ON NYĀYA-SŪTRA**

Elucidation

The section consisting of the last three *sūtra*-s is known as the *puruṣa-aśakti-līṅga-doṣa-sāmānyalakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*, because here is given the 'general definition' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of the defects (*doṣa*) which are 'indicative of' (*līṅga*) the disability (*aśakti*) of the contestants (*puruṣa*) in a debate.

**HERE ENDS THE FIRST CHAPTER (consisting of 2 *āhnika*-s, 11 *prakaraṇa*-s
and 61 *sūtra*-s) OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA**

POETRY OF WEAVERS AND TANNERS

I. D. SEREBRIAKOV

It was the Delhi Sultans' firm belief that a good enemy is a dead enemy, and they acted accordingly. However, the more ruthlessly they dealt with the people, the more tightly they turned the screw, the stronger grew popular resistance. If at times the national resistance movements subsided, it was only to gather strength for renewed assaults.

Information to hand concerning the popular liberation movements in the Delhi Sultanate come from chronicles whose authors were inimical to the "crowd" as they would term the people. The true sentiments of the people were expressed by the people's poets who were linked with the acute ideological struggle.

In the given period, feudal ideology developed along two basic lines: Hinduism and Islam. Though formally antagonistic to each other, both religions voiced the interests of the feudal class, while the strivings of other social groupings, including the lowest strata of society, manifested themselves in diverse oppositional sects. From these lower strata stemmed the most interesting and radical teachings, engendered by the life conditions of the feudal epoch.

Hinduism has never been a religion based on a single canon and a unified ecclesiastic organisation. Its adherents fell into numerous sects grouped around two main doctrines: Vaishnavite and Saivite. In their opposition to Islam as the religion implanted by foreign invaders, and to Hinduism with the rigid caste system and its suppression of the human individuality, the people sought a new, "rightful" creed, that would accept men as equal at least in heaven if not on earth. Gradually they came to integrate individual traits of Hinduism and Islam.

The teachings born out of the popular movements in the Delhi Sultanate are marked with this kind of combination of Muslim and Hindu ideas.

One of these endeavours to create an appropriate new religion is connected with the *bhakti* movement, that sprang up in the VI-VII centuries. Its fundamental premises may be formulated as follows: all men are equal before God, and the merits of each man's religious devotion are measured by the degree of *bhakti*, i.e. his personal dedication to God. Two trends can be clearly traced in the *bhakti* movement: the conservative and the democratic. The adherents of the former demanded an unqualified return to Hinduism, complete with all its institutions; it was in essence a reaction of Hindu feudal rulers against Muslim domination. The democratic trend, on the other hand, had absorbed some ideas of Islam and its sects, and voiced the people's longing for a unification of all anti-feudal forces.

The most outstanding spokesman of the democratic trend was Kabir (approximately XV century), a thinker and poet of real genius. His teachings as well as his creative writings exerted a considerable influence upon the further development of Punjabi literature. Kabir wrote in Braj, one of the dialects from which contemporary Hindi evolved. His poetry is considered not only as a brilliant chapter of Hindi literature but also as an integral part of medieval Punjabi literature. The most authentic of his poems are those included in the sacred book of the Sikhs, the *Adi Granth*.

Kabir addressed his teachings to the simple people, whatever their creed. There is no personified God, he proclaimed, looming like a monarch high above a gathering of subordinate gods and saints. There is neither a Vishnu nor an Allah. God is in every living creature, in every manifestation of nature. All men are equal, before God. Not only that, they are equal among themselves too. Kabir denounced castes as well as sects, and raised his voice against religious obscurantism, fanaticism, cults and rites, protesting that no religion could claim sole and supreme righteousness.

He himself belonged to the caste of weavers, and worked in his profession throughout his life. His songs and hymns included in the *Adi Granth* belong to different periods of his creative writing and express various stages in the development of his teaching. Yet he remained invariably the poet of the oppressed, of those who produce all material values, and hence participate in the world.

No one knoweth the mystery of me, the weaver
 Though the world cometh to me to get the cloth woven.
 When ye folks hear the Vedas and Puranas
 Then I see the whole creation stretched out like the Lord's workshop.
 Of the earth and the sky the Lord hath made a loom
 And the Sun and the Moon the warp and woof
 So I pray and my mind is pleased with the Lord
 And I, the weaver, realised the Lord within my own home.
 Sayeth Kabir : When the loom breaks
 Then the thread merges in the thread of the world.

Man's personal virtues alone, and not his caste, entitle him to call himself human :

The whole universe is the creation of Brahma
 Tell me, O Pandit, since when have Brahmins been created.
 Don't waste your life by crying (that you are a) Brahmin at every step.
 If you are a Brahmin because a Brahmin woman gave birth to you,
 Why are you Brahmin and why are we Sudras ?
 Why are we blood (unclean) and you are milk (clean) ?
 Kabir says that (the man) who really worships Brahma,
 We call only him the (true) Brahmin.

Sometimes Kabir words his social protest even more directly. Through the religious colouring of his poetry rings the clear voice of a toiler's passionate condemnation of social and economic inequality.

They who wear *dhotis* of three and a half yards, and three fold sacred cords
 And display rosaries on their necks and in their hands are the polished jugs;
 They are the cheats of Benaras, not the Saints of the Lord.
 I cannot respect such saints
 Who devour trees along with all their boughs

They scour their vessels before being placed on the hearth
 And wash the wood before it is lighted
 And digging out the earth they make double fire places.
 But devour the whole man they
 They live as sinners and transgressors
 Yea, they abide ever in ego and all their kindreds are drowned with them.
 They follow the lead of their minds and so do the deeds.

Here Kabir expresses the mood and sentiments of all people whose lot was equally hard, whether they lived in the regions of the upper Indus or in the Ganges valley. This accounts for his great popularity, and his influence on Punjabi literature.

Towards the end of the XV century, a new movement developed in Punjab-Sikhism, whose initiator was Nanak (1469-1539). A small grain merchant, like his father before him, Nanak travelled a great deal, visited Persia, and according to documentary sources, went as far as distant Mecca. He knew Persian and Arabic, had read the Koran and studied Sufi treatises. Neither these, however, nor Hindu treatises could offer him answers to the questions that moved him so deeply. Since his attitude to social and religious issues and his teachings in general largely continue, Kabir's legend has it that the two men had met.

Nanak's teaching is one of the various manifestations of the Hindu-Muslim cultural synthesis. It intertwines all the most vigorous aspects of the trends opposing orthodox Hinduism and Islam. Without challenging the authority of Vedas and Puranas, he denied the existence of a personified deity, and condemned idolatry, for there is but one divinity, he claimed, and this is truth embodied in the world's infinite manifoldness. All the gods of Hinduism, all its sacred writings, and those of Islam and other creeds too, are but separate manifestations of this all-embracing deity, in whose presence all are equal. And there is no distinction between human beings—either of caste, or of social adherence, or of sex. In this Nanak's ideas are a direct and consistent continuation of Kabir's.

To put these ideas into practice, Nanak founded a community that recognised no distinctions of caste or creed, and whose disciples strove to live according to the word of their master—the *guru*—Nanak himself. The majority of these disciples or Sikhs (*sikh*—a derivative of *śiṣya*—means "disciple") came mostly from among the Jats.

Nanak's teaching is essentially active, its central figure is not the hermit but the *grihāsti*—head of a family, engaged in a craft, or trade, or agriculture. The cult of the master indicates the influence of the Muslim Dervish orders, as well as that of some *bhakti* conceptions. Nanak's teaching is in actual fact a compromise between Hinduism, Islam, and the religions of various sects. In a philosophical poem *Japuji* (Prayer), Nanak asserts :

Words do not make men sinners or saints
 Only deeds are being written down in the Book of Fate,
 One will reap what one sows
 O, Nanak, choose your path !

While attributing supreme significance to action, to deeds and claiming that men should be appraised by what they do, Nanak retained some vital ethical principles of Hinduism, such as *karma*, i.e. predestination of fate, determined by good or evil deeds perpetrated in previous existences. Nanak endeavoured to unite all doctrines and sects of both Hinduism and Islam—maintaining that there is but one supreme divine essence for all to worship. This idea rendered his preaching abstract and gave rise to organisational weakness within the Sikh community.

Like a number of other spokesmen of *bhakti* and Sufism, Nanak expounded his teachings in the language used by the people, applying poetic forms close to those of folk poetry.

He took to writing at an early age. Not much of his poetry has come down to us : *Patti* (Alphabet) ; *Dakhni Omkar*—a mystical poem ; *Sidh Goshti* (Argument with the Siddha)—a polemic, in poetic form, with Gorakhnath, Charpat and other Naths; a number of religious poems, including *Asa-di-war* (Song of Morning) ; the poem *Barahmah* (Twelve Months), remarkable for its picturesque description of the Punjab landscape.

The poetic mastery of Nanak's verse is particularly apparent in his epic poem *Barahmah*. The *Barahmah* is one of the most ancient and presumably among the most popular of poetic forms to have come down to us. It consists of twelve stanzas or parts, each dedicated to its respective month of the year. It may begin with any month, but then proceeds in strict chronological sequence. Apart from the obligatory twelve stanzas it may contain an introductory and a concluding one. It is not restricted to any particular metric form. Genres similar to the *Barahmah* occur in other Indian literatures. Their essence lies in the following :

Every month has its specific character determined by the work performed in it, festivities falling on it, and natural phenomena typical of it. The poet dwells on the frame of mind of either a separate hero, or man in general in a particular month, attempting to motivate it. In doing so, he lends his verses either a local, or social, or lyrical, or religious tonality, thus introducing elements clearly linking it with folklore.

Asadh is hot for those who are away from God,
 Who had forsaken God that gives life to the entire world,
 Who (because of having forsaken God) are bereft
 Of milk, death has caught whose neck in its clutches,
 As they sow, so they reap, that is written in their fate,
 (They are like a woman) who has wasted the night (did not enjoy her husband), now full of
 sadness, leans (on the bed) disappointed.
 Though who get in contact with (real) *sadhus*, they reach God and are forgiven.

•When God is kind he satisfies the thirst of union with Him.
 O, God, there is no one except you in Nanak's prayers.
Asadh is beautiful for those, in whose hearts God is there.

As may be seen from the above, Nanak employs the *barahmah* genre for propaganda. Yet, as was the case in Farid's verses, the real world with its blatant contradictions breaks through the basically religious content.

Some are fed on meats, some on grass
 Some are provided with delicacies of all kinds
 Some abide in the earth and eat the dust.

Nanak's imagery derives from daily life and from the landscape of his native land. His poetry abounds in pictures linked with the occupations of the peasant, the artisan, the merchant, and images suggested by the luxuriant vegetable and animal world of the Punjab. Yet imagery linked with Hinduism, particularly *Ramaism* (there is no such now) also occurs.

As was mentioned before, Nanak made deliberate use of his poetry to propagate his teachings. He introduced profound philosophical motives into Punjabi poetry. It is for this reason that a number of polemic poems are attributed to him. He laid down a tradition subsequently followed by all the *gurus*—Sikh spiritual leaders: disseminating his teachings in poetic form, and resorting to genres, metres, and images current in folk poetry.

In the mid-sixteenth century, a prominent place among the first Sikh *gurus* belonged to Arjun (1567-1606), both poet and political spokesman. Arjun recognised Nanak's teachings as supremely important and highly relevant to the demands of the epoch, and ordered his works to be collected in one book. Thus he laid the beginning of the *Adi Granth*, which also comprised Arjun's own interpretations of Nanak's teachings. The compilation of the *Adi Granth* was entrusted to Arjun's most brilliant disciple, the poet Bhai Gurdas (1558-1637), and work on this compilation continued from 1604 to 1661. It embraced poetry not only in medieval Punjabi, reflecting the dialects of Lehada, Pothohari, Pahari, and Malvai, but also in Sadh Bhasha, Braj, and Avadhi.

The *Adi Granth* numbers sixteen thousand lines. The bulk naturally belongs to Sikh *gurus*: to Nanak (2,949 verses), Arjun (6,204 verses), Amar Das (2,522), Ram Das (1,730); next follow Kabir (1,146), Namdev, Sheikh Farid, Tukaram, Ravi Das, and others. The composition of the book is not directly conditioned by the content of the poems and lyrics included. The poetry is grouped, in the first place, according to the musical structure (the so-called *rāga*) in which the respective verses are to be performed, secondly according to either the metre or theme and thirdly according to authorship. From the very outset, it became a tradition to arrange the material within each separate *rāga* in

the following order : 1) *chaupaies*—quatrains ; 2) *ashtapadis*—octaves ; 3) long poems and epic poems ; 4) *chhans*—six-line verses ; 5) short verses ; 6) *vars* ; 7) poems outside the norms of Punjabi prosody.

The *Adi Granth* consummates a considerable process of development in the literature of the Punjabi people, and is thus a literary record of invaluable importance. Multilingual as its period is, it marks the beginning of a new stage in Punjabi literature, the period when its language becomes standardised approaching widely popular usage. The *Adi Granth* presents a summary, as it were, of the whole preceding development of Punjabi literature, laying bare its links with the literatures of peoples whose historical fates bore certain affinities with the fate of the Punjabi peoples, or whom economic or political circumstances had brought into contact with the Punjab. All this is evidenced not only in the ideological tendency of this book, but also in its poetics.

The authors included in it are peasants, artisans, and tradesmen. Their writing stems straight from folklore. This accounts, first, for the wealth of rhythms and metres not yet canonised at the time and therefore allowing for great freedom of the creative imagination, and secondly, for a predilection in this poetry for onomatopoeia as a favoured device of artistic expression. The poetic genres represented include the *bavanakhri*, the *painti*, the *barahmah*, and the *pandrahtitt*, whose emotional pitch depends on the theme and melody selected by the poet. In addition, the *Kafi* genre i.e. elegies appeared in the *Adi Granth*. Alongside the *salok* metre, long known in Punjabi versification, we encounter the *baint*—a couplet, rhymed or unrhymed, expressing a complete thought.

Through the *Adi Granth* runs the basic idea that the summits of religious and philosophic thought are accessible not only to Hindu pandits and Moslem theologians, but equally well to weavers and tanners, and that the beauties of the world and the magnificence of life are comprehensible to all.

By Word and by Sword.

By the late XVII century Sikhism had grown to such significance, and the Sikh community to such power that the Mogul emperors in Delhi saw themselves compelled to devote not a little time and strength to the Punjab affairs. Their attitude to Sikhism was getting from bad to worse and though tolerant at times, yet never—not even under Akbar—were they benevolent to it. Led by its first *guru*, Sikhism was still weak, unsupported by a broad mass movement, altogether too moderate to be able to assume ideological guidance of such a movement. Nanak's teachings, however, attracted increasing numbers of adherents. Putting to clever account the lands they received from the Mogul rulers, and the money collected from their adherents, the Sikh *guru* soon themselves became a kind of religio-feudal lords of no mean importance. Simultaneously, they continued engaging in trade : Arjun, for example, traded in horses with Afghanistan,

Bukhara, and Samarkand. The Sikh's growing wealth and their active interference in political affairs disconcerted the Mogul authorities. Presently Jehangir took issue with some verses included in the *Adi Granth* alleging them to be contradictory to Islam, and demanded that *guru* Arjun should eliminate them from the book. Arjun refused, whereupon he was tortured to death, bequeathing the defence of his teachings to his followers.

In the first armed clashes between the Moguls and the Sikhs, the Sikh warriors were put to rout. The struggle grew particularly bitter under the rule of Aurangzeb. He captured and executed the ninth Sikh *guru* Tegh Bahadur (1622-1675). Only under Gobind Singh (1660-1708), son of Tegh Bahadur, and the tenth Sikh *guru*, did Sikhism grow, into the mighty force that was instrumental to the collapse of the Mogul empire, and conducted the most persevering and effective resistance to the British invaders in the Punjab ; a force that furthered the consolidation of the Punjabi people.

Aurangzeb's policy rivalled in cruelty that of Mahmud Ghaznevi at his worst, and of other forerunners of the Moguls. Driven to despair by religious persecution and unbearable taxation, the peasants and artisans began to rally round the Sikhs. This determined the line of action embarked upon by Gobind Singh, who had set himself the aim of assuming leadership over all the anti-feudal forces in the Punjab, and of reorganising the *khalsa* (the Sikh community) on more democratic lines, turning it into the body of temporal and spiritual power. Gobind daringly presented his own interpretation of the ideas carried by the *Adi Granth*. His precepts are devoid of any contemplativeness, they are a challenge to implement the truth by use of force.

He is of the Khalsa
 Who protects the poor
 Who combats evil
 Who remembers God
 Who achieves greatness
 Who is intent upon the Lord
 Who is wholly unfettered
 Who mounts the war horse
 Who is ever waging battle
 Who is continually armed
 Who lays the Turks
 Who extends the faith
 And who gives his head with what is upon it.

Gobind had moved a long way from his predecessors' concept of the *guru* as the emanation of the Divine Essence, as the focal point of spiritual and temporal power. He proclaimed that all power should belong to the Khalsa—the Sikh community, which he deemed the rightful *guru*.

He who speaks of me as of the Lord
 Him will I sink into the pit of Hell !

Consider me as the slave of God
Of that have no doubt in thy mind
I am but the slave of the Lord
Came to behold the wonders of creation

Gobind's addresses to the Sikhs, his letters, his creative writing—all this forms a remarkable chapter in the history of Punjabi literature, both in content and form. His writings are collected in the *Dasama Granth* (*Book of the Tenth Guru*). It is a mixed kind of book, regarding both ideological tendencies and genres. It comprises hymns as well as the *Vachittar Natak* (*Motley*) Drama—Gobind's autobiography, into which are inserted his 'genealogy and various legends, a ballad on the goddess Bhagavati, the epic poem *Gyan Prabodh* (*The Light of Knowledge*), which reproduces several ancient legends, a number of poems in different metres, the *Tiriya Charitar* (*Feminine Pranks*), a collection of folklore stories, and Gobind Singh's poetry in Parsi (Persian). To the Ramaist-Vaishnava motifs that prevailed in the poetry of the early *gurus*, Gobind added Shaivite motifs and themes, thus not only extending the subjectmatter and enriching the imagery of literary expression, but also attracting Shaivism to the Sikh movement. In addition to the writings included in the *Dasama Granth*, the translation of the *Bhagavadgītā* into Punjabi, is also ascribed to Gobind.

The *Dasama Granth* is a significant landmark in the history of Punjabi literature—it opens a period in which literature becomes an important means of shaping social consciousness. Moreover, it testifies to the fact that the evolution of Punjabi as a national language was already an accomplished process.

Rich in aesthetic values and ideas, the *Dasama Granth* and the poetry of Gobind Singh's time, infinitely variegated in genres and individual styles, were of decisive importance in the development of Punjabi literature. It was the time when the creative writing of Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus merged into a single mainstream of national Punjabi literature.

Gobind Singh's autobiographical poem *Vachittar Natak* was conceived as the ideological centre of the *Dasama Granth*. It is not a poem only of remarkable literary value, but also rich in authentic historical information where it dwells on events contemporary to the poet's life. The word *nāṭaka* signifies in Sanskrit any piece of writing in the dramatic genre. In this particular instance it is merely intended to underscore the scope, significance and dramatic tension of the events described. Its genre is that of an epic poem, and although the poet lays repeated stress on his religious vision, yet the epic element prevails throughout, in the plots as well as in versification. From the very outset, the reader is aware that the poet is a warrior: traditionally, the poem was to contain a dedication to divine power, yet in actual fact it is the sword that is glorified. The clang reverberates through the opening lines:

1. sword

Disperse hordes of enemies
 Handle of which cannot be broken
 And which has a sharp blade
 Glittering brighter than the sun.

With polemical vigour, the poet then proceeds to elaborate on Nanak's concept of a single all-pervading divine essence comprising all the deities of the Hindu pantheon. He gives an account of the Creation in the way it is presented by the Puranas, whereupon he passes over to his own genealogy tracing it back to Rama. The descendants of Rama's two sons—Lava and Kusha—came to hate each other, for they could not divide their land and property. Ever since the world has been rent asunder by similar feuds.

From time immemorial enmity started
 Because of greediness for land and money
 Haughtiness and greediness rule over the earth
 And mirage of gold intoxicates everyone.

Eventually the feud between the two lineages of the old family ends in reconciliation, with the prediction that the head of the Kusha family will re-appear on the earth when *Kali-yuga* sets in.

The fifth chapter of the poem is dedicated to Kusha's re-incarnation in Nanak, and his presence in all Sikh *gurus* preceding Gobind. The subsequent chapter dwells on Gobind's contemporary India. It opens with a description of religious strife, and condemning Hinduism and its canons, Govind proves the righteousness of Nanak's teaching which alone transcends the contradictions of Hinduism. It must be noted that Gobind makes no attempt to incite hatred of those who profess a different faith. On the contrary, he conveys his reverence towards all existing teachings, and emphatically attributes all unworth misconceptions to erroneous interpretations of these teachings.

The seventh and eighth chapters relate the story of the poet's birth, which is presented as a manifestation of the divine soul, of his conduct in life, and of how he comes to be a *guru*. This is followed by a description of how Gobind founded the town of Paonta (*Anandpur*), and of his struggle against the Mogul viceregents. He gives a frank account of how he went any length so as to rally the people against the obnoxious Delhi sultans, sometimes crossing the will of Hindu feudal rulers. The final victory he ascribes to divine power :

Supreme God is my father
 Primeval force is my mother
 My teacher is all-pervading spirit, whose spouse is godly will,
 Taught me to make good.

Gobind Singh's epic poem was a distinctively new phenomenon in Punjabi

literature : it is a specific kind of confession by a son of his epoch—one of its greatest figures—presented in autobiographic form. The *Vachittar Natak* is an authentic historical image of the period, penned by a veritable master of the word, whose perception is quickened by thorough knowledge of the cultural heritage of, ancient and medieval India.

STUDIES IN NIBANDHA-S

Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya

(b) The *Kṛtyaratnākara*

(I) Its conception of *dharma*

The *Kṛtyaratnākara*, before prescribing the religious duties of a Hindu, appropriate to the twelve months of the year, devotes some 38 pages (p. 7-44) to the 'determination of *dharma*', divided into four topics, viz. definition (*svārūpa*), effects (*phala*), sources (*pramāṇa*) and requisites (*nimitta*). In defining *dharma* it quotes a text of Manu (II. 1),²⁹ which says that people are to follow that *dharma*, which is practised by persons, who are learned, honest and are always devoid of passion or hatred and which is respected by them in their very hearts. It next quotes a text of *Viśvāmitra*³⁰ to the effect that *dharma* is that, the practice of which is applauded by persons, conversant with the scriptures and *adharma* is that, the practice of which is decried by them. It then quotes a lengthy passage of *Āpastamba*,³¹ which means that determination of *dharma* is a difficult thing and *dharma* is the practice of the good, the polite, the aged, the unavaricious and the prideless persons. It last quotes a text of the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*,³² which says that *dharma* is the means of attaining prosperity. It then explains³³ the term *dharma* as applicable to its three kinds, viz. daily, casual and voluntary. It then further subdivides it on the authority of the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*³⁴ into *varṇadharmā*, *āśramadharmā*, *varṇāśramadharmā*,

29. vidvadbhiḥ sevitaḥ sadbhir-nityam-adveṣarāgibhiḥ /
hṛdayenābhyanujñāto yo dharmas-taṃ nivodhata //
30. yam-āryāḥ kriyamāṇaṃ hi śaṃsantyāgamavedinaḥ /
sa dharmo yaṃ vigarhanti tam-adharmaṃ pracakṣate //
31. na surā no gandharvā no pitaro 'yaṃ dharmo' yamadhar-ma iti /.....sarvajana-
padeṣvekānta-samāhitam āryā-ṇāṃ vṛttam samyag-vinitānāṃ vṛddhānāṃ evaṃ
alolupānāṃ adāmbhikānāṃ vṛttasādṛśyaṃ bhajetaivam ubhau lokāvabhijayatīti /
32. dharmāḥ śreyāḥ samuddiṣṭam śreyo' bhyudayasāadhanam /
33. ayañca dharmośabedo nityaṃ naimittikaṃ kāmiamityādyagrimānusāreṇa
kriyāpara iti boddhavyam.
- 34.* sa tu pañcaviḍaḥ prokto vedamulaḥ sanātanaḥ /
varṇadharmāḥ śmṛtastveka āśramānāṃ ataḥ param /
varṇāśramas tritīyastu gauṇa naimittikas tathā //
varṇatvam ekam āśritya yo dharmāḥ sampravartate /
varṇadharmāḥ sa uktas tu yathopanayanam nṛpa /i

guṇadharmā and *nimittadharmā* and exemplifies the above five classes on the same authority as follows :—

‘Investiture with the sacred thread’ (*upanayana*) is an instance of *varṇadharmā*, because only the three twice-born classes (*varṇas*) are entitled to it. ‘Begging and carrying a staff’ is an instance of *āśramadharmā*, because it is resorted to in the fourth stage († *āśrama*) of a man’s life. ‘Wearing the girdle made of *muñja* grass’ is an instance of *varṇāśramadharmā*, because it is prescribed for the members of the twice-born classes at the time of their *upanayana*, which marks their entrance into the first stage of life, viz. *brahmacarya* (i.e. studenthood). ‘Protection of the subjects by a duly installed king’ is a *guṇadharmā*, because it is concomitant with royalty which is an attribute (*guṇa*), while expiation (i.e. *prāyaścitta*) is a *nimittadharmā*, whereas it relates to a particular incident (*nimitta*), viz. incurring of sin.

It then lays down on the authority of the *Manusmṛti* (I. 88-91) and *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* the duties peculiar to the four castes (*varṇas*), which are to the effect that reading, teaching, making sacrifices, officiating in others sacrifices, taking gifts and making gifts are the six-fold duties of a Brāhmaṇa, protection of subjects, making gifts, making sacrifices, reading and control of passions are the five-fold duties of a Kṣatriya, tending cattle, making gifts, making sacrifices, reading, trade, usury and cultivation of lands are the seven-fold duties of a Vaiśya while the only duty of a Śūdra is the ungrudging service of the three higher castes.

The duties, common to all the castes, have been collected by our author from the *Kalikāpurāṇa*, *Nārada*, *Bṛhaspati*, *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, *Devala*, *Yājñavalkya* (I. 8), *Devīpurāṇa*, *Manu* (VI. 91-92) and *Dakṣa*. The quotation from the *Kalikāpurāṇa*⁸⁵ is to the effect that *Iṣṭa* and *Pūrta* are the *dharma*s sanctioned by *Smṛti* and also by *Śruti* as handed down by tradition, that *Iṣṭa*, which means ‘sacrifice’, confers worldly pleasure only and that *Pūrta*, which means ‘consecration of idols and reservoirs of water’, confers both pleasure and salvation on the person, who performs the same.

yas tvāśramam samāśritya adhikāraḥ pravartate /
sa khalvāśramadharmastu bhikṣādaṇḍādiko yathā //
varṇatvam āśramatvañca yo’ dhikṛtya pravartate /
sa varṇāśramadharmaḥ tumauñjīyā mekhalā yathā //
yo guṇena pravarteta guṇadharmāḥ sa ucyate /
yathā mūrdhābhiṣiktasya prajānām paripālanam //
nimittam ekamāśritya yo dharmāḥ sampravartate /
naimittikaḥ sa vijñeyāḥ prāyaścittavidhir yathā //

35. iṣṭāpūrtau smṛtau dharmāu śrutau tau śiṣṭasammatau /
pratīṣṭhādyanantayoḥ pūrtam iṣṭam yajñādīlakṣaṇam /
bhukti-mukti-pradam pūrtam iṣṭam bhogārthasāadhanam //

The quotation from the *Viṣṇu(-purāṇa)*³⁶ purports that forgiveness, truthfulness, control (of desires), cleanliness, charity, control of the organs (of senses and actions), abstinence from killing creatures, serving one's teacher and preceptor, visits to places of pilgrimage, pity, straightforwardness, absence of avarice, worshipping gods and Brāhmaṇas and absence of malice are the *dharma*, common to all the castes. The quotations from the rest are, more or less, paraphrases of the above two quotations.

It then devotes three sub-chapters to the effects, sources and requisites of *dharma* respectively.

In the sub-chapter on the effects of *dharma*, the quotations from the *Taittiriya Śruti*, *Manusmṛti* (II. 9), *Vaśiṣṭha* and *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* are significant. The quotation from the first³⁷ means that *dharma* is the support of the whole world, people resort to those who practise it, vices are cleared away by it, so they call *dharma* as the best. The quotation from the second³⁸ purports that a man derives fame in this life and exquisite happiness in the next one (after death) by practising *dharma*, as laid down in the Śruti and the Smṛti. The quotation from the third³⁹ is to the effect that the person, practising *dharma*, becomes praiseworthy in this world and attains heaven in the next. The quotation from the fourth⁴⁰ states that the practice of daily duties is necessary without any end in view, that of voluntary ones with a particular end in view and that of casual ones for the removal of vices.

Of the quotations in the sub-chapter on the sources of *dharma*, those from *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya*, *Mahābhārata* and *Hārīta* are important. The quotation from *Manu*⁴¹ (II. 6) is to the effect that the Vedas, the Smṛtis, good behaviour (*śīla*), the conduct of the good, who are conversant with the above and the unanimous verdict of the learned in a religious

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36. kṣamā satyaṃ damaḥ śaucaṃ dānam indriyanigrahaḥ /
 ahiṃsā guruśūśrūṣā tīrthānusaranaṃ dayā //
 ārjavaṃ lobhaśūnyatvaṃ devabrāhmaṇapūjanam /
 anabhyasūyā ca tathā dharmāḥ sāmānya ucyate //
37. dharmo viśvasya jagataḥ pratiṣṭhā, loke dharmiṣṭhaṃ prajā upasarpanti, dharmeṇa
 pāpam apanudati, dharme sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam tasmād-dharmaṃ paramaṃ vadanti /
38. śruti-smṛtyuditam dharmam anutiṣṭhan hi mānavaḥ /
 iha kīrtim avāpnoti pretya cānuttamaṃ sukham //
39. Dhārmikaḥ hrasāsyatām eti loke pretya ca svargabhāḥ bhavati /
- 40.* phalam vināpyanuṣṭhānam nityānām iṣyate sphuṭam /
 kāmyānām svaphalārthantu doṣaghātārtham eva ca /
 naimittikānām karaṇam trividham karmaṇām phalam //
41. vedo' khilo dharmamūlam smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām /
 ācāraścaiva sādhanām ātmanas-tuṣṭireva ca //

problem—are the sources of *dharma*. The quotation from *Yājñavalkya*⁴² (I. 7) means that Śruti, Smṛti, good customs and one's own discretion in the case of a conflict of the scriptures—are the sources of *dharma*. The interpretation of the term *śīla*, occurring in the above text of *Mauu*, has been taken by our author from the *Mahābhārata*⁴³ to make the meaning clear. It is to the effect that the learned call the non-infliction of injury on all creatures either by mind or by speech or by action, showing favour to them and knowledge as *śīla*. *Hārta's*⁴⁴ interpretation of this very term has also been appended by him just after the above interpretation of the *Mahābhārata*. It means that *śīla* is of thirteen kinds, viz. (1) identification of the individual self with the Supreme self, (2) adoration of the gods, (3) adoration of the Fathers, (4) comeliness, (5) absence of the habit of mortifying others, (6) absence of malice, (7) mildness, (8) absence of harshness, (9) friendship, (10) sweet-speaking habit, (11) gratitude, (12) offering shelter to others and (13) salutation (to superiors), and that these are as authoritative as customs.

He then quotes a further text of *Yājñavalkya*⁴⁵ (I. 3) to the effect that the four Vedas, the six auxiliaries of the Vedas, the Purāṇas, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā and the (metrical and aphoristic) Dharmaśāstra works are the fourteen sources of knowledge and of *dharma*. Our author then quotes a text of *Jābāla*⁴⁶ to the effect that in the case of a conflict between the Śruti and the Smṛti, the former should be respected. The citation from *Gautama*⁴⁷ purports that in the case of a conflict between two texts of Smṛti, either of them may be respected.

The last sub-chapter on the requisites of *dharma* opens with a prose passage of *Śaṅkhalikhita*,⁴⁸ which means that the requisites of *dharma* are proper place, time, procedure, the requisite article, devotion, person and sacrifice, and that *dharma* with devotion and person stands in need of proper time, which is secured when the proper

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42. śrutiḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanah /
samyak saṅkalpajaḥ kāmō dharmamūlam idam smṛtam //
43. adrohaḥ sarvabhūtānām karmaṇā manasā girā /
anugrahaśca jñānāñca śīlam etad-vidur-budhāḥ //
44. brahmaṇyatā devapitṛbhaktatā saumyatā aparopātāpitā anasūyatā mṛdutā
apāruṣyam maitratā priyavādītā kṛtajñatā śaraṇyatā praṇatiśceti
trayodaśavidham śīlam etasyācāravat prāmāṇyam /
45. purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharmaśāstrāṅga-miśrītaḥ /
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca caturdaśa //
46. śruti-smṛti-virodhe tu śrutireva garīyasī /
avirodhe sadā kāryam smṛtam vaidikavat sadā //
47. tulyabalavirodhe vikalpaḥ /
48. tatra dharmalakṣaṇāni—deśaḥ kāla upāyo dravyam śraddhā pātram tyāga iti
samasteṣu dharmodayaḥ sādharmaṇo' nyathā viparītaḥ /.....śraddhā-pātra-sampanno
dharmaḥ kālāpekṣaḥ śraddhā-dravyotpattiriti kālāḥ /

article is associated with devotion. This sub-chapter ends with a text of *aśiṣṭha*,⁴⁹ which means that *dharma* is that which is practised and customs are those which are followed in the *Āryāvarta* i.e. in the area intervening between the Himālayas and the Vindhyas.

(II) *Khañjana-darśana*

Khañjana-darśana or sight of the bird *Khañjana* (wagtail) is a peculiar Hindu omen, recorded in the *Kṛtyaratnākara* (pp. 366-373). Though it is also recorded in later works viz. Govindānanda's *Varṣakriyākaumudī* (pp. 449-51) and Raghunandana's *Tithitattva* (103-4), yet those treatments cover one or two pages only and as such, are less comprehensive than that of the present work, consisting of seven pages. We, therefore, give below a synopsis of this treatment in view of both its earlier and more detailed character.

"One should perform the *śānti*, called *nirāja*, in the eighth or twelfth *tithi* or on the full-moon day of the month of *Āśvina* or *Kārttika*. After the conclusion of the *nirājaśānti* ceremony by the king, the enemy, if chased by him in the direction of the flight of the *khañjana* bird, is fast subdued. This bird is first seen when the sun is in the asterism of *Hastā* and vanishes when the sun reaches that of *Rohiṇī*. That kind of *Khañjana*, which is fat, possessed of a long neck and a black throat and is dark from the neck and mouth is beneficent and fulfils all the desires of the observer ; while that other kind of *Khañjana*, which has a dark spot on the throat and the tips of whose hands and feet are white, is called *citrakṛt* and that, which is excessively yellow, is called *gopīta* (*gomūtrapīta* ?) and these two classes add to the misery of the observer. There are four kinds of *Khañjana* birds, viz. *samantabhadra*, *prabhadra*, *anubhadra* and *ambarabhadra*. That kind, which is dark on all sides of the neck, breast and head, is called *samantabhadra*, while that kind, which has dark head and breast but white neck and back, is called *prabhadra*. That kind, the neck and breast of which only are dark, is called *anubhadra*, while that kind, with a dark line in the neck, is called *ambarabhadra*. Of the above four kinds, the immediately preceding one excels the succeeding one in the matter of conferring success on a good action. That kind of *ākāśabhadra* (i.e. *ambarabhadra*), which has a dark line on the neck but a white face, brings about failure of designs. That kind, which resembles yellow juice in colour and is hence called *gomūtra* (the same as the *gopīta*), if seen in the morning, predicts miseries to the observer for the period of one year.

The *Khañjana* bird, if seen on a curd vessel or a stack of paddy, confers good, while that, seen on quagmire, predicts good grass and that, which is found on the dung of a bull, foretells the profusion of cow's milk. If seen on grass, *sakaṭa* tree, house-top, face of a person and *śuci* tree, it predicts the acquisition of clothes, sale of the country, failure, imprisonment and disease respectively. If found on the back of a goat or of a sheep, it indicates the speedy meeting with one's beloved ones. But if it is seen seated on the

bone of a dead buffalo, camel or ass, in a burning place of dead bodies, corner of a house, or on sand, wall, ashes or hair, it foretells evil and brings about death, disease and fear. If it shakes its wings or drinks from a water-course, it is inauspicious. Generally, it is auspicious, if seen at the time of sunrise but not so, if found at the time of sunset.

The places, where it performs sexual intercourse or vomits or voids its ordure, abound with gems, glass and coal respectively and the soil is to be dug in those places to unearth those curiosities. Its dead, wounded, diseased and bleeding condition predict the self-same states of the observer. If it is found falling to the ground from its accustomed height, it forebodes wealth to the observer, while if found soaring in the sky, it indicates future union with one's nearest relations. If it is seen in the morning on lotuses, cows, elephants, horses and big serpents, it predicts a kingdom to the observer; if found on unsoiled grass, it indicates good news; while if found on ashes, bones, wood, nails, hairs and husk, it entails misery upon the observer for the period of one year. But if found seated in the morning on elephants, sheep, *śāla* groves, balconies of palaces, curd vessels and clean soil, or over gold and winnowing fans used for kings, or in the clear sky, or on good shady trees with rich foliage and bent down with fruits, the *Khañjana* confers prosperity on the observer. If again it is seen in the morning sit very suddenly and in a happy mood on a river-bank, a lotus, cow-dung, the tail of a cow, *dūrvā* grass, royal palace, the topmost room of a house, *jambāla* fruit, new leaf, *kṣīra* tree, household materials, or on the main arch such of a house, it is then highly auspicious for the acquisition of water, food and drink, dear ones, cows, horses and cloths and for recovery from diseases. Its position on a boat predicts the acquisition of a house to the observer. But if it is shown by another person, that second person secures the company of a woman. If found on unploughed soil or on a stack of paddy, in the morning or in the sky, it foretells marriage, acquisition of paddy, union with one's dear ones and also with one's near ones respectively. If it is seen alighting from the sky, it indicates sufficient wealth; if found eating and drinking, it foretells the acquisition of food and drink; while if observed in other beautiful positions in the morning, it surely confers similar other desirable results on the observer. If it is found following an ass, a camel or a dog, or breaking its wings, it predicts death on the observer; and if it is found shaking its wings in the evening, or tied or dead, it forebodes evil. The observer as well as the intending traveller meets with the positions, good or bad, as attend the *Khañjana* bird in the morning. If seen in the south when the star *Agastya* is on the horizon, this bird fulfils the desire of the observer, who should, therefore worship it with a mantra and bow down to it with the head for the attainment of the good result, indicated by it. The sight and the utterance of the name of this bird are equally auspicious and if it is seen going in a revolving fashion, the desire of a traveller is fulfilled. The following mantra is to be uttered at its sight:

'O you, the son of a sage, practising *yoga*, you disappear with the advent of summer but reappear after the close of the rains, I bow down to you, *Khañjana*, who are full of wonders.'

• The *Khañjana* bird, seen in an ugly body in a bad place, doing reproachable acts, must then be worshipped by the observer, particularly for the removal of the vices, indicated by it. The observer should abstain from sexual intercourse and flesh-eating, lie down on the bare ground, bathe, mutter mantras, offer oblations to fire and worship the bird for the period of seven days.

SLAVE TRADE IN ANCIENT INDIA

Sandhya Mukerjee

The institution of slavery was prevalent in India from very early times. Our early Vedic literatures testify to this fact. But neither in Vedic literatures nor in early Dharma-sūtras do we get any reference to slave trade in our country. Pāli literatures, however, provide us with a vivid picture of the social and legal status of slaves in Ancient India. In the *Vidura Paṇḍita Jātaka* there is a reference to four kinds of slaves, one of which is described as *dhanena kita* or slave by purchase. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, Buddha prohibits his lay-worshippers to indulge in five kinds of trade, the second of which is *suttavanijja* (*Pañchaka Nipāta Upāsakavagga*. See *Inscriptions of Aśoka* by Barua, Pt. II, Trans. and Glossary p. 307) and Buddhaghosa explains this as *manuss-vanijja*, traffic in human beings. It is quite clear from the above statement of Buddha that during his time there existed a regular trade in human cargoes, which Buddha had to denounce.

In the Jātakas we have plenty of other references to slaves purchased with money. There are even references to the amount of money required for purchasing a slave. The conventional price of a slave, as stated in the Jātakas, was 100 Kahapanas or Karsapanas and 700 Kahapanas were enough to buy male and female slaves (*alam me ettakam dhanam dāsi dāsa mulya—Jāt. I. 224, 299*). In Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* we get a long discussion on *dāsa* and *karmakāra* (i. e. slaves and free labourers). In connection with this discussion frequent mentions are also made of buying and selling of slaves (*Kauṭ. III. 13 and III. 14*). In one place he clearly states that slavery should not be common feature of an Ārya's life. According to him it is no crime for a Mleccha to sale or mortgage the life of his own offspring. But never an Ārya could be subjected to slavery (*Kauṭ. III 13*). In certain exceptional cases, however, Kauṭilya permits an Ārya to sale or mortgage his life ; these are i) in order to tide over family difficulties, ii) to find money for fines or court decrees and iii) to recover confiscated household implements. From the above discussion it is clear that though buying and selling of human lives was condemned in high caste society yet the custom was very much in existence during Kauṭilya's time and even the members of the high caste society could not fully escape it.

In Manu's description of seven kinds of slaves there is a mention of slaves bought with money (*krīta—Manu VIII. 415*). But Manu, like Kauṭilya, does not cherish the idea of a high born man being subjected to slavery (Manu—VIII, 412). The same idea is also expressed by Viṣṇu (5. 151) and Nārada (5-38). But in spite of the disapproving attitude of our ancient law-givers, it is obvious from their statements that inland trading in slaves

had already become a common feature in ancient Indian society. Thus Manu mentions two types of Śūdras, bought and unbought—both of whom should be compelled to do servile works (Manu VIII. 413). Nārada on the other hand, in his list of fifteen kinds of slaves, refers to one 'who is bought'.

The ancient authors of our country apart, some foreign observers also have testified to the existence of slave trade in ancient India. Thus the author of the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* (an account of travel and trade in the Indian Ocean by an Egyptian Greek merchant of the 1st cent), while giving an account of sea-borne trade in Indian ocean, refers to the prevalence of slavery as well as slave trade in India. In one place he states that a brisk trade was carried on with the island of Dioscordia (Agatharchides refers to it as the "Island of the Blest", a stopping place for the voyagers between India, and Arabia—*Peri. Ery.* p. 133 Note 30) by the people of Muza (a port in Arabia identified with modern Mocha, *Peri. Ery.* p. 106, 233) and also by the traders coming from Daminika (country of Tamils—Drāviḍa-deśam including Cera, Pāṇḍya and Cola Kingdom—*Peri. Ery.* Note 53, p. 205) and Baryagaza (modern Broach on the Bombay coast). These traders used to bring with them, in the ships returning from India, rice, wheat and Indian cloth and a few female slaves. Thus here we find an interesting allusion to traffic in slaves. Indian slaves (specially the female ones) were exported to foreign lands and alien slaves both male and female were regularly imported to India from foreign market-towns. From Ommana, the market town of Persia, and Apologus, the market town at the upper end of the Persian gulf, many items of trade were exported to Barygaza (Broach) and Arabia. Among these items of trade were pearls, purple clothing, wine, a great quantity of dates, gold as well as slaves (*Peri. Ery.* 36). According to the author of the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* these luxury goods along with slaves were not only shipped to Barygaza but also to other important cities of India. Thus our author mentions a city called Ozene (modern city of Ujjain) formerly a royal capital. To this town was brought very costly vessels of silver, fine wines, thin clothing of the finest weave and choicest ointments. These costly presents were sent for the King and besides them, choir boys and lovely maidens were also sent for the King's harem. These singing boys and beautiful maidens, who were brought as presents for the King of Ujjain, were obviously slave girls and slave boys. The above statements made by the author of the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* clearly point to the fact that during the second half of the first century A.D. (when the author made a voyage to India) Indians took an active part in trading with Western and Middle-Eastern countries. A colony of traders was also set up in the island of Dioscordia (Socotra) and among these traders were Greeks, Arabs as well as Indians. Indian vessels loaded with merchandise were sent to Arabian and African harbours and Indian market-towns and harbours flooded with foreign luxury goods shipped there by the Arab and Greek merchants. One of the important articles of this maritime trade was human cargo and slave trading was fast becoming a lucrative business in which Indian and foreign traders took eager part.

We also learn from Strabo that by 150 B.C. slave hunting became a profitable

vocation in the East. Delos was the chief centre of this trade. As many as 11,000 slaves were sold every day (*Strabo, Geographica* XIV. 5-2). Companies were organized to carry on the trade with Italy. Sea-borne trade was also established with India and in the course of this merchant marine slave-trade was carried on as we have already learnt from the Egyptian Greek merchant of the first century A.D.

Another foreign writer viz., Athenaeus further corroborates the account of Periplus as well as Strabo. According to Athenaeus in the processions of Ptolemy Philadelphus, Indian women, Indian hunting dogs, Indian cows and other strange things were to be seen (Athenaeus *Diepnohisto* IV. 4, 6 and V, 2, 39. cf. *Inter-course between India and the Western World*, Rawlinson, p. 93). The Indian women who joined the procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus were obviously slave girls, as we have already noted above that slave girls and boys became common articles of trade in the course of busy commercial enterprises between India and her trading partners. Indian traders usually traded in spices, precious stones, ivory, cotton and silk clothings and muslins and along with these merchandise foreign merchants sometimes also received female slaves from ships returning from India.

Rules regarding manumission of slaves, often discussed by our ancient Indian authorities, also throw useful light on slave-trade in our country. We are told that emancipation of slaves could be effected in two ways: i) through master's favour, ii) through monetary payment. In Pāli literatures (*Dīgh. Nik.* I. 72, *Therīgāthā* p. 117, *Theragāthā* p. 22) we find references about manumission of slave done through master's favour. Jātakas, on the other hand, refer to the liberation of slaves through money payment. (*Jāt.* VI, 547). Kauṭilya also refers to this custom. According to him *dāsas* or slaves could work with free labourers in state farms (II. 42-2). These slaves were entitled to the same wages as free workers namely one *paṇa* and a quarter per month per head over and above their board (II. 24-28). The amount which was earned by a slave, by the work done for the master, ultimately enabled him to purchase back his freedom. Kauṭilya prescribes that the ransom necessary for a slave to regain his freedom is equal to what he had been sold for (III. 13). In another connection Kauṭilya, while laying down special rules to safeguard the rights of a child slave, indirectly alludes to slave trade in our country. He thus imposes a fine on those who sell or mortgages a slave (less than eight years of age) to a foreign land against his will. He further states that a fine of 12 *paṇas* should be imposed on those who fail to liberate a slave even after receiving ransom (III. 13). Similar conditions also prevailed in other ancient countries and we find ample provisions were made to safe-guard the position of slaves in the eyes of law.

In Kharoṣṭhī document there is a single instance of a slave seeking freedom after making some payment (as ransom or *toli museki*) for his life (Doc. No. 585, cf. *Position of Slaves in Kharoṣṭhī Document from Chinese Turkistan*, I. H. Q., June 1953 p. 105). In Greece a slave could purchase his freedom with peculium received from his master (*Ency. Briton.* Vol. XX 14th edition p. 774). In Rome manumission of slaves became fairly common among certain groups, because it often brought pecuniary advantage to the

the master. The ransom which he received after liberating his slave enabled him to purchase a new slave and at the same time gain a new client. In Rome slaves could be liberated in two ways : (i) *justa regular* and (ii) *minus jasta*. *Manumission minus jasta* was effected through considerable manifestations and formalities on the part of the master. (*Ency. Brit.* Vol. XX). These multifarious rules regarding liberation of slaves, through adequate payment of ransom, also point to a well-organized and profitable trading in slaves. While in India the slave-trade, though not so well-organized and rigorous, had all the essential features to allure Indian and foreign merchants into the business.

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Apart from the continuation of the *Studies in Nibandha-s* by Professor Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya, D. Litt., and the completion of the remaining portion of the *Brahmanical Settlements in Different Subdivisions of Bengal* by Dr. Puspa Niyogi, Senior Research Fellow, University Grants Commission, the present issue of the *Journal* contains two independent contributions. One of these is on *Puruṣottama-Jagannātha* by Dr. D. C. Sircar, Carmichael Professor and the Head of the Department of Ancient Indian History and Culture, Calcutta University, and the other on *Indian Gazetteers : Old and New* by Sri Amalendu Mookerjee, formerly Assistant Editor, District Gazetteers, West Bengal.

**BRAHMANIC SETTLEMENTS IN DIFFERENT
SUBDIVISIONS OF ANCIENT BENGAL**

PUSPA NIYOGI

WEST

We may now trace the extension of Brahmanism due to the effect of the settlement of Brahmins in the western parts of Bengal (Rāḍha). Brahmanic leadership gradually secured a firm footing in the different subdivisions of this area. There is a section of Brahmins in Bengal, designated as *Rāḍhīy Brāhmaṇas*, who are referred to by Halāyudha (12th century A. D.) in his famous work *Brāhmaṇa Sarvasva*.

Vardhamāna-bhukti

• In West Bengal an early recorded settlement was in the *Vardhamāna-bhukti* (modern Burdwan). In the 6th century A.D. Mahārāja Vijayasena during the time of Gopacandra⁴⁶ made the gift of a piece of land in Vettragartā within the Vakkattaka *vīthi* of the *Vardhamāna-bhukti*, measuring 8 *kulyavāpas*, to a Brahmin named Vatsasvāmin of the Kaunḍinya *gotra* belonging to the Bahvṛca *śākhā* of the Ṛgveda. The Naihāṭi copper-plate (12th century A.D.)⁴⁷ shows that Vallālasena made a gift of land situated in the village Vāllahitṭhā (modern Bāluṭiyā) of the *Vardhamāna-bhukti* to Ovāsudeva-Śarman of the Bhāradvāja *gotra*, a student of the Kauthuma school of the Sāmaveda, son of Lakṣmīdeva-Śarman, grandson of Bhadreśvaradeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Varāhadeva-Śarman. The gift land measured 7 *bhū-pāṭakas*, 9 *droṇas*, 1 *āḍhaka*, 40 *unmānas* and 3 *kākas* according to the reed known as *Vṛṣabha-śāṅkara-nala*. The occasion of the gift was the *Hemāśvamahādāna* ceremony performed by the king's mother, Vīlāsadevī during the solar eclipse. It appears to have been a special aim of the Senas to strengthen the Brahmanic element in this *bhukti*. Vallālasena's son Lakṣmaṇasena also made a gift of land comprised in the village Viḍḍāraśāsana, situated in Betaḍḍa-caturaka of the *Vardhamāna-bhukti* to a Brahmin of the Vātsya *gotra* of the same Vedic school as known from his Govindapur copper-plate.⁴⁸ The donee in this case was an *upādhyāya* named Vyāsadeva-Śarman, son of Śrīnivāsadeva-Śarman, grandson of Cahaladeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Gosvāmīdeva-Śarman, on the occasion of an anniversary of the

46. EI, XXIII, p. 155 ff ; XXX, p. 160 ff.

47. ibid. XIV. pp. 156-163 : IB, pp. 68-80

48. IB, p. 92 ff.

coronation ceremony of the king (*rājy-ābhiṣeka-samaye*). The gift land measured 60 *droṇas* and 17 *unmānas* and yielded an annual income of 900 *purāṇas*.

Daṇḍa-bhukti

The second *bhukti* in West Bengal to welcome Brahmins as settlers was *Daṇḍa-bhukti* (modern Dātan in the Midnapore district). An early reference to *Daṇḍa-bhukti* is found in the Jayrampur copper-plate inscription of the time of Gopacandra (regnal year 1).⁴⁹ In one of the copper-plate inscriptions of Śaśāṅka from Midnapore⁵⁰ the gift of a village called Mu(a)hā-Kumbhārapadraka to Bhaṭṭeśvara of the Kāśyapa *gotra* is recorded. Another copper-plate⁵¹ records the grant of some lands in the village Kumbhārapadraka as distinguished from the place of the same name with the prefix 'mahā', which is here assigned to the *deśa* Kétakapadrika. In the latter copper-plate the donee, Dāmyasvāmin is said to have belonged to the Bhāradvāja *gotra* and to Mādhyandina *śākhā*. The localities referred to in these grants were situated in the Tāvira *adhikaraṇa*, probably the administrative headquarters of *Daṇḍa-bhukti*, from which both the copper-plates were issued. This area is supposed by Dr. R. C. Majumdar to represent the modern Debra, which is about 15 miles south-east of Midnapore.

In the 10th century A.D. the Kāmoja king Nayapāladeva gave away a village called Bṛhat-Chattivannā situated in *Daṇḍa-bhukti*, which was under the administrative division of Vardhamāna-*bhukti*, to *paṇḍita* Aśvattha-Śarman of the Kauthuma school of the Śāmaveda, an adherent of Chāndogya-*carāṇa*, as stated in his Irda copper-plate grant.⁵² He belonged to a learned family. His father, Anukulamiśra, was an *upādhyāya* (teacher); his grandfather Prabhākara-Śarman was also an *upādhyāya*. His great grand-father was Bhaṭṭa Divākara-Śarman. They were of the Vātsya *gotra*.

Kaṅkagrāma-bhukti

In another administrative division of Rāḍha, viz. *Kaṅkagrāma-bhukti* (modern Kankjol) Brahmin settlements were formed under the patronage of the state. The Śaktipur copper-plate of Lakṣmaṇasena⁵³ records the gift of 89 *droṇas*

49. OHSR, XI, (1963), No. 4, p. 206 ff; cf, SI, pp. 530-531.

50. JRASB, (Letters), XI, (1945), pp. 1-9

51. *ibid*.

52. EI, XXII, p. 150 ff.

53. *ibid*, XXI, p. 211 ff.

of land comprising a part of a *Nimā-pāṭaka* (modern village of the same name) and the whole of five other *pāṭakas* namely, Rāghavabhaṭṭa, Vārahakoṇā, Vāllihitā, Vijahārapura and Dāmaravaḍā. The income from these gift lands totalled 500 *kapardaka purāṇas*. All the *pāṭakas* were situated in Kumārapura-*caturaka* in Madhugiri-*maṇḍala* attached to (Kumbhīnagara) in the Dakṣiṇa-*vlthi* of Uttara-Rāḍha in Kaṅkagrāma-*bhukti*. The whole area as denoted above was granted to a Brahmin named Kuvera, son of Ananta, grandson of Pṛthvidhara and great-grandson of Aniruddha, on the occasion of the solar eclipse. Incidentally, it is mentioned in the same inscription that a *kṣetra pāṭaka* of land had previously been granted by Vallālasena to Haridāsa, a Gayāl Brahmin probably of a priestly family.

Karṇasuvārṇa

Ancient Karṇasuvārṇa was situated in the Murshidabad district in Rāḍha (this location being supported by excavations now in progress near Berhampur). At least two copper-plate inscriptions were issued from this place in favour of Brahmins. One of these is the Vappaghoṣavāṭa grant of Jayanāga (or the Mallhā copper-plate (6th century A.D.)⁵⁴ recording the gift of the village Vappaghoṣavāṭa in favour of a Sāmavedin Brahmin of the Chāndogya *śākhā* named Bhaṭṭa Brahmavīra-svāmin of the Kāśyapa *gotra*. This gift village was bounded in the west by a Brahmin settlement belonging to the village Kutkuṭa (*paścimasyāndiśi Kutkuṭa-grāmina-vrā(brā)hmaṇānām sakta-tāmrapaṭṭa-sīmā* 11. 8-9). Incidentally the charter refers to other Brahmin settlements in the eastern neighbourhood of the village Vappaghoṣavāṭa, e.g. those under the grants enjoyed by Bhaṭṭa Unmīlanasvāmin and Bhaṇṇi-svāmin respectively. This shows that care was taken to donate lands of villages near existing Brahmin settlements, so that a compact Brahmin colony might grow in the locality.

The Nidhanpur plates were re-issued by Bhāskaravarman,⁵⁵ king of Kāmarūpa, from his victorious camp at Karṇasuvārṇa (*skandhāvārāt Karṇasuvārṇa-vāsakāt*, l. 3). Originally, the grant had been made by Bhūti-varman, great-great-grandfather of Bhāskaravarman (end of the 5th or beginning of the 6th century A.D.) under a charter which was later destroyed by fire. The plates so far available give names of 205 Brahmin donees belonging to 56 different *gotras*, together with a specification of 166. 11/16 shares (including 7 shares ear-marked for

54. EI xviii, pp. 60-64

55. *Ibid*, xii, pp. 65-76 ; xix, p. 115ff ; 245ff ; KS, p. 3ff.

*the maintenance of *bali*, *caru*, *satra*, etc.). The land which this document gives away was situated in Mayūra-śālmā-āgrahāra in the district of Candrapurī. There is a difference of opinion among scholars regarding the location of the gift land. One point, however, is clear that, by the beginning of the 6th century A.D., as the original grant shows, there were to be found large numbers of Brahmins settled in Bengal or its eastern neighbourhood.

Kāñjivilli and Talavāṭi in Uttara-Rāḍha are regarded as seats of Brahmins in the Chāndogya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa of Nārāyaṇa.

In Rāḍha, Brahmin settlers of the Kauthuma school of the Sāmaveda were most prominent and they received most of the royal grants as fees for their performance of religious ceremonies. These Brahmins were scholars and proficient in the performance of Vedic rites.

Siddhala

Siddhala, a village in West Bengal, enjoyed a high reputation for Brahmanic scholarship and rituals. In the Bhuvaneśvar *praśasti* of Bhaṭṭa Bhavadeva (11th century A.D.)⁵⁶ Siddhala has been described as the best of villages, the ornament of Āryāvarta and the goddess of fortune presiding over Rāḍha (*Āryāvartta-bhuvām=vibhūṣaṇam=iha khyātas-tu sarvv=āgrmo grāmaḥ Siddhala eva kevalam-alaṅkāro=sti Rāḍhā-śriyaḥ*—v. 3). At this village lived a family to which belonged Bhavadeva II of the Sāmaveda school, one of the most celebrated Brahmins of his time. The genealogy of his family, which started from the sage Sāvarṇa, is given in the Bhuvaneśvar inscription, as follows :

1—
1
Mahādeva

1
Bhavadeva I
1
Rathāṅga
1
Aṭyaṅga
1
Budha
1
Ādideva
1
Govarddhana
1
Bhavadeva II

—1
1
Aṭṭahāsa⁵⁷

56. *IB*, p. 5 ff ; *EI*, VI, p. 198ff.

57. He was not an elder brother as stated in the introduction by N. G. Mazumdar but a younger brother (cf. *IB*, p. 25ff. v. 6)

The Belava copper-plate of Bhojavarman⁵⁸ gives the history of another Brahmin family of Siddhala of the *Sāvarṇa gotra*. The inscription states that the great-grandfather of the donee came from the *Madhyadeśa*, which implies early association of the family with this locality. The donee, *Śāntyāgārādhikṛta* Rāmadeva-Śarman, a student of the Kāṇva *śākhā* of the Yajurveda, was the son of Viśvarūpadeva-Śarman, grandson of Jagannāthadeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Pitāambaradeva-Śarman.

Siddhalagrāma as a seat of Brahmanism was so well known that the donor of the Mehār copper-plate selected some Brahmins from this place for bestowal of gifts of land in his territory in south-east Bengal. Among the recipients of such gifts were some Brahmins belonging to the *Sāvarṇa gotra*. The twenty Brahmins favoured with gifts were headed by Kāpaḍī of the *Sāvarṇa gotra* who received the charter on behalf of all the donees.⁵⁹

The name of this village occurs in three inscriptions, the Bhuvaneśvar *praśasti* of Bhaṭṭa Bhavadeva (11th century A.D.), the Belava copper-plate of Bhojavarman (12th century A.D.) and the Mehār plate of Dāmodaradeva (13th century A.D.). According to Bhavadeva's inscription it was situated in Uttara-Rāḍha. The village Siddhala is represented by that modern Sidhalgrām, a village under Labpur police station in the Birbhum district.⁶⁰

The twenty donees referred to in the Mehār copper-plate went from different villages, viz. Kāṇyamala, Pūrvagrāma, Siddhalagrāma, Diṇḍasā and Keśarakoṇā. Names of these villages except Kāṇyamala, are included in the list of 56 *gāmis* of the *Rāḍhiya Brāhmaṇas* as found in the genealogical accounts of the Brahmins of Bengal. If the villages mentioned in the Mehār inscription are to be identified with those of the same names occurring in the *Kulapañjikā* list, it will be seen that due to their mention in the above inscription it may be possible to hold that these villages were already noted for their Brahmanic associations in the 13th century; particularly, so far as Siddhalagrāma was concerned, the date is still earlier. Pūrvagrāma is stated to be situated in Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍha.⁶¹ N. N. Vasu identifies this place with the present village of the same name, situated 7 miles to the west of the town of Murshidabad;

• 58. IB, p. 14ff.

59. Cf, Mehār plate of Dāmodaradeva, EI, xxvii, pp. 182-191; xxx, pp. 51-58.

60. SHAIB, p. 59n; BV, pt. II, 234n.

61. Cf, JAHRS iv, pp. 158-160; IMP, ii, p. 938; IC, 1938, p. 358.

Diṇḍasa with the modern Dimśā or Disā, district Burdwan and Keśarakoṇā with the village Keśarakoṇā situated in the Bankura district (both in West Bengal).⁶²

Bhūriśreṣṭhika

An important centre of Brahmanic learning was the city of Bhūriśreṣṭhika situated in Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍha to which reference is made by Kṛṣṇa Miśra in his *Prabodhacandrodaya Nāṭaka* (11th century A.D.).⁶³ At this place Śrīdhara (10th century A.D.), the author of *Nyāya-kandalī* composed a commentary on the Vaiśeṣika system of Brahmanical philosophy. Śrīdhara was the son of Baladeva and Abbokā. In Śrīdhara's time Bhūriśreṣṭhika was inhabited not only by pious and learned Brahmins but also by śreṣṭhins, merchants and bankers. This place is also mentioned by Bhārata Candra Raya (18th century A.D.) in his earliest work known as *Satya Pirer Kathā*. This celebrated place is represented by modern Bhursut, a village on the right bank of the Dāmodar river in the district of Hooghly.⁶⁴

Brahmins of Rāḍha were also patronised by the kings of Orissa. In an inscription belonging to the reign of Mahābhavagupta I, reference to a gift of land to *Bhattaputra* Jāturūpa, probably an immigrant from Rāḍha, is recorded.⁶⁵ In the opinion of some scholars, however, the name of the place is not Rāḍha.⁶⁶ In another inscription king Devendravarman of the Gaṇiga dynasty made the gift of a village to an immigrant from Uttara-Rāḍha named Govinda-Śarman.⁶⁷ The reputation of Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍha is particularly shown to have spread beyond the boundaries of Bengal. It is gathered from the Gaonri plates of Vākpati Muñja (A.D. 981) that a Brahmin named Donāka of the village of Vilvagavāsa in south Rāḍha received a gift from that king. He was a student of the Chāndogya-śākhā of the Sāmaveda.⁶⁸ A Śaiva teacher, resident of Pūrva-grāma, Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍha, settled in the Deccan where he made his influence felt.⁶⁹

62. VJI, (*Rāḍhiya-Brāhmaṇa vivaraṇa*, pp. 119-125.

63. ASB, edition, Act II, 49.

64. Cf, SHAIB, pp. 74-75.

65. EI, xi, p. 93ff.

66. DHNI, I, p. 397n ; EI, xi, pp. 101, 102, 201 ; cf, SHAIB, p. 74n.

67. EI, xxiii, p. 77.

68. ibid, xxiii, p. 105ff.

69. JAHRS, iv, pp. 158-162 ; IMP, ii, 938, No. 316 ; IS, vii, No. 2, (1966), pp. 169-170.

East and South

The sphere of Brahmanic influence widened with the inclusion of Vaṅga, another ancient division of Bengal. It is mentioned for the first time in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, later in the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*, the *Mahābhārata*, *Raghuvamśa*, etc. The earliest epigraphic reference to the territory is given in the Meharuli Iron Pillar inscription.⁷⁰ A notable subdivision of Vaṅga was Vikramapura. It occupied an important place 'in the military annals of Bengal'.⁷¹ Many inscriptions belonging to the Candras, Varmans and the Senas were issued from this place. Viśvarūpasena, the Sena ruler of Bengal, granted some land, yielding an annual income of 500 *purāṇas* to *Āvallika-panḍita* Halā-yudha-Śarman of the Vātsya *gotra* and of the Kāṇva branch of the Yajurveda, son of Adhyayadeva-Śarman, grandson of Devadharadeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Lakṣmīdhara-deva-Śarman.⁷² The land in question comprised eleven plots, distributed in the two subdivisions of Vaṅga. Here in the Vikramapura region included the following plots :

1. Five plots of lands in the village of Deūlahastī in Lāuhaṇḍā-*caturaka*, measuring $(25 + 10 + 7) = 42$ *udānas* and yielding 100 *purāṇas*.
2. Two plots of lands situated on an island, the name of which cannot be correctly read but may have belonged to this division. These two plots of land measured $(12\frac{1}{2} + 24) = 36\frac{1}{2}$ *udānas* and yielding 100 *purāṇas*.

The same king also granted two plots of land in the village Piñjokāṣṭī in the Vikramapura division of Vaṅga as recorded in his Madanapāḍā grant⁷³ to the *nītipāṭhaka* Viśvarūpadeva-Śarman of the Vātsya *gotra*, son of Vanamālīdeva-Śarman, grandson of Garbbheśvaradeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Parāsaradeva-Śarman. Keśavasena also granted land in Talapaḍā-pāṭaka situated within Vikramapura-bhāga of Vaṅga to a *nītipāṭhaka* Īśvaradeva-Śarman of the Vātsya *gotra*, son of Vanamālīdeva-Śarman, grandson of Garbbheśvaradeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Parāsaradeva-Śarman.⁷⁴ It is interesting to note that the names of the father, grandfather and great-grandfather of Viśvarūpadeva-Śarman, the donee of the Madanapāḍā grant, are the same as those of Īśvaradeva-Śarman of

70. CII, III, p. 141ff.

71. SHAIB, pp. 87-88.

72. IB, p. 140ff ; JAS, xx (1954), p. 201ff.

73. *ibid*; p. 132ff : JAS, xx, p. 209ff.

74. IB, p. 118 ff.

the Idilpur grant. Both were reciters of the *Nitiśāstra* and of the same *gotra*. Evidently they were brothers.

A grant discovered from Ādāvāḍī⁷⁵ in Vikramapura is of particular importance as it names a number of Brahmins who received land from king Daśarathadeva. The income of the land, which was given in specified shares to these Brahmins, was about 500 *purāṇas*. A point that may help in the location of the places in which the land was distributed is the fact that Antarvvāṭi, one of such places, may be identified with modern Ādāvāḍī. If this identification is correct there is likelihood that the other places were also contiguous to it. Some of the places mentioned are Bāndikhāṇḍā (modern Bāinkhāḍā), Navasaṃkhaha and Viṣayipāḍā. The boundaries of the donated land are as follows :

North—Nayanāva and Mūladeva (modern Nayanā and Māl)

South—Vaḍāilā and Bhāṅganiyā (corresponding to the present villages of the samename).

West—Gaṅgagrāma (=Ganāisār) and Māntahaṭā.

The following details are being furnished regarding the boundaries of the gift land to show its exact location.

Nāvya

Vaṅga had another subdivision known as Nāvya. This is known from the Calcutta Sāhitya-Pariṣat copper-plate grant of Viśvarūpasena (Vaṅga Nāvye 1. 42).⁷⁶ Nāvya as a name of a *maṇḍala* probably occurs in a grant of the Candrarāking Śricandra (10th century A.D.)⁷⁷ who made a gift of land to the Śāntivārika (priest in charge of propitiatory rites) Pītavāsagupta-Śarman of the Śāṇḍilya *gotra*, son of Sumaṅgalagupta, grandson of Varābhagupta and great-grandson of Makkaḍagupta on the occasion of the *Koṭihoma* ceremony. The gift land measured one *pāṭaka*, situated in Nehakāṣṭhi, a village comprised in the Nānya-*maṇḍala* (Nāvya-*maṇḍala*). Later, Viśvarūpasena, the Sena ruler granted a few plots of land to Halāyudha-Śarman, as noticed before, which were situated in this part of Vaṅga :

1. Two plots in the Sāmasiddhi-pāṭaka⁷⁸ measuring $67\frac{3}{4}$ *udānas* and yielding 100 *purāṇas* of which 19. 11/16 was the income from 7 *barajas*.

75. *ibid*, p. 181 ff.

76. *ibid*, p. 140 ff, 194 ff ; JAS, xx, (1954), p. 201 ff.

77. Cf, Rāmpal copper-plate of Śricandra, IB, p. 1 ff.

78. N. G. Majumdar reads it Rāmsiddhi-pāṭaka, IB, p. 141.

2. One plot in the village of Vinayatilaka, measuring 25 *udānas* and yielding 60 *purāṇas*.
3. One plot in Ajikulāpātaka which lay in Navasaṃgraha-*caturaka* included in Madhuksīraka-*āvr̥tti*, measuring 165 *udānas* and yielding 140 *purāṇas*.

The village Nehakāṣṭhi may be identified with Naikāṭhi in the Bakarganj district.⁷⁹ The village Sāmasiddhīpātaka of Viśvarūpa's grant situated in Nāvya has been identified with a village in the Gaurnadī area of Bākarganj.⁸⁰ It is regarded as a flourishing village inhabited by many *Śrotriya* Brahmins of the Mahintyāgāmi. Another village mentioned in the same grant has not been definitely identified. In the eastern side it extended up to the sea (*pūrvva samudra s̥mā* i.e. the head of the Bay and the estuary of the Meghnā).⁸¹ This region seems to have enjoyed special navigational facilities as probably corresponding 'to the tract of country lying along the lower course of the Padmā.'⁸² There is some doubt also about the identification and location of Ajikulapātaka in Madhuksīraka-*āvr̥tti* in Navasaṃgraha-*caturaka*; its connection with the Nāvya region is not certain.

Samataṭa

'The geography of Vaṅga was intimately connected with that of Samataṭa⁸³ which is mentioned for the first time in the Allahabad *praśasti* of Samudragupta as a border kingdom.'⁸⁴ It occurs as the name of a *maṇḍala* in the Mehār⁸⁵ and Sobharampur⁸⁶ copper-plate grants of Dāmodaradeva (13th century A.D.) of the Deva family. Dāmodaradeva's policy was to form strong Brahmanic settlements in his territory. In the village of Mehār (in the Candpur subdivision of the Tippera district, East Pakistan), in the Samataṭa-*maṇḍala*, grants of land to

79. Pañcapuṣpa, 1339 (B.S.), Phālguna, p. 379h.

80. *ibid*, 1339 (B.S.), Phālguna, p. 369.

81. Cf, IB, pp. 142, 146 ; HB, 16.

82. SHAIB, p. 87.

83. Many scholars hold that it was distinct from Vaṅga, cf, HGAI, p. 257.

84. SHAIB, p. 89.

85. EI, xxvii, p. 182ff ; xxx, pp. 55-58.

86. *ibid*, xxx, p. 184ff.

as many as twenty Brahmins, of different *gotras* were made, the share of each being shown separately.⁸⁷ Dāmodaradeva also granted land, distributed in three adjoining villages, namely, Sundaraya,⁸⁸ Āhaśyaga and Vāṇḍura together with some *dronas* of homestead land to two Brahmins named Kauśika and Devarāta of the Agniveśya *gotra*.

In an earlier inscription belonging to Śrīdhāraṇa Rāta of Samataṭa it is stated that the king was requested by his *Mahāsandhivigrahika* (minister of peace and war) Jayanātha for a grant of 25 *pāṭakas* of land, out of which 13 *pāṭakas* of land were later distributed to 13 learned Brahmins for the performance of their *pañca-mahāyajña*. These lands were comprised in the *viṣaya* of Guptināṭana and Paṭalāyikā, under the jurisdiction of the *Kumārāmatya* of Devaparvata.⁸⁹

Samataṭa was under the rule of Brahmin monarchs as early as the 7th century A.D.⁹⁰

In this context reference may be made to the Idilpur copper-plate of Śricandra⁹¹ which records the grant of a piece of land in the village Leliyā in the Kumāratālaka-*maṇḍala* situated in the Sataṭa-Padmāvāṭi-*viṣaya*. According to one view, the name Sataṭa-Padmāvāṭi-*viṣaya* is an 'abbreviated form of Samataṭa-Padmāvāṭi-*viṣaya*', which is to be taken as a part of Samataṭa.⁹² Some, however, connect Padmāvāṭi with the river Padmā and the name of the *maṇḍala* with the river Kumāra, 'still preserved in Kumarakhāli, in Faridpur district, not far from the old bed of the river Padmā.'⁹³

Khāḍi

Khāḍi was a part of Samataṭa. As the name of a *viṣaya* (district) it occurs in the Barrackpore grant of Vijayasena⁹⁴ and later as a *maṇḍala* in the Sundarban grant of his grandson, Lakṣmaṇasena.⁹⁵ In the Dākārṇava, Khāḍi is mentioned as one of the sacred places of the *śāktas*. Vijayasena, as his grant records, gave

87. See Appendix.

88. The reading seems to be Sundaraya-Diśaga according to Dr. D. C. Sircar.

89. IHQ, xxiii, (1947), p. 220ff.

90. Watters, ii, pp. 109, 168, 297 ; cf, SHAIB, p. 280ff.

91. IB, p. 166ff.

92. SHAIB, p. 96.

93. HB, pp. 25, 196.

94. IB, p. 57ff.

95. *ibid*, p. 169ff.

4 *pāṭakas* of land in a locality Ghāsa-sambhoga-bhaṭṭavaḍā (= *Bhāṭpāḍā*) in Khāḍi-*viṣaya*, where the standard of measurement, as used in Samataṭa, was applied. The annual income derived from the gift land was 200 *kapardaka-purāṇas*. The recipient of the grant was a Ṛgvedic Brahmin belonging to the Āśvalāyana branch named Udayakaradeva-Śarman, son of Bhāskaradeva-Śarman, grandson of Rahaskaradeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Ratnākaradeva-Śarman of the Vatsa *gotra*, who was an inhabitant of Kāntijoṅgā and an immigrant from *Madhyadeśa*.

According to the Sundarban copper-plate of Lakṣmaṇasena,⁹⁶ some land situated in the village called Maṇḍala-grāma and a homestead, measuring 3 *bhū-droṇas*, 1 *khāḍikā* (?), 23 *unmānas* and 2½ *kākinīs*, according to the standard of 32 cubits and yielding annually 50 *purāṇas*, situated in Kāntallapura-*caturaku* in the Khāḍi-*maṇḍala* was given to the Śāntyāgārika Kṛṣṇadeva-Śarman of the Āśvalāyana *śākhā* of the Ṛgveda and of the Gārgya *gotra*, son of Narasiṃhadharadeva-Śarman, grandson of Nārāyaṇadharadeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Jagadharadeva-Śarman. It is interesting to note that the plots marking the boundaries of this gift land also belonged to Brahmins : thus, plots in the east, west and north were in the possession of Śāntyāgārikas Prabhāsa, Rāmadeva, Viṣṇupāṇi (?) Gaḍoli and Keśava Gaḍoli respectively. In this way a sort of compact settlement exclusively of Brahmins was formed.

From another copper-plate grant from Sundarban⁹⁷ we learn that *Mahārāṇaka* Vāsudeva-Śarman, a student of the Kāṇva branch of the Yajurveda of the Vārdhīnasa *gotra*, son of Puruṣottamadeva and grandson of Somadeva, received a grant of land from Śrī Maḍommaṇapāla, which comprised the village named V(Dh)āmahithā, situated in the eastern part of Khāṭikā.⁹⁸ It is probable that the name Khāḍi is preserved in the form Khāṭikā in the grant issued by this ruler.

96. IB, pp. 169-172

97. IHQ, x, (1934), pp. 322-331 ; EI, xxvii, pp 119-124. Some scholars read the name as Dommaṇapāla, EI, xxx, p. 42 ff.

98. Compare *Paścimakhāṭikā* in Vardhamāna-bhukti mentioned in the Govindapur copper-plate of Lakṣmaṇasena (IB, pp. 92-98). It is likely that the *Pūrvakhāṭikā* from the dated copper-plate from Sundarban 'comprised the eastern portion of what was formerly called Khāḍi and which is now represented by the *pargana* bearing the same name.' The name Khāḍi still survives in the name of a *pargana* in the Diamond Harbour subdivision of the district of the 24-*parganas*.

Vyāghrataṭi-maṇḍala

A part of Samatata in the delta of the Ganges was known as Vyāghrataṭi-maṇḍala as early as the time of Dharmapāla of the Pāla dynasty. According to his Khalimpur plate, Dharmapāla⁹⁹ donated the village of Krauñca-śvabhagrāma and two other villages (Māḍhāśāmmali and Pālītāka) in the Mahantāprakṣa-viṣaya of Vyāghrataṭi-maṇḍala to some Brahmin priests from Lāṭa who were in charge of the temple of N(n)na-Nārāyaṇa. Later the Ānuliā copper-plate of Lakṣmaṇasena¹⁰⁰ records the grant of a field in Vyāghrataṭi to paṇḍita Raghudeva-Śarman of the Kāṇva branch of the Yajurveda school, son of Devadāsadeva-Śarman, grandson of Śaṃkaradeva-Śarman and great-grandson of Vipradāsadeva-Śarman belonging to the Kauśika gotra. The gift land yielded an annual income of 100 kapardaka-purāṇas, measured 1 pāṭaka, 9 droṇas, 1 āḍhāvāpa, 37 unmānas and 1 kākiṇikā according to the Vṛṣabha-śaṅkara-nala.

Some inscriptions belonging to this part (i.e. South and East) of Bengal do not specify the subdivision or subdivisions to which the grants recorded were assigned. Thus the first of the four copper-plates from the Faridpur district (three from Koṭālīpāḍā and one from Ghugrāhāti, a mouza close to Pinjāri)¹⁰¹ record the gift of some land situated in Dhruvilāṭi to a Brahmin named Candrasvāmin of the Bhāradvāja gotra belonging to the Vājasaneyā school; the second records the gift of some land to a Brahmin named Soma-svāmin of the Kāṇva-Lauhitya gotra belonging to the Vājasaneyā school. It is interesting to note that the donor of this land was a Brahmin named Vāsudeva-svāmin. The third records purchase of land by a Brahmin named Vatsapāla-svāmin. He bought the gift land at Dhruvilāṭi from some Bhāradvāja Brahmins at the established rate and granted the gift land to Bhaṭṭa Gomidatta-svāmin of the Kāṇva-Lauhitya gotra. The fourth records transfer of some land to the Brahmin Supratīkasvāmin. The village Dhruvilāṭi had been identified by Pargitar with modern Dhulat in the Faridpur District. This village is regarded as a large village of respectable size.¹⁰² It is necessary to draw special attention to the fact that land transactions in favour of Brahmins as recorded in some of the early Bengal inscriptions were made with the approval of local authorities or councils. Thus the admission of Brahmin elements into the

99. EI, iv, p. 243 ff.

100. IB, pp. 81-91; cf. the Nalanda copper-plate of Devapāladeva, EI, xvii, p. 310ff.

101. IA, xxxix, (1910), pp. 193-216; EI, xviii, p. 74 ff.

102. ibid, (1910) p. 216ff.

respective areas mentioned had the support of the leaders of the local people concerned.

The Tippera copper-plate of Lokanātha¹⁰³ furnishes some important information regarding the progress of Aryanisation and influence of the Brahmins in East Bengal. It records the gift of some land in the forest region in Suvvuṅga-*viṣaya*. 'It was outside the pale of human habitation, where there was no distinction between natural and artificial (*kṛt-ākṛt-āviruddha* 11, 22 and 25) infested by wild animals and poisonous reptiles, and covered with forest-out-growths.' The boundaries of the gift land are given. This plate was found in the district of Tippera where possibly Suvvuṅga-*viṣaya* was situated. The inscription itself tells us that the gift land was situated in the easternmost region. It appears that as early as the 7th or the 9th century A.D.¹⁰⁴ the Brahmins played the role of a pioneer in establishing an outpost of Brahmanic culture in a remote and inaccessible part of Bengal which was covered with dense forests.

This inscription has some special features which may be noted here. In the first place the king does not make the grant directly to the Brahmin settlers whose names are recorded in the text. Originally he gives some land to a high administrative official who is a Brahmin by caste, named *Mahāsāmanta* Pradoṣa-śarman, son of Toṣa-śarman, grandson of Jayaśarman-svāmin and great-grandson of Deva-śarman of the Agastya *gotra*. Pradoṣa-śarman's maternal great-grandfather was an *agnyāhita* Brahmin i.e. a Brahmin who offered sacrificial oblations to the sacred fires according to the injunctions of the *śāstras*. On the land received from the king, Pradoṣa-śarman constructed a temple of Ananta-Nārāyaṇa and settled there more than one hundred *cāturvidya* Brahmins, by allotting to them specified shares of land.¹⁰⁵ It may be remembered that the number of donees in the Kailan copper-plate grant of Śrīdharaṇa Rāta of Samataṭa as well as in the Mehār grant is comparatively large but the largest number is met with in the Tippera grant of Lokanātha.

In one of the grants of Śricandra found near Sabhar in Dacca,¹⁰⁶ grant of rent-free land 'measuring 8 *droṇas* exceeded by 8...' in a place named Vaṅgasāgara-sambhāṇḍariyaka in Yolāmaṇḍala is recorded.¹⁰⁷ The gift was made in favour of

103. EI, xv, pp. 301 ff.

104. SHAIB, p. 142 ff ; EI, xv, 301 ff.

105. EI, xv, p. 301ff.

106. *ibid*, xxvii, pp. 51-58

107. Cf, IB, pp. 165-166.

a Vedic Brahmin named Śukradeva, son of Hara, grandson of Varāha and great-grandson of Mahādeva, who also belonged to a family of 'three *Somapītin* Brahmins known as Mākha, Rāma and Dhruva.' In another plate of Śricandra¹⁰⁸ plots of land were endowed to the *Śāntivārika* Vyāsagaṅga-Śarman, son of Vibhugaṅga, grandson of Nandagaṅga (or Nannagaṅga) and great-grandson of Jayagaṅga of the Vārdhakaśika *gotra*. The donee was a student of the Kāṇva *śākhā*. The plots of land were granted by the king for conducting the *adbhutaśānti* ceremony on the occasion of the performance of the four *homas* (*homacatuṣṭaya*). The plots of land were scattered in Vallīmuṇḍā-*maṇḍala* in Khedīravillī-*viṣaya*, Yolāmaṇḍala in Ikkaḍāsī-*viṣaya* and places in their vicinity, altogether measuring 19 *halas* and 6 *droṇas*.

Similarly, in the Sāmantasār plate of Harivarman¹⁰⁹ found near the district of Faridpur in the Idilpur pargana, the gift of 86 *droṇas* of land in the village of Varaparvata in the Mayūravidja-*viṣaya* in the Pañcavāsa-*maṇḍala* was granted to a Brahmin (name damaged) belonging to the Āśvalāyana branch the of the Ṛgveda. The donee served as a *Śāntivārika*. He was the son of Padmanābha and grandson of Vedagarbha, of the Vatsa *gotra*.

It is not possible to bring certain areas, which cannot be definitely identified, under the system of regional classification adopted by us. Information about the extent of the spread of Brahmanic influence, as obtained from inscriptions referring to such unidentified places, must, however, be taken notice of in a chronological manner as far as possible, though it cannot be arranged regularly under the well-known geographical divisions. In the Rāmgaṅj copper-plate of Īśvaraghoṣa¹¹⁰ discovered in the district of Dinajpur, mention is made of a grant consisting of a village called Digghāsodikā situated in the Gāllītipyoka-*viṣaya* of the Piyolla-*maṇḍala*. This record was issued by the *Mahāmāṇḍalika* Īśvaraghoṣa from Dhekkarī which has been located by A.K. Maitra near Katwa in the Burdwan district. This place is mentioned in the *Rāmacarita* as a seat of one of the *sāmantas* who helped Rāmapāla. N. N. Vasu,¹¹¹ however locates it in Goalpara in Assam. It is probably the same as Dhikkara, a Buddhist sacred place, also mentioned in the *Dākārṇava* as one of the sixty-four *Pīṭhas*. This land was granted to *Bhaṭṭa* Nibboka-Śarman, a student of Yajurveda, an immigrant from Candavāra (modern Candwār near

108. IB, p. 165ff ; EI, xxxiii, p. 134ff.

109. *ibid*, p. 168ff ; EI, xxx, p. 255ff.

110. *ibid*, pp. 149-157.

111. Cf, IB, pp. 150, 151n.

Etawa in U.P.) and son of *Bhaṭṭa Vāsudeva* of the *Bhārgava gotra*. Though *Īśvara-ghoṣa*'s time is not known definitely, he has been assigned, on the evidence of the palaeography of his inscriptions, to about the 12th century A.D. It is seen that Brahmins were being invited to Bengal even as late as *Īśvaraghoṣa*'s time when already there were countless Brahmins settled in the land.

A copper-plate of *Dāmodaradeva* found near Chittagong (A.D. 1243)¹¹² records the gift by him to *Prthivīdhara-Śarman*, a *Yajurvedin* Brahmin, of 5 *droṇas* of land in *Dāmbāraḍāma*. Of this land, 3 *droṇas* lay in *Kāmanāpiṇḍiyāka* and 2 *droṇas* in the village of *Ketaṅgapālā*. Particulars of the ancestry, *gotra*, etc. of the donee are not given in the inscription.

Available epigraphic evidence, as discussed above, shows that different well-organised administrative and geographical divisions of Bengal in the north (*Koṭi-varṣa*, *Varendra*, etc.), in the west (*Vardhamāna-bhukti*, *Daṇḍa-bhukti*, *Kaṅka-grāma-bhukti*, *Karṇasuvarṇa*), in the south and east (*Vaṅga*, *Samatāṭa*, *Khāḍi*, *Vyāghratāṭi*) and also other places came to be associated with Brahmins or groups of Brahmins, at various times, who are found to have been given attractive terms for settlement.

It may be supposed that under conditions created by the formation of settlements, sometimes of the nature of colonies, of Brahmin families in different parts of Bengal through centuries, numerous other Brahmins, of whom no accurate record is available, may have been induced from time to time, even without offers of princely support or invitation, to immigrate to areas where Brahmanisation had made a substantial progress due to their influence, offering them opportunities for the pursuit of their traditional callings amongst an increasing number of people who needed their religious and other services. The range of duties of these humble Brahmins lay outside the field dominated by those wealthy and influential Brahmin settlers who had received grants of lands and villages in recognition of their scholarship and high priestly attainments.

Brahmin Settlers from outside

In the history of the movement of the Vedic Aryans to the east of the Punjab there is scarcely any reference to its progress in Bengal in any early source related thereto. It is only from inscriptions dated from the 5th century A.D. that accounts of Brahmanic settlements in this land are available. But in the inscriptions of the Gupta period, which are the earliest among them, no hint is given as to where the

112. IB, 158 ff.

Brahmin settlers mentioned in them originally lived or came from, although names of these Brahmins, their *gotras* and Vedic schools to which they were attached, are given. In later inscriptions, e.g. those belonging to the Pāla kings of Bengal the Brahmins concerned are sometimes significantly described as *Madhyadeśa vinirgātāḥ* i.e. as hailing from the *Madhyadeśa*. Other similar cases of migration are also noticed occasionally.

A number of Brahmins seem to have migrated to Bengal at the invitation of some Pāla kings professing Buddhism. In some cases they are offered high posts in the State. The Bādal Pillar inscription¹¹³ and the Bhagalpur grant of Nārāyaṇa-pāla¹¹⁴ refer to a family of Brahmin ministers who were held in great respect by the Pāla kings under whom they served. Some scholars believe that this Brahmin family may have migrated to Bengal from Pañcāladeśa in the United Province. Others came from such distant territories as Lāṭa (Southern Gujrat) and acted as priests in the temple of *Nanna-Nārāyaṇa* while Dharmapāla was on the throne.¹¹⁵

Immigration of Brahmins to Bengal continued as shown in the Jajilpādā copper-plate grant of the reign of Gopāla II.¹¹⁶ The donee in this case was an immigrant from Muktāvastu and a resident of Sīhagrāma. Muktāvastu has not been identified.¹¹⁷ But a place of this name is mentioned in three grants of the Paramāra king Arjunavarman and the Mandhata plates of his successor Devapāla.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the Bāngarh copper-plate of the reign of Mahipāla I¹¹⁹ records the gift of a village to Kṛṣṇāditya-Śarman, grandson of *Bhaṭṭaputra* Hṛṣīkeśa who was an immigrant from the village of Hastipada. Thus the connection of this family with Bengal extended for three generations at the time of the grant. A village called Hastipada is also mentioned in the Kudopali grant of the Somavamśi king of Kośāla (South) with which it may be identified.¹²⁰ This name is also familiar in the *Dīgha Nikāya*¹²¹ in which it is mentioned in connection with the journey of Buddha to Kāśī (Deoria district, U.P.) when he passed through

113. EI, ii, p. 160 ff.

114. IA, xv, p. 304 ff ; GLM, p. 57 ff.

115. EI, iv, p. 249 ff.

116. JASB, xvii, pp. 137-144.

117. According to some scholars it is to be located in Varendra, JASB, xvii, pp. 137-144.

118. EI, ix, p. 103 ff ; cf, HPD, p. 201.

119. *ibid*, xiv, p. 324 ff.

120. *ibid*, iv, p. 254 ff.

121. DN, ii, p. 123.

Ḥatthigrāma (Hastipada=Hattigrāma=Hattigama). It is further noticed in the *Samyutta Nikāya*.¹²² The Kahla plate of Sodhadeva¹²³ also refers to a place of this name, situated in the Gorakhpur district of U.P. There is a probability that some of these sources refer to one and the same place which thus appears to have been situated in the *Madhyadeśa*.

The Āmgāchi¹²⁴ and the Bangaon plates of Vighrapāla III¹²⁵ describe the migration of some Brahmins from Kroḍaṇca (Kroḍaṇci, Kolāṇca). From the Āmgāchi grant it is known that the donee's (Khoduladeva-Śarman) grandfather migrated from Kroḍaṇca and also from Matsyāvāsa. Kroḍaṇca may be placed in ancient Śrāvastī, i.e. the region round modern Set-Mahet on the borders of the Gonda and Bahraich district in U.P. or in Kanauj. But according to N. K. Dikshit this may be identified with Kulanch in the Bogra district. It is difficult to be sure as to whether this was the original Kroḍaṇca from which these Brahmins are said to have migrated or a settlement in Bengal which was named after it.¹²⁶

In mentioning the original home of the donee or his family the Āmgāchi grant gives two names, Kroḍaṇca and Matsyāvāsa, probably one of these was the name of the native place and the other that of the place of residence of the donee's family. As in the Āmgāchi grant the Irdā copper-plate of the Kāmboja king Nayapāladeva¹²⁷ also supplies the same kind of information in giving details about the earlier whereabouts of the family receiving the gift concerned. In this record it is stated that the donee, *paṇḍita* Āśvattha-Śarman was born at Droṇa but hailed from Kuṇṭira. Immigration of Brahmins to Bengal continued even under the patronage of the Varmans whose Belava copper-plate¹²⁸ mentions a gift of land made to Rāmadeva-Śarman, great-grandson of Pitambaradeva-Śarman said to be an immigrant from the Middle country, who settled in Siddhala in Uttara-Rāḍha.

Other cases of Brahmin immigration are also on record. During the period

122. SN, iv, p. 109.

123. EI, vii, p. 85 ff.

124. *ibid*, iv, p. 293 ff.

125. *ibid*, xxix, p. 48 ff ; cf, EI, xxiii, p. 101 ff.

126. EI, xxiii, p. 103 ff ; cf, JBORS, v, (1919), p. 587 ff ; SHAIB, p. 393n

127. *ibid*, xxii, p. 153 ff.

*128. IB, p. 14 ff.

of political' unrest caused by Muslim invasions the lives and occupations of the 'Midland Brahmins may have become troublesome and insecure. Hence at one stage, before the Muslims advanced as far east as Bengal, some of the distressed Brahmins probably left their homes in the disturbed areas and proceeded to safer places where livelihood was more comfortable. The rulers of Bengal during the period welcomed these Brahmins by making gifts of land to them or to their descendants. It means that Brahmins who came from outside enjoyed some special reputation whose presence seems to have been required to strengthen the position of the resident Brahmin community in Bengal. The position of Brahmanism in Bengal during the rule of the Sena kings may have been a cause of attraction for Brahmins outside. In addition to the cases already noted we may refer to that of Ratnākaradeva-Śarman of Kāñṭijongā, great-grandfather of the donee, in the Barrackpore grant, who was an immigrant from the *Madhyadeśa*.¹²⁹ Another instance is furnished by the Rāmganj copper-plate of Īśvaraghoṣa,¹³⁰ where reference is made to *Bhaṭṭa* Vāsudeva, described as an immigrant from Candavāra, which has been identified with Candwar near Etawa in the United Province, referred to by the Muhammadan historians.¹³¹

It may be assumed that even after migration the Brahmin settlers sometimes maintained their orthodoxy by continuing their social connection with the community outside Bengal to which they had originally belonged.

Caste rules in Bengal do not always appear to have been strictly observed in the orthodox fashion, to which testimony is borne by the Tippera copper-plate of Lokanātha¹³² which refers to the marriage of a Brahmin with a Śūdra woman, the offspring of the union being called a *Pārasava*. This *Pārasava* whose name was Keśava was placed in charge of the army enjoying the confidence of the king. This shows that such marriages did not inevitably lead to degradation or loss of status in the estimation of the king although an issue of such a marriage was no longer called a Brahmin. For example, Lokanātha of Brahmin ancestry in the above-mentioned grant, is referred to in the inscription as a '*karaṇa*'. This term may have, however, been used in this record in a double sense, administrative and social.

129. IB, p. 57 ff.

130. *ibid*, p. 149 ff.

131. TIN, pp. 470, 742 ; HI, II, 297n.

132. EI, xv, p. 301 ff.

Invitation to Brahmins of Bengal from outside

The Brahmins of Bengal in course of time built up a solid reputation which sometimes spread beyond its borders. Thus the Sāṅgalī plate of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa Govinda IV (A.D. 933-34)¹³³ tells us of a Brahmin named Keśavadīkṣitā of the Kauśika *gotra* who emigrated from Puṇḍravardhana in North Bengal to South India to receive the grant of the village Lohagrāma comprised in the Rāmapuri Seven-hundred circle. He was a student of Vāji-Kāṇva, i.e. Vājasaneyi-Kāṇva śakhā of the Yajurveda. The family may have migrated to the south when the donee's father Dāmodara Bhaṭṭa was alive. According to the terms of the gift, the donee was given unobstructed, permanent and inalienable right over the village.

An inscription of Khoṭṭiga (A.D. 967)¹³⁴ mentions the installation of some images of Kārttikeya and other gods by the *Brahmacārin* Gadādhara at the village of Kolagala. Gadādhara is described in its verse 13 as an ascetic belonging to the Śāṇḍilya *gotra* and as a 'crest-jewel of the Gauḍa country'. Verse 14 tells us that 'he was born in the village Taḍā and that he was the illuminator of the Varendrī country.' A high tribute in fact is paid to Gadādhara who was entrusted with the administration of 'the realm of god Kārttikeya.' Another inscription of Kolagallu (A.D. 964)¹³⁵ also refers in a similar manner to Gadādhara who had complete control over the area known as *Kārttikeya tapovana* which he administered from Kolagallu. The inscription further gives the history and ancestry of the poet Madhusūdana who composed the *praśasti*. He was the son of Atibala and grandson Ṛṣi (?), and was a *dvija* of the *Karmāra-kula* whose ancestors emigrated from Tarkārī in Varendrī. Thus both Gadādhara, the donee, and Madhusūdana, the composer of the *praśasti*, are found to have emigrated to the Deccan from Varendra. Gadādhara may have gone to the south with Kṛṣṇa III during his second expedition in A.D. 963-964.¹³⁶ The other emigrant, Madhusūdana was probably known for his abilities as a poet.

133. IA, xii, pp. 247-258.

134. EI, xxi, pp. 260-267 ; IHQ, xxxvi, (1960), pp. 196-200.

135. MER, 1914, pt, ii, No. 234 of 1913 ; cf, EI, xxi, 260-67 ; IHQ, xxxvi, pp. 196-200

136. cf, EI, xix, p. 287 ff.

Kings of different dynasties of Orissa are known to have invited Brahmins of Bengal, from time to time, to settle in their territory where they were endowed with gifts of villages and lands. On some occasions they were also appointed to responsible posts. One of the reasons for the patronage extended by the Somavamśi kings to Bengal Brahmins was their connection with Vaṅga as claimed in some of their records. Thus in the Jatesinga Dungri inscription (or Maranja—Mura charter), Mahāśivagupta I *alias* Yayāti, lord of Tṛkalinga, has been described as the full-moon in the sky of Vaṅga with his family called *Vaṅgānvaya* or of Vaṅga lineage.¹³⁷ Yayāti is further mentioned to have seized Gauḍa and Rāḍha. Not only Yayāti but other members of the Somavamśi dynasty also endowed Brahmins from Bengal as grantees of their charters. Thus, Mahābhavagupta I, Janamejaya (c.A.D. 975-1010) of the same dynasty made the gift of a village Vakratentali¹³⁸ to *Bhaṭṭaputra* Jātarūpa, son of Śrīvacha, who belonged to the Kaunḍinya *gotra* and Chāndogya-caraṇa. He was an emigrant to Orissa from Rāḍhāphamvalli-kandara.¹³⁹ He settled in the village Meraṇḍā. R. D. Banerji believes that originally the donee lived in the village of Phamballi-Kandara in Rāḍha in West Bengal.¹⁴⁰ This view is not accepted by Dr. H. C. Ray who identifies Rāḍhā-phamvalli-kandara with the modern state of Rairakhal.¹⁴¹

The same prince, in the 31st year of his reign, issued a charter from his camp of victory at Ārāma, by which he made a gift of a village to his chief minister *Mahattama* Sādhāraṇa, son of *Bhaṭṭa* Śobhana belonging to the Bhāradvāja *gotra*. He was a student of the Vājasaneyā *śākhā*. He was acquainted with the Vedas, texts of polity and law and other subsidiary branches of learning. An immigrant from Ṭakārī which may be located in North Bengal, he came to reside at Turvunā in Kośala.¹⁴²

As regards the identification of Ṭakārī, referred to above, from where the Brahmin donee migrated to Orissa it is not possible to arrive at a definite conclu-

137. JBORS, ii, p. 52 ff ; DHNI, i, pp. 401-3 ; cf, IHQ, xx, pp. 76-82

138. Dr. H. C. Ray identifies Vakratentali with Bantentuli, 16 miles west of Sonpur town, DHNI, I, p. 397n.

139. EI, xi, p. 93 ff.

140. HO, p. 206 ff ; cf, SHAIB, p. 74n.

141. DHNI, i, p. 397 n. ; a similar view is held by B. C. Mazumdar, EI, xi, pp. 101, 102, 201.

142. EI, iii, p. 323 ff ; xxiii, pp. 281-255.

sion in the absence of fuller details in the inscriptions concerned. The Silimpur slab stone inscriptton,¹⁴³ edited by Dr. R. G. Basak, shows that there was an important Brahmanic locality in North Bengal known by this name. As these rulers were proud of their connection with Bengal, it would not be strange if they had a special fascination for Brahmins of this famous centre.

An inscription of Orissa, noticed by R. D. Banerji records, according to him, a royal gift of the village of Lambeha, situated in Potoda-*viṣaya* of the Āirapaṭṭa-*maṇḍala*, to a Brahmin named *Bhaṭṭa* Brahmadhara, son of Śrīdhara and grandson of Ādityadhara. The donee, an immigrant from Nārayaṇapura in Puṇḍravardhana, belonged to the Kāṇva *śākhā* of the Yajurveda and the Kṛṣṇātreya *gotra*. The grant is not dated.¹⁴⁴

Similarly, in the Cakradharpur plates of Raṇabhañja, a Brahmin from the village Burullā in the Pecipāṭaka-*viṣaya* in the Varendra-*maṇḍala* receives the gift of the village Hastileṇḍā. The donee, Padmākara is said to have belonged to the Kṛṣṇātreya *gotra* of the Chāndogya-*caraṇa* and the Kauthuma *śākhā* of the Sāmaveda.¹⁴⁵ He was the son of Prabhākara and grandson of Aṅgaḍi.

Patronage was extended to Brahmins from Bengal by kings of the Gaṅga dynasty also in the form of land grants. The Indian Museum plate of *Mahārāja* Devendravarman (A.D. 802), son of *Mahārāja* Rājendravarman, records the gift of a village called Purujvanā (?) to Govinda-Śarman, son of *Bhaṭṭa* Nārāyaṇa. The donee is said to have migrated to Orissa from his native village in Uttara-Rāḍha. He belonged to the Vatsa *gotra* and was a student of the Yajurveda and the Kāṭha *caraṇa*.¹⁴⁶

The Cidivalasa plate of Devendravarman (Gaṅga year 397)¹⁴⁷ records the grant of a village Kandalivāḍa in Orissa in favour of Āditya *Bhaṭṭa*, Yaju *Bhaṭṭa* (Yajña-*bhaṭṭa*),¹⁴⁸ Sendideva *Bhaṭṭa* (Khaṇḍideva-*bhaṭṭa*)¹⁴⁹ and others. According to D. R. Bhandarkar and S. Rao the inscription refers to *Vaṅga* *Brāhmaṇas*

143. EI, xiii, pp. 283-295.

144. HO, pp. 202-3.

145. JBORS, vi, p. 269 ff; Bhandarkar's List : No. 1494.

146. EI, xxiii, p. 73 ff.

147. JAHRS, ii, p. 146 ff; Bhandarkar's List; No. 2052; JAS, xvii, (1952), No. 2, pp. 77-82.

148. JAS, xviii, pp. 77-82.

149. *ibid.*

i.e. Brahmins of Vaṅga. Dr. D. C. Sircar, however, thinks that the reading is not *Vaṅgaja* but *vaṃśaja*¹⁵⁰

The Talchar plate of Gayādatuṅgadeva¹⁵¹ records the grant of the village Vāmāitālla in the Tuṅkerā viśaya to three Brahmins all of whom, according to Dr. D. C. Sircar, went from Bengal. All these Brahmins belonged to the Kāṇva śākhā of the Yajurveda : (1) *Bhaṭṭaputra* Devaśarman, son of Paūma (i.e. Paḍma) and grandson of Dhanaśarman of the Kaśyapa gotra, (2) *Bhaṭṭaputra* Vāsudeva,¹⁵² son of Lallaḍa and grandson of Dhaḍūkā of the Vātsya gotra and (3) *Bhaṭṭaputra* Rāmadeva, son of the former. Devaśarman received half of the village and the other two the rest of it, each getting one-fourth. The first donee emigrated from the village Mūthāutha in Varendrī-maṇḍala in North Bengal to Sāvira in Oḍra-viśaya (i.e. Orissa). This place has been identified with Muktvastu in North Bengal. The other two donees emigrated from Sāvathi which has been located in the 'area around Baigram in the Bogra district of North Bengal.'¹⁵³ On palaeographical grounds the inscription may be placed in the 11th century A.D.

The Malkapuram stone pillar inscription¹⁵⁴ glorifies the activities of the Śaiva teacher, Viśveśvara Śambhu who became the High priest of the *Golāki-maṭha* in the Dāhala-maṇḍala. He emigrated from Pūrva-grāma in Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍha. His many-sided activities are noticed above. A similar case is noticed in the Badāun stone inscription of Lakhanapāla.¹⁵⁵ It is recorded there that a Brahmin of Gauḍa named Vasāvana belonging to the Vatsa-bhārgava gotra went and settled in Siṃhapallī in the Hariyāṇa country (modern Hariyāṇa in the Hissār district, Punjab). The inscription is silent regarding the cause of this migration. However, his eldest son, Īśānaśiva did not live in Siṃhapallī till the end of his life. We are told that he left Siṃhapallī and went to Vodāmayutā (modern Badāun, U. P.) and became a pupil of Mūrtigaṇa, the chief of the famous Śiva monastery there. In due time he became the chief of that monastery. He next founded another temple of Śiva and endowed it with the revenues of Bhadaṇaulikā.

A Brahmin of Bengal is also known to have gone to *Madhyadeśa* to receive

150. JAS, xviii, 77-82

151. JPASB, (NS), xii, (1916), pp. 291-295 ; EI, xxxiv, p. 91 ff.

152. R. D. Banerji reads Vṛstideva, cf, JPASB,(NS), xii, pp. 291-295.

153. Cf. EI, xxiii, p. 101 ff.

154. JAHRS, iv, pp. 158-162 ; IC, vii, No. 2, pp. 169-170.

155. EI, i, p. 62 ff.

a grant of land (five shares) from king Vākpatirāja Muñja (c. A.D. 986).¹⁵⁶ His name was Donāka who came from Vilvagavāsa in Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍha and belonged to the Chāndogya-śākhā of the Sāmaveda. Another pious Brahmin from Bengal went to Assam at the invitation of its ruler Vaidyadeva in the 12th century A.D. Vaidyadeva's Kamauli copper-plate inscription¹⁵⁷ records the grant of some land to him in Kāmarūpa-*maṇḍala* situated in Prāgjyotiṣapura-*bhukti*. The ancestor of this Brahmin donee, Śrīdhara was Bhārata who was an inhabitant of Bhāvagrāma in Varendra. Śrīdhara may have been a resident of Varendra also. Later he left his native village to settle in Kāmarūpa-*maṇḍala*.

Movement within Bengal

There is an interesting case of some Brahmin scholars moving from one part of Bengal to another for a specific reason. This is come across in the Silimpur stone inscription¹⁵⁸ where it is said that in the village of Bālagrāma there lived many Brahmin families, all proud of their 'learning, lineage and practice of austerities'. Some, belonging to the *paṇḍita* families, living in its eastern part, desiring to live apart, removed to a neighbouring place called Śīyamva(ba). This village was already under Brahmanic influence, being the birth place of a Brahmin named Paśupati who was 'skilful in the performance of six duties.' Another instance probably of an analogous character is furnished by the Keoār Viṣṇu Image inscription¹⁵⁹ which mentions that a Brahmin named Vaṅgoka, great-grandson of Śauriśarman, grandson of Pitāmaha and son of Sayoga of the Śāṇḍilya *gotra*, originally resident of the village of Ṭatākā in Varendri, migrated to Vikramapura *parganā* of Vaṅga. He may have installed the image which was found in Keoār. If this inscription can be assigned to a time later than the Muslim conquest of Nadia, it may be suggested that the Brahmin may have left his original home for East Bengal where Hindu rule continued under the Senas for some time. The donee's name Vaṅgoka was probably connected with Vaṅga and applied to the family after its migration to Vikramapura.

Although it was not perhaps difficult to meet with worthy local Brahmins, to whom gifts could be offered, the scope was extended, wherever necessary, by

156. 6I, I. 62.

157. *ibid*, ii, p. 347 ff.

158. *ibid*, xiii, pp. 283-295.

159. *ibid*, xvii, pp. 355-56.

inviting Brahmins from other parts of Bengal. Thus in the Belava copper-plate¹⁶⁰ we find that a Brahmin of Siddhala-grāma in Uttara-Rāḍha was donated the village Upyalikā belonging to Kauśāmbi-Astagachakhaṇḍala in the Adhahpattana-*maṇḍala* of Paṇḍravardhana-*bhukti* in North Bengal by king Bhojavarmaṇ. Similarly, Dāmodaradeva (c. A. D. 1243) selected some Brahmins from Siddhala for gift of land in his kingdom in South-East Bengal. He also granted land in South-East Bengal to Brahmin donees from Kāṇyamala, Pūrvagrāma, Diṇḍisa and Kesarakona.¹⁶¹ It may be understood from these instances that there was a time when Brahmins of Siddhala enjoyed a high reputation for their scholarship and piety, and consequently there was a demand for them in other areas of the country where there was a policy to strengthen the cause of Brahmanism.¹⁶²

160. IB, p. 14 ff.

161. cf, EI, xxvii, p. 182 ff; xxx, p. 51 ff.

162. Further details regarding grants of lands and donees are being incorporated in another paper to be published shortly.

icient Bengal

Village or land	Measurement & Prices	Miscellaneous
land	1 <i>kulyavāpa</i>	Purchased by the <i>Āyuktaka</i> and then made a gift of the same.
land	9 <i>kulyavāpas</i>	purchased and then made a gift of the same.
land	1 <i>kulyavāpa</i>	purchased.
land	1 <i>kulyavāpa</i>	purchased.
land	x	purchased and then made a gift of the same.
land	x	x
land	x	x
land	8 <i>kulyavāpas</i>	purchased.
land	x	x
land	x	x
Āpaggahoṣavāta	x	x
Ā-Kumbhārapadraka	x	x
Ābhārapadraka	x	x
ra-śālmal-āgrahāra ct of Candrapurī	x	See Appendix
in Suvvūṅga <i>viśaya</i>	x	See Appendix
		617 000 000 SRIKRISHNA PUBLIC LIBRARY
the <i>viśayās</i> of ana and Pāṭalāyikā	13 <i>pāṭakas</i>	See Appendix
villages :	x	x
śaśvabhra-grāma		

STUDIES IN NIBANDHA-s

Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya

(III) Its indebtedness to Ballāla Sena

We propose to discuss here the indebtedness to Ballāla Sena of Caṇḍeśvara and, as we shall see later on, of his *Kṛtyaratnākara* alone. This Ballāla Sena was a Hindu king of Bengal, reigning between 1158-1179 A.D. and produced at least five works on dharmaśāstra, two of which viz. *Adbhutasāgara* and *Dānasāgara* have been published⁵⁰ and the remaining three of which viz. *Pratiṣṭhāsāgara*, *Ācārasāgara* and *Vratasāgara* are known only from references⁵¹ in one of his published works. The 72 introductory verses of the India office MS. of the *Dānasāgara*, recorded in its Descriptive Catalogue, helped Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane to draw pointed attention of scholars in his *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, (p. 340), to the invaluable merit of the *Dānasāgara* in checking the contents of the extant Purāṇas. He also advised younger scholars on p. 162 of his above work to fix the chronology of the Purāṇas. Dr. R. C. Hazra acted up to his advice by consulting the India office MS. of the aforesaid work which helped him to check the contents of the extant Purāṇas, establish the chronology of the Puranic chapters and produce his *Studies in Puranic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs* in 1940. But neither Dr. Kane nor Dr. Hazra utilized or even mentioned Pandit Śyāmācaraṇa's partly printed edition of the *Dānasāgara* (vide note 10 above), which had been published in *Devanāgarī* script and earlier than the works of both.

Now as Caṇḍeśvara has quoted in the *Kṛtyaratnākara* no other work of Ballāla Sena than the *Dānasāgara*, our study will concern itself with the enumeration and identification of the quotations from the D. S. in the K. R. The index to the K. R. (p. 641) contains five entries against the D. S. and six against the *sāgara*, which is an obvious abbreviation of the name *Dānasāgara* and we have found out twenty-seven more quotations from the *Sāgara* or the *Dānasāgara* in the *Kṛtyaratnākara*. The *paribhāṣā* chapter of the former work (pp. 51-69) corresponds so closely to the same chapter of the latter work (pp. 45-79) in the enumeration and arrangement of topics, quotation of texts and comments that the whole chapter of the K. R. seems to be a faithful copy of the corresponding chapter of the D. R. with slight variations. So the mention of the several

50. The *Dānasāgara*, which has been fully published in 1956 by the present writer, was partly published twice earlier (see above in the *dānakāṇḍa* subsection). The *Adbhutasāgara* was published from Benares in 1905 (see below, note 156).
51. The *Pratiṣṭhāsāgara* and *Ācārasāgara* have been mentioned in introductory verses 55 and 56 (p. 6 of the present writer's edition) and the *Vratasāgara* on pp. 52 and 59 (of the same edition).

topics of the *.paribhāṣā* chapter of the two works in a tabular form will not be out of place here, [In the following Table are given the pages of D. S. first and the corresponding pages of K.R. are indicated by the sign =]

1. Paribhāṣā in general—pp. 51-55=pp. 45-50
2. „ for expiatory rites for small lapses—pp. 56-57=pp. 50-52
3. „ for rites for invalid persons—pp. 57-58=pp. 52-53
4. „ for rites for fasting—pp. 58-59=pp. 53-57
5. „ for rites for nocturnal eating—pp. 59-60=pp. 57-59
6. „ for rites for oblation to the sacred fire—pp. 60-62=pp. 59-62
7. „ for rites for muttering prayers—pp. 62-64=pp. 62-65
- 8-9. „ for articles and grains—pp. 64-65=pp. 65-69
- 10-12. „ for eighteen kinds of rice, all grains and all scents—pp. 65-66=pp. 69-71
- 13-15. „ for gems, flavours and minerals—p. 66=pp. 71-72
16. „ for substitutes in the absence of principal articles—pp. 67-68=pp. 73-76
17. „ for weights and measures—pp. 68-69=pp. 76-77
- 18-19. „ for incense and light—wanting in D. S.=pp. 77-79

So it will be seen that not only the (*Kṛtya*)-*kalpataru*, *Kāmadhenu* and *Pārijāta*, as admitted by the author but also the *Dānasāgara* was mainly utilized by him in the K.R.

Vide the Appendix (E) for the identified quotations from the *Dānasāgara* in the *Kṛtyaratnākara*.

(IV) Its indebtedness to Śrīdatta

Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane has devoted sec. 89 (pp. 363-5) of his *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I., to Śrīdatta Upādhyāya and has said on p. 365, “The *Samayapradīpa* is mentioned in the *Kṛtyaratnākara* (pp. 400, 479 and 505) of Caṇḍeśvara and in Śūlapāṇi’s *Durgotsava-viveka*. Śrīdatta is more frequently quoted in the *Śrāddhakriyākaumudī* of Govindānanda than almost any other author or work.” The above statement of Dr. Kane does not contain an exhaustive list of the authors or works quoting Śrīdatta, as the latter is also quoted by Vācaspati Miśra in his several *Cintāmaṇis* and by Raghunandana in his several *Tattvas*. But we are concerned here only with Caṇḍeśvara’s indebtedness to Śrīdatta, as both belonged to Mithilā and as the latter ‘flourished a short time before the former and must have composed his works between 1275 and 1310 A.D.’ (loc. cit.), while ‘the literary activities of Caṇḍeśvara extended for about 50 years from 1314’ (op. cit., p. 372). The *Kṛtyaratnākara* of Caṇḍeśvara was published (B.I., 1925) just five years before the publication of Dr. Kane’s above volume. But though he has utilized in it the information about Caṇḍeśvara’s quoting the *Samayapradīpa*, from the index (p. 641) to the K.R., yet he has not traced the quotations in the Deccan College MS. of the former (No. 371 of 1875-76), which MS. he has otherwise fully utilized in his description not only of Śrīdatta Upādhyāya (pp. 363-5) but also of Dhāreśvara Bhojadeva (pp. 275-9). So we propose to

trace, here those quotations from the *Samayapradīpa* in the K. R. and thus establish. Caṇḍeśvara's indebtedness to Śrīdatta, which is an interesting phenomenon in the history of Dharmaśāstra literature in view of the fact that both Śrīdatta and Caṇḍeśvara belonged to the same part of the country and were not separated by any appreciable interval of time.

Though the index to the K.R. contains eight entries against the S. P., yet Dr. Kane has stated three only in his remark quoted above and the present writer has succeeded in finding out two more quotations from the latter work in the former (pp. 233, 510). Śrīdatta has also been quoted once in the former work (p. 68) but the quotation is from his other work *Sandhyāprayoga*, as stated therein. The *Grhashtaratnākara* of Caṇḍeśvara has also quoted twice (pp. 195, 203) *Śrīdattāhnikā*, i.e. Śrīdatta's work on Āhnika, which may be the *Chandogāhnikā*, said to be one of Śrīdatta's works (Kane, op. cit., p. 364). The present writer has identified all the above ten quotations from the S. P. in the D. C. MS. of the same. Before describing these identifications, the present writer wishes to make two short remarks. One of them is that the first chapter of this work is not called '*Samaya-pariccheda*', as stated by Dr. Kane but '*Samaya-pradīpa prathamah paricchedaḥ*' (vide folio 31a). The other is that the correct form of the name, somewhat indistinct on folio 7a of the D.C. MS. and appearing to be '*Mitāmitrādibhiḥ*', is '*Jitāmitrādibhiḥ*', as the whole extract, beginning with '*yadi tu ekādaśim upavaset*' and ending with '*prapañcitam Jitāmitrādibhiḥ*', has been quoted by Raghunandana in his *Ekādaśītatva* (pp. 45-46) with the words '*tathā ca samayapradīpe Śrīdattopādhyāyāḥ*' and '*ityāhuḥ*', added just before and after the extract respectively.

The first quotation from the S. P. occurs in the *Śrāvaṇakṛtya* of the K.R. (p. 233) and is to the effect that the S.P., after quoting the first only of the previously written verses, has said that bitter, pungent, sour and sweet things are eaten in order. This quotation is found on folio 36a of the MS. of the S.P. The second and third quotations occur in the *kārttikakṛtya* of the K.R. (pp. 400, 401) and are found on folios 9b and 17b respectively of the MS. of the former. The second is the interpretation of a text on the grains allowed in a *haviṣya* diet and the third is the mention of the fact that the word *bahiḥsnāyī*, occurring in a text on p. 400, has been read as *nityasnāyī* in the S.P., which has interpreted *nityasnāna* as *prātaḥsnāna* on the authority of *Śaṅkha*. The fourth quotation occurs in the *Pauṣamāsakṛtya* of the K.R. (p. 479) and is found on folio 47a of the MS. of the S.P. It is to the effect that the S.P. is of opinion that cakes (*apūpas*) are to be taken by the *Chandogas* and *Vājasaneyas* according to their *Gṛhyasūtras*, while vegetables (*śāka*) by the *Kaṭhas* and that those whose *Gṛhyasūtras* contain no specific prescription may optionally take both cakes and vegetables. The fifth and sixth quotations occur in the *Māghakṛtya* of the K.R. (pp. 505, 509-510) and are found on folios 16b and 47b-48a respectively of the MS. of the S.P. The fifth quotation is to the effect that according to the S.P. the procedure (*Itikartavyatā*) of the *vrata*, referred to above, is derived from the previous words, beginning with '*māghamāse tu yo brahman.*' The sixth

quotation is rather a long one and covers the whole of p. 509 and runs up to the first six lines on p. 510. It is found in the MS. of the S.P. (from folio 47b to folio 48a) and concerns itself with the detailed rites of *māghasaptamī*. The seventh quotation occurs in the *Phālgunakṛtya* of the K.R. (p. 522) and is found on folio 49b of the MS. of the S.P. It is the mention of a different reading in the S.P. of a text of the *Brahmapurāṇa*, quoted just above and our author adds that the reading of the S.P. is different from that, adopted by the *Kṛtyasamuccaya Kalpataru* and others. The eighth quotation occurs in the *Prakṛnakṛtya* of the K.R. (p. 540) after the verse 'tilodvartī.....nāvasīdati' and is found on folio 50b of the MS. of the S.P. It is to the effect that the S.P. is of opinion that the above general prescription about the six-fold application of sesame really holds good in one's birth-day ceremonies. The ninth and tenth quotations occur in the *Vratacinā* section of the K.R. (pp. 633, 637) and are found on folios 3a and 6b to 7a of the MS. of the S.P. The ninth is the definition of the word *vrata* by the author of the S.P. and is to the effect that '*vrata* is a continuous resolve, regarding one's religious duties' and the tenth is the decision of the S.P., in case one *tithi* falls on two days.

Vide the Appendix (F) for the quotations.

(c) The *Gṛhastharatnākara*

(Supplementary portion of its text)

Dr. Kane has utilized in the first volume of his History (sec. on Caṇḍeśvara) the incomplete D.C. MS. (No. 44 of A 1883-84) of the *Gṛhastharatnākara*, as said above but has only referred to the printed edition of 1928 in Appendix A (p. 539) but not utilized) it in his above volume. But the second volume of his *History of Dharmaśāstra* (1941) contains not less than a hundred quotations and translated extracts from the printed edition. The frequency of these quotations and translated extracts can be best inferred from the fact that he has shortened in the list of abbreviations the name of the work into Gṛ R. and *gṛha. ra* (in Devanāgarī script) for the text and foot-note portions respectively. He has followed this process of abbreviation in the cases of two other nibandhas only. That he has ignored nothing important of the Gṛ R. in his second volume can be proved by the fact that he has utilized the interpretation⁵² of the former (p. 279) of the words *prṣṭhe vāstuni* (*Manu* III. 91), along with that of Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, a commentator of *Manu*, of the same. The Gṛ R. contained 68 *araṅgas* or chapters, as is evident from the last line of the last introductory verse⁵³ (no. 21) of the printed edition of the same (p. 3).

52. Gṛ R. says, '*prṣṭhe vāstuni* paścādgr̥he mūttrocāra-karaṇa-sthāna ityanvayaḥ' i.e. "the words *prṣṭhe vāstuni* should be interpreted as 'at the back of the house near the latrine'," while Kulluka says, '*gṛhasyopari yad-gṛhaṃ tat prṣṭha-vāstu*', i.e. "*prṣṭha-vāstu* means 'an apartment over another' (i.e. attic of a house)."

53. aṣṭa-ṣaṣṭir-amī sṛṣṭis-taraṅgāś-cittaraṅgadā //

But this printed edition, though containing on the cover the words 'complete work', is really incomplete, as it finishes with chap. 65 on *tyājyātyājya* and the post-colophon of the MS. *ka*, collated for the edition, adds the following line :

avaśiṣṭaṃ bhāratādi-śravaṇaṇca ādarśābhāvānna likhitam (i.e. 'the remaining chapters such as *bhāratādiśravaṇa* have not been copied owing to their absence in the model MSS.'). The two other MSS. of the Gṛ R., collated for the present edition, were also wanting in these three last chapters. So it appears that all the three MSS. are copies of the same incomplete original. Though Dr. Kane has said in his section on Caṇḍeśvara (Vol. I, p. 306), 'The Deccan College MS. that I could consult is incomplete, has only folios 30, 72-133 and contains the last 23 *taraṅgas* only', yet I find on examination of this very MS. (now deposited in the library of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona) that the folio 30 contains a fragment only of the *taraṅga* on *pakṣiṇaḥ*,⁵⁴ while the remaining folios (72-133) cover full 21 *taraṅgas* and a small portion of the *rakṣoghnācāravarṇana-taraṅga* (the penultimate *taraṅga*), the ultimate *taraṅga* on *bhāratādiśravaṇa*, being altogether omitted in this MS. So we see that of the missing three *taraṅgas*⁵⁵ of the printed edition, which ends abruptly on p. 591 with the text of Viṣṇu⁵⁶ in the *tyājyātyājya-taraṅga*, only the entire *ṛṇāpakaraṇa-taraṅga* and a little portion of the *rakṣoghnācāravarṇana-taraṅga* can be had from the Deccan College MS., which also contains the end of the *tyājyātyājya-taraṅga*, which appears to be missing in the printed edition :

It may be added in conclusion that Dr. Kane has given a short description of the contents of the Gṛ R., extending over nearly a paragraph on p. 166 of his Marathi work *Dharmaśāstra-vicāra*.

Vide the Appendix (G) for the text of the recovered supplementary portion.

(d) The *Śuddhiratnākara*

This work of Caṇḍeśvara is as yet unpublished. There is an incomplete MS. (No. 3826),⁵⁷ consisting of 97 folios only with gaps, in the Government of India collection

54. From *kalaviṅkaṃ kalam haṃsaṃ* (p. 371 of the printed text) to *pārāvata-kapotau ca abhakṣyāḥ* (p. 372 of the same).

55. *ṛṇāpakaraṇaṇcātha rakṣoghnācāravarṇanam* /
śravaṇaṃ bhāratādīnāṃ vidhānaṇca prakīrtitāḥ // (introductory verse, 20)

56. (a) *bhāryā putraśca bandhuśca saṃsṛṣṭaḥ pāpakarmabhiḥ* /
paribhāṣyo' parityājyaḥ patito' pi tathaiva ca // (as read in the printed edition).

(b) *bhāryā putraśca śiṣyaśca saṃsṛṣṭaḥ pāpakarmabhiḥ* /
paribhāvyāḥ parityājyāḥ patito' pyanathā bhavet // (as read in the D.C. MS.)

57. Vide p. 73, Descriptive catalogue of the Sanskrit MSS. of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. III, (Smṛti) by MM. Haraprasad Sastri, published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1925.

of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta. The present writer has made a transcript of this MS. and used it for this sub-section. Another incomplete and incorrect MS.⁵⁸ of the same work, consisting of 118 folios, has been described in the Mithilā catalogue. The present writer has found on p. 38 of his copy the beginning⁵⁹ of the Mithilā MS. But the end of that MS. could not be traced in the present writer's copy, as the Society's MS. ends in an earlier portion of the work. Though Caṇḍeśvara's three other parts of his *Smṛti-ratnākara* and the *Rājanīti-ratnākara* have already been published, as stated above and though this *Śuddhi-ratnākara* is another important work, yet it has not yet seen the light of day. Its great importance in the dharmaśāstra literature can be somewhat realised from the fact that Raghunandana, the great Bengal *nibandhakāra* of the 16th century, has quoted many times from it in his *Śuddhitattva*. This latter work quotes from many metrical Smṛtis, Purāṇas, digests and commentaries. But though quotations from all other digests are once or twice in each case, the *Hāralatā* of Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa has been quoted in the S. T. 44 times and the works of Caṇḍeśvara 27 times, the quotations from the *Śuddhiratnākara* alone being at least eleven times, once with the specific mention of the full name of the work and ten times with that of its abbreviated name, viz. *Ratnākara* : (Vide pp. 190-98 of the Appendix of the present writer's monograph viz. *Raghunandana's Indebtedness* etc. for the quotations from all the works of Caṇḍeśvara, including the *Śuddhiratnākara*).

It will be seen that Raghunandana principally laid the *Hāralatā* of Bengali Aniruddha and the *Śuddhi-ratnākara* of the Maithila Caṇḍeśvara under contribution in producing his *Śuddhitattva*. Aniruddha, who was prior to Caṇḍeśvara also by two centuries, has been quoted by the latter also in his present work. The present writer's copy (pp. 39, 48 and 6) contains three quotations from the *Hāralatā*, the former two by the specific mention of its name and the third as 'anye tu.....ityāhuḥ'. The first quotation⁶⁰ is found on p. 75 of the *Hāralatā*. The second quotation,⁶¹ which is the mention of the reading *asapiṇḍānām* in the *Hāralatā* for *sapiṇḍānām*, is found on p. 84 of the H. L. with the simple change of *apiṇḍānām* for *asapiṇḍānām*. Our author adds that the reading of the H. L. is a better one in the text, cited by him beforehand. The third quotation⁶² is

58. Vide p, 436, A descriptive catalogue of (Sanskrit) MSS. in Mithilā', Vol. I, Smṛti Manuscripts, by K. P. Jayaswal and A. Banerji-Shastri, published by the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna, 1927.

59. (samā-)nagrāmiyo'tra samīpavāsī pārijāte tu itareṣvācāryeṣu upādhyāyādiṣu /

60. Hāralatākāraṣtu—tat-putra ācāryaputraḥ sa ca yadyadhyāpayati tathā tanmarāṇe trirātram / adhyāpayan gurusuto guruvan-mānamarhati / iti manu (II. 208b) darśanāt /

61. Hāralatāyām asapiṇḍānām iti pāṭhaḥ sa tu sugamaḥ /

62. anye tu sarvakarmānītyadṛṣṭārtha-daiva-pitrya-karmaparam ityāhuḥ /

(H. L. reads sarvakarmanītyadṛṣṭarthānām daiva-paitrāṇām karmaṇām upasaṅgrahārtham).

found with a slight modification on p. 21 of the H. L. after the text of *Pañhinasi*, occurring on p. 26 of the same and also quoted by our author.

But curiously enough, Govindānanda, though quoting the *Hāratalā* and Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa several times in his *Śuddhikaumudī*, a cognate work on ceremonial impurity, never quotes the *Śuddhiratnākara* or simply *Ratnākara* in his above work. He was not, however totally ignorant of the *Ratnākara*, which is mentioned twice (pp. 59 and 474) in his another work, viz. the *Śrāddhakriyākaumudī*. But as the word *Ratnākara*, mentioned in it, presumably refers to other works of Caṇḍeśvara and not to the *Śuddhiratnākara* owing to the difference of the subject-matter of the *Śrāddhakriyākaumudī*, the present writer has refrained from comparing the quotations with his copy.

Enough has been said to prove that the *Śuddhiratnākara* is a very important work of the Mithilā School of Hindu Religious Law and, quoted as it has been in Raghunandana's *Śuddhitattva* a considerable number of times, it exercised a great influence over the Bengal school also and that it supplies the missing link between the *Hāratalā* and the *Śuddhitattva*, Bengal nibandhas of the 12th and 16th centuries respectively.

(c) The *Dānaratnākara*

Dr. Kane utilized extracts of the *Dānasāgara* from the India Office Catalogue and the Deccan College MS. (No. 114 of 1884-86) of the *Dānaratnākara* in appropriate places⁶³ of the first volume of his History, which also contains the important fact that 'the work (i.e. the *Dānasāgara*) is mentioned in the *Dānaratnākara* of Caṇḍeśvara'.⁶⁴ The same author has not, however, utilized the *Dānasāgara* in the second volume of his History but simply mentioned it as one of the 'digests specially devoted to the topic of *dāna*' on p. 841 of the same. He has also not used the *Dānaratnākara* in his above volume in the chapter on *dāna* but consulted the D.C. MS.⁶⁵ in an earlier chapter (on p. 131, footnote 290) for

63. Th D. S. extracts have been utilized in sec. 83 on Ballāla Sena, pp. 340-341. The third introductory verse and the last concluding verse of the D.R. have been quoted on p. 366 in sec. 90 on Caṇḍeśvara. The verses are :

(a) śrutoktam api yad-dānam kṛtyaratnākare punaḥ /

māsādi-kṛtya-sāmastyam gauravat-tad-udīritam //

(b) śrī-kṛtya-dāna-vyavahāra-śuddhi-pūjā-vivādeṣu tathā gṛhasṭhe /

ratnākara dharmasu ye nibandhā kṛtāḥ śrī-caṇḍeśvara-mantriṇā te //

Dr. Kane reads *gṛhasṭha-kṛtye* for *tathā gṛhasṭhe* in the latter quotation, following the almost similar verse of the *Vivādaratnākara*.

64. Op. cit., pp. 340-41.

65. Though Dr. Kane has obviously consulted fol. 10a of the above MS., yet he has not mentioned the folio reference. This quotation from Devala also occurs in the D.S. pp. 18-19.

a quotation from Devala about eight kinds of Brāhmaṇas (of whom each succeeding one is superior to each preceding one), viz. *mātra*, *brāhmaṇa*, *śrotriya*, *anūcāna*, *bhrūṇa*, *ṛṣikalpa*, *ṛṣi* and *muni*. He has, however, utilized in his 1st vol. the second and fourth verses⁶⁶ at the end of the *Dānaratnākara*, not from the above-mentioned Poona MS. but evidently from Mitra's Notices, Vol. VI, p. 135.⁶⁷ The same author, though completely silent about Ballāla Sena and the *Dānasāgara* in his Marathi work *Dharmaśāstra-vicāra*, has allotted same four lines to Caṇḍeśvara, including a quotation⁶⁸ from the *Dānaratnākara* on p. 43 of the same. He has also devoted nearly a paragraph to the *Gṛhashtaratnākara* on p. 166 of the same work, as stated above.

As the subjects dealt with in the *Dānasāgara*, divided into 75 *āvartas* (or chapters), have already been described by the present writer in his Introduction to its edition (pp. XXXVII-XL), so he now proposes to enumerate below the subjects of the *Dānaratnākara*, containing 29 *araṅgas* (or chapters) only :

The procedure followed in making gifts, meaning of *dāna*, what may or may not be gifted, fit objects of charity, the sixteen kinds of gifts called *mahādānas*, gifts of a thousand cows and of heaps of corn etc., the latter constituting the ten *parvata-dānas*, gifts of ten kinds of *dhenus* such as of jaggery, ghee etc., gifts of cows, oxen, golden effigies of cows, gifts of land, gold etc. and antelope hide, various gifts such as those of food, books etc., gifts appropriate to certain months, seasons, *tithis* and *nakṣatras* (i e. asterisms), founding of hospitals and offering protection to intimidated persons, settling Brāhmaṇas in houses, miscellaneous gifts, dedication of wells and tanks for public use, planting of trees, offering shelter and enumeration of the presiding deities of various articles of gift.

A comparison of the topics, dealt with in the *Dānasāgara* and the *Dānaratnākara* will convince the readers that the authors of both these works traverse over almost the same ground and that unlike Govindānanda,⁶⁹ a later digest-writer, Caṇḍeśvara does not dispense with the description of the sixteen *mahādānas* and the ten *parvata* (or *acala*) *dānas*, as being impossible for ordinary persons.

Though the *Dānaratnākara* quotes the *Dānasāgara* not less than fifteen times

66. *magnā mlecccha-mahārṇave vasumatī yenoddhṛtā līlayā* / (2nd verse)

yasya dānātirekeṇa loke nirjita-gauravaḥ /

kalpadrumaḥ pārijātaḥ kāmadhenuḥ kvacit kvacit // (4th verse)

67. None of these verses is found in the Poona MS. and Dr. Kane has given the above reference in connection with the latter verse, though he has added nothing in connection with the former.

68. The same as that quoted as the 2nd verse in note 66 above.

69. *tulāpuruṣādi-śoḍaśamabādānāni dhānyācalādi-daśa-vidhācalādānāni matsyapurāṇo-ktāni mahārājatarāsadhyānyatropekṣitāni mahādānapaddhatau draṣṭavyāni* / *anyāni ca dānāni yathāyatham ākareṣūhyāni* / (p. 86 of the *Dānakriyākaumudī*).

yet the present writer concludes this sub-section after identifying only one of those quotations without undertaking the unnecessary task of identifying all of them.

D. R.

(folio 71a of the D.C. MS.)

Kunmāṣa īṣad-svinnaḥ māṣaḥ
svalpamāṣa iti sāgaraḥ.

D.S.

(pp. 583 and 644 of the printed edition)

(1) Kunmāṣo rājamāṣaḥ (diff. reading—°
paścimadeśe rājamāṣaprasiddho vṛhiviśeṣaḥ,
which is almost the same as the reading of
K. R. (p. 592), as quoted from D.S.)

(2) Kunmāṣo rājamāṣa iti prasiddhaḥ
(diff. reading—° svalpamāṣa°).

III. Vidyāpati Upādhyāya (1375-1450 A.D.)

The late Rai Bahadur Manmohan Chakravarti in his long paper, covering 96 pages, viz. 'Contributions to the History of Smṛti in Bengal and Mithilā'⁷⁰ devotes almost three pages (pp. 390-92) to Vidyāpati Upādhyāya and refers to his twelve works, of which six are on Smṛti, viz. *Gaṅgā-vākyāvalī*, *Dānavākyāvalī*, *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī*, *Varṣakṛtya*, *Vibhāgasāra* and *Saivasarvasvasāra*, while the rest six on other topics, viz. *Kīrtilatā*, *Bhūparikramagrantha*, *Puruṣaparīkṣā*, *Kīrtipatākā*, *Padāvalī* and *Likhanāvalī*. Chakravarti says that of these twelve works, the *Kīrtipatākā* is an amatory poem in Maithili, in the time of Śivasimha and that one characteristic feature of Vidyāpati's works is that they were written under the patronage of one or other member of the royal family of Kāmeśvara; and that in some instances the works were even attributed to them. He then cites the instances of the three Smṛti works, viz. *Gaṅgā-vākyāvalī*, *Saivasarvasvasāra* and *Dānavākyāvalī*, the first two of which were attributed to the queen Viśvāsadevī and the third to the queen Dhīramatidevī. Chakravarti fixes 1395 to 1440 A.D. as the period of the literary activity of Vidyāpati.

Mr. Basanta Kumar Chatterji is perhaps the second scholar to write an informing paper⁷¹ on Vidyāpati, covering 32 pages. He has first described all the above works of Vidyāpati except his *Padāvalī* and then dealt with the *Padāvalī* at great length. Though it seems that he has consulted the same MSS. of the works of Vidyāpati and arrived at the same conclusions as done by his predecessor, Chakravarti, yet he has dissented from the view of the latter in assigning the period of the literary activity of Vidyāpati, which extends in his opinion⁷² from about 1405 to about 1448 A.D. One of

70. J. S. B., Vol. XI(1915), pp. 311-406.

71. Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, vol. xvi (1927), pp. 23-54.

72. Op. cit., p. 33.

his conclusions is, however, highly reasonable and supported by the twelfth introductory verse of the *Śaivasarvasvasāra*, one of the Smṛti works of Vidyāpati. It is to the effect that 'the title of the work (i.e. *Śaivasarvasvasāra*) is most probably *Śambhuvākyāvalī* as given in the 12th verse⁷³ and not *Śaivasarvasvasāra* as given in the 11th.⁷⁴ Compare the titles *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* and *Dānavākyāvalī*. The work is compared to a wish-granting creeper in the last verse, which gives the name of the work as *Śambhoḥ vākyāvalī*.⁷⁵ Though Chatterji's paper on Vidyāpati is highly reasonable, informing and accurate, yet one or two minor errors have crept into it. For example, he says on p. 32 that 'the *Dānavākyāvalī* is attributed to Dhīravatī, the elder queen of Narasiṃhadeva.' The name of the elder queen of Narasiṃhadeva, to whom the *Dānavākyāvalī* is attributed, was not Dhīravatī but Dhīramatī.⁷⁶

Though Dr. Kane has utilized the Deccan College MS. (No. 368 of 1891-95) of the *Dānavākyāvalī* in the chapter on *dāna* in his second volume (1941), yet he has devoted no separate section to Vidyāpati in his first volume (1930). He has not, however altogether omitted Vidyāpati from treatment in this volume but has collected all possible facts relating to his works and personal history in nearly a full column on pp. 739-40 (Appendix B) of the same. He has also added short notes on the six Smṛti works of Vidyāpati on pp. 538, 561,⁷⁷ 564, 618, 621 and 642 respectively in Appendix A of the same work. From the above seven notes in the two Appendices we can gather that 'Vidyāpati flourished between 1375 and 1450 A.D., was a voluminous and versatile writer, wrote in Maithili also and on moral tales (as in *Puruṣaparīkṣā*, *Bhūparikramaṇa*) and composed the following six works on Dharmaśāstra, viz. *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī*, *Dānavākyāvalī*, *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī*, *Varṣakṛtya*, *Vibhāgasāra* and *Śaivasarvasvasāra*. His *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* is mentioned by Govindānanda and Raghunandana (in *Prāyaścittatattva*). His *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī* mentioned Ratnakara and was his last work. His *Varṣakṛtya* is mentioned in the *Malamāsattva* of Raghunandana and he is mentioned in the *Kṛtyatattvārṇava* of Śrīnātha.' Dr. Kane says in his entry against the *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī* (p. 564) that it has been printed in Calcutta in 1909. The *Śaivasarvasvasāra* was, however, published from Darbhanga in 1897. Since the publication of Dr. Kane's first volume in 1930, only the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* of the remaining four Smṛti works of Vidyāpati has been critically edited and published by the late Dr. J. B. Chaudhuri from Calcutta in 1940. The *Puruṣaparīkṣā* was published earlier in 1888-89 from Darbhanga and in 1927-28 from Bombay. The

73. pramāṇamūlā navapallavāḍhyā sapuṣpikā ramyaphalopapannā /
abhiṣṭasiddhyartham vibudhair upeyā vākyāvalī kalpalateva Śambhoḥ //

74. vijñā'nujñāpya vidyāpati-kṛtinam asau viśva-vikhyātakirtiḥ /
śrīmad-viśvāsadevī viracayati śivam śaivasarvasvasāram //

75. p. 31a (footnote), Chatterji's paper on Vidyāpati.

76. Vide colophon of the D.C. MS. (No. 368 of 1891-95) of the *Dānavākyāvalī*, which reads° Śrī-dha (dhī ?) ramati-viracitā(dā-) navākyāvalī sampūrṇā /

77. The 71st forme (pp. 561-568) of this volume has been wrongly paginated as pp. 559-566 and so pp. 559 and 562 are really pp. 561 and 564 respectively.

printed edition of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* contains reference⁷⁸ to another printed edition of the *Durgābhakti*^o from Sylhet in 1934. But the present writer has not been able to secure a copy of either the Calcutta or Sylhet edition but has consulted a copy of the Darbhanga edition of 1900-1901 of the same.

The *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* has been published along with the *Dvārakā-pattala* of a lady, Binabāyī by name, in a single volume with very confusing pagination, as on account of the continuous numbering of the pages with the latter work the former begins from p. 43 and the introduction and the text run up to p. 314, while the appendices and indexes consist of 136 and 55 pages respectively, with separate paginations, and at the end of the volume there is a joint list of abbreviations, a general index etc. of the two works, covering 43 pages with another separate pagination. There are also joint dedication, foreword, preface and contents of the two works in the beginning of the volume, covering 12 pages, marked with Roman numerals. The reason for the joint publication of the two unconnected works by separate authors is that they form in a single bound volume, vols. III and IV of the author's series entitled "*The contribution of women to Sanskrit Literature*", as, according to the editor, the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* like the *Dvārakā-pattala* is also the production of a woman, the queen Viśvāsadevī of Mithilā and not Vidyāpati, the contemporary poet and scholar of the same place. So we find that the printed edition⁷⁹ of the G.V. consists of 506 pages and the text portion alone covers 208 pages. Though the present edition of the G. V., which is a work on *dharmaśāstra*, was published just a decade after the publication of Dr. Kane's epoch-making *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, yet the learned editor has nowhere mentioned Dr. Kane's great work in his bulky volume, consisting of 506 pages in the G.V. portion alone. Curiously enough, the same scholar, who has critically edited for the first time the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* of Vidyāpati and must have, therefore, consulted the learned papers on the same author by Chakravarti and Chatterji, has also nowhere mentioned the names of those pioneer scholars, who have tried to dispel the cloud of obscurity hanging over Vidyāpati and his works. The Introduction of the printed edition of the G.V. covers 64 pages and is nothing but a synopsis of the entire work, while the six appendices consist of the following six topics :

- (1) Further references, variant readings and notes.
- (2) Some remarks on the quotations in the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī*.
- (3) Description of the MSS. of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī*.
- (4) Some remarks on the authorship of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī*.
- (5) The royal family of Mithilā.
- (6) Some well-known *Smārtas* who have quoted the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* : Mitra Miśra, Raghunandana and Vācaspati Miśra.

78. Vide p. 119, footnote (Appendix portion).

79. Based on three MSS., two belonging to the Asiatic Society (Calcutta) and the third to the India office (London).

The exhaustive Introduction and the copious Appendices and indexes have made this edition of the G. V. highly useful. But though the learned editor has mostly identified the quotations in the G. V. in the original works, cited parallel quotations from other digests including those of the great Bengal digest-writer Raghunandana, described him and his works and reproduced some ten quotations from the G. V. in several works of the same digest-writer, yet he has nowhere identified these quotations in the printed edition of the G. V., which circumstance would have really testified to the great merit and popularity of the work.

Before proceeding to trace the quotations from the G. V. in several works of Govindānanda and Raghunandana, it will not be out of place here to give a short account of the literary life of Vidyāpati and discuss the authorship of the G. V., which is ascribed by Dr. Chaudhuri to the patron queen Viśvāsadevī of Mithilā and to Vidyāpati.

Vidyāpati adorned the courts of as many as nine rulers of Mithilā, viz. Kirtisimha, Bhavasimha, Devasimha, Śivasimha, Padmasimha. Viśvāsadevī, Harasimha, Narasimha and Dhīrasimha, as will be evident from the following facts :

(1) The *Kīrtilatā* was composed by Vidyāpati during the reign of Kirtisimha to commemorate his victory over Aslan.⁸⁰

(2) Vidyāpati refers to Bhavasimha as king in verse 1 of the *Śaivasarvasvasāra* and eulogises Devasimha in verse 2 of the same and also in verse 1 of the *Puruṣaparikṣā*. The *Bhūparikramaṇa* of Vidyāpati was composed at the instance of the latter king.⁸¹

(3) Vidyāpati frequently refers in his *Padāvalī*⁸² to Rūpanārāyaṇa, another name Śivasimha and to his wives, Lakhimā Devī, Sukhmā Devī, Madhumatī Devī etc.

(4) Vidyāpati refers in verses 5 and 6 of his *Śaivasarvasvasāra* to the succession of Padmasimha to the throne of Mithilā after his brother Śivasimha.

(5) Vidyāpati says in verses 8 and 12 of the same work that Viśvāsadevī was the wife of Padmasimha and ruled Mithilā with great success, was a devotee of Śiva and ordered Vidyāpati to compose a work on Śiva called *Śaivasarvasvasāra*.

(6) The *Vibhāgasāra*⁸³ of Vidyāpati refers to the name of Harasimha, which was another name of Harasimha.

(7) The *Dānavākyaṇḍī*⁸⁴ and *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī* (v. 3) of Vidyāpati refer to Narasimha or Nṛsimha, *alias* Darpanārāyaṇa.

80. Vide p. 2 of the *Kīrtilatā*, ed. by Mm. Haraprasad Shastri, Calcutta, 1924-25.

81. Vide verses 2 and 3, MS. No. 79, Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. at the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, Vol. IV.

82. *Vidyāpatir Padāvalī*, ed. by Nagendranath Gupta, Calcutta (1909-10), *pada* 21, p. 15 — *rūpanārāyaṇai rasa jānathi śivasimha mithilā bhūpe* / See also the land-grant, Indian Antiquary, Vol. XIV, p. 190, 2nd column and *Vidyāpatir Padāvalī*, Nos. 52, 186 and 467.

83. *rājño bhavesād-dharisimha āsit-tat-sūnunā darpanārāyaṇena / rājñā niyukto' tra vibhāgasāraṃ vicārya vidyāpatirātanoti* // [MS. No. 329, Descriptive Catalogue of (Sanskrit) MSS. in Mithilā, Vol. I (Smṛti)].

84. Op. cit., MS. No. 192.

. (8) The *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī* (v. 6) of Vidyāpati was composed at the instance of Dhīrasimha, also known as Rūpanārāyaṇa.

Dr. Chaudhuri says that the fact of Vidyāpati's adorning the courts of as many as eight⁸⁵ rulers of Mithilā 'is indeed unique in the history of the world ; this, however, became possible as many of them reigned only for short periods.'⁸⁶

As Vidyāpati's first work, the *Kīrtīlatā*, was composed just after his first patron king, Kīrtisimha, ascended the throne of Mithilā after the assassination of Gaṇeśvara by Aslan in 1367-68 A.D., so it seems to have been composed in c. 1370 A.D., when Vidyāpati must have been at least twenty years old. Again as Śrīnivāsa's *Setudarpanī* was composed about 1438 A.D.⁸⁷ at the instance of Dhīrasimha, the last royal patron of Vidyāpati, who must have been nearly ninety years old by that time, so we see that the period c. 1370-c. 1440 A.D., assigned by Dr. Chaudhuri to Vidyāpati's literary activity, compares favourably with that assigned by Dr. Kane to the same, viz. 1375-1450 A.D. Vidyāpati was the grandson of Jayadatta, who was the son of Dhīreśvara, uncle of Caṇḍeśvara, the great Mithilā digest-writer of the 14th century. So it is very likely that Vidyāpati who was later than Caṇḍeśvara (1310-1360 A.D.) by two generations, must have flourished by the time assigned by Drs. Kane and Chaudhuri and not by that assigned either by Chakravarti or by Chatterji, referred to above. Though the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* is one of the three published dharmaśāstra works of Vidyāpati and one of his best and most authoritative works, being quoted thrice by Govindānanda and about twenty times by Raghunandana,⁸⁸ yet the second introductory verse in all MSS. and the colophon in almost all MSS. of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* ascribe the authorship of the work not to Vidyāpati but to his patron queen Viśvāsadevī. The colophons in only two MSS.⁸⁹ of the G.V. ascribe

85. Not eight but nine. Dr. Chaudhuri inadvertently omits Bhavasimha from his final enumeration, though he describes his career at great length on pp. 112-13 (App. portion).

86. Op. cit., p. 120 (App. portion).

87. Though Dr. Chaudhuri says under the heading 'Dhīrasimha' on p. 120 (App. portion) that 'In 321 of the Lakṣmaṇa era i.e. 1438 A.D. the commentary *Setudarpanī* of Śrīnivāsa on the *Setubandha* was copied at his instance', yet he says on p. 123 (App. portion) that 'The date of Dhīrasimha, the last royal patron of Vidyāpati, is also known ; at his instance Śrīnivāsa's *Setudarpanī* was composed about 1430 A.D.'

88. Raghunandana has also quoted the *Dānavākyāvalī* only once in the *Udvāhatattva*, the *Varṣakṛtya* thrice in the *Malamāsa*^o, only once in the *Durgotsava*^o and once in the *Ekādaśī*^o and the *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī* seven times in his *Durgotsava*^o. Vide p. 138, Jivānanda's edn. of *Smṛtitattva*, Vol. II for the quotation in the *Udvāhatattva* and footnote 171 below for those in the *Malamāsatattva*.

89. Vide Descriptive catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. at the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, vol. II, p. 501 and Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS., vol. III, p. 234 f., no. 1251.

the work to Vidyāpati. But the following concluding verse occurs in every MS. of the same :

kiyan-nibandham ālokya śrī-vidyāpati-sūrinā /
gaṅgāvākyāvalī devyāḥ pramāṇair vimalīkṛtā //

The purport of the verse is that 'the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* of the queen (Viśvāsadevī) has been rendered lucid by the scholar Vidyāpati with authoritative statements after consultation of some *nibandha*.' All previous Sanskrit scholars have attributed the authorship of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* to Vidyāpati and the late Manmohan Chakravarti has drawn pointed attention to 'one characteristic feature of Vidyāpati's works that they were written under the patronage of one or other member of the royal family of Kāmeśvara ; and that in some instances the works were even attributed to them.'⁹⁰ But Dr. Chaudhuri ascribes it to Viśvāsadevī on the strength of the second introductory verse and colophon and explains away the concluding verse, quoted above by interpreting it to mean that 'Vidyāpati rendered the help (to Viśvāsadevī) in course of revision of the work' and adds, 'So it is certain that Viśvāsadevī would not have been able to compose the work, if she were not sure of the materials at her disposal.'⁹¹ Dr. Chaudhuri quotes on p. 107 (footnote 2) (App. portion) three references to the author of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* as *gaṅgāvākyāvalīkāra* by Govindānanda in two of his works viz. *Varṣakriyākaumudī* and *Śuddhikaumudī*. Though the Sanskrit word *gaṅgāvākyāvalīkāra* is masculine and hence denotes a male author, which may mean Vidyāpati, yet Dr. Chaudhuri explains the word away by saying that it is used in a general sense and that the gender is not designated. Though he admits Vidyāpati to be a great poet, scholar and helper of Viśvāsadevī in her composing the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī*, yet he says that 'it does not necessarily follow that Viśvāsadevī could not have been so learned as to compose the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī*.'⁹² He then adduces evidence to show that the royal family of Mithilā including the ladies was very learned ; and that Viśvāsadevī's sister-in-law Lakhimādevī, too, was a poetess of repute. The present writer appends below the following reasons for establishing the authorship of Vidyāpati of the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* :

(1) Not only the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* but also the *Dānavākyāvalī*, the *Śambhuvākyāvalī* (which is the real name of the work *Śaivasarvasvasāra*, as seen above) and the *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī*⁹³ are attributed to royal patrons, Dhīramatidevī, Viśvāsadevī and Dhīra-siṃha respectively.

(2) The concluding verse of the *Dānavākyāvalī*⁹⁴ is almost identical with that of

90. J. A. S. B., Vol. XI (1915), p. 391.

91. Vide p. 106 (Appendix portion), G.V.

92. Vide p. 107 (op. cit.).

93. V. 6.

94. nibandhān samyag-ālokya śrī-vidyāpatisūrinā /
dānavākyāvalī devyāḥ pramāṇair-vimalīkṛtā //

the *Gaṅgāvākyāvalī* and both these verses implicitly state that neither Dhīśamatidevī nor Viśvāsadevī but Vidyāpati is the real author of both the works.

(3) The eleventh verse⁹⁵ of the *Śambhuvākyāvalī* is also similar in import to the above two concluding verses and explicitly makes Viśvāsadevī and not Vidyāpati the author of the work, though it implicitly ascribes the authorship to the latter.

(4) The *Madanapārijāta*, *Mahārṇava*, *Tithinirṇayasāra* and *Smṛtikaumudī*, four other digests, though ostensibly the works of the king Madanapāla and his son, Mandhātā, were really composed by their protegee, Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa.⁹⁶

Vide the Appendix (H) for the quotations.

IV. Vācaspati Miśra (1425-1480 A.D.)

The *Tīrthacintāmaṇi*

The late Mm. Dr. Haraprasad Shastri in his Preface to the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Vol. III, Smṛti (published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1925) has devoted some pages to *tīrthas* or places of pilgrimage and has described in the body of the Catalogue Smṛti MSS., (including those on *tīrthas*) of the Government of India collection under the care of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Though a full MS. of the *Tīrthacintāmaṇi* of Vācaspati Miśra and a partial one are of the same, dealing with *Gayāprakāśa*, belonging to this collection, has been described by the Shastri in the body of the Catalogue and though the *Tīrthacintāmaṇi* was critically edited⁹⁷ in 1912 by the late Mm. Kamalakṛṣṇa Smṛtītīrtha in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, yet the Shastri has not taken even a passing notice either of the MSS. or of the printed edition in his elaborate Preface. This *Tīrthacintāmaṇi* is an important work in dharmaśāstra literature for the following three reasons, viz. (1) it is one of the few published works, which deal exclusively with *tīrtha*, (2) it is from the pen of the fifteenth century *nibandhakāra* Vācaspati Miśra of Mithilā, whose other works on dharmaśāstra are still of paramount authority in that region and (3) the great Bengal *nibandhakāra* Raghunandana of the 16th century, who was posterior to Vācaspati by nearly a century, has quoted from it a number of times, thus proving its great influence over the Bengal School also. So we propose to discuss its contents in brief.

* Though the rites and ceremonies in Prayāga, Puruṣottama, Gaṅgā, Gayā and

95. Vide footnote 74 above.

96. *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, pp. 381-4.

97. On the basis of four MSS., one obtained from the Asiatic Society (Calcutta), the other from the Sanskrit College (Calcutta), the third from a private library of Bhatpara (West Bengal) and the fourth from the Sanskrit College (Benares).

Vārāṇasī⁹⁸ are the main subject-matter of the work which is divided into five corresponding *prakāśas* (or sections), yet some twenty-five other places of pilgrimage have also been touched upon and the rites peculiar to them described. The most important of these subsidiary places of pilgrimage are Vindusaras (pp. 176-80), Koṇārka, (pp. 180-82), Rāmeśvara (p. 182), Kaṇakhala (p. 217), Nīlaparvata (p. 217) and Saptagrāma (p. 219).

The Vindusaras is a holy lake and a plunge into it has been recommended by our author in his description of the rites of the *Kṛttivāsas Kṣetra*. It is evident from the first five lines⁹⁹ of p. 176 that this holy lake is situated in Orissa near the modern capital city of Bhuvaneśvara. The purport of these lines is that the great god, who wears tiger's skin (*Kṛttivāsā maheśvaraḥ*, i.e. Śiva), resides in the country of Utkala (modern Orissa) and his place of residence (*kṣetra*) is extremely unattainable and removes (if attained) all kinds of sins ; that this place is filled with innumerable phallic emblems and is as holy as Vārāṇasī, is famous as *Ekāmraka* and consists of eight holy places, including the place of pilgrimage of Vindusaras. The Koṇārka is nothing but the present Konarak, also in Orissa, as appears from its first descriptive verse¹⁰⁰ (p. 180). But the Rāmeśvara of our author does not seem to be the present Rāmeśvaram in the extreme south of India near the Cape Comorin but was probably at the time of our author a holy place, situated within the territorial limits of the greater Koṇārka, as is definitely proved by the first¹⁰¹ of the six verses (p. 182), specially devoted to it but included with the *Kaṇārka-vidhi* (i.e. the rites relating to Koṇārka). Saptagrāma on the Gaṅgā was a flourishing city in the 15th century, being situated near modern Ādisaptagrāma and Trivenī in the Hooghly district of West Bengal. It has been called by our author *Dakṣiṇāprayāga* and explained by him as *Muktavenī* and *Saptagrāma*, inasmuch as like Prayāga (modern Allahabad),

98. This selection of only five places of pilgrimage by our author seems to be guided by the following statement of the *Vāyupurāṇa* (II. 45. 50b-51b) :

Let Vārāṇasī, Prayāga, Puruṣottama and the confluence of the Gaṅgā with the sea remain for ever. The place on the Phalgu (i.e. Gayā), presided over by Gadādhara, is the best of all places of pilgrimage.

99. Tathā hi Brahmapurāṇe :

tathā caivotkaladeśe kṛttivāsā maheśvaraḥ /
sarva-pāpa-haram tasya kṣetram parama-durlabham //
liṅga-koṭi-somāyuktam vāraṇasyāḥ samam śubham /
ekāmraketi vikhyātam tīrthāṣṭaka-samanvitam //
tīrtham vindusaro nāma tasmin kṣetre dvijottamāḥ /

100. Tathā hi—

etanmayā muniśreṣṭhāḥ kṣetram proktam sudurlabham /
koṇārkasyodadhes-tīram bhukti-mukti-phalapradam //

101 koṇārka-kṣetram adhikṛtya—

āste tatra mahādevaḥ tīre nada-nadīpatḥ /
rāmeśvara iti khyātaḥ sarvakāma-phalapradaḥ //

it was, also the confluence of three rivers, viz. Gaṅgā, Yamunā and Sarasvatī. Our author says on the authority of the *Mahābhārata*¹⁰² that the Yamunā has separated here from the Gaṅgā and so a bath in this place in the river confers the same religious merit on the performer as in Prayāga. Thus according to our author the braids of hairs of the three rivers, united at the latter place, have been, as it were, loosened here, which circumstance has given it the appellation of *muktaveṇī* (lit. loosened braids).

Before taking up the specific description of the sacred places of pilgrimage, our author devotes some 17 pages to the *sāmānyavidhi* or general remarks. These include his own viewpoints regarding pilgrimages in general, the proper time and preliminaries and contain topics of transport, religious fervour and culture, as they existed in Eastern India in the 15th century at the close of the Pathan regime.¹⁰³

Vācaspati Miśra says on the authority of the *Mahābhārata* that pilgrimages are prescribed for the poorer sections of the community, as unlike sacrifices they can be easily performed by the poor, the helpless and the single persons. But the intending pilgrim should exercise control over the hands, feet and mind and should possess knowledge, austerity and fame. Control over hands is needed for restraining oneself from stealing, that over feet for preventing him from visiting forbidden countries and knowledge is required to know beforehand the merits of the respective places of pilgrimage. Austerity consists in residence and fasting in those places and fame is the public renown of the pilgrim as a good man, because it is the good men who reap the fruits of their knowledge. Though positive good does not accrue to the bad persons, their sins also vanish by visits to places of pilgrimage. An intending pilgrim should not only control his senses but also be physically fit to withstand the rigours of the journey and the climate. Three days before his departure he should take one meal in the whole twenty-four hours, shave his head and fast on the next day and worship the god *Gaṇeśa* and offer oblations of ghee to the gods and *manes* on the next following day. He should pass the night of this third day in the next village, situated within a *krośa* (i.e. two miles) and start on his contemplated journey the next morning.

The author then quotes three verses from the *Matsyapurāṇa* to the effect that journey to a holy place, if accomplished in a conveyance, specially in one drawn by bullocks, is rendered fruitless. But he explains the verses away by saying that the above prohibition of conveyances holds good only in the case of a pilgrimage to Prayāga. The reason is obvious. The distances of Gayā (in South Bihar), Puruṣottama (or modern

102. **tad-dakṣiṇaprayāgaṣtu gaṅgāto yamunā gatā /*
snānāt-tatrākṣayaṃ puṇyaṃ prayāga iva labhyate //
dakṣiṇa-prayāstu mukta-veṇī sapta-grāma iti prasiddhaḥ /

103. Vide the sub-section "The Tīrthakāṇḍa" I (d) above for a comparison of the contents of this work with those of the former work.

Puri in Orissa), the Gaṅgā (which flows by the southern extremity of Mithilā or North Bīhar) and Vārāṇasī (in the Uttara Pradeśa) from our author's place of residence in Mithilā were too considerable to be reached on foot, but the way between Vārāṇasī and Prayāga (modern Allahabad) did not offer such an insurmountable difficulty to the pedestrian pilgrim, as both the above places are situated in the modern Uttara Pradeśa at a distance of one hundred miles only.

The author then says that walking bare-footed conduces to four times the religious merit, occurring from the visit to a place of pilgrimage. But putting on shoes is also not condemned, as he says on the authority of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* that a person, who wishes to protect his own self, should use the umbrella in summer and rains, the staff at night and in forest and should always go about by covering his feet with shoes. His next remark is to the effect that a person, going to a place of pilgrimage with the financial assistance of another person, gains one-sixteenth part only of the religious merit and one, primarily bound for a separate place but incidentally reaching a holy place- *en route*, gets half of the merit after the performance of bathing and other religious ceremonies.

Vide Appendix (pp. 203-4) of the present writer's monograph on '*Raghunandana's indebtedness etc.*' for the quotations from the T.C. in several works of that author.

V. Govindānanda Kavikaṅkaṇācārya (1510-1550 A.D.)

(a) His date, place of residence, social pedigree and his hitherto-unknown fifth digest, the *Kriyākaumudī*

(I) Date and the fifth digest

Govindānanda Kavikaṅkaṇācārya, who was a senior contemporary¹⁰⁴ of the great Bengali *nibandhakāra*, Raghunandana Bhaṭṭācārya, was known to Sanskrit scholars up to the end of the last century as the commentator on the *Prāyaścittaviveka* of Śūlapāṇi, a fourteenth century predecessor of the same province. Diligent students of the *Tithitattva* of Raghunandana found, however, references to Govindānanda and quotations from his *Varṣa-kriyā-kaumudī* (V.K.K.) in the commentary of the same work by the Bengali, Kāśīrāma Vācaspati of the 18th century. It is due to the discovery and subsequent publication in the *Bibliotheca Indica* of the four digests of Govindānanda, to be described below, between 1900 and 1905 by the late Mm. Kamalakṣṇa Smṛtīrtha that his name was prominently brought to the notice of Sanskrit scholars. His date has been finally settled by the editor in the preface to his edition of the V.K.K. on the strength of the concluding verse of the *Jyotiṣmatī*,¹⁰⁵ an unpublished astronomical work by the author's father, Gaṇapati Bhaṭṭa and corroborated by the editor later in the preface to his edition of the *Śuddhikaumudī*, another work by the same author, on the strength of several *śaka* years¹⁰⁶ with intercalary months, recorded in it. But the late Rai Bahadur Manmohan Chakravarti overlooked both the above pieces of evidence in his previously mentioned paper viz. 'Contributions to the History of Smṛti in Bengal and Mithilā' (1915) and Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane has lost sight of the first piece of evidence in the first volume of his

104. Raghunandana flourished in Navadvīpa in the Nadia district, while Govindānanda lived in Bagri in the Midnapore district, both in Bengal, the two scholars being separated by almost a generation only (vide Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. I, 415 and 419, vide also pp. II-III of the preface to V.K.K.).

105. Viśvāṅga-śruti-sammite Kaliyugasyābde prasiddhāhvayo bhaṭṭaḥ khyāta-guṇottaro gaṇapatir-jyotirvidām-agraṇīḥ / lakṣmi-nandi-purandarānuja-padadvandvāravindārpitasvāntaḥ santatam-indirā-parigato jyotiṣmatīmātanot //, which means that Gaṇapati, the foremost of the astronomers, composed that work in the Kali year 4613 (=1512 A.D.) in his mature age.

106. All the *śaka* years, mentioned by our author in connection with intercalary months between pp. 266 and 270 in his *Śuddhikaumudī*, are given below in chronological order : 1397, 1414, 1416, 1419, 1422, 1424, 1443, 1449, 1452, 1454 and 1457.

History (1930).^{*} It may also be added that the examination by the author of the several intercalary months in his *Śuddhikaumudī* (pp. 266-270) has been mentioned by both the editor, Mm. Smṛtīrtha and Dr. Kane, the former in the preface to the *Śuddhikaumudī*, as stated above and the latter in his section on Govindānanda (op. cit.). But both of them are a bit inaccurate. The editor's statement, viz. 'In this treatise (i.e. *Śuddhikaumudī*) the author has examined every 'Malamāsa' or intercalary month from śaka 1400-1457, corresponding to 1478 to 1535 A.D.' loses sight of the śaka 1397, which has also been mentioned in this connection by the author on p. 268 of the above work. Dr. Kane's statement (loc. cit.), viz. 'His *Śuddhikaumudī* examines intercalary months from śāke 1414 to śāke 1457 (i.e. from 1492 A.D. to 1535 A.D.)' and his quotation from p. 266 only in the corresponding footnote no. 1016, combined with his remark just following it, viz. 'vide p. 270 for intercalary month in śāke 1449 and 1457', ignore the connected matter on p. 268, in which the author has examined the intercalary months of the śaka years 1424, 1397 and 1443. The editor established the author's date as between 1510 and 1540 A.D. from the mention of the Kali year 4613 (=1512 A.D.) as the year of composition of the *Jyotiṣmatī* by the author's father in his mature age and added after his previously quoted statement in the preface to the *Śuddhikaumudī*, 'This (i.e. 1478 to 1535 A.D.) appears to be the period of the author's literary activity and it corroborates the date of the author as arrived at in the preface to the *Varṣakriyākaumudī*.' This is also somewhat inaccurate, as it is in conflict with the date of the author, viz. between 1510 and 1540 A.D., as settled by the editor in the abovementioned preface and also because sixty years (or fiftyseven years according to the editor's inaccurate enumeration) between 1475 and 1535 A.D. is too long a time to be the flourishing period of *one single* author and may possibly be the combined periods of literary activity of both the author's father and the author himself. It should be remembered in this connection that the author's father, who composed the *Jyotiṣmatī*, a treatise on Astronomy, was an astronomer and was thus in a position to record the specific years with intercalary months from so early a date as śaka 1397 (i.e. 1475 A.D.), which our author has fully utilized in his *Śuddhikaumudī*. So the following statement of Dr. Kane, just after the one quoted above, seems to be justified, viz. 'Therefore it appears that he wrote his *Śuddhikaumudī* immediately after śāke 1457 (i.e. 1535 A.D.). He wrote the *Śrāddhakaumudī* and *Varṣakriyākaumudī* after the *Śuddhikaumudī*. Therefore we shall be very near the truth if his literary activity be placed between 1500 and 1540 A.D.' As the *Dānakriyākaumudī* quotes no other work of the same author and the *Śuddhikaumudī* cites it alone, so the exact sequence of the composition of the four works of Govindānanda is as follows :

Dānakriyākaumudī, *Śuddhikaumudī* (quoting the *Dāna°* on p. 160), *Śrāddhakriyākaumudī* (quoting the *Dāna°* on pp. 34 and 529 and the *Śuddhi°* on pp. 323, 342, 440 and 483) and *Varṣakriyākaumudī* (quoting the *Śuddhi°* on pp. 236 and 359 and the *Śrāddh°* on pp. 352 and 487). This sequence fully agrees with that, given by Dr. Kane on p. 414 in his section on Govindānanda, while enumerating the works of the latter. The exact period of the time of composition of the above four works can be corrected and further

narrowed down as between 1530 and 1550 A.D. on the strength of the above sequence, coupled with the probable facts that the second work, viz. the *Śuddhi*°, was composed just after 1535 A.D. and that the first work, viz. the *Dāna*°, was produced within the five years, just preceding that date and that the third and fourth works, viz. *Śrāddha*° and *Varṣa*°, were completed within the fifteen years, just following the above date. We append below the extents of the above four works in support of the probability of our assumption :

Dāna° (206 pages), *Śuddhi*° (360 pages), *Śrāddha*° (560 pages) and *Varṣa*° (579 pages). But as our author also wrote the *Kriyākaumudī*, a hitherto-unknown fifth digest, a commentary on the *Prāyaścittaviveka* of *Śūlapāṇi* and several other commentaries, so the period of his literary activity seems to be between 1510 and 1550 A.D.¹⁰⁷

The editor, Mm. Smṛitīrtha, says on p. II of his preface to the V.K.K., '*Varṣa-kṛtya* has been quoted by Raghunandana Bhaṭṭācārya in his *Malamāsātattva* (in the *cāturmāsya-vrata-prakaraṇa*) and *Kriyākaumudī* in the *Āhnikatattva* (*snāna-prakaraṇa*)' and also says on p. I of the same preface, 'His other works of the same series are *Kriyākaumudī*, *Dānakaumudī*, *Śrāddhakaumudī* and *Śuddhikaumudī* ; all these, excepting *Kriyākaumudī*, of which there is only one incomplete copy available in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, are now being collected and edited by me under the patronage of the aforesaid Society.' The first part of the first statement of the editor is wrong, as the *Varṣakṛtya* is not identical with the *Varṣakriyākaumudī* but is a different work by Vidyāpati, having been quoted thrice in the *Malamāsātattva* (pp. 775, 822 and 823), the first two with the word '*Varṣakṛtye*' and the last with the phrase '*Vidyāpatikṛta-Varṣakṛtye*.' The second part of the first statement is absolutely correct, as Raghunandana has quoted the *Kriyākaumudī* on pp. 343 and 344 and the *Kaumudī* on p. 376 of his *Āhnikatattva* and these quotations have recently been traced by Śrīmatī Vāṇī Cakravartī in her Bengali monograph viz. *Samāja-saṃskāraka Raghunandana* (published from Calcutta, July, 1964) in the solitary Asiatic Society MS. of the same work, referred to by the editor in the second statement. She has also shown that Govindānanda's reference to it in his *Śrāddhakriyākaumudī* (p. 559), viz. '*prayogastu kriyākaumudyāṃ draṣṭavyaḥ*', which means that 'the procedure in question should be looked for in the *Kriyākaumudī*', is also in connection with the author's own work of the same name. The priority of Govindānanda to Raghunandana, who flourished about 1560 A.D., which was proved by the editor from other sources, is now definitely confirmed by Śrīmatī Cakravartī's above identification of Raghunandana's quotations in the MS. of the *Kriyākaumudī*. The late Rai Bahadur Chakravartī rightly resented the above wrong equation of the *Varṣakṛtya* with the *Varṣakriyākaumudī* by the editor but Dr. Kane has inadvertently accepted it, as is evident from his following sentence (loc. cit.) viz. 'He (i.e. Govindānanda) is quoted by Raghu-

107. This is in correction of the present writer's carelessly affixing Govindānanda's date as 1510-1540 A.D. and 1520-1550 A.D. on pp. 13 and 23 respectively of his '*Studies in Dharmaśāstra*' I. (Ancient Period).

nandana in his *Malamāsatattva* and *Āhnikatattva*.' The second part of the above statement of Dr. Kane, viz. 'Raghunandana's quoting Govindānanda in his *Āhnikatattva*' is, however, right, as will be apparent from the foregoing discussion.

(II) Residence and pedigree

The editor, Mm. Smṛitīrtha, clearly stated in his prefaces of the first two works of Govindānanda, viz. the *Varṣa*^o (p. II) and *Dāna*^o that the author was a resident of the village Bagri in the district of Midnapore and belonged to the *Pāścātya Vaidika* (i.e. *Vaidika* from the west) class of Bengali Brāhmaṇas. But curiously enough, the late Mm. Dr. Haraprasad Shastri in the preface (pp. xxī and lvi) to his Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., vol. iii, Smṛti, (published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1925) has made the following two inaccurate statements about Govindānanda due to oversight :

(a) The end of the 15th century was also the time when a leader of the foreign Brahmins settled in the outskirts of Bengal, in the district of Bankura, wrote a code for the Brahmins of his own persuasion (sic), entitled *Varṣa-kriyā-kaumudī*, complete in six books. It is being still used by the foreign Brahmins of the district and printed in the Bibl. Ind. Series.

(b) Govindānanda Kavikaṅkaṇācārya was a Drāviḍa Brāhmaṇa settled in the district of Bankura in Bengal. He wrote a comprehensive work entitled *Kriyākaumudī* of which *Dānā-kriyā* and *Varṣa-kriyā* are represented in nos. 2691 and 2692.

The above two statements mean practically the same thing, the only two further inaccuracies in the former being that (1) the code is 'entitled *Varṣa-kriyā-kaumudī*' and that (2) it is 'complete in six books,' and the only additional incorrectness in the latter being that Govindānanda's comprehensive work is entitled *Kriyā-kaumudī*.' The fact is that one of the books (and not the entire code) is entitled '*Varṣa-kriyā-kaumudī*', that it is complete in five books (and not in six) and that the comprehensive work, i.e. the code, is not 'entitled *Kriyā-kaumudī*', which latter, as we have seen above, is the name of the hitherto-unknown fifth digest of our author.

The above-mentioned careless conversion by the late Mm. Dr. Shastri of the Midnapore district into Bankura is due to the fact that Bagri, the residential village of Govindānanda, is situated in the northern most part of Midnapore district, contiguous to the adjacent district of Bankura. Again, the above substitution by that scholar of *Pāścātya Vaidika* Brāhmaṇas, to which class our author belonged, by Drāviḍa or foreign Brāhmaṇas has been probably occasioned by the later advent of the *Pāścātya Vaidika* Brāhmaṇas from Kanauj in the Uttara Pradesh to West Bengal than the *Rāḍhīya* Brāhmaṇas, to which sect the great Bengali digest-writer, Raghunandana and the late Shastri belonged. The *Pāścātya Vaidika* Brāhmaṇas began migrating to West Bengal from the end of the 15th

century, if Govindānanda's father, Gaṇapati Bhaṭṭa, is considered to be the first immigrant, while they were brought earlier to East Bengal by the king Śāmalavarmā in the 11th century (1079 A.D.)¹⁰⁸

The above inaccurate statements of the late Shastri have led many scholars to doubt the findings of the editor, regarding the place of residence and social pedigree of our author. For example, Dr. R. C. Hazra¹⁰⁹ has reopened the questions and expressed doubts about the authenticity of the editor's statements. So the present writer has been compelled to re-emphasize those statements and add in this connection the following facts.

The late Pandit Haran Chandra Tarkavagiśa, who supplied the editor with the decisive concluding verse of the *Jyotiṣmatī*, was a direct descendant of Govindānanda and a cognatic relation of the editor, who was descended from Nārāyaṇa Ṭhakkura, another *Pāścātya Vaidika* Brāhmaṇa from Kanouj and the author of the *Brahmasaṃskāramañjarī*. Haran Chandra's agnates, who are also descended from our author, still live in that village, which is only four miles off Garbeta station on the South-Eastern Railway, 109 miles distant from Calcutta. One of the descendants of Govindānanda, the late Adityram Bhattacharya, migrated to the present writer's residential town, Bhatpara and his surviving sons still live here as next-door neighbours of the present writer.

Dr. S. C. Banerji has made the following erroneous remark on p. 20 of his Bengali work viz. *Smṛtiśāstre Bāṅgālī*¹¹⁰ (i.e. the Bengalis as the producers of Smṛti literature):

"Some scholars conclude from the mention of the *Kriyākaumudī* by Raghunandana in his *Āhnikatattva* (*Smṛtitattva*, vol. I., p. 343) that Govindānanda was anterior to Raghunandana. According to their view the *Varṣakriyākaumudī* is only a part of Govindānanda's bigger work '*Kriyākaumudī*'. But there is no proof of that opinion. It is true that Govindānanda himself has referred to the *Kriyākaumudī* (p. 559 of the *Śrāddhakriyākaumudī*) but he has not definitely said that it was his own composition." The misconception of Dr. Banerji regarding the authorship of the *Kriyākaumudī* has been already refuted by the present writer, who wishes to point out in conclusion that the editor, being misled by the names of the first three works, viz. *Varṣa°*, *Dāna°* and *Śrāddha°*, as given in their corresponding concluding verses, has so named the works. But the respective colophons give the correct names, and this has been pointed out by Dr. Hazra in his abovementioned paper. This inaccurate naming by the editor created confusion to the late Shastri and Dr. Banerji, as is evident from their remarks, quoted above. The editor, before being so misled, has correctly named the works, while enumerating them on p. I of his preface to the V.K.K., quoted above.

108. Vide Dr. N. K. Bhattasali's paper, viz. 'A broken fragment of a new charter of Śāmalavarmā, a well-known Bengal king of the 11th century A.D.' *Modern Review*, November, 1932, pp. 529-32, at p. 532.

109. 'Govindānanda Kavikaṅkaṇācārya', *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras (1951), vol. xviii, part. II, pp. 97-108

110. Published from Calcutta in Pausa, 1368, B.E. (=December, 1961/January, 1962).

PURUSOTTAMA-JAGANNĀTHA

D. C. Sircar

• The town of Purī in the District of the same name, on the sea coast of Orissa, is celebrated throughout the world for the great temple of the god who is called Puruṣottama or Jagannātha and is identified with Viṣṇu. As a matter of fact, the name of the town is a part of the fuller name Puruṣottama-purī or Jagannātha-purī, i.e. the city of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha. It is sometimes also called Puruṣottama which is likewise a part of the fuller name Puruṣottama-purī or Puruṣottama-kṣetra. Purī is now considered to be the greatest of the East Indian *tīrthas* (holy places), although this status was originally enjoyed by Gaṅgāsāgara situated at the junction of the Bhāgīrathī and the Bay of Bengal. Gaṅgāsāgara gave place to Purī, as the greatest *tīrtha* about the eastern border of India, finally during the reign of the Imperial Gaṅgas of Orissa (from the 12th century onwards),¹ although the latter had already become popular a few centuries earlier, as we shall see below.

The Mahārājās of Purī may be regarded as the modern representatives of the imperial rulers of medieval Orissa, and it is well known that they consider themselves to be servants of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha, sweeping the compound of the Purī temple being one of their important duties on the occasion of the Car Festival (*Ratha-yātrā*) of the said god.² There is evidence to prove that the Hindu rulers holding sway over medieval Orissa considered the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha to be the ruler of their empire and regarded their own selves as mere viceroys of the deity. The fiction of the real ruler of a country being placed in the position of a subordinate either to a god or to a spiritual guide (whether alive or dead) is well known to the students of Indian history and is not unknown even in the annals of other countries. The dedication of one's landed property and other belongings in favour of the family deity or of the spiritual guide of the family and its administration and enjoyment as a representative of that deity or saint is a familiar custom in all parts of India, there being also a number of instances of similar dedication of an entire kingdom in favour of a god or saint in the history of India. Thus the rulers of Travancore regarded the god Padmanābhasvāmin as the king of their territories and considered themselves as the god's viceroys, while the Gubilot kings of Mewar represented themselves as the Dewāns (chief administrators) of the god Ekaliṅga who was believed to have been the real lord of their dominions. Likewise, Śivājī, the great founder of the Marāṭhā kingdom in the latter half of the 17th century,

1. *Proc. IHC*, 1947, pp. 91 ff. ; Sircar, *Stud. Geog. Anc. Med. Ind.*, pp. 178 ff.

2. The car festival of gods and goddesses is popular in South India and was probably a Dravidian religious institution. It seems to have been introduced in the worship of Puruṣottama-Jagannātha of Purī by the Gaṅgas who had come to Orissa from the South. See *JAS*, 4th Series, Vol. vi, No. 1, 1962, p. 9.

is said to have dedicated his dominions to his spiritual guide Rāmadāsa and to have administered the country in the saint's name. In the same way, the Kalacuri monarch Gāṅgeyadeva Vikramāditya (circa 1015-41 A.D.), also called Sāhasika (Sāhasāṅka), is known to have dedicated his empire covering the present Jabalpur region in favour of his preceptor, the Śalva saint Vāmaśambhu or Vāmadeva, and, from that date for several centuries, his descendants are known to have regarded themselves as the viceroys of the saint.³ The conception of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha of Purī as the ruler of Orissa, so far as we know, originated in the days of the Imperial Gaṅgas.

The mighty Gaṅga monarch Anantavarman Coḍagaṅga (1078-1147 A.D.) had his capital at Kalinganagara which is identified with modern Mukhalingam near Srikakulam (Chicacole) in Andhra Pradesh. He is known to have conquered the whole east coast region up to the Gangetic Delta and to have annexed the Puri-Cuttack area to the Gaṅga empire after having extirpated the rule of the Somavaṃśī kings in the said territory. The inscriptions of Coḍagaṅga's descendants state that it was he who built the great temple of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha on the shore of the sea as the earlier rulers of the country had neglected to do it.⁴ It may be pointed out that the Somavaṃśīs, who held sway over the Puri-Cuttack region before Coḍagaṅga's conquest, were Śaivas and may not have been much enthusiastic about the deity regarded as a form of Viṣṇu. Like his ancestors who worshipped Gokarṇeśvara Śiva on the Mahendragiri in the Ganjam District, Coḍagaṅga also was a staunch Śaiva in the early years of his reign. Soon after his conquest of the Puri-Cuttack area about the beginning of the twelfth century, however, we find him inclining gradually more and more towards the worship of Viṣṇu, apparently in the form of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha of Purī. Coḍagaṅga calls himself both a Śaiva and a Vaiṣṇava in one of his charters dated 1112 A.D., while, in his later documents, the reference to his devotion to Śiva is totally omitted and the king is represented only as a Vaiṣṇava.⁵

A tradition recorded in the Utkala-khaṇḍa (otherwise called Puruṣottama-māhātmya) section of the *Skanda Purāṇa* shows beyond doubt that Puruṣottama-Jagannātha of Purī was originally worshipped by the aboriginal Śabara inhabitants of the Nīlācala and that the worship of the deity became gradually popular with the orthodox Hindus at a later

3. See *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. xxx, pp. 46 ff. While the dedication of Sāhasika's kingdom to the ascetic Vāmadeva is known from the commentary on Jayāṇaka's *Pr̥thvīrājaviṣaya* (twelfth century), Gāṅgeya's descendants continued to call themselves *Vāmadeva-pād-ānudhyāta* from the days of Karṇa (1041-71 A.D.) to the end of the dynasty, and the Malkapuram inscription of 1263 A.D. speaks of Vāmaśambhu's worship by the Kalacuri kings for centuries till that date.

4. *Ibid.*, Vol. xxviii, pp. 251-52, verses 27-28 which are also found in other records.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

date.⁶ Like Minākṣī of Madurai in South India, Kāmākhyā near Gauhati in Assam and numerous other gods and goddesses in various parts of India, the aboriginal god of Pūrī was absorbed in the Brahmanical pantheon in course of time and was ultimately identified with Viṣṇu. The identification of the god, originally worshipped by the Śābaras of the Pūrī region, with Viṣṇu was apparently well established considerably before the beginning of the twelfth century when Anantavarman Coḍagaṅga annexed the Pūrī-Cuttack region to his empire.

The fact however that Hiuen-tsang, the Chinese pilgrim who visited Orissa in 638-39 A.D., does not speak of Puruṣottama-Jagannātha in his account of the Oḍra country⁷ shows that the god was no better than a local deity of limited celebrity and importance till as late as the seventh century A.D. His position in the religious life of Eastern and Central India must have been well established in the tenth and eleventh centuries as we know from epigraphic and literary references,⁸ and in the twelfth century, the conversion of Anantavarman Coḍagaṅga to Vaiṣṇavism under his influence set him on the way to all-India importance.

The successors of Coḍagaṅga were all worshippers of Viṣṇu in the form of Puruṣottama-Jagannātha. But it was his great-grandson Anaṅgabhīma III (circa 1211-38 A.D.) who was really responsible for raising the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha to an all-India figure and the temple of Pūrī to its present position of pre-eminence amongst the places of pilgrimage in India. The rise of Pūrī must have been facilitated by the gradual obscuration of Gaṅgāsāgara due to many factors including the Muslim occupation of Bengal and consequent want of royal patronage, as also the similar obscuration of Virajā (modern Jāipur), the oldest Brahmanical *tīrtha* in Orissa, which enjoyed an important position during the age of the Bhauma-Kara kings (from the ninth to the beginning of the twelfth century A.D.) who had their capital in that city or its neighbourhood. By the time of Anaṅgabhīma III, the Gaṅgas had already transferred their capital to Cuttack (Kaṭaka). This king issued his charters from Abhinava-Vārāṇasī-kaṭaka or Vārāṇasī-kaṭaka which is modern Cuttack. According to a tradition recorded in the Oriya chronicle entitled *Mādalā Pāñjī*, a king named Anaṅgabhīma who at first had his capital at Caudvāra-kaṭaka, built a new city named Vāṇarāśī(Vārāṇasī)-kaṭaka at the site of a village called

6. See Chapters vii-viii.

7. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Vol. ii. pp. 93-94.

8. An inscription of the tenth century A.D., from Maihar in the Satna District of Madhya Pradesh, refers to the pilgrimage of a Brāhmaṇa youth of that area to the sea-shore in the Oḍra country in order to have a *darśana* of the god Puruṣottama (*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. xxxv, p. 173). The popularity of Puruṣottama-Jagannātha of Pūrī in the said region about the same time is further proved by Kṛṣṇa-miśra's *Prabodhacandrodaya* composed in the eighties of the eleventh century A.D. at the court of the Candella king Kīrtivarman (c. 1065-1100 A.D.). See *ibid.*, Vol. xxxiii, p. 184, note 1.

Vāravāṭi on the opposite bank of the Mahānadī and removed his residence there.⁹ The *Mādalā Pāñjī* further says that the Gaṅga king named Anaṅgabhīma built the temple of Puruṣottama-Jagannātha at Purī. This king is no other than Anaṅgabhīma III who may have completed the Purī temple begun by his great-grandfather and is actually known from the Nagari plates to have installed a god named Puruṣottama-Jagannātha in a new temple built by him at his capital at Vārāṇasī-kaṭaka (Cuttack).¹⁰ The earliest records in the Purī temple are four inscriptions of the reign of Anaṅgabhīma III.¹¹

According to another tradition recorded in the *Mādalā Pāñjī*, a king named Anaṅgabhīma (apparently Anaṅgabhīma III) dedicated all his possessions including the empire in favour of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha of Purī and began to rule as a *Rāuta* (i.e. feudatory) of the said god, and his successors did not celebrate a formal coronation at the time of their accession as they considered themselves to be mere feudatories of the god.¹² These traditions have remarkable support from a large number of Gaṅga inscriptions.

In many of the inscriptions of king Anaṅgabhīma III himself and his successors, the Gaṅga monarch is described as a *Rāuta*, *Rāutta* or *Rāvuta*, which is derived from Sanskrit *Rājaputra* (literally 'a prince', but really a title of nobility) and was often assumed by subordinate rulers. An inscription¹³ from the Liṅgarāja temple at Bhubaneswar in the Puri District speaks of the dominions of Anaṅgabhīma III as *Puruṣottama-sāmrājya*, i.e. the empire belonging to the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha. The Kanchipuram inscription of the said Gaṅga king and the Kapilas inscription of his son Narasiṃha I (1238-64 A.D.) represent both the monarchs as obeying the orders of the god Puruṣottama.¹⁴ Out of the four inscriptions of Anaṅgabhīma III in the Pātāleśvara

9. See *ibid*, Vol. xxx, p. 21 and note 7 : *e uttāre Anaṅgabhīmadevaṅka sāna-bhāi Bhīma-parirāeṅku Bhīmanagara-daṇḍapāṭum āni rajā kale. e duṭi Anaṅgabhīmadeva hoile. e rajā nagara-Caudvāre kaṭake vije kari thānti. emantare eka-dinare rajāe vije kari āsi Mahānadī pāra hoi e-nadīru dakṣiṇa-tīre dekhile Koḍiṇḍā-daṇḍapāṭara Vāravāṭi-grāmāre Viśveśvaradevaṅkara-sanidhe sāmala-pakṣiki vāga māri vasiachi. chā dekhī rajāe vāḍa āścarya pāi śubha-yoga-dinare e-Vāravāṭi-grāmāre śubha dei naara tolāi kaṭaka kari e-kaṭaka-nāma Vāṇarāśi-kaṭaka volī nāma dei nagara-Caudvāra-kaṭaka chāḍī āsi kaṭaka kari rahile.* The epithet *Abhinava-Yayātinagara-Viṣṇu* applied to the said king by the *Mādalā Pāñjī* suggests that he had his capital previously at 'New-Yayātinagara (Yayātipura)', i.e. modern Jāipur.

10. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. xxviii, pp. 247-48.

11. *Ibid.*, Vol. xxx, pp. 97ff.

12. *Ibid.*, Vol. xxx, p. 19 : *e nagara-Kaṭake thāi śrī-Puruṣottama śrī-Jagannātha-devaṅku samasta samarpi Rāuta-paṇe thāānti. rajā 2ṅka abhiṣeka na hele. Oḍiśā-rājya-rajā śrī-Jagannātha-mahāprabhu emanta kaḥi abhiṣeka nohile.*

13. *Ind. Cult.*, Vol. vi, p. 73.

14. *Ep. Ind*, Vol. xxxi, p. 97 ; Vol. xxxiii, p. 43.

shrine within the inner compound of the Purī temple, all of them recording grants made in favour of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha, one gives its date in the passage *Śrī-Puruṣottamasya pravardhamāna-vijaya-rājye Rāutta-Śrīmad-Anaṅgabhīmadevasya srāhī sam* 29 which clearly mentions the Gaṅga king as a vassal of the god of Purī.¹⁵ Two other Liṅgarāja temple inscriptions of Anaṅgabhīma III again describe him as the son of the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha.¹⁶ Another inscription of the king from the same place shows how he was mentioned even by his Śaiva subjects as a *Bhagavān* (god or Lord). This undoubtedly points to the fact that the said Gaṅga king was a saintly Vaiṣṇava highly respected by different religious communities.¹⁷

We have observed above that, like Anaṅgabhīma III, his successors called themselves *Rāuta*, *Rāutta* or *Rāvuta*.¹⁸ But most of them do not specifically mention the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha as their overlord as Anaṅgabhīma III himself does in some of his inscriptions already referred to. An interesting exception to this is Bhānu II who was the great-great-grandson of Anaṅgabhīma III and ruled in *circa* 1305-27 A.D.¹⁹ This fact shows that, amongst the descendants of Anaṅgabhīma III, who were all no doubt continuing to suffer the fiction created by the dedication of the Gaṅga empire to the god Puruṣottama-Jagannātha by that king, Bhānu II alone was as religiously minded as his distinguished ancestor. Indeed Bhānu II may probably be regarded as more zealous in this respect than even Anaṅgabhīma III himself since, in several records of his time, the god alone is mentioned as the lord of the realm and the king's name is altogether omitted. Unfortunately, this fact gave rise to certain unwarranted theories regarding the interpretation of the records in question. Writers like R.D. Banerji²⁰ believed that during the early years of Bhānu's reign, a person named Puruṣottama usurped the Gaṅga

15. *Ibid.*, Vol. xxx, pp. 201-02.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 234. That these kings were not antagonistic to the worship of Śiva and Śakti is indicated by a few inscriptions in Śiva temples, in which Anaṅgabhīma III and Narasiṃha I are represented as both Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva; cf. the epithets *Paramavaiṣṇava*, *Paramamāheśvara*, *Puruṣottama-putra*, *Rudra-putra* and *Durgā-putra* applied to the former and *Paramamāheśvara*, *Durgā-putra* and *Puruṣottama-putra* to the latter (*ibid.*, Vol. xxxiii, pp. 43, 126-27). Likewise, Kapileśvara (1435-66 A.D.), founder of the Sūryavamśī Gajapati dynasty of Orissa, is called *Maheśvara-putra*, *Durgā-putra* and *Puruṣottama-putra* in the Warangal inscription which describes his nephew Raghudeva as *Durgā-vara-putra* and *Jagannāthadeva-(labdha*)-varaprasāda* (*ibid.*, p. 127).

17. *Ibid.*, Vol. xxx, p. 19.

18. Cf. *SII*, Vol. v, Nos. 1264 and 1294 for Narasiṃha I (1238-64 A.D.), and *ibid.*, Vol. vi, No. 1118, for Narasiṃha II (1278-1305 A.D.).

19. *JKHRS*, Vol. I, pp. 251 ff.

20. *History of Orissa*, Vol. i, pp. 277-79.

throne for several years, while others like R. Subba Rao²¹ suggested that Bhānu II. was also known by the names or titles, Puruṣottama and Jagannātha. An inscription (1309 A.D.)²² from Srikurmam is stated to have been dated in the reign of Jagannātha when Bhānu II (described in the record as *Jiyyana*, Oriya *Jenā*, which is the same as *Rājaputra*=*Rāutta*) was governing, while according to the Purī plates,²³ Bhānu II, endowed with the subordinate title *Rāutta*, made certain grants in 1313 A.D., during the reign of Puruṣottama. Another Srikurmam inscription,²⁴ dated 1327 A.D., mentions Puruṣottama as the reigning king and omits the name of Bhānu II altogether. Two of the Simhachalam inscriptions²⁵ offer valuable evidence in this regard. Neither of these records mentions the name of Bhānu II, even though they are dated respectively in 1319 and 1314 A.D., both the dates falling in the reign of the said Gaṅga monarch (*circa* 1305-27 A.D.). It should however be noted that the regnal reckoning of Bhānu II has been attributed in the first of the two inscriptions to *Devādideva* Jagannātha and in the second to *Devādideva* Puruṣottama. There can be no doubt that this Puruṣottama-Jagannātha, described as *Devādideva*, i.e. 'the foremost god amongst all the gods', is no other than the deity worshipped in the Purī temple, to whom Bhānu II and other rulers of the Gaṅga family owed fictitious allegiance as a theoretical viceroy or subordinate.²⁶

21. *History of Kalinga* (offprint), p. 192.

22. *SII*, Vol. v, No. 1214; *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. v, pp. 35-36: *Śrī-Jagannāthadeva-vijaya-rājya-saṁvatsarambulu* 3 *Śrī-vīra-Bāṇudeva-jīyanaṁgārī vohoraṇa-munanddu*. The reference here is to the reign of Jagannātha and the administration of Bhānu Jenā (Prince).

23. *JAS*, Letters, Vol. xvii, pp. 19 ff.: *Śrī-Puruṣottamadevasya pravardhamāna-vijaya-rājye saptame*=*'ñke...vīraśrīmad-Bhānudeva-rāutta-varmā*.

24. *SII*, Vol. v, Nos. 1154-55.

25. *Ibid.*, Vol. vi, Nos. 714 and 938. No. 714 of Śaka 1241=1319 A.D. gives the date as *Śrī-devādideva-Śrī-Jagannāthadevarala-vijayarājya-saṁvatsarambulu* 13, while No. 938 has *Śrī-devādideva-Śrī-Puruṣottamadevasya pravardhamāna-vijaya-rājya-saṁvatsarambulu* 9.

26. For a summary of some of the views expressed here, see *Indo-Asian Culture*, Vol. ii, No. 2, October 1953, pp. 120ff.

INDIAN GAZETTEERS : OLD AND NEW

Amalendu Mookerjee

Standard western encyclopaedias trace geographical dictionaries to the sixth century; fragments of the work of Stephanus Byzantinus of early sixth century are extant. About India, Scylax (sixth century B.C.) and Megasthenes (fourth century B.C.) have left interesting accounts, and Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, though in the main an administrative manual, contains important geographical and economic information about the country and its different regions. In the accounts of the Fa Hien, Hiuen Tsang, Ibn Batuta, Alberuni and others, we often find discerning observations about the country and its people.

The word gazetteer originally referred to one who wrote for a "Gazette". "Gazette" was a kind of single-sheet sixteenth century Venetian literary newspaper which sold for a *gazetta*, a small Venetian coin. It was not till the beginning of the eighteenth century that the word was used in the sense of a geographical dictionary; the first to bear the name was Lawrence Echard's *The Gazetteers or Newsman's Interpreter : Being a Geographical Index* (1703). Gazetteers have ranged from simple pronouncing geographical index to comprehensive geographical and socio-economic account of a region, big or small, usually the world or a State or Empire, or an administrative unit of it.

The German scholar, Hassel's *Geographisch statistisches Handwörterbuch*, published in 1817, is usually recognised in the west as the first modern gazetteer. Johnston's *Dictionary of Geography* and Blackie's Imperial gazetteer were both published in Scotland in 1850. Among the more informative international gazetteers published towards the close of the nineteenth century are Ritter's *Geographical Statistisches Lexicon* (Germany, 1874), Vivien de Saint-Martin's *Nouveau Dictionnaire de Geographie Universelle* (Paris, 1879-1900) and Longman's *Gazetteer of the World* (London, 1895, later on the *Times Gazetteer*). Among gazetteers of individual countries, particular mention should be made of Joanne's eight volume *Dictionnaire* for France and her colonies (1890-1905).

Akbar's minister Abul Fazl's *Āin-i-Ākbari* has been termed the first imperial gazetteer of India, and rightly so. It includes valuable accounts of the Mughal imperial provinces besides accounts of administration, cultural affairs, etc. It is not only "a masterpiece of administrative detail" (Hunter), but much more. Considering the state of knowledge at the time, it fairly succeeds in presenting a reasonably comprehensive account of the country, and is even today accepted as the authentic contemporary account of the country, which is of course the test for any gazetteer.

With the British conquest, the rulers were faced with the problem of knowing an

unknown country they had to administer with a view to economic exploitation. These exigencies compelled them from the very beginning (1769) to take up with the utmost seriousness preparation of various types of surveys or accounts of the country and its various administrative parts. One of the most significant of such surveys was that of some districts of the then Bengal Presidency conducted between 1807 and 1813 under orders of the Court of Directors of the East India Company by Dr. Francis Buchanan, commonly known as Buchanan Hamilton, who had been employed in the important Mysore survey. Buchanan, employed on an emolument of twenty-three hundred *sikka* rupees per month, "sedulously pursued" the project for seven years, with the help of an efficient staff of assistants. Buchanan collected elaborate (if very occasionally inadequate or wrong due to the state of knowledge at the time or due to his lack of "insight into the interior life of the districts") information upon the "general topography of each district, the condition of the inhabitants, their religious customs, the natural productions of the country, fisheries, forests, mines and quarries, the state of agriculture, the condition of landed property and tenures, the progress made in the arts and in manufactures, the operations of commerce, and every particular that can be regarded as forming an element in the prosperity or depression of the people." But the work was not done on any reasonable scale and suffered from methodlessness. As a result, when only some of the districts had been investigated, the project was brought to a close after expenditure of about thirty thousand pounds. The voluminous materials sent to the Court of Directors in 1816 still remain at London. Except in the case of the district of Dinajpur, the materials were not made available to the public till 1838, and even then Montgomery Martin made what he classed as "a judicious selection" from these records. (*The History, Antiquities, Topography and Statistics of Eastern India*, 1838). The Dinajpur Report, Martin's inadequate work, and recent discussions more than justify what Martin observed: "I commend its careful perusal to every friend of India." What distinguishes Buchanan's works from most of such works is his sincere effort to be honest and accurate even where the British were to be blamed. His investigations are one of the few in which facts relating to British economic exploitation of the country are not suppressed. Mackenzie's *Surveys* and Logan's *Malabar* also deserve honourable mention.

Walter Hamilton's *East India Gazetteer* first came out in 1815, and a second edition in 1828 (two volumes). Messrs. Rushton & Co. published the two-volume *Bengal and Agra Guide and Gazetteer* in 1841-42. The four-volume *Gazetteer of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company* by Edward Thornton was brought out in 1854, the *Gazetteer of Southern India* by Pharoah & Co. in 1855, and the *Cyclopaedia of India* (with its supplements) by Surgeon-Major Balfour in 1856-62. Each of these works was subsidised to a greater or less extent. "In this vast mass of printed matter there is a much conscientious work, and occasionally sterling practical merit...It is when we judge of these works by the practical information they afford, rather than by the claims their authors may, on other grounds, have upon our respect, that their sterility appears." (Hunter, *Plan For An Imperial Gazetteer of India*,

1870). For instance, even in Thornton's Gazetteer which was drawn up under directions of the Government, was "the highest result of this first series of efforts towards the elucidation of the country" and, till the publication of the Imperial Gazetteer of 1881 was regarded "as an epitome of all that has yet been written and published" respecting India, we look in vain (in his article on Calcutta) for any mention of either the external commerce or inland trade of the city, or for any return of the shipping of commerce of the Hooghly in his separate account of the river." (Hunter).

In the meantime local officers had been writing accounts of regions (provinces, divisions, districts, etc.) under official orders.

The Bengal series was prepared between 1837 and 1840; of the few that were printed, Dr. Taylor's *Dacca* and Dr. John M'Cosh's *Assam* were for many years the standard works on the respective regions. Another significant effort made a little later was the *Principal Heads of the History and Statistics of the Dacca Division* drawn up by the District officers of Eastern Bengal. Due to the efforts of Richard Temple, the preparation of District Gazetteers was first begun in the 1866 in the Central Provinces.

The revenue surveys and the scientific surveys like trigonometrical, topographical and geological surveys of different regions that had been prepared also constituted a vast body of literature. Many of them contained not only the relevant technical and scientific materials but also useful general descriptions of the country and the people. The revenue surveys of many Bengal districts published in the eighteen fifties contained besides the revenue data useful short notes on topography, fauna, flora, etc.

While much useful work was being done, though at forbidding costs, public bodies as well as the Govt. strongly felt that the work should be done all over the country on a uniform plan, so as to be more universally useful, and so that they might easily form the basis for a general account of India. Accordingly, under orders of the Viceroy, W. W. Hunter in 1869 submitted to him a plan for a Statistical Survey and an Imperial Gazetteer of the country. As envisaged in the scheme, a Provincial Editor, assisted by competent staff, prepared Accounts (called "Statistical Accounts") of the districts in each province with the help of the provincial and local administrative machinery which was utilised in the task. These Accounts were for purposes of organisation and publication grouped into Provincial Accounts. The fifteen Provincial Accounts ran into one hundred twenty-eight volumes. The Accounts were brought out by 1881. The Provincial Accounts of Bengal and Assam were written by Hunter himself, and, as in most other provinces, are the first systematic accounts covering all aspects of life in the districts. Hunter writes about the plan for the Bengal volumes : "In every District I start with a description of its geography, general aspects, and physical features. I then proceed to the people, their occupations, ethnical divisions and creeds, with their material condition and distribution into town & country. Agriculture follows, with special details regarding

rice cultivation and other crops, the condition of the husbandmen, the size of their farms, their implements, land tenures, prices & wages, rates of rent, and the natural calamities to which the District is subject. Its commerce, means of communications, manufactures, capital and interest, and other industrial aspects are dealt with. The working of the District Administration is next exhibited in considerable details,—its revenue and expenditure at present and at previous periods; the statistics of protection to person & property, the police, the jails, and the criminal classes; the statistics of education and of the post office with notice of any local institutions, and the statistics of the Administrative Subdivision. Each Account concludes with the sanitary aspects of the District, its medical topography, endemic and epidemic diseases, indigenous drugs, medical charities, and such meteorological data as can be procured.” With the *Āin-in-Ākbari* and France’s nineteenth century *Military Survey of Egypt* as his models, Hunter wrote the nine-volume *Imperial Gazetteers of India* (1881). A second edition in fourteen volumes under the editorship of Hunter himself was brought out between 1885-87. “A revised form of the article on India, greatly enlarged and with statistics brought up to date, appeared as an independent volume in 1893, under the title of ‘The Indian Empire : Its people, History, and Product,’ (Revised by Hunter himself). A new edition, virtually a new work, was published in 1907 in twenty-six volumes, four introductory ones replacing the Indian Empire volume, twenty volumes in alphabetical order, one index volume and one atlas volume. A parallel Provincial Series was published in 1908-09. As Prof. Humayun Kabir, in his Preface to the recently published 1st Volume of the Indian Union series of the new Gazetteer of India, so aptly puts it, “*The Imperial Gazetteer* was immediately accepted as an authoritative and comprehensive study of India in all the richness of her life and culture.”

New series of District Gazetteers were also issued. In Bengal, a new series was issued between 1906 and 1925, and, if we take into account Eastern Bengal and Assam, the series consisted of about fifty volumes. More than thirty of these were written by L.S.S. O'Malley of the Indian Civil Service. The Plan for these volumes was more elaborate than that of Hunter's Accounts and was each published as an independent volume. Except in matters relating to British economic exploitation, or the freedom struggle, etc., the series presented faithful and graphic accounts of the districts and their people, and their interesting and readable style could scarcely be improved. Of course, much of the accounts became outdated with the passage of time and consequent changes in conditions in the districts, and especially with the advancement of knowledge in historical and other fields. All said and done, the Bengal series was by far the best series of District Gazetteers. Subject to the limitations of treatment where British Imperialist interest that we have referred to were concerned, the 3rd edition of the *Imperial Gazetteers*, taken with the revised District Gazetteers, constituted a body of Gazetteer literature of which there were no compeers in the world, in volume, in comprehensiveness, in authenticity and in style.

Although standard dictionaries of to-day continue to give the rather inadequate meaning of Gazetteers as geographical dictionaries, a Gazetteer, at least in the Indian

context, means a comprehensive and authentic account of an area and its people and of all aspects of their life and history. However that may be, in West Bengal, small volumes of Statistical tables which had begun to be published from 1901-02, were published every ten years till 1931-32 with a view to keep the Statistics in the District Gazetteers upto-date. Many of the settlement reports of the West Bengal districts published in the nineteen thirties and forties contained besides the technical settlement data, much invaluable information on revenue history and other topics like topography, soils, agriculture, etc. In Bengal, only one District Gazetteer, that of Darjeeling, was revised in 1947.

The old Gazetteers had become out of date. Advancement of knowledge in historical and other fields, the revolutionary changes in the socio-economic life of the country, the careful suppression in the old Gazetteer of facts relating to British economic exploitation or the freedom struggle—all this rendered revision, in fact rewriting, of the Imperial Gazetteers and the District Gazetteers a major cultural task after Independence. Several State Govts. had taken up the work of preparation of new District Gazetteers, but while all credit is due to their initiative compared to some other States, they merely tinkered with the task. The Poona Gazetteer reminds us of the severe criticism Campbell (the editor of the old Bombay Gazetteers of 1877-86) had to face for diffuseness of treatment. The Gaya and Hazaribag Gazetteers are not sufficiently revised, possibly due to the hurry of bringing out the volumes. Sri Asok Mitra, who was the Census Superintendent of West Bengal, in the introductions to his District Census Handbooks (1951), mostly reprinted slightly adapted extracts from the old District Gazetteers, Settlement Reports, etc. Sri Mitra's contribution in this respect lies, not in re-writing the Gazetteers, as some scholars and press reviewers have sought to claim, but as he himself will perhaps agree, in reviving in West Bengal interest in the Gazetteers which had been all but forgotten. About 1955, the Central Govt. adopted the scheme for a new series of Indian Gazetteers and also sponsored the preparation of new District Gazetteers by the State Govt. under Central guidance and financial aid and according to a uniform all-India plan. Under the scheme, the Central Govt. itself would undertake the responsibility for re-writing the "Indian Empire" volumes of the old Imperial Gazetteers, while the States would take up the task of re-writing the District Gazetteers according to the uniform plan laid down by the Centre and with Central financial aid, subject to approval of the drafts by the Centre. The all-India Gazetteers (to be known as the "Indian Union" volumes) will be published in four volumes, viz. Vol. I : Country and people, Vol. II : History and Culture, Vol. III : Economic Structure and Activities, and Vol. IV : Administration and Public Welfare. These four introductory Indian Union Volumes along with the District Gazetteers and a comprehensive all-India index of them would constitute the Gazetteer of India which was to be "planned as a single co-ordinated unit, with a uniformity of form, content and standard, but providing room for variations and additions to meet local or special needs." As there would be the index, no all-India alphabetical series would be issued under the new scheme, but preparation of a State series

in replacement of the old provincial series would be considered after completion of work on the new District Gazetteers. The preparation of the Indian Union Volumes and the District Gazetteers would be completed by the end of the second plan period (gradually extended to the end of Fourth Plan period).

Volume I of the Indian Union series, covering "the Country and the People" was published in August last. The planning has been careful, and the contributions are from only the most eminent of Indian experts in the various fields. The volume, especially some of its less technical chapters, is eminently readable. The chapters on the People and Social Life, for instance, are epitomes of all previous authoritative expositions on these subjects. The treatment at certain places, e.g., of some of the individual Indian Languages might perhaps have been more adequate. Although ten long years have elapsed since the adoption of the scheme, the vast and complex task is at last in grip, thanks to the efforts of Prof. Kabir and his associates of the Central Advisory Board for Revision of Gazetteers, and to Dr. S.B. Choudhuri, the former editor and his successors, especially the present editor in charge of the Indian Union series, Dr. K. Gopalachari.

The plan for the District Gazetteers also has been drawn up with much care, on the model of the best of the old District Gazetteers but taking into account the needs of the vast changes in the social and economic conditions; some small questions, however, remain unanswered. But while the plan may on the whole be quite all right, the District Gazetteers part of the full-proof scheme for the new Gazetteers contained hidden rocks on which many schemes for preparation of Gazetteers prior to that of Hunter had wrecked. The hugeness of the organisational task involved, the widely differing attitudes of the State Govt. and the widely varying importance given by them to the task, the limited, virtually non-existent control the Centre, in fact the meagreness of the Central aid and the consequent limitation of the Centre's role to mere persuasion, all these contained seeds of trouble that are in full sprout now, and have been acting as bottlenecks to progress, however Prof. Kabir may try to gloss it over in his preface to the recently published 1st Volume of the Indian Union Series. The different States joined the Central Scheme in their own good time, planned their District Gazetteers Units mostly in disregard of the scale suggested by the Centre, and gave widely differing rank and status to the State Editors. That the post of State Editor demanded special aptitude has been frequently denied, except perhaps in theory, in several States, and, as the old District Gazetteers were written by civilians, there has been the presumption that one administrative officer was as good as another and that any such officer was therefore equal to the task of writing Gazetteers.

The result has been that while about three hundred and thirty five District Gazetteers are to be published, only about fifty or so have been brought out in the last ten years, and a few more are in the press. Obviously enough, at the present rate of progress, the task cannot be finished even by the second extension (the end of the Fourth Plan period).

This is the least sorry part of the picture. Due to the wide time-gap between the

different District Gazetteers published under the scheme, they are losing all comparability between themselves and the Indian Union series; and the State Gazetteers, preparation of which may be taken up after the last District Gazetteers has been published in its own tardy time, will likewise lose comparatively with the Indian Union series as well as with their constituent District Gazetteers.

The District Gazetteers of the different States also exhibit a defeating divergence of treatment and style. Bihar has placed greater premium on speed of publication than on thoroughness of revision and re-writing; Maharashtra has followed a casual elaborateness in deviation from the Central Scheme. Madras and Uttar Pradesh (for instance, Lucknow edited by Sri V.C. Sharma and Faizabad edited by Sm E.B. Joshi) have produced excellent volumes according to the Central Plan, and have established a standard for the new series. West Bengal, where the author of this article had the opportunity to be associated as the Asst. Editor for more than five years since inception, started as late as 1960, but gathered momentum very quickly. Although it has published only one volume (West Dinajpur, edited by Sri J. C. Sengupta, former State Editor), by early 1965 Sri Sengupta completed another volume (Malda) and drafted substantial portions of two other volumes (Bankura and Burdwan). The progress since then is not known to the present writer. The present writer would naturally refrain from discussing the merits of West Dinajpur volume,¹ but one particularly noteworthy feature is that, unlike several of the District Gazetteer series (say, Kerala) the West Dinajpur volume does not take sides in current politics and, while faithfully reporting the material progress in the district, is nowhere cheap eulogy of the Government.

It would be relevant to refer in this context to the 1961 Census District Handbooks of West Bengal (edited by Sri B. Roy) and published by the State Govt., with the one or two volumes of which the author of this article has been slightly associated. Besides the Census tables and official statistics, the West Bengal Handbooks in pursuance of Shri Mitra's 1951 plan give introductions which are virtually summary gazetteers, of course with emphasis on demography. The introductions, though not uniformly planned in the few volumes so far published, are in the main original works and, as the latest micro-regional studies of districts of West Bengal, deserve serious notice. They form useful companion volumes to the new District Gazetteers, and, in view of the forgotten time dimension of the District Gazetteer scheme, would achieve added significance if published within a short time as per schedule.

The well-known scholar Dr. S. B. Choudhuri's recently published book on *History of the Gazetteers of India* covers the whole field in his usual thorough, erudite, and eminently readable style. A detailed assessment of some of the District Gazetteers

1. According to Mr. J. Burton-Page, "if the series continues on the lines of this Gazetteer it will represent a worthy line of succession to the old I.C.S. Gazetteers." (Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 29, Pt. 2, 1966).

series (e.g., the O' Malley series), written in the early years of the twentieth century is, however, lacking, unexpectedly enough, and there is unfortunately no attempt at analysing the reasons that have been preventing progress and timely completion of the task, specially the District Gazetteers part of it. There is also a complete, though understandable, silence on the quality of District Gazetteer work (correct series).

To revert to our main discussion, the not so bright aspects of District Gazetteer work are due to limitations inherent in the scheme. The persuasive role of the Centre has been exercised in full by the former Central Editor, Dr. S. B. Choudhuri and his successors, especially by the present Editor in charge of co-ordination of District Gazetteer work, Dr. P. N. Chopra, and the progress achieved is considerably due to their continuous persuasive pleas with the State Govts. But while the States which have shown considerable progress deserve commendation, if the task is to be really completed by March, 1971, and thus not to lose all comparability, the Central Gazetteers Unit should immediately take upon itself the responsibility for preparation and publication of the remaining District Gazetteers of the State which have not been able to show reasonable progress, for whatever reasons. Or would the State Governments concerned show greater awareness of the task ?

"Nothing, nothing is more costly to a Government than ignorance," wrote Hunter. As Prof. Kabir points out, "this is a truth which applies with equal, even greater force," today (*Preface to Volume I of the Indian Union series*). The claim inherent in the attitude of many responsible quarters to this matter is that ignorance today is much less than in the days of Hunter, and that the Gazetteers are therefore less important to-day. A careful study of Hunter's papers in connection with his Gazetteer scheme might be of help in this regard. And, if opinions about omniscience of authority still persist, we can safely recommend a careful perusal of the just published Vol. I of the new Indian Union series in order to realise how much there is to know about our own country and how little we do know.

APPENDICES

BRAHMANIC SETTLEMENTS IN DIFFERENT SUBDIVISIONS OF ANCIENT BENGAL

PUSPA NIYOGI

Appendix I

List of Brahmins with allotted Shares (From the Tippera copper-plate of Lokanātha)

<i>Names</i>	<i>Portions</i>
1. <i>Bhaṭṭa</i> Anantadeva-svāmin	<i>Pāṭakas</i> 9
2. „ Dharmadāma	„ 1
3. „ Nāgadatta	„ 1
4. „ Keśava	„ 1
5. „ Gada (?) nandin	„ 1
6. „ Medhaśoma	„ 1
7. „ Udayacandra	„ 1
8. „ Manojñadeva	„ 1
9. „ Jayaśoma-svāmin	„ $\frac{1}{2}$
10. „ Pūrṇadāma	<i>Droṇas</i> 20
11. „ Videśā	„ 20
12. „ Yajñadeva	„ 20
13. „ Amaradeva	„ 20
14. „ Lādra(?) -svāmin	„ 20
15. „ Pūrṇaghoṣa	„ 20
16. „ Ugrasoma	„ 20
17. „ Manoratha	Jointly <i>pāṭakas</i> 2
18. „ Ṛavi (?) la	„
19. „ Rāsañscala	„
20. „ Bhikṣata	„
21. „ Hariśarman	<i>Droṇas</i> 10 + 7 = 17
22. „ Janasoma	„ 10 + 5 = (?) 15
23. „ Vinda	„ 15
24. „ Bhānu	„ 10 (?)
25. Kaṇa	$\frac{1}{2}$ of what is not clear
26. Viśva	„
27. Khaḍga	„
28. Vadara	„
29. Vicakṣana	„
30. Patī (?)	„
31. Govardhāna	„
32. Prabhāvariṣa	„
33. Viṣṇu	„

<i>Names</i>	<i>Portions</i>
34. Andasûri	$\frac{1}{2}$ of what is not clear
35. Piṭrkeśvir	„
36. Antacara	„
37. Harṣabhūti	„
38. Subhra (?) ta	„
39. Bhaṇḍa	„
40. Harṣa	Portions not known
41. Mādra	„
42. Khaliśa	„
43. Vṛddhdroha	<i>Droṇas</i> 20 of woodland
44. Vidadagdh and others	<i>Pāṭaka</i> 1
45. Kakka	<i>Droṇas</i> 20
46. Maheśa (?)	Jointly <i>Droṇas</i> 20 (?)
47. Teja	„
48. Soma Janārdana	„
49. Anda	„
50. Nṛga	„
51. Sadeśa	„
52. Śaṅkara	„
53. Rudra	(Jointly) <i>Pāṭaka</i> 1 (?)
54. Vikasita	„
55. Divākara	„
56. Hariṣa	„
57. Vijaya	„
58. Vāmana	„
59. Gopiśarman	„
60. Ānanda	„
61. Nirdhāra (?)	„
62. Sutoṣa	„
63. Lachuka	„
64. Sūkṣmabhūti	<i>Pāṭaka</i> 1
65. Rudra	(Jointly) <i>pāṭaka</i> 1
66. Dāmodara	Portions not known
67. Ānda	„
68. Tṛsoma	„
69. Vidadgḍha	„
70. Janārdana	„
71. Upati (?)	„
72. Skanda	„
73. Īśana	„

<i>Names</i>	<i>Portions</i>
74. Pati	Portions not known
75. Kṛṣṇa	"
76. Bhava	"
77. Rudra	"
78. Surata	"
79. Janasoma	"
80. Vidagdha	"
81. Vappa	"
82. Dhṛti	"
83. Avalipta	"
84. Koṇṭa (?)	"
85. Buddhadatta-śarman	"
86. Vappa-śarman	"
87. Navaccakra	"
88. Jaya	Jointly <i>dronas</i> 20
89. Śiva	"
90. Viṣṇu	"
91. Sujāta-śarman	"
92. Bandhu	Portions not known
93. Vedaju	"
94. Lavvu	"
95. Dhṛti	"
96. Jayāmitra	"
97. Deva	"
98. Sradhu	"
99. Vidāśa	"
100. Jīva	"
101. Mahāsaka	"
102. Vihi	"
103. Suy (?) ta	"
104. Ugra	"
105. Pratoṣaka	"
106.Artha	"
107. Adbhu	"
108. Śantoṣa	"
109. Daitagaṇa	"
110. Rūpa	"
111. Santu (?)	"
112. Viṣnumitra	"
113. Nistāraṇa	"

<i>. Names</i>	<i>Portions</i>
114. Govinda	Portions not known
115. Koṇṭa (?)	„
116. Kaṇādū (?) gdha	„
117. Vappa (?)	„
118. Suṣena	„
119. Lavvu	„
120. Liṅga	„
121. Śoka	„
122. Hambo	„
123. Subha	„
124. Guṇatoṣa	„
125. Vappa	„
126. Śoka	„
127. Vappa	„
128. Atithi	„
129. Bhānu	„
130. Kṣiragaṇḍu	„
131. Nīdhi	„
132. Bhadra	<i>Droṇas</i> 20
133. Janārdhana	„
134. Bhāskara	„
135. Vappa	„
136. Devadatta	„
137. Dhanaṅkara	(Jointly) <i>droṇas</i> 20
138. <i>Bhaṭṭa</i> Brahmadatta	„
139. „ Apadatta	<i>Droṇas</i> 20
140. Svāmidatta-vappa	Portions not known
141. Candra	„
142. Pana	„
143. Kṛṣṇa	(Jointly) but portions not known
144. Hariṣa	„
144a. Vikasita	„
145. Manoratha	„
146. Vṛkaśa	„
147. Nayana	„
148. Citra	„
149. Vipāścita	„
150. Yajña	„
151. Sukṛta	„

<i>Names</i>	<i>Portions</i>
152. Toṣa	(Jointly) but portions not known
153. Candra-vappa	„
154. Ahi	„
155. Markaṭa	„
156. Candra	„
157. Prāṇa	„
158. Nanda	„
159. Kṣemabhūti	<i>Pāṭakas</i> 2
160. Vappa	<i>Pāṭaka</i> 1 (each ?)
161. Deva	„
62. Praśānta	„
153. Dudhu-svāmin	„
164. Prakāśa	„
165. Gauṇa	„
166. Pṛyadāma	<i>Draṇas</i> 20
167. Ānanda	(Jointly) <i>draṇas</i> 20 (?)
168. Indra-svāmin	„
169. Nārāyaṇa	(Jointly) <i>Pāṭaka</i> 1
170. Harideva	„
171. Candrakeśa	„
172. <i>Bhaṭṭa</i> Sūta	<i>Draṇas</i> 10
173. „ Piñchadeva	<i>Pāṭaka</i> 1
174. Nandagopa	Portions not known
175. Vanamāli	„
176. Trilocana	„
177. Khanya	„
178. Pūjiṣṇu	Jointly (?) <i>Pāṭakas</i> 9
179. Ahi	„
180.Svāmin	„
181. Samṛdha	Portions not known
182. Saṅgha	„
183. Santoṣa	„
184. Jayaśarman	„
185. Daideva	„
186. Ivaṇṭi (ṇṇi) (?)	„
187. Naravijaya	„
188. Saṃbhuvijaya	„
189. Guptājaya	„
190. Sūri	<i>Draṇas</i> 9 (?)

<i>Names</i>	<i>Portions</i>
191. Pṛya	<i>Droṇas</i> 10
192. Madhu (?)	It is not clear if each of these men got one <i>āḍhaka</i>
193. Lakṣaṇa	„
194. Dhanananda	„
195. Paraśāla	„
196. Uśa	„
197. Indra	„
198. Hari	„
199. Dhṛti	„
200. Iccha	„
201. Deva	„
202. Gaṇa	„
203. Mahārāja	„
204. Dadibhaṭi	„
205. Bhogin Bhavadāsa	<i>Droṇas</i> 20
206. <i>pāchaka</i> Vasu	„
207. <i>vāchaka</i> Sudhāma (?)	„
208. Vira (?) he	„ 10+9
209. <i>utkata-kārmaṇa</i> Nara-datta	„ 10+9=19

Appendix II

*List of Brahmin recipients of land-shares with their gotra-names and Vedic affiliations
(From the Nidhanpur plates of Bhāskaravarman)*

No.	Veda	Gotra	Name	Share
1.	Vājasaneyin	Prācetasa	Sādhāraṇa--svāmin (<i>paṭṭakapati</i> i.e. the holder of the copper-plates)	2
2-5.	do	do	Śrīvasu with his three brothers	1
6-7.	do	do	Somavasu with his master	$\frac{1}{2}$
8.	Chāndogya (i.e. Sāmavedin)	Kātyāyana	Manoratha-svāmin (<i>paṭṭakapati</i>)	$1\frac{1}{2}$
9.	do	do	Viṣṇughoṣa-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
10.	do	do	Vedaghoṣa-svāmin	1
11.	Bāhvṛcyā (i.e. Ṛgvedin)	Yāska	Dāmadeva-svāmin	1
12.	do	do	Ghoṣadeva-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
13.	do	do	Nandadeva-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
14.	Chāndogya	Bhāradvāja	Arkadatta-svāmin with his clan shares	$1\frac{1}{2}$
15.	do	do	Tuṣṭidatta-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
16.	Vājasaneyin	Kāśyapa	Rṣidāma-svāmin	1
17.	do	do	Śubhadama-svāmin	1
18.	do	Kautsa	Śanaīscarabhūti (clan share)	$1\frac{1}{2}$
19.	Bāhvṛcyā	Gaurātreyā	San̐karṣana-svāmin	2
20.	do	do	Nara-svāmin	1
21.	do	do	Nārāyaṇa-svāmin	1
22.	do	do	Viṣṇu-svāmin	1
23.	do	do	Sudarśana-svāmin	1
24.	do	do	Gopendra-svāmin	1
25. *	do	do	Arka-svāmin	$\frac{1}{4}$
26.	do	do	Bhānu-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
27.	do	do	Bhūyaskara-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
28.	Vājasaneyin	Kṛṣṇātreyā	Yaśobhūti-svāmin (clan-share)	$1\frac{1}{2}$
29.	Chāndogya	Bhāradvāja	Varuṇa-svāmin	1

<i>No.</i>	<i>Veda</i>	<i>Gotra</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Share</i>
30.	Vājasaneyin	Kauṇḍinya	Madhusena-svāmin	1
31.	Chāndogya	Gautama	Dhruvasoma-svāmin	1
32.	do	do	Viṣṇusoma-svāmin	1
33.	Vājasaneyin	Bhāradvāja	Viṣṇupālita-svāmin	1½
34.	do	do	Śucipālita-svāmin	1
35, 36.	do	do	Mitrapālita and Arthapālita	½
37.	do	do	Prajāpatipālita-svāmin	½
38.	do	Gautama	Madhu-svāmin	1
39.	do	do	Cakradeva-svāmin	½
40.	Cārakya (i.e. Yajurvedin)	Vātsa	Kuṣmāṇḍapatra-svāmin	3/16
41.	do	do	Īśvaradatta-svāmin	2
42, 43.	Vājasaneyin	Maudgalya	Sudarśana and Dinakara- svāmins	1
44.	do	Śaumbhaka (Śaunaka ?)	Yajñakuṇḍa-svāmin	1½
45.	do	do	Yośākuṇḍa-svāmin	1½
46.	do	do	Śrāddhakuṇḍa-svāmin	1
47.	do	do	Nārāyaṇakuṇḍa-svāmin	1
48.	do	do	Īśvarakuṇḍa-svāmin	1 + 1/8
49.	do	do	Śaktikuṇḍa-svāmin	½
50.	do	do	Toṣakuṇḍa-svāmin	1 + 1/8
51.	Cāraka	Pārāśarya	Sādhu-svāmin	1
52.	Chāndogya	Āśvalāyana	Gaṅga-svāmin	1
53.	Bāhvrya	Vārāha	Nara-svāmin	1
54.	Vājasaneyin	Śālaṅkāyana	Sūryya-svamin	1
55.	do	Bhāradvāja	Bhavadeva-svāmin	1
56.	do	do	Śarvadeva-svāmin	1
57.	do	do	Gomideva-svāmin	½
58.	do	do	Sāvitradeva-svāmin	2
59.	do	do	Arkadeva-svāmin	½
60.	do	do	Sādhāraṇa-svāmin	½
61.	do	Gārgya	Dāmarāta-svāmin	1
62.	do	Bhāradvāja	Vasudatta-svāmin	2
63.	do	Ātambāyana	Yogeśvara-svāmin	2
64.	do	do	Viṣveśvara-svāmin	1
65.	do	do	Divyeśvara-svāmin	1
66.	do	do	Gaṇeśvara-svāmin	1
67.	do	do	Buddheśvara-svāmin	1
68, 69.	do	do	Jaṭeśvara-svāmin and Aṅgeśvara-svāmin	½

<i>No.</i>	<i>Veda</i>	<i>Gotra</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Share</i>
70.	Vājasaneyin	Ātambāyana	Dhauteśvara-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
71.	do	do	Mageśvara-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
72.	do	do	Jāhnaviśvara-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
73.	do	do	Nandeśvara-svāmin	1
74.	do	Āngīrasa	Dāmabhūti-svāmin	1
75, 76.	Bāhvṛcya	Kāśyapa	Prakāsavara-svāmin with brother	1
77.	Vājasaneyin	Yāska	Gāyatrīpāla-svāmin	1
78.	Bāhvṛcya	Parāśara	Śantaśarma-svāmin	1
79.	do	Kauśika	Padmadāsa-svāmin (clan share)	$1\frac{1}{2}$
80, 81.	do	do	Govardhana, Yajñapāla and Panu Sudarśana-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
82.	Chāndogya	Pāṅkalya	Gopāla-svāmin	1
83.	Taittiriya (Yajurvedin)	Kāśyapa	Ugradatta-svāmin	1
84.	Bāhvṛcya	Vārhaspatya	Bhaṭṭinanda-svāmin	1
85.	do	do	Sādhu-svāmin	1
86.	do	do	Devakula-svāmin	1
87.	do	do	Janārdana-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
88, 89, 90.	do	do	Sunayana, Nārāyaṇa and Vṛddhi-svāmīns	$\frac{1}{2}$
91.	do	Gautama	Īśvarabhaṭṭa-svāmin	1
92.	do	do	Bhṛgu-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
93.	do	Bhāradvāja	Rudraghoṣa-svāmin	1
94.	Cāraka	Kātyāyana	Kauśīsoma-svāmin	1
95.	Vājasadeyin	Gautama	Prabhākarakīrtti-svāmin	1
96.	do	Śāṇḍilya	Ananta-svāmin	1
97.	Bāhvṛcya	Śaunaka	Gatibhaṭṭi-svāmin	1
98.	do	do	Tejabhaṭṭi-svāmin	1
99, 100.	do	do	Mantraghoṣa, Tejabhaṭṭi and Mandibhūtī-svāmīns	$\frac{1}{2}$
101.	do	do	Dāmabhaṭṭi-svāmin	1
102.	do	do	Medhabhaṭṭi-svāmin	1
103.	do	do	Sumatibhaṭṭi-svāmin	1
104.	do	do	Suyogabhaṭṭi-svāmin	1
105.	do	Vātsya	Śāsvatadāma-svāmin	1
106.	Chāndogya	Gautama	Toṣa-svāmin	1
107.	Bāhvṛcya	Vārāha	Bhaṭṭihara-svāmin	1
108.	Vājasaneyin	Bhāradvāja	Nāgadatta-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
109, 110.	do	Ālambāyana	Durveśvara-svāmin with brother	$\frac{1}{2}$
111.	Vājaysneyin	Bhāradvāja	Rūpūdhya-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$

<i>No.</i>	<i>Veda</i>	<i>Gotra</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Share</i>
112, 113.	Bāhvṛcya	Kauśika	Candradāsa and Vimardanadāsa- svāmins	1
114.	Vājasaneyin	Kāśyapa	Supraṭiṣṭhita-svāmin,	1
115.	do	Gautama	Nandana-svāmin	1
116.	do	Śākaṭāyana	Toṣa-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
117, 118.	do	Gautama & Kāśyapa	Sarasa and Vakula-svāmins	1
119.	do	Bhāradvāja	Viduṣa-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
120.	Bāhvṛcya	Vārāha	Pravara(nā)ga-svāmin	$\frac{3}{4}$
121.	do	do	Āpanāga-svāmin	1
122, 123.	do	do	Toṣanāga and Hampināga- svāmins	$\frac{1}{4}$
124.	Vājasaneyin	Kāśyapa	Managhoṣa-svāmin	1
125.	Chāndogya	Vaiṣṇavṛddhī	Sarppiṇi-svāmin	1
126.	do	do	Janārdana-svāmin	1
127.	Bāhvṛcya	Kauśika	Arka-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
128.	do	do	Śraddhadāsa-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
129.	Vājasaneyin	Gautama	Sanātana-svāmin	1
130.	do	do	Harsaprabha with his <i>gotra</i>	$\frac{1}{2}$
131.	do	Kauṭilya	Khaṇḍasoma-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
132, 133, 134.	do	do	Śreyaskara, Gati, Gauri-soma (svāmins)	1
135.	do	do	Vakulasoma-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
136, 137.	do	do	Dhṛtisoma, Siṃhasoma (svāmins)	$\frac{1}{2}$
138.	do	Kṛṣṇātreya	Bhāyaśaḥ-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
139.	do	do	Yajña-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
140.	do	do	Daiva-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{4}$
141.	do	do	Daridi-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
142.	do	do	Pradyumna-svāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
143.	do	do	Vṛddhi-svāmin	2
144-148.	do	do	Divākara, Hari, Adbhuta, Tvaṣṭra, Toṣanāga (svāmins)	1
149.	do	Kavestara	Medha-svāmin	1
150.	do	Māṇḍavya	Dhṛti-svāmin with his <i>gotra</i>	$\frac{1}{4}$
151.	do	Kāśyapa	Keśava-svāmin	1
152.	do	Bhāradvāja	Gauri-svāmin	1
153.	do	do	Sucarita-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
154.	do	do	Bappa-svāmin	1
155.	Bāhvṛcya	Kauṇḍinya	Karkadatta-svāmin	1

No. .	Veda	Gotra	Name	Share
156.	Bāhvṛcya	Bhāradvāja	Udayana-svāmin	1
157.	do	Vāsiṣṭha	Meruḍatta-svāmin	1
158, 159.	Vājasaneyin	Agniveśya	Narendra-(Reṇubhuti)- svāmins	1
160.	do	do	Medhabhuti-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
161.	Cārakya	Saṅkṛtyāyana	Candrapakṣa-svāmin	1
162.	Bāhvṛcya	Yāska	Kāli-svāmin	1
163.	do	dosvāmin	$1\frac{1}{2}$
164.	do	do	Bhaṭṭa-Maheśvara-svāmins	$\frac{1}{2}$
165.	do	Parāśarya	Gopalanandi-svāmin	1
166.	do	Bhargava	Viśvabhuti-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
167, 168.	do	do	Surakṣita, Sucarita- svāmins	$\frac{1}{2}$
169.	Taittirīya	Bhāradvāja	Śivagaṇa-svāmin	1
170.-173.	Bāhvṛcya	Kātyāyana	Vasuśri-svāmin with three brothers	1
174.	Vājasaneyin	Kauśika	Vīrabhūti-svāmin	1
175.	do	do	Viṣṇubhuti-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
176.	do	do	Pramodabhuti-svāmin	1
177.	do	Bhāradvāja	Viṣṇudatta-svāmin	1
178.	do	Kauṇḍinya	Bṛhaspati-svāmin	1
179.	Bāhvṛcya	Yāska	Harṣadeva-svāmin	1
180.	Vājasaneyin	Jātūkeṇa	Medha-svāmin	1
181.	do	do	Kṛṣṇa-svāmin	1
182, 183.	do	do	Mādhava-Hari-svāmins	1
184.	Cāndoga	Bhāradvāja	Janārdana-svāmin	1
185.	Vājasaneyin	Maudgalya	Viṣṇusoma-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
186.	Cārakya	Gārgya	Dhanasena-svāmin	1
187, 188.	do	do	Pramodasena, Ghoṣasena (svāmins)	1
189.	do	do	Somasena-svāmin	1
190.	Bāhvṛcya	Gautama	Bhāskaramittra-svāmin	1
191.	do	do	Madhumittra-svāmin	1
192, 193.	do	do	Sādhāraṇamittra Sādhumittra (svāmins)	• 1
194.	do	do	Dhṛtimittra-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
195.	do	Bhāradvāja	Śukrabbava-svāmin	1

<i>No.</i>	<i>Veda</i>	<i>Gotra</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Share</i>
196, 197.	Bāhvṛcya	Pautṛmaṣya	Sudarśana, Dhaneśvara-svāmins	$\frac{1}{2}$
198.	Vājasaneyin	Śāṇḍilya	Ravi-svāmin	1
199.	do	do	Madhu-svāmin	1
200.	do	do	Mahīdhara-svāmin	1
201.	Bāhvṛcya	Paurṇṇa	Bhaṭṭi-Maheśvara-svāmin	1
202.	do	do	Bhaṭṭi-Mātṛ-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
203.	do	do	Rudrabhaṭṭi-svāmin	$\frac{1}{2}$
204.	Cāndogya	Kauśika	Adrvilepana-svāmin	1
205.	Vājasaneyin	Sāvarna	Gomināga-svāmin	1

Appendix III

(From the Kailan copper-plate of king Śrādhara Rāta of Samatāṭa)

Name	Shares
1. <i>Bhaṭṭa</i> Divākara	5 <i>Padas</i> ($1\frac{1}{4}$ <i>Pāṭakas</i>)
2. „ Bhava	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
3. „ Vatsa	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
4-5. Valivardayaśas and Vṛṣabhayaśas	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
6. <i>Bhaṭṭa</i> Bhadra	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
7. „ Lalita	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
8. Nārāyaṇa	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
9. Āloka	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)
10. Valivardacandra	3 „ ($\frac{3}{4}$ „)
11. Candrasvāmin	2 „ ($\frac{1}{2}$ „)
12. Sādhāraṇaghoṣa	2 „ ($\frac{1}{2}$ „)
13. Paśupati	5 „ ($1\frac{1}{4}$ „)

Appendix IV

(From the Mehār copper-plate of Dāmodaradeva)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Gotra</i>	<i>Income</i>
1. <i>Paṇḍita</i> Kāpaḍika	Sāvarṇa	25 <i>Purāṇas</i>
2. <i>Brāhmaṇa</i> Śāṅkoka	do	5 „
3. „ Sudoka	do	8 „
4. „ Kālemika	do	4 „
5. „ Tārāpati	do	4½ „
6. <i>Paṇḍita</i> Pāṇḍoka	Bhāradvāja	10½ „
7. <i>Brāhmaṇa</i> Deuka (Deḍaka)	do	4 „
8. „ Sudoka	do	8 + 7/16 „
9. „ Keśava of Kāṇṭāmaṇi		(4 + 7/8 + 9/16) „
10. „ Brahmoka		(2 + 1½ + 2) „
11. „ Śiroka		5¾ „
12. „ Dharaṇika of Pūrvagrāma		2½ „
13. <i>Paṇḍita</i> Pauka (Pāṇḍuka) of Siddhalagrāma		4 „
14. <i>Brāhmaṇa</i> Śāṅkoka (Śaṅkoka)	Ātreya	1½ „
15. „ Prajāpati of Diṇḍisāya		3½ „
16. <i>Gṛha-paṇḍita</i> Nāthoka (Śrī Janoka)		1½ (minus 1 & 1/8) „
17. <i>Brāhmaṇa</i> Viśvarūpa		3 + 3/8 „
18. „ Mādhoka		No income from the gift land
19. „ Śrīpati of Keśarakoṇa		
20. „ Śrīvatsa		

Appendix V

List of Gotras

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Agastya | 24. Kṛṣṇātreya |
| 2. Āgniveśya | 25. Māṇḍavya |
| 3. Āṅgīrasa | 26. Maudgalya |
| 4. Āśvalāyana | 27. Pāṅkalya |
| 5. Ālambāyana | 28. Parāśara |
| 6. Ātreya | 29. Paurṇṇa |
| 7. Bārhaspatya | 30. Pautṛmaṣya |
| 8. Bhāradvāja | 31. Prācetasa |
| 9. Bhārgava | 32. Śāketāyana |
| 10. Gārgya | 33. Śālaṅkāyana |
| 11. Gaurātreya | 34. Śāṇḍilya |
| 12. Gautama | 35. Sāṅkṛtyāyana |
| 13. Hastidāsa | 36. Śaunaka |
| 14. Jātūkaṛṇa | 37. Sāvarṇa |
| 15. Kāṇva-Lauhittya | 38. Vaiṣṇavṛddhi |
| 16. Kāśyapa | 39. Vārāha |
| 17. Kāśyaka | 40. Vārddha-kauśika |
| 18. Kātyāyana | 41. Vārdhīnasa |
| 19. Kauṇḍinya | 42. Vāsiṣṭha |
| 20. Kauṭilya | 43. Vatsa |
| 21. Kautsa | 44. Vatsabhārgava |
| 22. Kauśika | 45. Vātsya |
| 23. Kavestara | 46. Yāska |

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	- Aitareya Āraṇyaka - A. B. Keith
AGI	- Ancient Geography of India - A. Cunningham
AOEI	- The Aryan Occupation of Eastern India - H. C. Chakladar
AS	- Asiatic Society
ASB	- Asiatic Society of Bengal
ASI, ASR	- Archaeological Survey of India, Report
BDS	- Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra - Fuhrer
Beal-Life	- The Life of Hiuen Tsang by Shaman Hwei Li. Tr. by S. Beal
BV	- Bīrbhūm Vivaraṇa - H. Mukherjee
CASR	- Cunningham's Archaeological Survey Reports*
CII	- Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum
DHNI	- The Dynastic History of Northern India - H. C. Ray
DN	- Dīgha-Nikāya
EBS	- The Early Brahmanical System of Gotra and Pravara - John Brough
EHNI	- Contributions to the Economic History of Northern India - Puspa Niyogi
EI	- Epigraphica Indica
ESAI	- Ethnic Settlements in Ancient India - S. B. Chaudhuri
GAMI	- Studies in the Geography of Ancient and Medieval India - D. C. Sircar
GDAMI	- The Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Medieval India - N. L. Dey
GLM	- Gauḍalekhamālā - A. K. Maitreya
HB	- History of Bengal (Vol. I) - Dacca University
HGAI	- Historical Geography of Ancient India - B. C. Law
HI	- The History of India as told by its own Historians - Elliot and Dawson
HNEI	- History of North Eastern India - R. G. Basak
HO	- History of Orissa - R. D. Banerji
HPD	- History of the Paramara Dynasty - D. C. Ganguly
IA	- Indian Antiquary
IB	- Inscriptions of Bengal, Vol. III, ed. by N. G. Mazumdar
IC	- Indian Culture
IHQ	- Indian Historical Quarterly
IMP	- Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency - V. Rangacharya
IS	- Indian Studies : Past & Present
JAHRs	- Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society
JAS	- Journal of the Asiatic Society
JASB	- Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JBORS	- Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society
JPASB(NS)	- Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (New Series)

JRASB	- Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal	.
KS	- Kāmarūpa-Śāsanāvali - Padmanath Bhattacharya	.
MES	- Madras Epigraphical Report	
MGOLS	- Mysore Government Oriental Literature Series	
ODBL	- The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language - S. K. Chatterjee	
OHRS	- Orissa Historical Research Society	
PHAI	- Political History of Ancient India - H. C. Raychaudhuri	
RC	- Rāmacarita of Sandhyākara Nandi	
SBE	- Sacred Books of the East Series	
SHAIB	- Some Historical Aspects of the inscriptions of Bengal - B. C. Sen	
SI	- Select Inscriptions - D. C. Sircar	
SIA	- Studies in Indian Antiquities - H. C. Raychaudhuri	
SN	- Saṃyutta Nikāya	
SPP	- Vaṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā, Calcutta	
TIN	- Tabāqāt-i-Nasirī - Raverty	
Tṛkāṇḍaśeṣa	- Tṛkāṇḍaśeṣa of Puraṣottamadeva	
VJI	- Vāṅglār Jātīya Itihāsa - N. Vasu	
Watters	- Yuan Ch'wang's Travels in India - T. Watters	

INDIAN STUDIES

PAST & PRESENT

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No. 4

With this issue, the *Indian Studies : Past & Present* completes its eighth year of publication. In this context we avail ourselves of the chance to express our gratitude to our contributors, subscribers, and numerous other patrons, without whose co-operation it would have been difficult for us to continue our publication.

Apart from a continuation of the *Studies in Nibandha-s* by Professor Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya M.A., D.Lit., the present issue contains the following :

Selected Papers of Rev. James Long, as edited by Dr. Mahadevprasad Saha. The papers included in this issue are : 1) *Popular Bengali Proverbs* illustrating opinions of the Ryots, working-class and women of Bengal. This was read by Rev. Long on January 13, 1868 and was included in the *Transactions of the Bengal Social Science Association*, vol. ii, 1868, pp. 135-142. 2) *Oriental Proverbs* in relation to Folklore, History, Sociology with suggestions for their collection, interpretation and publication. This was originally published in 1875. 3) *On Russian Proverbs*, as illustrating Russian manners and customs, originally published in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature*, vol. xi, Part 2, *New Series*. 4) *Economy and Trade—The Social Condition of the Muhammadans of Bengal and the Remedies*. This was read on January 21, 1869, and was published in the *Transactions of the Bengal Social Science Association*, Vol. II, 1868, pp. 1-17. We hope to publish other *Papers* of Rev. Long in our forthcoming issues.

The next feature in the present issue is a *Review* By. Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, National Professor of India in Humanities, of the book *Aiśa and Tibet* by Alaka Chattopadhyaya.

This issue ends with a *Reprint* of the first instalment of the *Auto-biography* of Sarat Chandra Das, which originally appeared as the *Narrative of the Incidents of my Early life* in the *Modern Review*, Vol. VII, Nos. 1-6, Allahabad, 1907.

STUDIES IN NIBANDHA-S

Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya

STUDIES IN NIBANDHA-s

Bhabatosh Bhattacharyya

(b) *The Varṣakriyākaumudī*

It has been seen above that this work, though the first in point of publication (1902) of our author's four digests, is the last in that of composition by him. Dr. Kane, though not doing sufficient justice to it in the first volume of his history, has drawn upon it a great deal in the *vrata* section of the fifth volume, part I (1958) of his same work. The principal points of difference¹¹¹ of our author with his illustrious junior contemporary, Raghunandana, have already been set forth by the editor in his preface to this work. We now propose to give here a brief resume of the contents of this work.

The V. K. K. is a voluminous work, the text itself occupying 579 pages of the printed edition. After five benedictory verses, the author devotes 27 pages (pp. 2-28) to define the characteristics of a *tithi* and its auspicious parts for the performance of religious rites. He introduces this topic with the following remarks: 'while explaining the religious duties to be performed during the year, as *tithi*-s are important for their performance, firstly, the nature of the *tithi*-s and of their holy parts, fit for the observance

111. The exact references for the fourteen points of difference between the V. K. K. and Raghunandana's *Ekādaśī-tattva* (E.T.), *Kṛtya-tattva* (K.T.) and *Tithi-tattva* (T.T.) are given below. References to Raghunandana's works are from Jivānanda Vidyāśāgara's edition, Calcutta, 1895.

(1) V.K.K. p. 280 =T.T. p. 62	(8) V.K.K. p. 301=T.T. p. 51
(2) p. 286 =E.T. p. 105	(9) p. 305= „ p. 53
(3) p. 251 =T.T. p. 114	(10) p. 108= „ p. 157
(4) p. 247 = „ p. 187	(11) p. 48= „ p. 107
(5) pp. 316-7= „ p. 32	(12) p. 61=K.T. p. 429
(6) p. 218 = „ p. 149	(13) p. 503=T.T. p. 58
(7) p. 249 = „ p. 30	(14) p. 500= „ p. 39

It is necessary to add that both Govindānanda and Raghunandana, though differing on these 14 points, agree about the time for payment of the *dakṣiṇā* (priest's fee) for *Durgāpūjā* (worship of the Goddess Durgā in autumn), which is 'just after the conclusion of the *navamīpūjā* (worship on the ninth *tithi* of the bright fortnight of *Āśvina*) and not after the immersion of the image in water on the tenth *tithi* as prescribed by the Maithilas' (vide V K.K., pp. 447-8 ; T.T. p. 101 and the *Durgā-bhaktī-taraṅgiṇī* of Vidyāpati, Darbhanga, 1900-1, p. 126). Both of them have also included the topic of *Khañjana-darśana* (sight of the bird *Khañjana* or wagtail) after the *Durgāpūjā* as a decisive omen for the success or failure of a person, starting on a journey (vide V. K. K., pp. 449-51 and T.T., pp. 103-4).

of pious actions, will be described.' He then quotes three lines from the *Sūryasiddhānta*¹¹² to the following effect : "After leaving the sun just after the last moment of a new moon day, the moon goes daily eastward. That lunar day, divided into twelve parts is called a *tithi*." Then he says that as there are Vedic passages, prescribing the morning, noon and afternoon as proper periods of time for the performance of rites in honour of the gods, human beings and *manes* respectively, and as there are also *smṛti* texts, enjoining the worship of the gods in the morning, the word *divā* (i.e. day) is to be construed as morning, noon, afternoon or night as is consistent with the religious rite in question, which should be performed at the proper time of the appropriate day of the requisite *tithi* only. Our author next quotes two verses of the *Gṛhyapariśiṣṭa* to lay down the general rules, guiding the performance of religious rites, when a *tithi*, fit for observing them, is found on two consecutive days or is not so found. '[Combinations of] the second and third *tithi*-s, the fourth and fifth *tithi*-s, the sixth and seventh *tithi*-s, the eighth and ninth *tithi*-s, the eleventh and twelfth *tithi*-s, the fourteenth and full moon *tithi*-s, the newmoon and first *tithi*-s are producers of great religious efficacy. Other combinations of two consecutive *tithi*-s are very harmful and remove the previously acquired religious merit of the performer.' The following explanation has been offered by our author to the above two verses : 'The day in which there is a conjunction of the second and third *tithi*-s is fit for the religious rite in question and neither the preceding nor the succeeding day, with the first or the fourth *tithi* joined with them, is so fit.' Our author then describes in the next 54 pages (pp. 28-82) the duties, imperative on a devout Hindu, in the sixteen *tithi*-s beginning with the first one and ending with the full moon and the new moon *tithi*-s. The following topics are then treated fully in the following sequence :—

Actions forbidden in the particular *tithi*-s (pp. 82-90) ; solar and lunar eclipses (pp. 90-108) ; rites to be observed during these two eclipses (pp. 108-14) ; and practices forbidden after the occurrence of the eclipses (pp. 114-17). After describing the duties in the *tithi*-s in general, our author lays down the procedure of worshipping Govinda and other gods according to Vedic, Tāntric and mixed rites (pp. 117-204). He then deals (pp. 204-22) with *saṅkrānti* (i.e. the last day of a solar month in which the sun passes into the next *rāśi* or sign of the zodiac) and the particular rites to be performed at that time, including the *dadhi-saṅkrānti-vrata* (i.e. a *vrata* to be observed for a year in every *saṅkrānti*, beginning with that of the *uttarāyaṇa*, i.e. the winter solstice at the end of Pausa).

Our author then devotes 18 pages (pp. 222-40) to the following three connected topics in three consecutive chapters :—

(1) Definition and classification of months, such as lunar, sidereal, solar, astral and intercalary (pp. 222-36),

112. V. 12 of *Mānādhyāya*, ch. xiv, MM. Sudhākara Dvivedī's edition (1909-11, B.I. work no. 173), reprinted in 1925, omits the second of the three lines.

(2) Definition of a fortnight, which is usually the half-portion of a lunar month (pp. 236-7) and

(3) Determination of a season (pp. 237-40).

We take up the above three topics in due order.

(I) Months

As the performance of all the religious duties, to be discharged in several months, depends upon the knowledge of the various kinds of months, so before going to describe those duties, an attempt is made in the following pages to define a month generally and the several months such as Caitra specially.

Somebody has said—"As Hārīta has laid down that the word 'month' (*māsa*) is indicative of the 'lunar month', so the former is primarily meant to apply to the latter only and secondarily to other kinds of months.

So says Hārīta :—

The beginning of a month is to be known as the day in which sacrifices to gods, Indra and Agni, are made ; the sacrifices to gods, Agni and Soma, are prescribed to be performed in the course of that month ; while those, meant for the Pitṛs (the *manes*) and Soma, are ordained to be gone through in the concluding day of that month (*samāptau*). If the sun ever goes, crossing over that month, the month, so crossed over, is to be known as the *malimluca* (or *malamāsa* i.e. intercalary) month, while the just following month is to be reckoned as the real month (for the performance of religious duties).

Sacrifices to gods, Indra and Agni, are to be made in the first *tithi* (i.e. *pratipad*) of the bright fortnight, while those to gods, Agni and Soma, in the similar *tithi* of the dark fortnight. These two kinds of sacrifices are included within the newmoon and full moon sacrifices. The sacrifice of offering to fire, meant for the god Soma with the *Pitṛs*, is to be performed on the newmoon day. By the use of the word '*samāptau*', the word '*māsa*' (i.e. month) is to be taken as the lunar month, beginning with the first day of the bright fortnight and ending with the next newmoon day. The clause viz. "If the sun ever goes, crossing over that month, means that there is no *saṅkrānti* in that lunar month, which is to be designated as a *malimluca* (or intercalary) month."

This is wrong in view of the facts that Hārīta has described a lunar month only, fit for becoming an intercalary month in special cases, as is evident from his concluding clause viz. "If the sun ever goes etc. (*tam atikramya* etc.) and that many other sages have used the word 'month' in solar, sidereal, lunar and astral months. So the word 'month,' indicative of many senses, is primarily (and not secondarily to be applied to all the above four kinds of months. It is not to be argued that owing to the applicability of the word 'month' in many senses, it primarily means a 'lunar month' and secondarily

other kinds of months, as there is no warrant for such assumption and as all the sages have invariably used the word 'month' in all its meanings ; otherwise there arises the objection of the loss of its various meanings.

So the *Brahmasiddhānta* says :—

A lunar month is reckoned from the (first day of) the bright (fortnight) to the next newmoon day, a sidereal month consists of thirty days only, while the period, in which the sun rests in a single *rāśi* (sign of the zodiac), is known as the solar month.

Here the word '*śuklādiḥ*' (i.e. beginning with the bright) means '*śukla-pratipadādiḥ*' (i.e. from the first day of the bright fortnight), the word '*śukla*' here referring to the fortnight, designated by the same.

So also the *Varāhasaṃhitā* says :—

A lunar month is from one newmoon day to the next newmoon day, a sidereal month is of thirty days only and all those, who are proficient (in Astronomy) put the label 'solar' to the period of time, covered by the sun's staying in one *rāśi*.

Here the fifth case-ending in *darśād* (i.e. from one newmoon day) is to be taken as indicative of *avadhi* (i.e. exclusion of the newmoon day) and not of *abhiṣidhi* (i.e. inclusion of the same). Otherwise, if we take a lunar month as beginning with a newmoon day or with the end of a newmoon day, six months of the year will vanish (as every alternate lunar month, amounting to six months in a whole year, will be thereby left out of consideration). It is not to be argued that one newmoon day is the concluding day of the previous (lunar) month, because as a result of that argument there arises the objection of one newmoon day being the parts of two such months and also because there is the convention of the existence of the several months in mutual isolation and as there arises the further difficulty of performing the annual *śrāddha* of a person, who died on a newmoon day. So in the following text of the *Viṣṇudharma* (*Viṣṇudharmottara* ?),⁶ the words such as '*sannikarṣād-athārabhya*' (i.e. beginning from the conjunction of the sun and the moon) are to be interpreted as referring to 'the period of time, just following the conjunction.'

The *Viṣṇudharmottara* (I. 72. 13b-16a) says :—

The moon meets with the sun at the end of the dark fortnight. The learned call the month, beginning from the conjunction of the sun and the moon (*sannikarṣād-athārabhya*) to the next such conjunction, as a lunar month. In a sidereal month there are only thirty risings of the sun (i.e. days). A solar month is reckoned by the sun's resting in a single *rāśi*, while an astral month is measured by the passage (of the moon) through all the stars.

The *Rājamārtanḍa* says :—

The solar month is effected by the sun's resting in one *rāśi*, the lunar month occurs during the period of the passage of the moon from the first day of the bright fortnight to the (next) newmoon day, the sidereal month is reckoned by thirty days only, while the astral month is the name given to the period of the passage (of the moon) through all the stars.

It is said in the *Ratnamālā* :—

The month, ending in a newmoon day, is called lunar, that, coinciding with the sun's resting in a *rāśi*, is known as solar, while the appellation 'sidereal' is given to a collection of thirty days and an astral month is nothing but the period of the passage of the moon through all the stars.

The *Sūryasiddhānta* (*madhyamādhikāra*, ch. I, vv 12a-13a) says :—

An astral day is said to consist of sixty *daṇḍas* (i.e. collections of twenty-four minutes) and a sidereal month consists of thirty risings of the sun (i.e. days) A lunar month is similarly composed (of thirty *tithis*) and a solar month is formed by a *saṅkrānti*.

The next rising of the sun (*arkodaya*), which amounts to a day, increases by several *palas* (i.e. collections of twenty-four seconds) over and above the usual twenty-four hours, owing to the increase of the duration of the day by reason of the sun's resting in a particular *rāśi*.

It is again stated in connection with the above in the same work (*Spaṣṭādhikāra*, ch. II, v. 59)¹¹³ to the following effect :—

Multiply the daily motion of a planet by the time of rising of the sign in which it is, and divide by eighteen hundred ; the quotient add to, or subtract from, the number of respirations in a revolution : the result is the number of respirations in the day and night of the planet.

Thus a sidereal year is a day longer than an astral year—this is the only difference between these two years. This astral month is fit for astronomical calculations, while the already mentioned one, described in the *Viṣṇudharmottara* and tantamount to the moon's passage through all the stars, is fit for general use. 'A lunar month is similarly (*tadvat*) composed' means that a lunar month also consists of thirty *tithis*.

Here, though it has been stated in an indefinite way as of 'thirty *tithis*' (*trīṃśatā tithibhiḥ*), yet according to the principle of *ekavākyatā* (i.e. reconciliation of conflicting texts), applied to the previously quoted authorities such as *Hārīta*, *Brahmasiddhānta*, *Varāhasamhitā*, *Viṣṇudharma* (*Viṣṇudharmottara* ?), *Rājamārtaṇḍa* and others, the above phrase should be construed as of 'thirty *tithi*-s, beginning with the first *tithi* of the bright fortnight.'

So it has been said in the 13th chapter of the self-same *Sūryasiddhānta* (*mānādhyaḃya*, ch. xiv, v. 14a) :—

A lunar month consists of thirty *tithi*-s and the same period of time is a day of the *Pitṛs* (the *manes*).

Owing to the inclusion of the phrase 'a day of the *Pitṛs*' in the above text, the lunar month, so described, invariably consists of a bright and a dark fortnight.

As *Manu* (I. 66) says :—

113. The *Sūryasiddhānta* reads '*svāhorātrāsavaḥ smṛtāḥ*', while our author reads '*āhorātrāsavaḥ kramāt*' as the last foot of the above verse.

The night-and-day of the *Pitṛs* consists of a (human) month, divided into two fortnights. The day portion, which is dark (i.e. a dark fortnight), is meant for activity, while the night portion, which is bright (i.e. a bright fortnight) is for sleeping.

The word 'month' has been secondarily applied to a collection of thirty *tithi*-s in the following texts of the *Chandogopariśiṣṭu*, *Marīci* and *Viṣṇu* respectively.

(1) The six-monthly *śrāddhas* can be performed when it is one day less in six-months or three days less in a year (i.e. on the day previous to the six-monthly *tithi* of death of the person or three days prior to the annual *tithi* of the same).

(2) The principal *śrāddha* is to be performed every month, failing that, in every season.

(3) One should perform (the *śrāddha* of a just deceased person) every month in the very *tithi* of his death.

So the word 'month' is to be understood to apply secondarily to the (lunar) month, beginning with the first *tithi* of the dark fortnight and ending with the next fullmoon day.

Thus, owing to the several meanings of the word 'month', the use in the following texts of the qualified phrase 'lunar month' holds good, otherwise it would have been meaningless :—

(a) The lunar month, crossed over by the sun, is known as *malimluca* (or intercalary month).

(b) The lunar month is also to be followed in the annual *śrāddha* of the *Pitṛs* (the manes).

(c) The lunar month, in which the sun passes into Aries, is called *Caitra*.

The above discussion also silences all those who say that the word 'month' applies conventionally to the three kinds, such as the solar month and derivatively to the lunar one, which consists of the collection of thirty *tithi*-s, by virtue of the derivation of the word '*māsa*' (i.e. month) from the root '*mās*' (i.e. the moon), meaning thereby 'belonging to, (*tasyāyam*) i. e. to the moon', inasmuch as Hārīta and many other sages have applied the word 'month' to a lunar month also alike to the solar and to other kinds of months. Otherwise, that would have been useless and also because the mention of the word '*cāndra*', as used in the phrase '*cāndro māsaḥ*' (i.e. lunar month) in the texts of many sages, would have become superfluous, if the single word '*māsa*' (i.e. month) is able to bring out that meaning.

Thus it is established that months are of four kinds and that there are also four kinds of years, composed of twelve months of such four kinds of months such as the solar, owing to the following *Śruti* and also owing to the following text of the *Viṣṇu-dharmottara* (I. 72. 19b-20a, 21) :—

(a) Twelve months constitute a year.

(b) O son of Bhṛgu ! a year, calculated on the solar basis, is six days longer than that, if measured by the sidereal method and eleven days more than that, if calculated on the lunar basis.

It is not to be argued that the year, in which an *adhimāsa* (i.e. intercalary month) falls, is said to be composed of thirteen lunar months, as the following text has described the two months in question as one month :—

Bādarāyaṇa has (in this case) described a month as consisting of sixty days, the first half of such a month being discarded and the second half only being accepted.

This conduces to the proposition that the use of the word 'lunar year' is in relation to twelve months only, fit for religious purposes and not in relation to the additional intercalary month.

The following statement of the *Sūryasiddhānta*¹¹⁴ (*mānādhyāya*, ch. xiv, v. 10b) is only to show that a solar year begins with Aries :—

The twelve months, beginning with Aries, are collectively known as a year.

Now we begin our consideration of the implications of the words, which are the names of the months, beginning with *Caitra*.

Somebody has said regarding this topic that the name of the the month '*Caitra*' holds good both in the solar and lunar months owing to the wide-spread practice. This is wrong, because, if our purpose is served in one case by implication, it is not proper to attribute many senses to one word, like the word 'white'. Otherwise there will arise the fault of cumbrousness. So it has been said that implication is better than attribution and that the theory of various meanings of a single word is accepted only for want of any other alternative, just as it has been so done in the case of *akṣa* (meaning dice, latitude, etc.) and similar other words, where the primary meaning being absent and there being no scope for implication, there is no other alternative left except the attribution of various meanings to the same word. But in the present case it cannot be argued that there is absence of an alternative to the acceptance of various meanings, as the denotation of the means of the months, beginning with *Caitra*, exists in the lunar months alone.

So says Brahmagupta :—

The lunar month, in which the sun passes into Aries, is *Caitra*. Similarly, (the lunar months), such so *Vaiśākha* are formed by the sun's passage into Taurus etc.

There is also the *Śruti* :—

That is known as the newmoon day of *Vaiśākha*, which is in conjunction with the asterism *Rohiṇī*.

As owing to the established law of the joint location of the sun and the moon in the ending moments of a newmoon day and also as there is the possibility of its conjunction with the asterism *Rohiṇī* when the sun is in Taurus and not in Aries, "so we find that the *Śruti* has also corroborated the definition of Brahmagupta. On the authority of the first of the previously quoted texts of Hārīta, viz. 'The beginning of a month.....the concluding day of that month', when, owing to the slow or quick motion

114. The *Sūryasiddhānta* reads '*māsāstaireva vatsarah*', while our author reads *māsāḥ samvatsarah smṛtaḥ*.'

respectively of the sun, both the *tithi*-s are got within that *rāśi* and there arises thereby the doubt of performing a *śrāddha*, or no such *tithi* is available, resulting in the non-performance of a *śrāddha*, it has been therein advised by him to leave aside the stamp of solar month, designate the above lunar month as *Pauṣa*, *Māgha* and so on and unhesitatingly perform the annual *śrāddha* in that month, thus singled out and he has thus established the force of the month names such as *Māgha* in the lunar months alone.

Thus in the following text the application of the names such as *Māgha* and others to solar month is rather secondary, owing to its similarity with the month, begun by the sun in Capricornus, just like the expression viz. "The boy is fire."

'The sages recommend the performance of tonsure and vows in the six months, beginning with *Māgha* and ending with the time of the beginning of the sleep of Śāraṅgin (i.e. Hari); a group of two months, beginning with *Māgha*, is called a season and three such seasons make an *ayana* (i.e. the total period of the sun's northward or southward march).'

So, "by reason of various uses, found in the *Brahmapurāṇa* and other works, the force of the words '*Māgha* and others primarily rests in the lunar months, ending in a fullmoon day and secondarily in such months, ending in a newmoon day'—this view is also refuted, inasmuch as the quotations from the *Śruti*, *Hārīta*, Brahmagupta and other authorities have designated a month as ending in a newmoon day and because the text of designation is more authoritative than that of analogical deduction and also because, in view of the facts that the lunar month of *Caitra*, ending in a fullmoon day, consists of thirty *tithis*, ending in a *Caitra* fullmoon day and the implied meaning must always have an expressed counterpart, it depends upon the lunar month of *Caitra*, ending in a newmoon day.

Thus, it having been established that the use of the words '*Caitra*' etc is in relation to the month of the same name, ending in a newmoon day, somebody has said on the authority of the *sūtras* of Pāṇini (iv. 2, 3 and iv. 2, 21) :—

"'A period of time is designated by an asterism' and 'the fullmoon day in an asterism (gives the name to that month)' the words such as *Caitra* have been derived from the fullmoon day with the *Citrā* asterism with the further suffix *aṇ*, on the strength of the above *sūtras*."

This is wrong, because the words *Caitra* and others are also applied to *ahorātra* (day-and-night taken together), *trirātra* (three nights, i.e. three full days), *daśarātra* (ten nights, i.e. ten fulldays) and other measures of time.

If it is assumed that the words *Caitra* and others are exclusively applied to months by derivative convention, the reply is that the words *kārttika* and others are applied even though the asterisms, viz. *kṛttikā* and others, do not coincide with those months (the names of which are obviously derived from the names of those asterisms).

So says the *Jyotiṣa* :—

The ultimate and the penultimate months, as also the month of *Phālguna* are known

as consisting of three asterisms each, while the remaining (nine) months are considered as consisting of two asterisms each, as calculated from the *kṛttikā* asterism.

The meaning of the above text is :—

Two asterisms, beginning with *kṛttikā*, in nine months and three such in *Āśvina* and *Bhādra*, which are the ultimate and penultimate months (in this scheme) and also in *Phālguna*, all in conjunction with the fullmoon day, form the twelve months, beginning with *kārttika*.

Pāṇini has laid down the above-mentioned partial derivation of the month names from the names of asterisms on the general observation of facts. So it is not to be said that either of the two asterisms, *Kṛttikā* and *Rohiṇī*, is got from the word *kṛttikā* and this argument holds good in other months also, because the above-quoted text viz. 'The ultimate etc.' has also been laid down on the general observation of facts, to which the case under consideration is an exception.

As the *Brahmapurāṇa* says :—

When the *Āgneya* asterism coincides with the fullmoon day of *kārttika*, that *tithi* is said to be a great one and pre-eminently fit for bathing and fasts. When again the *Yāmya* asterism falls in that *tithi*, that is also spoken of by the sages as highly auspicious.

When also the *Prājāpatya* asterism concurs with that *tithi*, that is spoken of as the *Mahākārttikī* and is difficult to be secured even by the gods

Āgneya, *Yāmya* and *Prājāpatya* are *Kṛttikā*, *Bharaṇī* and *Rohiṇī* respectively. Here in the above text the fullmoon *tithi* in conjunction with *Bharaṇī*, also belongs to *Kārttika* but according to the opponent it comes to the category of *Āśvina*. In the fullmoon day, falling within the period between the 16th and 26th days of the month when the sun is in Libra (i.e. in the solar *Kārttika* month), there occurs the invariable concurrence of the *Bharaṇī* asterism, in view of the fact that the above fullmoon day, included as it is within the lunar month, coinciding with the solar *Kārttika* month, is undoubtedly of the *Kārttika* month, owing to the fixed rule of the staying of the moon in the self-same serial position of the sun, when in the seventh *rāśi* (i.e. *Kārttika*) at the end of the fullmoon day. So also the conjunction with the *Rohiṇī* asterism occurs only in the *Kārttika* fullmoon day, included within the lunar month, running from the solar *Kārttika* month and falling between the 10th and 14th days of the solar *Agrahāyana* month, when the sun is in Scorpio and in no other *Kārttika* fullmoon day. Similarly, in the fullmoon day, falling between the 16th and 23rd days of the month, when the sun is in Scorpio (i.e. in the solar *Agrahāyana* month), there occurs the invariable concurrence of the *Rohiṇī* asterism and very seldom of the *Mṛgaśīrā* asterism, in view of the fact that the above fullmoon day, included as it is within the lunar month, coinciding with the solar *Agrahāyana* month, is undoubtedly of the *Agrahāyana* month, owing to the fixed rule of the staying of both the sun and the moon in the self-same serial position, when in the seventh *rāśi* (i.e. *Kārttika*) at the end of the fullmoon day. In that case the conversion of the *Mārgaśīrṣa*

(i.e. *Agrahāyana*) month into the (astral) *Kārttika* month takes place owing to the transference of the asterism. Thus similar cases of transference of asterisms shall be understood by the learned in other months also.

Somebody has defined the *Caitra* month as 'the lunar month, begun by the sun in Pisces and beginning from the bright *pratipad* (i.e. first *tithi*) and ending in the newmoon day.' This definition is also not happy, as it is too short to cover a *Kṣayamāsa* (i.e. when a full solar month is included within a full lunar month of the above description).

So the *Jyotiṣa* says :—

An *adhimāsa* (or intercalary month) is clearly a month without any *saṅkrāntis*, while sometimes a *kṣayamāsa* occurs, having two *saṅkrāntis* included within it. The latter may happen only in the three months beginning with *Kārttika* and nowhere else and in that eventuality to *adhimāsa* (i.e. intercalary months) come up within the course of a year.¹¹⁵

The *Jyotiṣa* again says :—

When two intercalary months happen in a year and a *kṣayamāsa* invariably occurs in either of the three months, beginning with *Kārttika*, these three months are to be carefully avoided in marriage, sacrifice, festivity and other auspicious acts.

As a *kṣayamāsa* has two *saṅkrāntis* included within it, so the possibility of the loss of one (solar) month, included within a lunar month, arises. When the sun's entrance into Sagittarius occurs in the *pratipad* of the bright fortnight and that into Capricornus in the next newmoon day, the lunar month, begun as it is by the sun in Scorpio, is *Mārgaśīrṣa* (i.e. *Agrahāyana*) and the next lunar month, begun as it is by the sun in Capricornus, is appropriately *Māgha* and consequently the loss of the month of *Pauṣa* occurs, owing to the absence of the solar month, begun by the sun in Sagittarius. If you say 'Let that happen', then in that year there arises the objection of the loss of the annual *śrāddhas* to be performed in the appropriate *tithi*-s of that month, militating against the injunction of annual performance of the same.

The above discussion thus does away with such definitions as the following :—

The lunar month, which ends in a (solar) month, to be completed by the sun in

115. The obvious reason of a *kṣayamāsa*, happening only in the three months, beginning with *Kārttika* i.e. in *Kārttika*, *Agrahāyana* and *Pauṣa* only, is that these months alone may have 29 days only and a lunar month is $29\frac{1}{2}$ days only, the lunar month's duration in such cases being more than the corresponding solar month's duration. The reason of two *adhimāsas* coming up within a year in the eventuality of a *kṣayamāsa* is that two *adhimāsas*, one preceding and the other succeeding a *kṣayamāsa*, prepare the ground for the opposite coincidence of the solar and lunar months by their coincidence of the same. Śaka 1885 (=1963-64 A.D.) is a recent example of the phenomenon.

Aries, is called *Caitra*'. Otherwise an intercalary month is likely to be named after the preceding solar month.

Others, again, accept the definition of Brahmagupta as good, Brahmagupta says :—

The lunar month, in which the *saṅkrānti* with the sun in Aries occurs, is *Caitra*. Similarly, the lunar months, beginning with *Vaiśākha*, are formed by the passage of the sun into Taurus etc.

Tac-caitram (i.e. that is *Caitra*)—here *Caitraḥ* (masculine gender) *eva* (is verily *Caitram* (neuter gender) with the suffix *aṇ* (Pāṇini iv. 2, 55, Vārtika 2744), added for forming a synonym, inasmuch as sometimes suffixes appended for forming synonyms, such as in words like *devatā* (feminine gender, meaning a 'god') becoming *daivata* (neuter gender with the suffix *aṇ*, also meaning 'a god'), thus change the genders of the original words. The above definition (of a lunar month) holds good in the case of a *kṣayamāsa* also, as one single month becomes designated with two names, owing to the entrance of the sun in two *rāśis* in that month. But here the fault arises in the definition being too short to include an intercalary month. Owing to the following and similar other text viz. 'The lunar month, crossed over by the sun, is known as an intercalary month,' a lunar month without any *saṅkrānti* is, indeed, an intercalary month.

It is not to be said that an intercalary month is a nameless (*anāmaka*) month, owing to the absence of any month over and above the months such as *Caitra*, on account of the maxim viz. 'An unqualified thing cannot be a general thing.' It is also not to be argued on the strength of the following text :—

The vicious nameless (*vināmaka*) month, within a year, attacked as it is with *nairṛtas* and *yātudhānas* (classes of goblins), destroys the good effects of sacrifices.

For, the above text is spurious. Even if it be a genuine one, the epithet *vināmaka* is figurative and means *vināmakapada* (i.e. assuming the role of a nameless month), owing to the absence of any religious action to be performed in the months marked as *Caitra* etc. and also owing to the use of words such as *dvirāṣāḍha* (i.e. the second *Āṣāḍha*) in such texts as the following of the *Rājamārtanḍa* :—

The month, in which the sun goes to the cancer after crossing over the newmoon (i.e. after the lapse of a full lunar month), is known as *dvirāṣāḍha*. Viṣṇu sleeps in the Cancer.

The word '*vināmakaḥ*' in the former text has been read as '*vināmakaiḥ*' in the *Kālamādhavīya*.

We should not say that the use of words such as *dvirāṣāḍha* is secondary, because :—

(1) an epithet cannot be simultaneously applied to two things and an epithet cannot be double,

(2) if an intercalary month be a nameless month and a person dies in that month, his *sapiṇḍīkaraṇa* (i.e. the first annual *śrāddha*) and *sāṃvatsarika* (i.e. the next following annual *śrāddhas* become impossible of performance, as such a month is without the special designation such as *Caitra* and other months and

(3) there is the absolute duty of performing the *sapīṇḍikaraṇa* in the corresponding *śukla* of the next year, which is nothing but the particular *tithi* of the particular month of death of that person, otherwise there will be a serious lapse.

In another text of the *Rājamārtaṇḍa* viz. Whenever two months of the same name happen in a single year, the religious duties for the *manes* and those for the gods are to be performed in the former and in the latter months respectively, the two months have been spoken of as bearing the same designation and the word '*pitṛkāryāṇi*', occurring in the clause viz. '*tatrādye pitṛkāryāṇi*' [i.e. the religious duties for the *manes* (are to be performed) in the former], includes *sapīṇḍikaraṇa*. There is also the text of *Hārīta* to the same effect :—

The learned do not take an intercalary month into account in the performance of the *sapīṇḍikaraṇa*.

In the following text of the *Bhīmaparākrama* viz. 'The lunar month, crossed over by sun, is known as an intercalary month ; the religious duties, to be performed in that month, are to be done in the next following month'—which means 'that the duties, to be discharged in that intercalary month in accordance with the prescribed order, beginning from *Vaiśākha*, are to be performed in the next following month, which is the real *Vaiśākha* month in this case', the naming of that intercalary month as *Vaiśākha* etc. has been clearly established. Otherwise that would have been improper, owing to the absence of religious duties in an intercalary month.

Moreover, in the following two texts of *Jyotiṣa* and *Hārīta* respectively, viz. "If there occurs no *saṅkrānti* in the two fortnights, bright and dark, the duties, to be discharged in that lunar month (composed of the two fortnights), are to be gone through in the next following lunar month," and "The first (*ādya*) month (in such a case) is to be known as intercalary, while the second (*dvitīya*) is the real month (for the performance of religious duties)," the appellations *ādya* and *dvitīya* (i.e. first and second) hold good only in the event of both the months bearing the same name.

In fact, in accordance with the Śruti text viz. "That is to be known as the newmoon day of *Vaiśākha*, which is in conjunction with the asterism of *Rohiṇī*", another definition of a lunar month is set out below :—

The lunar month, connected with the sun in Pisces and different from the month, begun by a *saṅkrānti* (*sasaṅkrānta*) but without the passing of the sun into Aries, is called *Caitra*. To the statement "The lunar month, connected with the sun in Pisces, is *Caitra*" is added the phrase viz. "different from the month, begun by a *saṅkrānti* (*sasaṅkrānta*) but without the passing of the sun into Aries, because the month *Phālguna* is not so different (but is such a month, begun by a *saṅkrānti*) but without the passing of the sun into Aries. The addition of the word '*sasaṅkrānta*' is to obviate the fault of excluding an intercalary month from the above definition. The epithet *minastha-ravi-samyogī* (i.e. connected with the sun in Pisces) is to do away with the defect of being too wide as to include all the months in an intercalary month.

When the sun goes to the next *rāśi* and thereby creates a *saṅkrānti* in the first

moment of the first *tithi* (after a newmoon day), with the result that the earlier month becomes, indeed, an intercalary month and the real appellation of that month is certainly applied to the later month, it being the real month (for the performance of religious duties), it is not to be argued that the above definition is too short to include that phenomenon, owing to its absence of solar connection in the previous *rāśi*. There is no narrowness in the above definition, as the solar sphere is wide enough to allow its one portion to have connection with the previous *rāśi*, inspite of the connection of its another portion with the subsequent *rāśi*. Thus 'the lunar month, connected with the sun in Aries but different from the month, begun by a *saṅkrānti* but without the passing of the sun in Taurus, is called *Vaiśākha*'—such definitions of the other months are to be understood. Thus the double naming of a single month, *kṣayamāsa*, is proper, as the definitions of two successive months apply to it, owing to the passing of the sun into the two appropriate *rāśis* of those months.

It is not to be argued that in case of a person's death in a *kṣayamāsa*, which bears the appellations of both the months, there is no possibility of the performance of his annual *śrāddha*, as on the strength of the following text of Vyāsa viz. "In case of a persons's death in the first or the second half of a *tithi*, the earlier or the later month respectively, included within the *kṣayamāsa*, is to be decided upon by the learned (for the performance of his *śrāddha*)", the prescribed procedure is to take the corresponding *tithi* of the earlier or the later month respectively in case a person dies in the first or the second half of a *tithi*. It is not to be suspected that the above-quoted text is a spurious one, as it has been cited in the western *nibandhas* such as the *Kālamādhavīya*.

The (principal) lunar months such as *Caitra* having been thus properly defined, a subsidiary lunar month of *Caitra* is to be understood as "the collection of thirty *tithi*s ending in a fullmoon day of *Caitra*." This latter kind of month is not to be defined as "The month, begun by the sun in Pisces and commencing from the first *tithi* of a dark fortnight and ending in the next fullmoon day", as this definition is too short to include the month, begun by the sun in Aquarius and commencing from the first *tithi* of a dark fortnight. It is also not to be defined as "the dark fortnight. to be ended by the sun in Pisces and the immediately following bright fortnight taken together", as this definition contains the defect of excluding a *kṣayamāsa*.

Thus the words *Caitra* etc. are primarily applied to the lunar month of those names, while they impliedly refer to the solar months, due to almost universal practice. So the months *Caitra* etc. are to be understood as solar, only when there are appropriate attributes prefixed to them, in the absence of which they invariably refer to the principal lunar months and when there are references in the context to their subsidiary lunar character, they are to be so understood. The *Śuddhikaumudī* (of the present author, i.e. Govindānanda) is to be consulted for the determination of an intercalary month, which is passed over here for reasons of space.

(2) Fortnight

Somebody has said that "fortnight means the half portion of a lunar month" on the authority of various texts, such as the following :—

The *Vāyupurāṇa* (II. 21, 51) says :—

An experienced man should perform *śrāddhas* in the forenoon of a bright fortnight and in the afternoon of a dark fortnight but should not overstep *Rohiṇa* (i.e. the 9th *muhūrta* in which *śrāddhas* are performed). [The 9th *muhūrta* is between 6 hrs. 24 ms. and 7 hrs. 12ms. after sunrise.]

Manu (III. 278) says :—

Just as the later (i.e. the dark) fortnight is superior to the earlier (i.e. the bright) one for the performance of *śrāddhas*, so the afternoon is better than the forenoon for the same purpose.

The *Brahmapurāṇa* says :—

One should perform *śrāddhas* daily in the dark fortnight of the month of *Āśvina*.

Kātyāyana says :—

One should not transgress the dark fortnight (i.e. one should perform *śrāddhas* in the same period) even by the offering of *śākas* (i.e. vegetables).

The above view is wrong, as the word 'fortnight' also applies to fifteen days of a sidereal month.

As the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* says :—

I have already said that thirty *muhūrtas* (i.e. collections of 48 minutes) constitute a day (i.e. a day and a night taken together). Fifteen such days, O Brahman ! are collectively known as a fortnight.

The *Amarakoṣa* also says :—

Thirty such (*muhūrtas*) make a day (i.e. a day and night taken together) and a fortnight consists of fifteen such days.

It is not to be argued that though the word 'fortnight' is applicable to both the above senses (i.e. half-portion of a lunar month and any other collection of fifteen days), yet owing to conventional implication, supported by the users of this word, it applies principally to the collection of fifteen *tithis*, beginning with *pratipad*. There is also not the suspicion of this reversal of its usual meaning, owing to the absence of a defining text, which is more powerful than an illustrative one. The *Amarakoṣa* has further said that 'the earlier and later fortnights are to be known as the bright and dark ones respectively and a month consists of both the fortnights.' The above definition is simply an illustration of the word 'fortnight', divided into bright and dark ones. No argument of almost universal usage holds good here by the logic that the power of conventional implication is equally forceful as definition, just as the words *Caitra* etc. refer to solar months (by virtue of almost universal usage). But it may at most be said that the words 'bright' and 'dark' have the force of applicability to the collection of fifteen *tithis*, beginning with *pratipad*.

(3) Season

The *Sūryasiddhānta*¹¹⁶ (*mānādhyāya*, ch. xiv, vv. 9a-10a) says :—

The six months, following the sun's entrance into Capricornus, are collectively the period of the sun's northward march (*uttarāyana*) and similarly the six months, following the sun's entrance into Cancer, are collectively the period of the sun's southward march (*dakṣiṇāyana*). Winter and other seasons are each composed of two *rāśis*.

Māgha and other months constitute a season by the sun's staying into two consecutive *rāśis*. The seasons are the following :—winter, spring, summer, rainy, autumn and late autumn. There are three seasons each in the *uttarāyana* and *dakṣiṇāyana* periods respectively.. So a season is the period of the sun's staying in two consecutive *rāśis*, such as Capricornus. This the definition of a season.

So the *Ratnamālā* says :—

Six seasons, viz. winter, spring, summer, rainy, autumn and late autumn happen in succession by reason of the sun's staying into two consecutive *rāśis*, beginning with Capricornus (*mṛga*).

The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* says :—

Two months, created by the sun, constitute a season. This shows that the definition of a season as 'consisting of two consecutive months, calculated by the solar method', has been given.

Moreover, the *Amarakoṣa*, an authority on definitions of words (being a dictionary), says :—

"Two consecutive months such as *Māgha* constitute a season and three such consecutive seasons make up the period of the sun's northward or southward march (*ayana*)." This latter statement viz. 'three such seasons etc. definitely establishes that the measurement of a season is by means of the solar months.

The Śruti says :—

Tapas and *Tapasya* (i.e. *Māgha* and *Phālguna*) constitute the winter season, *Madhu* and *Mādhava* (i.e. *Caitra* and *Vaiśākha*) make up the spring season and *Śukra* and *Śuci* (i.e. *Jyaiṣṭha* and *Āṣāḍha*) constitute the summer season. This entire period of the sun's northward march (*udagayana*, i.e. *uttarāyana*) is the day-time of the gods. *Nabhas* and *Nabhasya* (i.e. *Śrāvaṇa* and *Bhādra*), constitute the rainy season, *Iṣa* and *Urja* (i.e. *Āśvina* and *Kārttika*) make up the autumn season and *Sahas* and *Sahasya* (i.e. *Agrahāyana* and *Pauṣa*) constitute the late autumn season. This entire period of the sun's southward march (*dakṣiṇāyana*) is the night of the gods,

Here, as the Śruti concludes by the words *uttarāyana* (*udayana* in the Śruti text) and *dakṣiṇāyana* and as *ayana* (i.e. going, march) is invariably of the sun and

116. The *Sūryasiddhānta* reads "*ṣaṇmāsā uttarāyaṇam*," and "*dvirāśimāthā ṛtavastato pi*" in the 1st and 3rd lines, while our author reads "*ṣaṇmāsāstuttarāyaṇam*" and "*dvirāśimānā ṛtavaste cāpi*" in the corresponding portions.

consequently the words such as *Tapas* and *Tapasya* refer by necessary implication to the solar months, so the Śruti has also described the force of the term 'season' in relation to the constituent solar months, bearing those names. So the erroneous view of some writers in applying the term 'season' to the couple of the principal lunar months of the names of *Tapas* and *Tapasya* etc. by analogy of their primary import is to be discarded.

So, while explaining the text viz. "In the thirteenth *tithi* of the dark fortnight of the (subsidiary lunar) month of *Āśvina* in conjunction with the asterism of *Māgha* in the *prāvṛd-ṛtu* (i.e. the rainy season), Yama, (the god of Death) (throws into the human world) the just deceased persons and the *manes* from his abode", the *Śrāddhaviveka*¹¹⁷ (of Śūlapāṇi) (pp. 91-92) has interpreted the word *prāvṛd-ṛtu* as 'consisting of four months' in accordance with the view that 'three seasons makes a year.' Any other explanation (such as 'season of two months' for the word *ṛtu*) would have otherwise been improper, in view of the fact that the thirteenth *tithi* in conjunction with the asterism of *Maghā* falls in the principal lunar *Bhādra* month and is thus properly within the rainy season, according to the above view.

In the following text of *Marīci* viz. "One should perform the principal *śrāddhas* every month and failing to do so, in every season", the use of the word 'season' is in relation to the lunar calculation, which must needs be the subsidiary one, (as such a season comes earlier than the one by the principal lunar calculation and is thus not very much different from the solar season) owing to the absence of its specific signification of winter and other seasons and also due to the fact that there is no season in excess of the six such, beginning with winter, by virtue of the maxim, 'An unqualified statement cannot be a general statement.'

In the following statement of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* viz. "The established rule is that one should give gems to the members of the twice-born classes, specially in the fullmoon day of *Kārttika* after the lapse of the autumn", it is understood that the end of season is calculated by the subsidiary lunar month, ending in a fullmoon day (as such a fullmoon day of *Kārttika* invariably occurs in that very month, which just follows the autumnal season and not in *Agrahāyana*, in which the fullmoon day of *Kārttika*, by the principal lunar calculation normally happens). So the words 'autumn' etc. are applied by implication to the couples of months, ending in fullmoon days and no suspicion of the general reversal of meaning thereby arises, owing to the absence of a defining text in its favour, which is more powerful than an illustrative text and also due to the principle of the comparative weakness of a Smṛti text than a Śruti text.

Now we begin to describe the main subject-matter of the work, covering 293 pages

117. The *Śrāddhaviveka* (edited with the commentary of Śrīkṛṣṇa Tarkālaṅkāra by Caṇḍīcaraṇa Smṛtibhuṣaṇa in Bengali characters, Calcutta, 13f4 (B.E.)=1907 A.D.) reads 'prāvṛd-ṛtur atra māsa-catuṣṭayam tryṛtu-saṃvatsara-matena', while our author reads 'prāvṛd-ṛtur atra ṛtuḥ saṃvatsara iti matena' which is meaningless.

(pp. 240-532) and accordingly enumerate in brief the different duties, incumbent on a religious-minded person and relevant to the several months, beginning with *Vaiśākha*.

The usual religious duties of this first month, along with a detailed description of the *Akṣaya-tritīyā* and *Piplitaki-dvādaśī-vratas*, cover 19 pages (pp. 240-259). Then follow the duties of the month of *Jyaiṣṭha* with a similarly detailed description of the *Savitri-caturdaśī vrata* and a short account of *Dośaharā* (i.e. worship of the Gaṅgā), covering 24 pages (pp. 259-283). The rites of *Āṣāḍha* with a description of the *cāturmāsya-vrata*, beginning from an auspicious *tithi* of this month and ending in the similar *tithi* of *Kārttika* and thus extending over four months, cover the next 9 pages (pp. 283-292). The *Śrāvaṇa* duties, containing also the worship of the goddess *Manasādevī* on the fifth day of the dark fortnight of the month to secure immunity from snake-bite, are described in 5 pages only (pp. 292-297). The *Bhādra* portion is rather a long one, covering 45 pages (pp. 298-343) and includes *Rohiṇaṣṭamīvrata* or (*Kṛṣṇa*-) *janmāṣṭamī-vrata*, *Ananta-caturdaśī-vrata* and *Agastyārgha-dāna*. The *Āśvina* portion is the longest one in this work, covering as it does 112 pages (pp. 343-454) and includes *Aśvayuk-kṛṣṇapakṣa-śrāddha*, *Maghā-trayodaśī-śrāddha*, *Durgotsava-vrata* (according to the *Kālikāpurāṇa*), *khañjana-darśana*¹¹⁸ (or sight of the bird *khañjana* or wagtail) and *kojāgara-Lakṣmīpūjā*. The portion, devoted to the month of *Kārttika*, is comparatively short, consisting of 27 pages only (pp. 455-481) and includes many miscellaneous topics such as *Preta-caturdaśī*, *Lukṣmīpūjā*, *Dyūta-pratipad*, *Bhrātṛ-dvītiyā*, *Vaka-pañcaka*, *Śrīharer-Uttānam* and *Kārttikī-vrata*. This portion also contains passing references to *Goṣṭhaṣṭamī* (i.e. worship and feeding of cows) and *Jagad-dhātṛī-pūjā* (i.e. worship of *Durgā* in a lion-seated form) on the eighth and ninth *tithis* respectively of the bright fortnight of *Kārttika*. The chapters on *Mārgaśīrṣa* (i.e. *Agrahāyaṇa*) and *Pauṣa* are rather shorter, the former comprising 6 pages (pp. 482-487) and the latter two pages and a half only (pp. 487-490). The former includes *Navāṇṇa-śrāddha* (i.e. a *śrāddha* on account of the harvesting of new rice) with its duties, while the latter lays down the duty of performing *śrāddha* on the eighth *tithi* of the dark fortnight with cakes. The *Māgha* chapter covers 16 pages (pp. 490-506) and contains among others the important topics of *Māgha-saptamī-snāna* (i.e. ceremonial ablution in any river, specially in the Gaṅgā, in the seventh *tithi* of the bright fortnight of the month of *Māgha*), *Bhīṣmāṣṭamī-tarpaṇa* and *Bhalmī-ekādaśī*, in which last one has got to undergo fasting. The *Phālguna* section consists of 11 pages only (pp. 506-517) and contains the only important topic of the *Śiva-rātri-vrata*, which is to be performed in the fourteenth *tithi* of the dark fortnight of the month. The concluding *Caitra* section, though not a large one and extending over 15 pages only

118. Vide 'A volume of studies in Indology, presented to Prof. P. V. Kane' (Poona, 1941), pp. 67-69 for the present writer's paper viz. *Khañjana-darśana* and also II (b) (II) above in this part of the present work.

(pp. 517-532), includes the highly important topic of the *Rāmanavaml-vrata*, the only authority utilized in this connection being the *Agastya-saṃhitā*¹¹⁹ (altogether 32 verses from chaps. 13, 26-28).

It may be added here that the Durgotsava-vrata, according to the *Kālikā-purāṇa* and described in the *Āśvina* chapter of V. K. K., covers 85 pagas (pp. 365-449) and is thus a small treatise in itself, having been thrust into the relevant portion of the longer work, like the *Durgotsava-tattva* of Raghunandana, similarly incorporated within his *Tithitattva*. The separateness of this Durgotsava-vrata portion of V. K. K. is evident from the fact that it has been specifically named by our author as the '*Durgārcā-kaumudī*' (i.e. a manual on the worship of the goddess Durgā) and begins with a benedictory and ends with a concluding verse, the special name of this portion being given in the latter verse. The former verse expressly says that *Śrī-durgārcā* (i.e. worship of the goddess Durgā) is being considered in following pages in accordance with the prescriptions of the *Kālikāpurāṇa*, which is however, the only authority for the procedural portion (pp. 399-449) but many other Purāṇas, including the *Devī*^o and *Nandikeśvara*^o, both of which also contain elaborate procedures of the worship of Durgā, have also been utilized by our author in the preceding theoretical portion (pp. 365-398) of this *Durgārcā-kaumudī*.

The concluding 47 pages (pp. 533-79) deal with miscellaneous matters such as the glorification of the Gaṅgā, the religious efficacy of the *tulasī* (basil) leaf, the greatness of *śālogrāma* stone (fossil ammonite), the particular *vratas*, appropriate to the seven days of the week, worship on *Sūtikā-ṣaṣṭhī* (the sixth day after the birth of a child when the goddess is to be invoked), worship of the *Maṅgala-caṇḍikā*, worship on one's birthday, authoritative texts on miscellaneous topics, the duties of a Śūdra, of a widow and of a chaste wife.

(c) His definition of *dāna* and its detailed procedure with a concluding note on the *Dānakriyākaumudī*.

The *Dānakriyākaumudī*, (D.K.K.) as we have seen earlier, is the first in composition of our author's four published digests and is also the shortest of them. It is also shorter than all other published digests on *dāna*, such as the *Dānakāṇḍa* of the *Kṛtyakalpataru* of Lakṣmīdhara, the *Dānasāgara* of Ballāla Sena, the *Dānakhaṇḍa* of the *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* of Hemādri etc. The text portion of this work consists of 206 pages only., the preface, contents and index etc. occupying further 41 pages. Our author devotes,

119. Vide pp. 13-15 of the first part of the present work, for particulars about this work. It may also be stated here that V.K.K. quotes profusely from the *Agastya-saṃhitā* or the *Agastya* (which is the same as the former) in its previous portions and on pp. 537-39 also, as will be evident from the Index (p. 20) of the latter.

after the usual benedictory verses on the first page, almost 38 pages (pp. 2-39) to the following preliminary topics :—

- (1) Definition of *dāna* (pp. 2-5),
- (2) Determination of the specific deities, presiding over different objects of gift (pp. 5-7),
- (3) Proper procedure of the acceptance of gifts (pp. 7-11),
- (4) Proper procedure of the making of gifts (pp. 11-14) and
- (5) Detailed procedure of the making and receiving of gifts (pp. 14-39).

We are concerned here with the first and last topics only, viz. definition of *dāna* and its detailed procedure.

(I) Definition of *dāna*

Our author first quotes Devala which is to the following effect :—

Gift, which is the making over of wealth to a person, mentioned in the Scriptures and in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein (*yathāvat*),¹²⁰ is being described here.

A verse of the *Agnipurāṇa* is next cited, the purport of which is given below :—

One should throw water on the ground after referring mentally to (*uddiśya*) a recipient. There is an end of the ocean but there is no limit to the effects of a gift.

Our author adds the following comment to the above verse :—

It must be admitted that the word *uddiśya* means here 'believing that (the object of gift) will be accepted by somebody.' If on the above understanding an article is gifted away and its acceptance is by chance not effected, the gift so made is no gift at all and conduces to nullity. One cannot say that the above procedure of making a gift is too short to include a gift of learning, as the word 'gift' is used there figuratively. Otherwise, there would arise the necessity of repeating the formula of making a gift and the teacher, who makes the gift, would also have to give *dakṣiṇā* (i.e. an accessory of gift in the shape of money) to the pupil on the authority of the following text of Vyāsa :—

A gift without a *dakṣiṇā* becomes fruitless.

On the contrary it is the teacher who receives (and does not give) the *dakṣiṇā*. Similarly figurative is the use of the word *dāna* in the phrase *abhaya-dāna* (i.e. gift of protection from fear of death etc.), as it is gift of no tangible thing at all but is the

120. The *Dānasāgara* (p. 28) and the *Śuddhittva* of Raghunandana (p. 345) read *śraddhayā* (i.e. with a charitable attitude) instead of the above word, used by our author and explained by him as *śāstroktā-prakāraṇam*.

suppression of fear only. In case of a gift made to a deity there is no corresponding acceptance on the part of the latter but it is an implied gift on the assumption of its acceptance. Moreover, the offering to a god is a *yāga* (i.e. sacrifice) and the appropriate phrases used in worship, which includes an offering to the god concerned, are *śaci-yāga*, *māṭṛ-yāga* etc., thereby indicating that it is a *yāga* (and not a *dāna*), whence the conclusion is that the use of the word *dāna* in those cases also is figurative. So the definition of an ordinary gift comes to be the following :—

A gift is the relinquishing of one's ownership over a thing with the intention of conferring (*uddeśyagata*) it on some other person.

By virtue of this definition giving of clothes and similar other things to servants, friends and so on amounts to a gift proper. Here the phrase *uddeśyagata* has been used to obviate the taking over by somebody of the clothes etc., cast off by the monks.

Our author now quotes *Yājñavalkya* (I. 200-203), *Viṣṇu*, the *Rāmāyaṇa* (I. 12, 30) and *Agnipurāṇa*, the purports of which are given below :—

Yājñavalkya :—

A person becomes a fit donee not by dint of learning or penance only but by the association of both with good religious habits. A learned man, wishing his prosperity, should worship and bestow cows, land, sesame, gold and similar other things on a deserving person but nothing on an unworthy individual. A person, devoid of learning and penance, should accept no gift. If he does so, he lowers down not only the donor but also his own self. One should make daily gifts to worthy recipients and specially on proper occasions, after having sanctified them, with charitable attitude and according to one's capacity, after having gone to the residence of or called at one's own residence, such persons.

*Viṣṇu*¹²¹ :—

If a person makes a gift of even the entire wealth, acquired by unfair means (*anyāyādhigatām*) to an unworthy person, being himself devoid of the charitable attitude, he reaps no religious merit from such an action. But if a person, possessed of the charitable attitude and devotion, makes gift of a handful of vegetables to highly worthy man, he secures the highest prosperity.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* :—

Whatever is given away with contempt is tainted with the faults of the donor.

The *Agnipurāṇa* :—

A gift, made to a Vedic student, is increased hundredfold, that to a person, who has understood the sacred lore, becomes endless in merit and that to an officiating priest assumes permanence in effect.

121. Quoted in the *Dānasūgara* (p. 33) as from Devala with two minor changes and one important different reading, viz. *apī nyāyāgatām* (i.e. even if acquired by proper means) instead of *anyāyādhigatām*.

(II) Its detailed procedure

The more important matters of this rather long topic, covering 25 pages, are set out below :—

(1) In the formula of making a gift, there occurs the phrase, viz. *Viśiṣṭa-bhārata-varṣākhyā-bhūpradeśe* [i.e. in the tract of land, specially designated as *Bhārata-varṣa* (i.e. India)]. After saying this our author adds by way of comment that the mention of the requisite in the form of the name of the country such as the above is necessary. Otherwise, the gift, if made in any other country which is not a land of religious actions, will be rendered null and void. Our author quotes the following text of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* in support of his above argument :—

O sage ! heaven is reached and salvation attained from this country (i.e. *Bhārata-varṣa*) alone, which is also the place, where men are born as lower animals and suffer from the torments of hell. No other tract of land exists on the earth for the mortals, where they are called upon to discharge their religious duties.

(2) The above formula also contains the word '*adya*' (i.e. to-day) in the phrase viz. *adyāmuke māsi*, in defence of which our author says that though we get the very *tithi*, fortnight and month from other words of the formula, yet this very word *adya* has been additionally inserted in it on the authority of the texts of sages, as recorded in the *Agnipurāṇa*, *Skandapurāṇa*, *Śaṅkha-Likhita* and *Garuḍapurāṇa* and also by force of inference from the use of the particle *ca* (i.e. and), occurring in the phrase, viz. *māsa-pakṣa-tithināñca* (i.e. and of the month, fortnight and *tithi*) in a text of the *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* and implying thereby that 'to-day, consisting of a day and a night, i.e. 24 hours', is to be understood from it.

(3) Here say the *Tīrabhukṣīyas*¹²² :—

"As the word *adya* means 'in this day' and the word 'day' implies, the day-portion only and not 'day and night taken together', so the use of the word *adya* is unjustified in the case of the performance of a religious act at night, where the phrase *asyām rātryām* (i.e. in this night) is preferable."

Our author, after having quoted the above, condemns the use of the latter phrase, as suggested by the Maithilas by force of the argument that the word *adya*, though literally meaning 'this day', is always used to indicate 'day and night taken together' and thus invariably applies to this bigger period of time, just as the word *sadyaḥ*, though literally meaning 'in the same day', implies 'immediately'. He then quotes the *Amara-koṣā*, Caṇḍidāsa's commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa, *Manu* (V. 83) and many other authorities in support of his above interpretation.

(4) Our author then says in a learned disquisition that in spite of the absence of

122. The printed edition wrongly reads *Tīrabhakṣīyāḥ*, which should be *Tīrabhukṣīyāḥ*, meaning 'the residents of *Tīrabhukṣī*' i.e. the Maithilas, *Tīrabhukṣī* being a synonym of *Mithilā*.

a text, prescribing the specific mention of the month etc. in making gifts of beds and other things in a *śrāddha* in the second day, calculated from the ending day of impurity (*aśaucānta-dvitiya-dine*), such mention is also to be made on that day. He then incidentally refutes the following argument of the moderner :—

“On the authority of the use in the *Viṣṇusūtra* and *Matsyapurāṇa* of the phrases, viz. *aśauca-vyapagame* (i.e. after the expiry of the impurity) and *sūtakānte* (i.e. at the end of the uncleanness), the cessation of the unclean period is shown as the occasion and so the use of the phrase viz. *aśaucāntā-dvitiye’ hani* (on the second day, calculated from the ending day of impurity) does not hold good in a *śrāddha*, intended for a single person (*ekoddīṣṭa*) and performed along with the gift of beds etc. on the very day of death in cases of immediate purity. So the ancient usage of pronouncing the words, viz. *aśaucāntādvitiye’ hani* is to be discarded and invariably substituted by the phrase viz. *aśauca-vyapagame*.”

Our author says by way of refutation that the above innovation of the moderner is also to be rejected on the authority of the specific mention of the previous phrase in the *Matsyapurāṇa* and also by force of the logic that immediate purity (*sadyaḥ śauca*) is no impurity at all, as laid down by *Gotama*, *Yājñavalkya* (III. 28-29), *Parāśara*, *Manu* (V. 78) and *Śaṅkha*. Even in a case of immediate purity, which occurs when one gets the news of the death of his relation after the lapse of a whole year and when one becomes ceremonially purified just after taking a bath, there is no authority for prescribing the performance on that very day of the gift of the bedding requisites etc., as required in a *vṛṣotsarga-śrāddha* (i.e. a *śrāddha* with the additional rite of letting loose a bull for the benefit of the soul of the just deceased person) and the reasoning of its performance on the very day is necessarily weaker than the express text of the *Matsyapurāṇa*, prescribing it to be performed on the next following day. Moreover, if on the above reasoning of the moderner we accept the formula viz. ‘after the expiry of the impurity’ and if any obstacle arises in the performance of the *vṛṣotsarga-śrāddha* etc. on that very day (i.e. the eleventh day, calculated from the day of death), which is the ‘day following the end of impurity’, such *śrāddha* becomes fit to be performed on any following day whatsoever. So though the eleventh day is the proper day on account of its just following the expiry of impurity, yet it can by no means be qualified by the epithet viz. ‘after the expiry of the impurity’, inasmuch as when one comes to know of immediate purity at night or in the case of a *pakṣiṇī aśauca* (i.e. impurity extending over a day and a half—from one day’s sunrise to the next day’s sunset), when the impurity expires in the night itself, which is unfit for ordinary *śrāddhas* and the next following day is not the day, immediately after the expiry of impurity, there arises the impossibility of the performance of the *śrāddha* itself. Moreover, though the expiry of impurity is the deciding factor of the proper time of the *śrāddha*, yet if some other impurity intervenes or bleeding starts on the person of the performer on that very day, it becomes thereby unfit and the next day after the expiry of this second impurity becomes so fit, when *vṛṣotsarga* and similar other rites are to be performed.

Again, on the authority of the following text of the *Devīpurāṇa* it becomes evident that the proper time of a *śrāddha* is just on reaching a place of pilgrimage :—

“One should immediately perform a *śrāddha* just on reaching a place of pilgrimage.”

But if one reaches such a place at night and bleeding etc. prevent the performance of the *śrāddha* on the just following day, the *śrāddha* so deferred is to be performed on the day just after the expiry of this new impurity, which is the proper time of its performance. So the case being a bit different here, the above decision has been based on the authority of the texts of *Hārīta*, using the phrase viz. *Śvo bhūte* (i.e. on the next following day) and of *Vaijavāpagṛhya*, containing the word *aparedyuh* (i.e. on the next day), read with the above-mentioned text of the *Matsyapurāṇa*, viz. *āśaucāntād dvitīye’ hni* (i.e. on the day just after the expiry of impurity). But on the authority of special texts the *śrāddha*, intended for a single person, is to be gone through on the eleventh *tithi* of a dark fortnight and similar other day (i.e. a newmoon day). So the earlier authorities prescribe even in cases of immediate purity the offering of the ten *piṇḍas*, shaving and cleansing the house and clothes only on that very day but defer the performance of the *vṛṣotsarga*, *ekoddiṣṭa* etc. on the very next day, as these are prohibited to be performed on that very day after shaving.

Somebody has recommended the use of the phrase viz. *śuddhidine* (i.e. on the day of purity), which is also to be discarded owing to its inapplicability in cases of *pakṣiṇī* and similar other kinds of impurity. So the ancient usage of the formula *āśaucāntād dvitīye’ hantī* is justified.

(5) Though in the following texts of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (II.86.2ab) and *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, the names of the articles to be donated with those of their recipients are mentioned, yet the effects of those donations are not expressly stated therein :—

The *Rāmāyaṇa* says :—

Then (he) gave away wealth to Brāhmaṇas for (the spiritual benefit of the soul of) his father.

The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* says :—

He, who, being possessed of riches, should give to Brāhmaṇas wealth in the shape of jewels, clothes, land, conveyances and all other things to enjoy for our spiritual benefit.....

Our author says that one is not to conclude that in the absence of any express mention of the definite results of these gifts that heaven is the result by virtue of the maxim of the *Viśvājīti* sacrifice (where heaven is considered to be the result in the absence of any specific mention). He is of opinion that the results are to be inferred here from similar other texts, specifying them, as there is no propriety of making any inference of the attainment of heaven as the result here and also because that procedure leads to cumbrousness.

Somebody has also prescribed on the authority of the following longer text of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (II.86.2-3) (which occurs after the performance by Bharata of the *śrāddha* of his father, Daśaratha) that the gifts, specified here, are to be made after the performance

of the *ekoddiṣṭa śrāddha*. Our author, disapproving of this prescription, says that as a *śrāddha* is to be invariably performed at noon and as a gift is always to be made in the forenoon and also because the text of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in question simply lays down the handing over of the various articles of gift (and not the ceremonial act of giving), such donations are to be made before the performance of the *śrāddha* and that this conclusion is in consonance with the established practice of the *śiṣṭas* (i.e. the cultured persons).

The *Rāmāyaṇa* text is to the following effect :—

Then (he i. e. Bharata) gave away wealth to Brāhmaṇas for (the spiritual benefit of the soul of) his father, such as costly jewels, cows, beasts of burden, conveyances, maid-servants and man-servants, very big houses and magnificent ornaments on the occasion of the (deceased) king's obsequies.

(III) A concluding note on the D.K.K.

Though our author treats in the D.K.K. of 38 gifts only against 1375 ones, described in the *Dānasāgara*, yet the treatment of the former closely follows that of the latter, as will be evident from the appendage of the relevant Vedic mantras to each of the above gifts, following the practice of Ballāla Sena and unlike that of the *Dānakāṇḍa* of the *Kṛtyakalpataru* of Lakṣmīdhara and other later digest-writers on *dāna*. Not only in the main subject-matter but also in the preliminary topics nos. (2), (3) and (4), enumerated above and relating to the determination of the specific presiding deities and proper procedures of the making and receiving of gifts, our author's treatment is nothing but a faithful copy¹²³ of the encyclopaedic *Dānasāgara*, which is almost the earliest and most comprehensive treatise on the bestowal of gifts. Readers are referred to the present writer's Introduction to his edition¹²⁴ of this latter work for a description of its contents.

123. The only important exception is the topic viz. *kanyādāna* (i.e. giving away a maiden in marriage, pp. 74-80 of D.K.K.). Though both the *Dānasāgara* (vv. 5 and 19, pp. 49-50) and the D.K.K. quote verses from the *Viṣṇudharmottara* (III. 301, 15a and 29a) in the topic on the procedure of acceptance of gifts (along with the names of the presiding deities of the various articles donated), which verses mention the name of a maiden as one of the things to be given away in a particular manner and with the utterance of the name of a particular presiding deity, yet the former elaborate work has omitted *kanyādāna* from its treatment ; but the latter manual has included it in its description. Another exception, which is of minor importance, is the topic viz. *śālagrāma-śilā-dāna* (i.e. gift of the *śālagrāma* stone, i.e. fossil ammonite, used as an emblem in the worship of Viṣṇu). It covers 8 lines only on p. 65.

124. Published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* as work no. 274, 1953-56.

(d) His definition of *aśauca*

The *Śuddhikaumudī* as we have seen above, is the second in composition of our author's four published digests and is midway in size among all of them. The text portion contains 360 pages and is divided into three separate portions, viz. (I) *aśauca* (ceremonial impurity), pp. 1-180, (II) *kālaśuddhi* (determination of and acts forbidden in a *malamāsa* or intercalary month), pp. 180-296, and *dravya-śuddhi* (determination of purity of things like water) pp. 297-360. We are concerned here with the definition of *aśauca*, as stated by our author in the very beginning (pp. 1-5) of that work.

Śuddhi (ceremonial purity) consists in the eligibility of performing acts, laid down in the Vedas, which eligibility varies with every different act. The particular mandatory prescriptions about the proper person, proper time etc. for the performance of any specific act, are collectively known as the *śuddhi* of the same. It is not to be argued that the above definition does not apply to the case in which there is ineligibility owing to the non-performance of the *ācamana* (i.e. sipping of water), which is a necessary part of the religious act, inspite of the existence of *śuddhi*. The eligibility *does* exist even in that case. But since such acts as putting on the upper garment, *ācamana* etc., which are the requisites of the act itself, are left undone, a deficiency in the parts of the act occurs and thereby the act itself becomes doubled (i.e. by doing the undone parts with the done once over again). So it cannot be said that there is absence of *śuddhi* in that case and, therefore, that *ācamana* is spoken of as a part of the act itself.

Now with the intention of determining *śuddhi* we shall first describe the *śuddhi* of *aśauca*, through the process of defining the latter, which is the opposite of the former.

Somebody has said that '*aśauca* consists in the production of ineligibility of contact with one's kith and kin in cases, where such ineligibility can be removed by actions other than *śānti* (i.e. propitiation of the malefic planets etc.)' This is wrong, because the above definition does not apply to those cases of *aśauca*, where the period of untouchability of each other's person has been over and also to cases of the birth of *sapiṇḍas* (i.e. agnates within seven degrees) or of a daughter. It cannot also be said that '*aśauca* is nothing but the ineligibility of performing religious acts in cases, where such ineligibility can be removed by actions other than *śānti*', as this definition cannot apply to cases of immediate purity (*sadyaś śauca*), where the impurity is removable by simple bathing. The above definition is also too wide to include bleeding, shaving, belching, vomiting, etc., as the text of the *Kālikāpurāṇa*¹²⁵ lays down that all the above render the

125. "One should not even perform one's daily duties, if there is a wound on a portion of the body above the knees, birth or death in the family of one's agnates, shaving, sexual intercourse, belching, vomiting, touching leeches, snakes and worms called *kṛmi* and *gaṇḍūpada* intentionally with the hands."

religious act, null and void. The deferred *śrāddha*, intended for a single person and to be performed on such days, is done in those cases in the next following days. The definition is also too wide, as it might include the cases of menstruation of women.

Basing on the statement of *Manu* (v. 66),¹²⁶ occurring in the context of *aśauca*, it should not also be argued that there is *aśauca* for a woman even in her menstruation period. For a definition should be formulated with reference to the thing to be defined, which should not, on the contrary, be so changed as to fit in with the definition. Otherwise there will be an unwarranted licence. The word *aśauca* is also found neither in the *dharmaśāstra* works nor in popular usage to apply to any kind of act, involving any kind of uncleanness, such as menstruation of a woman, bleeding, shaving, vomiting, touching a leech etc. On the contrary, the text of *Yājñavalkya*¹²⁷ (III. 30a) has differentiated between *aśauca* and any other kind of uncleanness and has thus prohibited the use of the word *aśauca* in the case of menstruation of a woman.

Manu has, in the verse referred to above, spoken of the purification even in the case of menstruation of a woman in course of his prescription of the same in the case of abortion. It does not mean that menstruation is an *aśauca*; otherwise the performance of the rites, subsequent to *aśauca*, would have been prescribed. Besides, on the strength of the text of the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*,¹²⁸ there will be the possibility of offering *piṇḍas* to a just deceased person by a woman even during her menses. Because this would be a case similar to one, where a person is enjoined to offer *piṇḍas* with regard to a dead relative, even if he is undergoing *aśauca* due to some other cause. Besides there would be the possibility of performing expiatory rites, to be performed on account of the partaking of meals from persons, who are bleeding, vomiting etc., as is the case on doing the same from a person undergoing *aśauca*.

Moreover, the word *aśauca*, implying any kind of uncleanness, removable by efforts and the term *sūtaka*, meaning only the kind of impurity, arising out of birth and death, have different imports, being themselves in the nature of the general and special terms. So in accordance with the text of *Ṛṣyaśṛṅga*,¹²⁹ prescribing the general impurity

126. "In case of miscarriage a woman becomes ceremonially purified in nights (i.e. fulldays), equal to the number of months she was carrying and a menstruating woman also becomes similarly pure by taking a bath after the cessation of the menses."
127. "If a person is touched by a menstruating woman or a person undergoing *aśauca*, he should then take a bath and then touch all other persons."
128. "If there is an *aśauca*, all the persons of the same *gotra* become untouchable, but if the *aśauca* falls within the period of the performance of *śrāddha* for a just deceased person, the *piṇḍas* should be offered for the propitiation of the soul of such person (i.e. his *śrāddha* should be performed)."
129. "If an *aśauca* falls before the performance of *śrāddha* to the fathers, the same should be performed after the expiry of *aśauca*."

and that of *Śaṅkha*¹³⁰ (xv. 24), laying down the special one and also, due to the occurrence of the word *preta-piṇḍa-kriyā-varjam* (i.e. except the rites of offering *piṇḍas* to a just deceased person) in the latter text, the above word serving the purpose of an exception to an exception the performance of the annual *śrāddha*, intended for a just deceased person, to be performed on the *tithi* of death of that person, becomes imperative within the period of impurity.

[The Ms. *Kha* reads the following extract here instead of the sentence viz. 'So in accordance.....period of impurity,' just above :—

As an offering of the (*pūraka*) *piṇḍas* on the tenth day of death of a deceased person, if made in a period of *sūtaka* impurity, is rendered null and void owing to the prohibition of its performance at such a time and as also the special saving phrase viz. *preta-piṇḍa-kriyā-varjam* does away with the similar prohibition of performance of the annual *śrāddha* of a just deceased single person, to be performed on the *tithi* of death of that person, falling within the period of *aśauca*, due to birth or death, so the latter becomes fit to be performed even in such *aśauca*, owing to the applicability of the word *aśuddhi* (i.e. impurity) to general cases and due to that of the word *sūtaka* to special cases. Further, the texts of *Ṛṣyaśṛṅga* and *Śaṅkha* refer to different contexts, the former concerning itself to the impurity other than that arising out of birth and death.]

If we take the words *aśauca* and *sūtaka* to be synonymous, then there arises the conflict of two contradictory texts, bearing on the same topic, which, being reconciled by the principle of *eka-vakyatā* (i.e. the maxim of two or more conflicting texts forming a contextual whole), lay down that the annual *śrāddhs* as well as that intended for a just deceased single person is to be performed on the expiry of the *sūtaka* and not otherwise. So on the authority of the text, "If an obstacle arises during the course of performance of a *śrāddha* or if the day of death of the person, for whom the *śrāddha* is to be done, is not known, the same should be gone through on an eleventh *tithi*, specially of a dark fortnight," the annual *śrāddha* and that intended for a just deceased single person, (the performance of which has been obstructed on account of menstruation of the performing woman), are to be performed on the eleventh *tithi* of a dark fortnight and not after the cessation of the menses.

The approved usage of the entire *Gauḍa* country (i.e. Bengal) is that a *śrāddha*, obstructed due to the presence of a wound or of dysentery, may be performed after they have been cured.

In fact, the word *aśauca* has got the special meaning of only that kind of absence of 'purity, which is due to birth or death and is thus synonymous with the word *sūtaka*. So *Dakṣa* (VI. 1a) has defined *aśauca* thus :—

130. "A gift, an acceptance of gift, *homa* (i.e. oblation to fire), study of the Vedas and obsequial rites for the father, except the offering of *piṇḍas* to a just deceased person (*preta-piṇḍa-kriyā-varjam*), cease in a *sūtaka*." (*Śaṅkha* reads '*aśaucam*' for '*sūtaka*.')

"I shall now describe *aśauca*, which arises only out of the birth or death of a person."¹³¹

Therefore, the definition of *aśauca* is the incapacity of doing acts, enjoined by the Vedas, on account of birth or death of a person.

It is not to be argued that the above definition is too short to apply to cases of partaking of meals of a person, undergoing *aśauca* and of lamentation in the company of the corpse, touching it etc., inasmuch as death, along with such partaking etc., causes the incapacity of doing the acts spoken of. In cases of the sight of *Rāhu* (i.e. of a solar or lunar eclipse), the *aśauca* due to death is extended, by analogy, to avoidance of cooked food, throwing away of the cooking pots, taking a purificatory bath etc., in accordance with the text of the *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*,¹³² although there is no *aśauca* in such cases.

Aśauca may also be defined as "the unforeseen result, arising out of birth or death and bringing about incapacity of doing acts, enjoined by the Vedas."

131. Our author reads '*aśaucantu pravakṣyāmi mṛtyu-prasava-lakṣaṇam*,' while *Dakṣa* reads '*sūtakantu pravakṣyāmi janma-mṛtyu-samudbhavam*.'

132. "In cases of eclipse, there is *aśauca*, similar to that on the death of a person."

SELECTED PAPERS

REV. JAMES LONG

**EDITED BY
MAHADEVPRASAD SAHA**

I. ON PROVERBS

POPULAR BENGALI PROVERBS
illustrating
Opinions of the Ryots, Working Classes,
and Women of Bengal.

The literature of Proverbs is in the present day assuming an important position among the agencies for sounding the depths of popular opinion and feeling, and as one of the best clues to the labyrinths of thought among the masses. Archbishop Trench, Disraeli, Bohn, and a host of writers, have published works on the subject which have gained a wide circulation. Lord Bacon, three centuries ago, said, "Proverbs serve ont only for ornament and delight, but also for action and civil uses, as being the edge tools of speech which cut and penetrate the knots of business and affairs." The truth of this has been exemplified in the Proverbs of Solomon, the Edda of the Scandinavians, the Poems of Hesiod, the writings of Cicero, down to the period of Erasmus, Scaliger, and a host of writers in different parts of Europe and Asia.

I have made a collection of more than 5,000 Bengali Proverbs,¹ a great number of which have been collected from the zenana, which is always the stronghold of native life and opinion. These Proverbs have been in current use for centuries, and show—in opposition to a common notion—that Bengali was a nervous and expressive language centuries ago; in fact the style that is now coming into use among educated native authors is pretty similar to that which prevailed for centuries before the English held a foot of land in the country. Many of them date probably from the era of Bulal Sen a thousand years ago. I give here a selection to show what treasures remain in this folk-lore repository.

The Bengal ryot has been called a dumb animal; he is certainly a very patient one, for he seldom kicks against his oppressors; he has been consigned not only to serfdom, but to what generally accompanies it—ignorance, and on one ground that he is too stupid to learn, and that money for his education is only flung into a Serbonian bog. Now that the Bengal ryots and working classes are not naturally stupid, but have great powers of discrimination and observation, could, we think, be shown from the information regarding plants and animals they acquire in every-day life, as well as from what forms the subject of our present essay, the Proverbs, which express, as Proverbs generally do, shortness, sense, and

1. A selection from them is now passing through the press.

salt, confirming the truth of what Disraeli says on this subject.—“Proverbs, those neglected fragments of wisdom which exist among all nations, still offer many interesting objects for the studies of the philosopher and the historian ; and for men of the world still open an extensive school of human life and manners.”

CASTE

Caste is gone and the stomach not filled When a man has sacrificed his principles without gaining any advantage.

The nightingale lays its eggs in the crow's nest, but afterwards the young ones act according to their natural disposition.

When you like a person, what care you whether he is a sweeper or basket-maker ?

Notice a dog and he'll leap on your neck.

Though you sing filthy songs on its banks, the Ganges is not defiled ; a world of praises to the wicked, they will not be gentle.

DOCTORS AND LAWYERS

Doctors in Bengal, as elsewhere, come in for their share of popular sarcasm.

An ignorant doctor is as bad as Yama, the god of death,

The death of one hundred patients makes a man a doctor,

The death of one thousand patients makes a man a physician.

This quack is only equal to a cow doctor.

Once a patient and a physician ever after.

The healthy man fears not the doctor.

Lawyers, too, have their share.

The judge is changed, not so his decision.

The facility for litigation is denoted by

The judge's door is open.

During the trial the Judge is a Kazi, when it is over, he is a paji (or fool)^a

He is a shell-cutter's saw. This cuts both ways, like attorneys who act for both plaintiff and defendant. So the English proverb :—*Keeping with the hare, running with the hound.*

2. Sic. When the work is finished the carpenter is a scoundrel ; or, the river crossed and God forgotten.

DOMESTIC LIFE

Who has no mother and whose wife is foul-mouthed, his house is like a jungle.

Where there are brothers there is division ; referring to the quarrels about family property.

My husband cannot give me rice for food,

But he is clever in thumping me,

My home is a dish to bake me in.

A man beaten by his wife no more tells it than he does his losses.

I cannot see with patience a twinkling lamp or a prying husband.

No clothes to the back, a veil on the head.

HISTORICAL

The Bengalis have generally little knowledge of or taste for history. Of the Mahrattas who desolated Bengal a century and a half ago, there is little trace except in these Proverbs :—

Bargir-hangam (the outrages of the Mahrattas).

The Mahratta and his army crossed the Damuda.

Of the Musulmans there are a few—

The Mullah runs as far as the mosque.

Ask the Kazi, the Hindu has no holidays.

In my mind I am a Sikh ;

Yet I carry a brick under my arm.

Ridiculing the poor and proud Moslem nobles—

Like a Hindu's cow or a Musulman's bastard.

—One is of little use, the other vicious and contemptible ?

IMAGERY

Like all Orientals the Bengali ryot loves to illustrate ethical truths through the medium of imagery. There is much poetic prose in the language of the common people. The following are some specimens—

An upstart boasting of his family.

A devotee of yesterday with his top-knot down to his heels.

The French system of equality does not find much favour in the patriarchal system of the East—

Are the five fingers equal ?

Of the evil effects of gain won by oppression—

The ant's wings increase to its own destruction.

The friendship of the wicked is a dam of sand.

The bondage of the Mahajan or creditor is expressed by—

A goat tied up is at the will of even a child.

A mere plodder or drudge is an oilman's ox.

The man who cares little for his parents when living, yet spends much money on their shradh or funeral ceremony—

While alive he gives not a slap of his fingers for him,

When dead he covers his head with fragrant grass.

Poor people wishing for fine furniture, &c.—

Living in a hovel in a rice field,

wishing for a bedstead.

An useless gift is denoted by giving a blind cow to a Brahmin.

The difficulty of separating things when once united is expressed by—

Sand mixed up with molasses.

Old women proud of their ornaments—

A gray head decorated with vermilion spots.

A fellow without shame—

A crow with its bill cut off.

Uncertain affection—

A witch's love.

Applying different treatment according to the persons you have to deal with—

The palm thrives when its leaves are kept uncleft,

The date thrives when its leaves are cut.

Even if taken up to heaven, the pedal would continue to husk the rice.

Were a woman to go to heaven, she would take her cow with her.

As long as he does not see the devil, he does not use Ram's name⁸

In separating the hair from the blanket nothing remains.

Water never mixes with oil.

The Blacksmith knows what he will make of the iron.

A looking glass in the hand of a monkey.

Which is more useful, the nose or the breath ?

He is a dwarf, yet he tries to catch the moon.

He cuts at the root, yet waters the top.

Having an Almanac ; yet guessing lucky days.

3. So—when the devil was ill, the devil a monk would be, when the devil was well, the devil a monk was he.

Using a looking glass to look at one's bracelets.
 An ox without a tail pushing at an elephant.
 The sieve says to the needle, you have a large hole.
 The poor man's word like the tortoise's head.
 The birdlime falls on the moustache.
 They pour oil into the mouth.
 Sprinkling salt on a wound,—like "Job's comforters."
 One is impaled ;
 Another counts the joints of the stake.

Any one that has seen a crowd of Bengalis watching a fire without lending any aid, can understand this—

Commence with putting on a load of cotton, you may afterwards make the man draw a harrow.

Inserting the thin edge of the wedge—
 Milk once drawn re-enters not the dug.
 What's done is done—
 The Churuck Puja is spoiled by many devotees.
 So, too many cooks spoil the broth.
 He caught a frog, but broke his stick,
 In promise placing the moon in your hands.

He whose relation has been devoured by an alligator, is terrified when he sees a log.

So, a burnt child dreads the fire.

Unless there be crows, will there be no morning ?—alluding to those who think a work cannot be accomplished without them.

The bore is come up the river, therefore punish the potter.
 So, the Godwin Sands and Tenterden steeple.

KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is valued to a certain extent as is shown by the 10,000 vernacular village schools in Bengal and Behar—

As is the master, so the scholar.
 If the buttermilk be sour, the cocoanut splits.

If the bamboo is not bent when young, when of full age it makes a harsh sound.

MISCELLANEOUS

- A body with an ugly nose, yet named lotus' eye.
The lame man's foot slips in the hole.
If the stomach be empty, blushing is of no consequence,
Going to Ceylon for a few grains of turmeric.
Weeding out the rogues, the village is a desert.
Like digging a well when the house is on fire.
Scented oil on the head, the body so filthy as to drive away sleep.
The sight of a horse makes the traveller lame.
When a fool tries to be witty, he gives you a stroke with his scythe.
The fool not knowing how to walk, cries out the road is rough.
Is there a fellow so stupid as to wish to hear a thing, when he can see it with his own eyes ?
Droppings from his own thatch drown him, yet he would cross the ocean.
You can never tame the wild.
Oil and water can never mix.
Can the fishing boat hold the ship's mast ?

NATURAL AFFECTION

- No people exceed the Hindus in the strength of their natural affections even "sati" was regarded, like duelling in Europe, as a point of honour.
Who venerates his mother gains salvation.
Happiness is found in the mother's bosom

OPPRESSION

- The relation of the carving knife to the pumpkin.
- The love the Musulman has to his fowl,
The same the Zemindar has to the ryot.
—So the English, As sheep fattened for the slaughter.
The twig is harder than its parent bamboo. —Showing that minor agents are more oppressive than the principals.
The tiger killing the cow.
No gain, but the punch of a stick.

TALKING, GRATITUDE

That the Bengali is too much a race of talkers is acknowledged in the following —

In talk a tiger in fighting a lizard.

Lazy in work, powerful in eating, in work he sets everything on fire.

—Bengalis have been accused of having neither gratitude nor a word for it in their language, though there are such terms as *Kritagyata*, the sense of a favour—*Nimakharam*, one who destroys his salt.

Whose food he eats, his praises he sings,
Whose salt he eats, his qualities he respects.

TRUTH, HONESTY

It is only the shrimp who moves backward.
The house of Yam (Death) is a razor's edge.
For the double-minded there is no salvation.
The thief and the hog go the same road.

WOMEN

Women of course are treated very sarcastically—

Woman's cunning brings on a deluge of destruction.

Woman eats twice as much as a man. And is four times as cunning.

Women are never straightforward.

Tell a woman a secret, she will publish it.

A woman with high forehead, long teeth, crooked feet, whoever marries her,
destroys three generations.

Like the boasting of the chaukidar before his wife.

It is only when a woman dies and is turned to ashes, that we know certainly
she is free from fault.

He gets no place in the assembly,

On returning home he thrashes his wife.

The wife recognises not the Brahman in the husband.

—So the English, Too much familiarity breeds contempt.

[DISCUSSION ON THE PAPER]

Babu Greesh Chunder Ghose said that Bengali literature abounded in

proverbs, and that weddings were a fruitful source of them, it being the custom for the bridesmaids to exhibit their wit in this way, and to test severely the intellect of the bridegroom by asking him to explain them. There was one proverb, however, which the writer had erroneously translated. "During the trial the judge is a Kazi, when it is over, he is a fool." The true meaning of the proverb was this : speaking of a selfish and ungrateful man, "When he wants anything from me, he treats me like a judge, but when he has got it, I am nobody at all."

Babu Shamachurn Sircar supported the writer in his opinion that Bengali literature was of no recent date. The *Rāmāyaṇa* dated back several centuries, and he (the speaker) had seen Bengali Sanads which were some hundred years old. At the same time prose writing was doubtless of late date than poetry.

The Revd. Mr. Long said he had not been able to find any proverbs relating to the English conquest of the country, and he should be glad to be made acquainted with any which existed.

ORIENTAL PROVERBS

*In Relation to Folklore, History, Sociology, with Suggestions
for their Collections, Interpretation and Publication*

Eleven years ago I had the honour to read a paper before this Society, entitled "Five Hundred Questions on the Social Condition of the people of India." That paper has been widely circulated, and has excited some interest on the subject. Since then, I have prosecuted one department of it—Oriental Proverbs in Relation to the Life and History of the People in India.

This subject I brought before the Oriental Congress, at their last Session in London. There was no time to have it discussed there ; but perhaps the question of Oriental Proverbs may be submitted again at the next Congress, to be held at St. Petersburg. The Russians have done much with their own proverbs, and from their political relations in Asia, they may be able to give important aid towards securing a complete Collection, Classification and Publication of the Proverbs of China, Mongolia, Siberia and Central Asia on one side ; while the English contribute to those of India and Southern Asia on the other. These investigations may throw light on the supposed affinity between the Dravidian and Tartar tongues.

Some will say *cui bono* ? What have Proverbs to do with the lucubrations of learned societies ? They relate only to the common people, the villagers, the *ignavum pecus* ; they contain much that is frivolous, and superstitious, and absurd—the dreamy notions of the ignorant ! Very true. Admitting this—but they are Parolmiai, words of the way-side ; like foundlings, no one knows the date of their birth. They relate however, to the masses, to those whose views and opinions in these days of extended suffrage are cropping up, and gradually controlling the upper strata of society. As Lord Shaftesbury said, in defence of mass education, we must educate our masters, and we must therefore know their views and opinions. We do. I remember, in the height of the Indian Mutiny, Lord Canning sending for me at Calcutta to consult on the best method of getting at native opinion—a very vital one for maintaining good rule in India. His Lordship remarked to me, "We have certain Chiefs on our side, but how are we to know regarding what the people feel ?" I pointed out the clues the Native Press gave on this difficult subject, and the result was, the Government took action, and instituted the important department of Reporters of the Native Vernacular Press of India.

This department, diving down into the undercurrents of native opinion, has been very useful to a Government like that of India, a small body of saxon foreigners located among an oriental race, whose stand-point is so very different from the European. Now the proverbs in popular use are also of value in gauging the depths of popular sentiment. A proverb is a spark thrown up from the depths beneath ; as Lord Bacon states, "The genius, spirit, and wit of a nation are discovered in its proverbs "

Brahmanical influence on the Pandits has led the study of proverbs in India to be treated with contempt as relating to the baser sort, according to Brahman view.

Even in England, notwithstanding the opposition of such writers as Lord Chesterfield to proverbs as vulgar, a reaction is taking place in their favour as a branch of folklore, as is shown by the multiplication of works on them. Take, for example, the remarkable book, Tupper's *Proverbial Philosophy*, of which forty large editions have been sold in England, and more than one million copies in the United States.

Proverbs which are probably coeval with the discovery of writing, survive the overthrow of empires and the desolations brought by conquerors ; they leave their ripples on the sands of time ; they are like wild flowers, which outlive ruin, and mark the flora of the district. When we consider that many of the Indian proverbs are probably 1000 years old, and when we look at the difficulty of tracing the past in India, an auxiliary like proverbs ought not to be despised ; from the strong impression they have left on the memory in their poetic form, they survive where *history perishes*.

Proverbs are guides to antiquity like tradition, being, as D'Israeli says, "neglected fragments of wisdom still offering many interesting objects for the studies of the philosopher and the historian."

The Eastern people, especially the Hindus, are anti-historic. We have therefore few historical documents, and have to explore the dim recesses of the past by the dim lights of ruins, coins, inscriptions, which perish by time. What an auxiliary, then, are proverbs, which give the history, not merely of kings and conqueror, but of the people, in their innermost thoughts, in the domestic hearths. For instance, I have in Bengali proverbs numerous references to old customs, old temples, historical characters, which have long since passed away unrecorded either in MSS or books.

It is from the data supplied by institutions, languages and material remains, that we gain a glimpse into pre-historic times, and proverbs may be the fossils to utilize in the reconstruction of the long-buried past ; they give us the facts instead of fancies.

Primitive law, as Sir H. Maine, in his *Early History of Institutions*, has shown, and has illustrated by the *Brehon Code*, consists chiefly in the reduction to order and method of a mass of pre-existing customs. Now proverbs, as stereo-

typing customs, are the key to law, and of course to the customs common to the Aryan race *in its various branches*.

The Indian proverbs show how deeply the village and patriarchal system has been engrafted into the Indian mind in contrast to the feudal one introduced by the Mahomedans and English. The families grouped into a village constituted the Hindu Unit of Government. The village system, that great fragment of antiquity that has floated down the stream of time for 2000 years through the Indian, Slavonic, Keltic, and Teutonic races, is recorded in proverbs: it is now dying out in India as far as respects land held in common, as the Hindus find with the Telugu proverb, that—

The sheep that was the joint property of two persons was deserted and died.

—but it is in vigorous action in Russia, as is illustrated in the following Russian proverbs:

What the *mir* (commune) has arranged is God's decision. The *mir* (commune) is the surging wave.

The *mir* (commune) sighs, and the rock is rent asunder. A thread of the *mir* (commune) is a shirt for the naked.

Comparative anatomy, or comparative mythology, is of great use. The system of comparison has been carried over to fairy tales and nursery stories. In the important domain of comparative philology proverbs exercise an important influence. In them are embodied the *archaisms* of language. Words that have long disappeared from the mouths of living men again come on the stage, giving a clue to linguistic affinities, and opening out a vista into the past life and opinions of the people: and these words have a place in no dictionary. I found this to be case in the Bengali language, Molesworth's Mahratta Dictionary illustrates by proverbs the only one, I believe, with the exception of Dahl's Great Russian Dictionary which goes to proverbs, as Dr. Johnson went to books, to exemplify meanings.

It is a subject of great satisfaction that the Bengal Government has liberally subscribed to a Hindustani and English Dictionary of Dr. Fallon's, which will embrace the *spoken* as well as the written language, and the *rekhti* or vocabulary of the women, *never before given in any dictionary*. "The only national speech," says the author in his prospectus, "is that which bears the people's stamp, and in this category the first place must be assigned to the language of women. The seclusion of native females in India has been the asylum of true vernacular, as pure and simple as it is unaffected by the pedantries of word-makers. It is also the soil in which the mother-tongue has its most natural development. Many of the most caustic and terse epigrams of the language have their birth in this isolated women's apartments, whose inmates are jealously barred from any communication

with straggle men." Another important feature of Dr. Fallon's proposed work will be a copious supply of examples, "which while they bring out and indicate a particular meaning, will serve also to illustrate to some extent the yet unwritten literature of the country: its proverbs, songs, and traditions, its wit and *humour*, and *satire* and invective, in which are compressed with epigrammatic terseness the brief epitome of the social life of the people, the domestic relations of men and women, their modes of thought and ruling passions, their joys and sorrows and the jealousies and heartburnings of their inner life."

In the Sanskrit-derived languages of India we have a number of words non-Aryan. By collecting these from proverbs we have a basis for comparison with other languages, especially the Tartar groups of Central Asia. A great problem we have to solve is the connexion between the Prakrit and Sanskrit Vernaculars of India, and every archaism is a precious coin in this investigation.

It is a common thing in India now for some newly-fledged Saxons to apply to the natives the contemptuous epithet nigger, and to deny to the common people intelligence and gratitude; had these neophytes only studied the proverbs, they would have learned to appreciate the people in a very different way; for comparative studies diminish national prejudices. Travellers would often judge better of the character of a people by its proverbs, than by the hasty generalizations formed from the railway journeys—you make the people describe themselves, put them into the witness-box.

On the great question of peasant education and instruction, the proverbs, the hereditary wisdom of the serfs, vindicate their claim to *intelligence*. Townspeople and those bred up in collegiate seclusion are apt to fancy the peasants are as dull as the clods of earth they break; but their frequent and apt quotations of proverbs on common subjects show they have a power of observation and moral faculty they do not commonly get credit for.

Proverbs photograph the varying lights of social usages; the experience of an age is crystallized in the pithy aphorism. What a light is shed by them on customs which shift and change like a camera obscura! Sir H. Elliot's Glossary is in this respect a valuable contribution to Indian folklore.

The proverbs, for instance, on *women*, are numerous, and as written by men, their master, are of course sarcastic, and dwell on the weak points of women.

Money left in the hands of women won't last; a child left in the hands of a man won't live.

A woman's word is a bundle of water.

Woman eats twice as much as a man, and is four times as cunning.

It is only when a woman dies, and is reduced to ashes, we know with certainty she is free from fault.

—Yet they give sufficient indication that woman had great power in the social and domestic circle. She stooped to conquer.

The Bengalis say—

Who venerates his mother gains salvation.

Happiness is found in mother's bosom.

Another Bengali proverb states :

A man beaten by his wife no more tells it than he does his losses.

Proverbs will yet rend the veil on what is now so little known—the feelings and opinions of women shut up in the recesses of zenana. When are we to have an Indian Dickens, who will sound the depths of woman's "inner man", with the plummet of proverbs, the material expression and vent of her feelings? She will be shown by them to have far higher intelligence, wit, observation, than she gets credit for.

Proverbs are of great value to him who would impress the popular mind in the East either by teaching or preaching, as Captain Burton says, "The apposite use of aphorisms is, like wit and eloquence, a manner of power." But proverbs are with the people what the *sūtra* or aphorism was with the pandits and philosophers. It is this love for sense, salt, and wit which makes the bulk of vernacular literature in India to consist of poetry; and Sak(h)ya Muni, the great Buddhist preacher, set an example by the use of metaphorical language in his preaching, which those missionaries who imitate the example of Christ in teaching by parables, would do well to study. In Bengali literature, the most developed of all the Indian vernaculars, the revival is marked by the free use of proverbs and proverbial sayings in the modern works; these give point and raciness, instead of the stiff pedantic pandit style, *sesquipedalia verba*.¹

Dr. Muir has lately published some interesting papers on religious and moral maxims freely translated from Indian writers.

This is transition period in Hindu society. The spread of education and the changes of society are rapidly sweeping into the gulf of oblivion many of the old traditions and fragmentary folklore. The old Pauranic pandits are vanishing from the scene. Now is therefore the time to collect what remains of the living proverbs, which are connected so much with local history, and the domestic life of the people. We want some one now to do for proverbs what Mr. Thomas has done so well for coins, i.e. collect, classify and publish them.

Pocock, Erpenius, Burkhardt, Freytag, have laboured much in illustrating the Semitic class. Bohtlingk in his *Spruche* gives a few of the Sanskrit.

Oriental Proverbs are little known in Europe out of the circle of Orientalists and even they have to a great extent overlooked them,—coins, architecture, antiquities, naturally having the preference.

Among the Indian Proverbs recently published are: Percival's Tamil Proverbs; Carr's Telugu Proverbs; 1000 Malayalam, Long's Bengali Proverbs.

1. Words a foot and a half long.

The Russians, as head of the Slavonic race are coming into the scene of action of the future not only politically but also in a literary way. The Philo-Slav School of Moscow has begun working a mine of literature, both new and picturesque, with a manifest oriental colouring. In nothing is this more manifest than in their Folklore, of which Professor Ralston has given some excellent specimen translations in his Songs of the Russian People. It is to be regretted that we have no translations of their proverbs; I published in Calcutta eight years ago a translation of about 560, which interested many Europeans; this is, I believe, the only English one existing, though the mine is very rich—richer than the Spanish; I brought with me from Moscow 25,000 Russian Proverbs, published by the Russian Academy, and collected by Dr. Dahl. Prof. Snegiref published in 1834, in Moscow, a work in four volumes on Russian Proverbs, which is a model of what classification should be. Masson published in St. Petersburg, in 1868, a selection of Russian Proverbs, arranged according to subjects, with parallel ones from Germany, France, Spain, England and other Aryan nations.

The Russian proverbs have strong Oriental ring; I will give a few in illustration as relating to women—

When you walk, pray once; when you go to sea, twice; when you go to be married, three times.

The preparations of a woman are as long as the legs of a goose.

A woman's hair is long: her tongue is longer. The tears of a woman and of a drunkard are cheap.

A woman is a pot, everything put in will boil.

The flattery of a woman has no teeth; but it will eat your flesh with the bones.

What I have to propose particularly to this Society is that it should issue a circular to the leading Oriental and Ethnological Societies in Europe, Asia and America, asking their co-operation towards the collection, interpretation, and publication of proverbs; especially in reference to India, acting there through the Asiatic Societies of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, as well as through the Directors of Public Instruction in the local governments, and the editors of native journals and newspapers.

The Bengal Government has set a good example by publishing lately Lewin's Hill Proverbs of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; they show that those wild people, under a barbarian outside, have a heart beating with sympathy, as shown in these proverbs—

For sweetness, honey; for love; a wife.

Do not love a woman because she is young, nor cast her off because she is old.

Having myself been engaged in the collection and classification of Bengali and other Indian proverbs for fifteen years (I published in Calcutta 6000 Bengali

Proverbs), I will give the result of my experience as to the mode of collecting Proverbs. I found the services of pandits, teachers, and inspectors of village schools, of great value in collecting them. The editors of native newspapers also lent me aid by advertising their willingness to receive and forward to me any that might be sent to them. As the best collections of proverbs are among the women, who interlard their discourses plentifully with them, I paid women to collect them in the zenanas. I got a plentiful and rich crop, though many of them, from their coarseness, could not be published: native women in their Billingsgate slang draw copiously from the well-furnished arsenal of native proverbs; they can scold in them in a style not exceeded by that of the *Les dames des Halles* of Paris.

It might be desirable to publish the proverbs classified according to subjects. I here give Snegiref's classification of Russian proverbs, which may serve, *paribus*, as a basis of the classification of Oriental ones.

I. FOREIGN: Historical influences in relation to proverbs, and illustrated by proverbs.

II. Proverbs in relation to PHILOLOGY, the meaning of words, archaisms, wit, songs, and metaphors.

III. Proverbs in relation to ANTHROPOLOGY, the laws, customs, belief, food, dwellings, dress, servants, recreations, home life, education, creed, superstitions, sects, family-life, relations, marriage, woman's position, funeral customs, hospitalities, patriotism, trade, truth, justice.

IV. Proverbs, POLITICAL, LEGAL, laws expressed in proverbs, the ruler's power, people's meetings, upper classes, priests, monks, fairs, ordeals; the effect of foreign ruler or law, punishments, tortures, the lot. Proverbs, the echoes of history, religion, and localities; history at various periods illustrated by political and juridical proverbs.

V. Proverbs relating to PHYSICAL subjects, meteorological, astronomical, rural, referring to crops, seasons; medical, remedies, diseases.

VI. HISTORICAL, topographical, local, relating to various dynasties, celebrated places.

VII. ETHNOGRAPHIC.

VIII. SATIRICAL.

One of the most difficult problems in proverbs is the *interpretation*, owing to their local allusion and special references, as well as to their epigrammatic brevity, the vagueness of which allows a great variety of meanings, while the play upon words, and alliteration, cause many of them to lose their point in translation; the wit, like a fine essence vanishes in the transfusion. I have found in Bengali the same proverbs susceptible of several interpretations, according to the individual who gave it or the locality it was in. What one wants is not the guess work of mere individual private judgement, but the traditional interpretation of the people.

The pandits will, when pushed, rather than avow their ignorance, give you a fancy interpretation. The meaning must therefore be gathered from the people themselves.

In Russia, for instance, I found considerable difference of opinion as to the meaning of that proverb—

Do not buy a priest's horse, or marry a widow's daughter.

—the latter clause is easy on Sam Waller's Maxim, "Beware of the widow" ; or, as an old English proverb has it, "He who marries a widow with two daughters, marries three thieves."

I select a few specimen proverbs as illustrating native opinion and social life.

The Hindus have no sympathy with the abolitionists of *corporal punishment*. The Telegus say—

A washerman will only wash for one who thrashes him, like the Russian—

Strike a Russian, and he will make you even a watch.

The feelings towards a *mother-in-law*—

When the daughter-in-law said she was hungry, her mother-in-law told her to swallow the pestle,²

the Bengalis say, Sisters-in-law are nettles.

The want of *punctuality* in the East is expressed by the Telugu proverb—

When he says to-morrow, he means six months.

The Bengalis denote their aversion to *straightforwardness* by—

You can only extract butter with crooked finger.

Women in the East have far more power over men than is commonly thought. The Telugus describe a hen-pecked husband as—

One on whose head the wife grinds pepper.

The quarrels of women by—

When three women join together, the stars come out in broad daylight.

Men that give you only *fire words*—

Let us have a talk in my house, and dinner in yours.

The view of the *cunning of the Brahman* :

A Brahman's hand and an elephants' trunk are never quiet. The equalization of property an evil—

The joint husband was neglected and died.

Where there are brothers, there are divisions.

The dread of Government employees—

Face a royal tiger, but not a Government official.

2. This feeling against mother-in-law is very strongly expressed in Russian proverbs.

The Russian Proverbs are equally strong against the *techinovnik*, or subordinate official—

The pockets of a *techinovnik* is like the crop of a duck, you can never fill it.
The *techinovniks* have a good portion in the next world, they are at once made devils.

Defend yourself against a thief by a stick ;
Defend yourself against a *techinovnik* by a rouble.
The *techinovnik* only takes up his pen,
The peasant prays, and birds tremble.

The responsibility of *girls* in a family—

A house full of young girls, and a fire of little twigs.

The feeling towards the Musalman is expressed—

Vain as a Hindu begging in a Musalman town.
When the Musalman is judge, the Hindu has no holdings.

Social Equality is an impossibility—

If all get into the palankin, who will be the bearers ?
Are the five fingers equal ?

The *expenses of Marriage* referred to—

Try building a house, try making a marriage.

The connexion between the Bengali Zamindar and Ryot is expressed by—

The relation of the carving knife to the pumpkin.
The love the Musalman has to his fowl,
The same the Zamindar has to the Ryot.

DESIDERATA ON INDIAN PROVERBS

1. The *archaic* words used in proverbs, throwing light on the formation and affinities of the language.

2. Clues to the origin of the nation. The problem of the origin of the Aborigines of India, like that of the Red Indians of North America, might thus receive some aid towards its solution. The Aborigines were in India what the Kelts were in Europe—the first inhabitants ; they have been compared to the ripple-marked slabs of sandstone recording the tidal flow of the primeval ocean.

3. The earliest *dialects* existing as shown in proverbs. The dialectical variations are far more numerous in India than in England ; thus in Gujarat the dialect is said to alter every thirty miles.

4. *Sanskrit* proverbs incorporated in vernacular ones.³

5. The Proverbs of the *Aborigines* of India. These may furnish a clue to how they came to India, and what were their movements.

6. *Jain* proverbs. This steady, commercial people, an offshoot from Buddhism, deserve more attention than they have received.

7. *Hindi* proverbs. Chand, who was contemporary with Dante, may furnish some and may throw light on the dreary, dark period between the first and the ninth centuries.

8. *Maharatta* proverbs.

9. *Punjabi* proverbs.

10. *Prakrit* proverbs. The women in the Hindu dramas speak in *Prakrit*, the connecting link between *Sanskrit* and the modern vernaculars, as the Romance languages were to Europe.⁴

11. *The connection between the Dravidian and the Tartar proverbs of Central Asia*, throwing light on the Aryan origin of peoples of India and Central Asia.

12. *Gypsy* proverbs in Europe. These may give a clue to the Eastern origin of Gypsies, their curious customs, and their line of route in emigrating from the East.

13. Any traces of an Oriental element in *European* proverbs. We have the strongest proofs of this in the Slavonic and Russian proverbs.

3. Bohtlingk, in his excellent "*Indische Spruiche*" has collected a large number of aphorisms, but these cannot be called proverbs.

4. See Lewis on the Romance Languages.

ON RUSSIAN PROVERBS

As Illustrating Russian Manners and Customs

That Proverbs are deserving the attention of a literary society is a truth now generally admitted ; they express the law written on the heart, they are the hieroglyphics of the masses, the coins of antiquity ; they picture out the *juventus mundi* or youth of the world, they preserve the memory of events and usages which would otherwise have perished for ever ; the hoar of ages is on them. Isaac D'Israeli, in his *Curiosities of Literature*, has well said, "Proverbs existed before books, they give a deep insight into domestic life, and, although they are no longer the ornaments of conversation, they have not ceased to be the treasure of Thought",—and this in spite of Lord Chesterfield's denunciation of them as vulgar.

A residence of 30 years in India impressed me deeply with the utility of Proverbs as instruments for conveying instruction to youth and adults, and a two years' residence in Russia made me acquainted with the rich treasures of this kind deposited in that country, from which I have brought 25,000, which I am utilising, along with Oriental Proverbs, in the preparation of a book to illustrate Scripture by Oriental emblems and proverbs, a subject so interesting to the young and the masses.

RUSSIAN PROVERBS LITTLE KNOWN

Russian proverbs, though perhaps the richest in Europe in originality and wit, exceeding in this respect the Spanish, are little known. Bohn ignores them, so does Trench ; and Kelly, in his *Proverbs of all Nations*, does not quote even one. What would Erasmus not have given had he had access to such a storehouse !

The reason mainly is that Russian proverbs, like the Russian people themselves, are strangers to Europe. Two of Europe's greatest events, the Crusades and the Reformation, had no effect on Russia. Russian Proverbs are buried in a language one of the most difficult on the face of the earth ; the difficulty of translating proverbs generally, arising from their love of rhythm and alliteration, is peculiarly great in the Russian, for the Russians, as semi-orientals, are a very poetic people, and express their proverbs in a metrical form.

I believe I have the honour of being the first to publish a translation of select Russian proverbs in Calcutta, in 1868. Mr. Ralston, in the *Quarterly Review* for October, 1875, has given an admirable article on the subject.

As the Russians are becoming our neighbours in Asia, it is of great importance to be acquainted with their Proverbs as an index to their national mind.

RUSSIAN WORKS ON PROVERBS

No people have more diligently investigated their folk-lore and proverbs than the Russians. Peter the Great valued them, and the great Empress Catherine herself compiled a selection of Russian proverbs remarking that 'they point sense and strengthen speech.' Foremost among Proverbologists are Dr. Dahl, of Moscow, who published in 1862 a classified collection of more than 25,000 Russian proverbs, and proverbial sayings; and Snegiref, who has, in 1831-4, in four volumes the *Russians in their Proverbs*, written a most interesting analysis and disquisition on the origin, antiquity, and signification of those coins of the people, in relation to anthropology, history, with parallel ones from European proverbs.

Dahl, in his great Russian dictionary, has set an example worthy of imitation in other languages, viz., illustrating the words by quotations from proverbs, not like Dr. Johnson from books. He has well said, to know Russian proverbs is to know the Russian language, and a nation's proverbs form its popular code of laws.

ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN PROVERBS

The connection of Russia with Constantinople and its Greek form of Christianity, has introduced many Greek proverbs into Russia, as it has many letters of the Greek alphabet into the Russian Alphabet.

The majority of Russian proverbs originated during the rule of the Tatars in Russia, when the sacred fire of knowledge was transmitted from father to son in the form of proverbs and short sentences in the cold of winter, called mother dear, the people assembled round the stove and kept up the memories of proverbs.

The influence of the Normans and Germans in Russia introduced many proverbs, but though many English as well as Dutch words were introduced into Russia, yet English proverbs were not transmitted with them.

Many Russian proverbs are similar to those of other European nations,

and illustrate "the many diversities of form which the same thought assumes as expressed in different times and by many distinct races of men." Here are a few examples.

The voice of the people, the voice of God.

One hand will wash the other.

You catch fish in troubled waters.

Still in the main Russian proverbs, like the Russian people, indicate an Asiatic origin ; the Slavs kept to the East of Europe and formed a link between East and West.

Latin, which worked itself into the dialects of western Europe has left few traces in the Russian either in words or proverbs.

RUSSIA SEEN THROUGH POLISH SPECTACLES

Russia has in former days been too much described by pens dipped in Polish ink ; happily there is great revolution in English opinion of late years in favour of the Russian people ; while Russian literature, as a fresh contribution to somewhat *blase* literature of Europe, is being hailed as an acquisition.

Whereas the Poles and Germans paint the Russians as barbarians, their proverbs show them to be a race attached to home and the family—forgiving and forgetting, letting bygones be bygones—"Knock out his eye who remembers bygones. Bury it as a stone in water, only bubbles at the top."

They were hospitable to strangers—reverencing religion—kind :

A kind word is better than a pie.

On the other hand the Poles, though a kindred Slav race, are viewed with no kindly eye by the Russians ; as the former were their conquerors, and endeavoured to impose on them the Latin language and Romish rites—

When God made the world he sent the Poles some reason and the feet of a gnat, but even this little was taken away by the women.

A Pole tells lies even in his old age.

The Polish women are very beautiful, and strongly anti-Russian, hence the saying—

We are not in Poland, where the women are stronger than the men.

RUSSIAN PROVERBS ON THE PEOPLE

While Russian history, as presented to Europe, is chiefly occupied with the Czars, nobles, and wars foreign and domestic, the Russian people have been to a great degree ignored ; less was known of them in Europe than of the Hindus—

their country was far, there was a difficult language to master, and a hostile climate to encounter ; but matters are altering. Petersburg is now only three days from London, and the multiplication of books on Russia shows an increasing interest in the country ; while the Turkish question is leading to full liberty for the trampled-down Slavs of the Danubian Provinces. To know something, however, about the Russian people, you must not go merely to the pages of the historians, you must seek them in their homes and in their proverbs which express the salt, sense and wit of the multitude. In the long winter evenings of Russia, proverbs and pictures are never-failing sources of amusement to the men wrapped in sheepskins, congregated round the stove or stretched on a bench. The rural population do not view things through French, English, or German spectacles, but regard them from their own Slav standpoint. The foreign and French innovations of Peter the Great and Catherine are seen only in the saloons of the upper classes, who, having been civilised superficially, have too often become demoralised, but these innovations have not stirred the depths beneath, though they have produced in the upper ten thousand a servile imitation of strangers with a disregard of the historical, political, and religious antecedents of the nation.

Russian literature is very rich on subjects relating to folk-lore and peasant life, which Tourgeneuf, the Walter Scott of Russia, has dramatised. Krilof, effected by his fables greater social reforms in Russia than Dickens has accomplished in England ; there is an excellent translation of Krilof by Mr. Ralston ; but we require translations also of the fables of Dimitrief and Khimnitzer.

The peasant of Russia, like the peasant of India, is little ruffled by the waves of politics which play over his head. A strong reverence for God and trust in His Providence, a love to relations and country, to "Holy Russia", as it is called ; above all, to the Czar as the embodiment of authority, are marked features ; the peasants are redolent of patriarchal times.

A good-humoured, witty sarcasm marks them.

How expressive are the following !

Pray to God, but keep rowing to the shore.

Dreams are dreadful, but God is merciful.

Having to make a selection out of 25,000 Russian proverbs in my collection, I shall dwell on groups, or those chiefly which are characteristics or peculiar to the Russian people, simply referring to a few on morals.

RUSSIAN PROVERBS ON MORALS

There are some 500 proverbs relating to drinking and drunkenness.

Drinking is the bane of the Russian peasants ; they often drink for the pleasure of mere intoxication, and not for sociality.

Drink at table, not behind a pillar.

The soldiers who are recruited from the ranks of the peasantry carry those, drinking habits with them—

“The soldier finds a place neither in Paradise nor hell; for Paradise he is too outrageous, and in hell he would worry the devils with drinking.”

Of great talkers and little doers—

“Dog, why do you bark?—to frighten the wolf away? but, dog, your tail is between your legs. Oh! I’m afraid of the wolf.”¹

On the danger of bad company—

“The wolf asked the goat to dinner, the goat respectfully declined”, i.e., he was invited to be eaten.

On caution in bad company—

“If acquainted with a bear, keep hold of the axe.”

On building castles in the air—

“His thoughts are over the mountains, but death is behind his shoulder.”

On trust in God—

“With God go over the sea.² Without God go not over the threshold.”

On women and marriage the Russians have more than 500 proverbs some of which are very racy—

“The hop searches for a pole to rest on, and a young girl for a young man.”

On caution in marriage—

“Choose a wife by the ear rather than the eye”, i.e., have regard rather to her character than her looks—

When you walk, pray once,

When you go to sea, pray twice,

When you go to be married, pray three times.

“A wife is not a slipper, or a glove, or a saddle, which you can remove when you like.”

“A wife is not a guitar, which, when you have played on, you can hang against the wall.

Habits are not easily altered—

“Feed the wolf as often as you like, still he will look to the forest.”

Hospitality was a boon, as the guest served as a walking newspaper.

“A guest has not to thank the host but the host the guest.”

1. The Bengalis have a corresponding one—In talk a tiger, in act a lizard.
2. The Russians are an inland people, hence that dread of the unknown deep.

THE PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN PROVERBS

Lord Bacon has truly said, "The genius, wit, and spirit of a nation are discovered in its proverbs." The Russian proverbs not only show this, but they also illustrate many points in local natural history, peculiar usages, superstitions. There are more proverbs in Russian on God, the devil, and the Church than in any other language.

One is struck in travelling in Russia at the reckless regard for the future, in the way the forests are being cut down, but the peasant answers you in the proverb—

"It will last our time—if after us no grass grows, what matters it to us?"

The usurers in Russia, as in India, are sources of great evil—

"In the other world usurers have to count red-hot coins with bare hands."

Priests and monks in Russia, as in Europe in the middle ages, come in for the lash—

"You are born, baptised, married, buried, but for all you must feed the priest."

"Hell is occupied by priests, clerks, and unjust judges."

"Buy not a gypsy's horse."

"Marry not a priest's daughter."

"The monk has the beard of an apostle ; but the moustache of a devil."

Judges were notoriously corrupt, quite in the style of Jeffries.

"Fear not the law, but the judge."

"A judge is like a carpenter, what he wants he carves."

"Go before God with Justice,

"Before the judge with money."

The *tehinovnik*, or Russian official, is known for his oppression and bribery—

"To defend yourself against a thief, take stick,

To defend yourself against a *Tehinovnik*, a rouble."

"The *Tehinovniks* have a good portion in the other world,

They are directly promoted to be devils."

"The *Techinovnik* only takes up his pen,

The peasants pray and birds tremble."

PROVERBS ILLUSTRATING OPINION

The Russian proverbs are specially sarcastic on women.

In these days of the advocacy of women's rights and suffrage, the subject does not find much favour in Russia, except among a few women in the upper strata. The Russian proverbs recognise the distinct sphere of man and woman.

"If you be a cock, crow,
If a hen, lay eggs."

"Do not trust the wind in the fields,
Nor a woman with too much liberty."

And yet they recognise the power of woman's influence. There is a popular but mistaken idea in England, that the women of India are slaves ; I have, however, myself often witnessed in India, that much of the Christian influence over the men is nullified by the power the female has in the domestic hearth when she stoops to conquer. The Russians say, on this head,

"The wife, without beating the husband, rules him by her temper."

"The husband is the head of the house. The wife is its soul."

"Having a good wife and rich cabbage soup ; other things seek not."

Celibacy is not much esteemed by the people.

"A man without a wife is like a man in winter without a fur bonnet."

"A bachelor is a goose without water."

"The cuckoo complains because she has no nest,
It is a nuisance to go alone even to be drowned."

A man under female control, or what the Germans call under the slipper, is thus described—

"A crab is not a fish among fishes,
A bat is not a bird among birds,
So a hen-pecked husband is not a man among men."

SLAV RACE, ITS FUTURE—SEMI-ORIENTAL

The recent revolutions in Turkey and Central Asia are lifting the curtain on a great drama, in which the Slav race, 80,000,000 in number, will have to take leading part. While the Latin race, as represented by France, Spain, and Portugal is on the decline, a new and brilliant future is opening out to the Slavs, provided it is not marred by the old bane, too great extent of territory and the spirit of anarchy. The Slavs of Turkey and of Austria have, however, a common interest arising from race, religion, and language, and leading them to sympathise with Russia, their federal head. They have successfully struggled against the deadening influences of German centralisation, and have vindicated for themselves their character as a semi-oriental race, and as a bridge over the gulf between the east

and west ; while having that unity amid variety, and agreement with other Europeans, which indicates their having come from a common Aryan stock, yet their proverbs have a distinct oriental ring.

Russian proverbs, as coins, may hereafter throw light on the origin and migration of the Aryan race from their plateau in Central Asia. Proverbs, like myths, fables, language, stone remains, are clues to guide us in the labyrinths of early days.

The terms *thelobetz*, or presenting a petition, signifies striking the ground with the forehead, the position in which petitions were presented, and, like the prostration in prayer, indicates that spirit of reverence which may be seen in the meanest cab driver in St. Petersburg, who, in passing a church even on the coldest day, is sure to take off his hat out of respect, hence the proverb—

“The wife should reverence the husband as the cross on the steeple,
but the husband must respect the wife as a chimney in bath,”

i. e., in the Russian vapour bath, owing to the damp, there is no danger of the chimney catching fire.

Yet the Russians seem agreed to split the difference as to the relative position of man and wife, for while—

“The husband is father of his wife.”

On the other hand—

“The wife is the crown of her husband.
The husband is the head of the family,
The wife is the soul.”

Another proverb, however, adds something not so fatherly.

“Beat your wife before dinner, and again before supper.”

The love of symbols is to be seen everywhere in the proverbs as well as on the brilliant shop fronts of Moscow.

In Russian proverbs may be found traces of pagan worship which the old Slavs paid to trees, forests, wood spirits, etc.

RUSSIAN PROVERBS—SEMI-ORIENTAL

The love of word painting, quaint illustrations, humorous allegories, and emblems, is conspicuous in Russia, mixed with a quiet vein of sarcasm like that in the picture in which the Russians describe John Bull in his top boots, a big man living in a very small island, where he has no room to turn ; or in the one with the Emperor Nicholas' portrait on a lamp shade, an obstacle to enlightenment.

Maidens were secluded until the days of Peter the Great. Modesty was the maiden's necklace, not to be shown to vulgar eyes ; the women were veiled, and

it was only Peter's despotism which forced the nobles of Moscow to bring their wives and daughters into public—

“Birds in cages and maidens in the upper chambers.

A visible girl is of copper, an invisible of silver.”

Shir Ali, the Ruler of Afghanistan, when he visited Lord Mayo in the Punjab and saw the array of English ladies assembled there, so far from being struck with it, said the English are like my countrymen, they keep their prettiest women at home.

The *widows* come in for their share of odium, the old Slavs of Russia used to burn them with their deceased husbands,—beware of the widow is still their maxim.

“He has not seen misfortune who has not married a young widow.”

“It is mawkish to remain a maid,

It is laborious to be a wife,

To be a widow is to be ducked in water.”

And yet they say—

“He who throws even a splinter to cover a widow's house will be protected by God.”

Fatalism was held very strongly ; the Hindus say our destiny is marked in lines on our forehead.

Any one who has been in Russia knows what *si tchas* means ; you order a thing, the servant says it is ready, but that means two hours hence.

“The Russian is clever, but always too late.”

The proverbs generally take a metrical form, as Mr. Ralston states, “To this day, ‘to speak in verse’, is an expression used to signify a speaker's wisdom, the language of their tales is a modulated and cadenced prose.”

RUSSIANS AND FOREIGNERS

The Russian people are very hospitable to strangers, but they are jealous of them, and nothing but the iron will of a Peter the Great could have introduced the foreign element into Russia. While the Greeks styled foreigners barbarians, and the Hindus called them *mleccha* or unclean, the Russians, applying to themselves the title of Slavs or the speakers, gave to foreigners the name *nyemetz* or the dumb people ; an epithet particularly applicable to the Germans, whom the Russians detest from race, temperament, and religious antagonism, as well as from their being used as the instruments of landlord and government oppression, the

tools of despotism and worshippers of the almighty dollar. Germans monopolise some of the best offices in the state, and are the chief apothecaries, bakers, etc., of the country, hence they are called "sausage makers": the fraternity of German tailors, also, is very numerous.

"The German may be a good fellow, but it is better to hang him."

The anarchy innate in the Slav race led the Russians at an early period to choose a foreign ruler, Rurik the Norman; but for a long period since the German element has been prominent in the State.

The Wends were a Slav race, occupying Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomerania, as far as the banks of the Elbe, but the Germans so oppressed them, destroying their independence and language, that the term Slav and slave became synonymous, hence the Slav and Saxon were as hostile as the Saxon and Celt.

The *Gypsies*, some 400,000 in Russia, found, like the Jews all over Russia, and of equally filthy, wandering, and cheating habits, [they are, however, the best singers in the Moscow saloons], come in, also, for censure.

"A gypsey once in his life tells the truth, but then he repents of so doing."

"A gypsey cannot live a single day without cheating."

"Where a Jew could not go the gypsey crept."

The French are thus referred to—

"Napoleon was not scorched, but he left Moscow"

"A frightened Frenchman runs away from even a she-goat."

"A Frenchman's legs are thin, his soul little, he is fickle as the wind."

The Jew, so cheating and dirty in Russia, is not favourite.

"A tamed wolf, a baptized Jew, and a reconciled enemy are equal in value."

"When you baptize a Jew, keep him under water"; i.e., drown him or he will turn renegade.

Of the modern Greeks they say—

"A Greek tells the truth once a year."

"One Jew is equal to in cheating two Greeks,
One Greek to two Armenians."

"A Russian can be cheated only by a gypsey, a gypsey by a Jew, a Jew by a Greek, and a Greek by the devil."

On the Tartars, the oppressors of Russia, after the fashion of Goths and Vandals, for three centuries, it is said—

"A Tartar has no soul, only a little vapour."

"A Tartar is born a pig, therefore he does not eat pork."

"The Pope of Rome and the Khan of the Crimea are the two additional misfortunes of Russia."

The Tartars, though they destroyed so many monuments of ancient civilisation as well as Russian records, yet altered very little its language or its proverbs—

The Armenians, the great bankers and traders, come in for their share :

“Out of two cauldrons in which the Jews were boiled, the devil has shaped one Armenian.”

Landlordism, in the English or feudal sense, was utterly unknown to the Slavs or Orientals ; wherever there was a landlord, he simply held a beneficiary interest. The Russians, like the Hindus, held the land in common with chiefs who were elected. Here are some of their Proverbs on landlords—

“The landlord’s court has a wide entrance, but a narrow exit” i.e., it is easy to get in his debt, difficult to get out of it.

“The kindness of the landlord is as fleeting as dew.”

“Even in hell the peasant will have to serve the landlord, for, while the latter is boiling in a cauldron, the former will have to put wood under it.”

“Praise not the crop until it is stacked,

Praise not the landlord until he is in the coffin.”

“By birth a landlord, by deeds a Jew.”

“God made the peasant, but the devil begot the landlord.”

“Should a peasant become a landlord, he will flay the peasants.”

The Bengalis have, respecting their zemindars or landlords, a proverb—

“The love which the Mussulman has to his fowl,” (i.e., he fattens it in order to devour it) “the landlord has to the peasant.”

The Dissenters or Raskolniks of Russia are very numerous, some 15,000,000, and many are very bitter against the National Church.

“He who fears God does not go to church.”

Some are like the English Quakers, and say—

“The Church is not in beams but in ribs.”

“Songs and dances are Satan’s daughters.”

The beard is held in high veneration by them—

“Without a beard no admission to paradise.”

“To shave is to destroy the image of God.”

Tea, coffee, tobacco, and potatoes are denounced by Dissenters as “the ruin of soul and body.”

“Who smokes drives away the Holy Spirit.”

“Thunder slays the Coffee drinker.”

“Tea, the Chinese arrow, has pierced the Russian heart.”

“The smoker is brother to a dog.”

By some sects in Russia tobacco is denounced as a sin on the principle of the text, “Not that which goeth *into* the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh *out* of the mouth.”

But in spite of this, tea is so popular in Russia that the common term for drink-money is *a chai*, tea-money.

With "Too many cooks spoil the broth" compare

"With seven nurses the child loses his eyes."

What the hearth or fireside is to the English, the stove or *petch* is to the Russian ; as, on it, it is the privilege of the old women to sleep, it is called second mother, on which is to be found the warmth of summer-tide.

"Hold by an old friend but a new house."

Caste feeling is less strong in Russia than in Germany or England :

"The poor may wear a coat of sheepskin, but he has a human heart."

Until overshadowed by the autocracy of the Tsars, Russia was a freer country than France, as is shown in the history of Novogorod ;³ feudalism never took root and when Peter the Great introduced the English law of primogeniture it was never popular.

Though the Russian people are so democratic in feeling, yet this is combined with the principle of fraternity, equality, great loyalty, and reverence to the Tsar,⁴ respecting whom there are more than 100 proverbs.

"Our souls are God's, our body the Tsar's."

"The Tsar is not fire, but approaching him you will be signed."

"The cars do not grow higher than the forehead," i. e., you cannot rival the Tsar."⁵

"Without the Tsar the earth is a widow."

The joint family system, an offshoot of patriarchal times, in which all the relations of a family lived under one roof and shared the inheritance, was an institution common to India and Russia ; yet this joint family system often led to much dissension, as they themselves admit "two bears cannot live in one den."

"Sisters-in-law are nettles."

"She grumbles like a mother-in-law"

Of a wife in the house of her husband's relations it is stated—

"The father-in-law grumbles at her.

The mother-in-law abuses her,

The brother-in-law mocks her,

The sister-in-law does her mischief,

The husband is jealous."

3. See *Quarterly Review*, October, 1862.

4. The Tsar represented in the dark days of Russia the centre of unity, as against lawlessness, brought in the Tartar rule of three centuries.

5. An expression used by the nobles to show they had no ideas or rivalry.

"In wood I met a bear, in my house the step-mother."

She combs him as the stepmother combs her step-son," i.e., tears his hair out.

The Mir, or village commune, which along with the autocracy was a great conservative power in Russia, has survived the desolations of the Tartars ; it has lived through the grinding days of serfdom, and the feudal system fostered by the Tsars, and has come down with the hoar of 3000 years on ; indeed, from the period when the ancestors of the English and Russians lived together on the plains of Central Asia, it has been the base of their social development.

"The Commune is the surging wave."

"The neck and shoulders of the Commune are broad and it will carry all."

"A thread of the Commune becomes shirt for the naked."

"The Commune sighs and the rock is rent asunder."

The limits I have assigned to this paper have been reached ; I hope at a future time to take up the subject of the affinities between Russian and Indian Proverbs.

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDIES

ECNOMY AND TRADE

The Social Condition of the Muhammadans of Bengal, and the Remedies.

Three great waves have swept over this country, which have left a deep impression on the people's manners and social condition : first, the Brahminical, which identified itself with caste and the degradation of the lower orders ; then the Buddhist, which proclaimed the great doctrine of social equality, and the rights of the masses to knowledge ; the next, the Muhammadan, which has left its mark in the feudal system of the land tenure, the languages of the country, and the immuring of women. The last, the Anglo-Saxon, is, we trust, destined to proclaim the great principle of the social elevation of the people, and no monopoly of knowledge to a favoured few.

Our subject treats of the reflex action of the third wave in the social condition of the Muhammadans of Bengal ; but the limit assigned to this paper, and the extensive bearings of the question, restrict us mainly to the issues ; for as to the facts, it is evident that all over Bengal the Musalmans are gradually deteriorating.

The finger of decay appears on all relating to Muhammadanism in India whether we look at their crumbling palaces or debased social condition ; their nobility are vanishing like the old French *noblesse* while the descendants of the once mighty rulers of the land eke out a miserable pittance, living in the light of other days.

This is not a subject for the mere sentimentalist or the investigations of the antiquary ; it involves considerations connected with the peace and social progress of the country, as decay leads to desperation, and those that have nothing to lose are ripe for any revolutionary scheme. When the sons of kings become beggars—as I have seen at Janpur—we can understand what the state of feeling is, keeping alive the fire of envy and hatred. Let us not despise the Musalmans because they are low and poor ; for the history of India shows us a Shakya Muni heading the Lower orders in a successful crusade against the Brahmins, and a Govindh forming the Sikhs, chiefly of the lower castes ; one of the leaders of the Khalsa troops was a barbar, another was a bearer.

Among the difficult problems of the day in relation to India, there is none pressing with more weight on reflecting minds than this very question of the social condition of Musalmans in India, and especially of Bengal. It is a painful truth

that they are sinking in the social scale, and that the new rule adopted of requiring a knowledge of English from all candidates for offices of any importance, is plunging them still lower. Hence, in few Government offices in Bengal are there any respectable Muhammadan officials, but plenty of duffries and peons.

Fallen, fallen, fallen, fallen—

Fallen from its high estate.

What are the causes of this state is evident : the Musalmans have lost the employments they held as conquerors, and are being superseded by Hindus with the new conquerors of the empire ; they maintain a style of luxury and living quite incompatible with their means ; profligacy and depravity exercise a baneful effect. Adalut Khan, Munshi of Fort William College, refers in his Lecture on Sadi to this : “The love of luxury has ruined us, and made us unfit to assume the name of a nation,—this has numbed the quickness of our reasoning faculty,—this has degraded us to such a pitch that in education, skill, and bravery we are for inferior to the other rising nations of the globe ; and this—this only—has made our kings mere puppets in the hands of their designing ministers, and lastly hurled them down from their seats of royalty.”

Of the Muhammadans in relation to the English, it may be said that though among them they are not of them,—Musalman stands alone ; though he professes a religion in its main features based on Christianity ; though in his love for history and actualities, he has more affinity with the European than the Hindu ; though his history is connected with European history, in the annals of Spain, the Crusades, of Austria and Turkey. And yet of the social condition of the Muhammadan little is known or even cared for : how can it be ? Though the Muhammadans are probably 30,000,000 in India, yet how little is attention in England drawn to their feelings or opinions. At the period of the Indian mutiny there was a painful consciousness of the existence of Muhammadans in India ; but since that event the knowledge seems to have evaporated, and we seem to be ignoring, with respect to the Musalmans, that sound maxim of Tod in his *Rajasthan*—“that no European can be an acceptable or useful functionary amongst the Hindus who is not familiar with their language, manners, and institution and disposed to mix with them upon equal and social terms.”

Yet though the Moslems have fallen from their palmy state,—no longer the rulers of the land, and the leaders of India,—yet are they not unworthy of our sympathy ; we must regard them as a mighty ruin, as the *debris* left by a vast and overwhelming torrent. We cannot forget the noble reign of the mighty Akbar, a monarch ahead of almost all the European monarchs of his day.

Though ignorant of them, we must not ignore them—they are too numerous for that, as Sir Richard Temple stated at a late meeting of our Society : “In most parts of India, the Muhammadan races still possessed vitality ; the lower orders were still military, while the upper distinguished themselves in politics or

literature Wherever administrative capacity and energy were required there would Muhammadans be found, now as ever. At Hyderabad, where he (the speaker) had spent the last few months, there Muhammadan administrators and statesmen, one of whom, Sir Salar Jung, had a repute which might justly be a source of pride to his Muhammadan compatriot and co-religionists." And our President made remarks in a similar strain: "It ought never to be forgotten that the Muhammadan population was lately predominant in this country, and the recollection of their former power in connection with their present want of social importance was liable to engender feelings not of the most desirable nature. The subject was therefore of the highest political importance. We had not long ago experienced that the disaffection of the Muhammadans may be a serious evil, and he thought, therefore, that no opportunities should be lost of conciliating them by a spirit of fairness and justice."

One great difficulty in dealing with this subject is that, to treat it properly, it has to grapple with political questions, which are excluded from our debates; besides, the social elevation and education of the Musalman is not a simple question for schoolmasters or political economists: it has much to do with the stability of civilization in India, with the contentedness of a people, grounded on giving them a due share in the administration of their own country.¹ We know that the reversal of this policy by the Muhammadans in the days of Aurungzeb so incensed the Hindus as to lead to that formidable Mahratta power which, in its struggle of despair, helped to overthrow the Mogul colossus. Let us not tread in their steps.

While politics then are excluded from our Society, yet there is one subject which even the parent Society does not exclude—peace and international relations. A socially degraded people cannot be a contented one; they may appear so, but it is only the temporary repose of the volcano—the lull indicative of the approaching hurricane.

A knowledge that could make the Muhammadans acquainted with the power, intelligence, and resources of the English Government would tend powerfully to tranquillise them. We saw the other side in the mutiny, when, ignorant of all European knowledge, the mutineers thought England was a little island in the ocean, not far from Saugur, and that exhausted of men she was sending women in petticoats (i.e. kilts) to conceal her weakness.

The following resolution was sent, August 19th, 1867, to the local Governments of India:—"The Governor-General in Council is fully alive to the urgent political necessity for opening up to natives of ability and character a more important, dignified, and lucrative sphere of employment in the administration of British India."

Of course, to some it appears a solution of the present policy to say, "Keep down the Muhammadans by the sword", or as Alfred St. Clare says in "Uncle Tom" of the American slaves, "Of course they must be kept down steadily, consistently." We can only say that even if right, it would be a sheer impossibility. You cannot repress 30,000,000—a population ten times as numerous as that of Scotland. You cannot oppose the great law : force without enlightenment is the mother of rebellion. You cannot treat this immense number, equal to the population of France, as Helots or Pariahs. One of the greatest writers of the day has said "there is no sure foundation set on blood."

The Musalmans of Bengal may be weak and without energy, but they are connected by descent, religion, and trade and above all, by a common misfortune of being equally under the Kafir yoke, with the hardy races of other parts of India. The Afghans for a long period held possession of Bengal. Any one that will look into the mysteries of the Bara Bazar will find there a powerful link—an impulse of common thought which vibrates throughout India : the Bara Bazar chain on one side extends to Hyderabad, on the other to Bokhara. In the mutiny they had frequently information of matters of importance even before the Government. Of late we know the correspondence that has been carried on between Dacca and our north-west frontier by the Ferazis and Wahabis.

We cannot now carry out the old policy of *divide et impera*. The rail and other causes are leading natives to see the value of combination, that union is strength, and that on certain question Hindus and Musalmans can combine. Even the Hindus feel that the Muhammadans settled in the country they conquered, spent their money there, intermarried with the natives, and admitted them to their privileges.

The Ferazis and Wahabis have, like the Irish, sought to extend their influence abroad through want of home sympathy. As the Irish looked for intervention in their case from France, Austria and Spain, so the Wahabis fan the flame in Central Asia and our Afghan frontier. The history of the Ferazis and Wahabis clearly shows that Muhammadanism is not dead, but sleeping.

The Wahabis sprung from that remarkable association founded in the deserts of Arabia a century ago by Abdul Wahib,—a species of Moslem-Puritanism which has since spread along the Persian Gulf to India, and even to Bengal.² In Bengal, like other sects, they are chiefly composed of the middle classes—of the sons of tailors, butchers, hide merchants, petty traders, shop-keepers, and ryots. There are few of the upper classes belonging to them, excepting the Begum of Bhopal and the Nawab of Tonk.

2. For an interesting account of them, see Burkhardt's *Travels* and that most valuable work, Palgrave's *Arabia*. The expenses of Mr. Palgrave's journey were defrayed by the Emperor Napoleon.

Two years ago, I spent a week at the Nawab of Murshedabad's palace. I long before had been deeply interested in the sad state the social degradation of Muhammadans of Bengal, and the remedies for ameliorating it. I made many enquiries there on the subject and, at my request, the Dewan of the Nazim summoned a meeting of the gentry of Murshedabad to talk over the question with me. We had a most interesting meeting, which lasted three hours, and in which the gentlemen made their remarks fully and freely, as I wished them to do. The conclusions I came to were, that there was an immense amount of bitterness and discontent existing owing to the want of a career for Muhammadans. Their fall from political power and the English Government making a book-career a test for office had left numbers, poor and proud, with any resources, swelling that torrent of discontent which rolls between Hyderabad, Lucknow, and Bokhara.

They admitted the idleness and false luxury of many, but they complained seriously that the Government did not give them credit for the time they were obliged to devote to Persian studies: the Bengalees had only two languages to study,—they had three.

What are the remedies for this unhappy state of things?

I. The foremost step, we believe, must be a sincere attempt to remove that veil which hides the Bengal Moslem world from us. We have pursued in this case what may be called an ostrich policy, in following the well-known practice of that bird, which, when closely pursued, buries its head in the sand, fancying that by hiding the danger it escapes from it. So in India men have shrunk from the question—What will you do with the Musalmans? They are 30,000,000 in India: they are sinking to the level of a Pariah race,—possessing great physical energy, with minds intensely embittered by their position and hoping that revolutions may bring them some relief.

II. The collecting and communicating information through the agency of this Society, on all points relating to the social condition of the Muhammadans, the following among others:—

1. The numbers and position of those Musalmans of Pathan or Mogul descent resident in Bengal.

2. The points of difference between Muhammadans and Hindus in social life and morals.

3. The number, education, emoluments, and influence of Mullahs and Kazis.

4. The mutual influence of Musalmans and Hindus on each other.

5. The intercourse kept up between Musalmans in Bengal and in other parts of India.

6. The numbers and social position of Arab seamen, Afgan traders, and Moguls in Calcutta.

7. The past and present social condition of the Musalmans in Dacca, Murshedabad, Hooghly, Calcutta, Pandua, Furridpur.

The *Selr Mutakherin*, published last century, throws much light on the social condition of Murshedabad, and the state of the Muhammadans : it is a second Clarendon.

Herklots has written well on the manners and customs of the Musalmans, but, chiefly those of South India.

The *Memoir of Lutfella*, by Eastwick, is also valuable : his first ideas of Englishmen were that they were a race who had no skin, but a thick membrane covering their bodies, which made them appear white, and whose creed was that the Almighty had a wife and a son. The secrets of Harm life have been unfolded by *Mrs. Mir Haseyn*, an English lady married to a Muhammadan. Sir H. Elliot's *Works* are very valuable as to the past.

We are greatly in need of statistics in reference to the social condion of the Muhammadans in Bengal ; one face is patent—they have degenerated, are degenerating, and will sink to a still lower depth, unless steps are taken to remedy what must be an evil attended with serious consequences. Our social structure in India must not be built on a quicksand. You must not turn numbers of the people through rank despair into those mysterious but mischievous being, wandering fakirs ; the mutiny records their influence, so did the days of Aurungzeb, when they amounted to 110,000 : *gens aeterna in qua nemo nascitur*.

The panics in the mutiny illustrate our ignorance of the Muhammadans, as well as those bazar rumours so mysterious in their origin, but so pernicious and widespread in their effects. Look even at a late scene in the City of Palaces, which boasts so of its civilization, or rather English varnish ; the lower class of natives in Calcutta were quite in a panic for several weeks, afraid to cross the plain at night because they believed that several hundred heads were being cut off by Government as an offering to complete Kidderpur bridge. A tailor told a lady of my acquaintance that he saw seven headless corpses lying in the plain, their heads having been cut off to make this offering

III. Encouragement must be given to the study of Arabic and Persian among Europeans. Sir Frederic Halliday, when Governor of Bengal, remarked on this—“To find Europeans in India acquainted with Arabic is now very difficult. The Government has long ceased to encourage the acquisition of such knowledge by its servants ; and it is with great difficulty that an officer can be found capable of superintending the College. Indeed, when Principal Less visited England last year, the Government was obliged to entrust the temporary superintendence in his absence to an officer who had some knowledge of Persian indeed, but did not pretend to any skill in Arabic. And if any accident were to remove the present Principal, I am not acquainted, even by name, with any officer competent by knowledge of Arabic to supply his place.” *

Are we to maintain the policy pursued towards Ireland, where, when Queen Elizabeth founded a University, there were chairs of Latin, Greek, Hebrew, & c. ;

and though chairs of Italian, German and French have been established of late, yet, to the present time, there is not an endowed chair of the Celtic language. See on this subject Matthew Arnold's able Lectures on Celtic Literature.

The Marquis of Wellesley's policy was not such when he founded the College of Fort William, and gave every encouragement to the study of Arabic and Persian by Europeans.

IV. The opposing of excessive centralization and leaden uniformity so popular in India : We want, like the French Revolutionists, one dead level for all ignoring the fact as stated by Mr. Bright in the House of Commons : "Be it 50, or 100 years, or 500 years, does any man with the smallest glimmering of common sense believe that that great country, with its 20 different nations, and its 20 languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire ? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible."

The great question is : Is India to be regarded as one country to which you can apply one great system of centralization, or is it to be regarded as a collection of nationalities like Europe, to be treated on the Federal principle ? The former has been applied to the Muhammadans, and hence no regard has been paid to their specialties.³

The Moslems resemble the Celts very much in the tenacity with which they adhere to their ancient character and language : the history of Ireland for five centuries, and of Wales even in the present day, as well as of the Highlands of Scotland, illustrates this. Moore, the historian, remarks of the Irish Celts, as a remarkable result, "that after many successful invasions by foreign tribes, the great bulk of the nation itself—its language, character, and institutions—should have remained so free from change that even the conquering tribes themselves should have been mingled with the general mass."

No one can win such men without sympathy. It has been remarked of the Irish : "We might as reasonably expect the reflexion of a mirror without an original object to produce it, as gratitude and veneration to discover themselves in the hearts of those who have never been treated with benevolence and con-

3. M. Guizot, in an excellent article in *La Revue des Deux Monde* for last September—"La France et le Prusse responsable devant l'Europe"—makes the following weighty observations : "Not only is the diversity of race and languages in those organised societies that we call a nation or a state, a fact which from the earliest period has been maintained in history, but this fact has powerfully contributed to the moral and social development of men, and to the progress of general civilization : it enters evidently into the plans of Divine Providence."

descending sympathy." The policy in Ireland was to ignore the Celtic language, and history tells us, in lines of blood, the result ; so little sympathy was there for a race whom Lord Lyndhurst styled alines in blood, speech, and religion, that the ablest Celtic grammar was published by a German, Zeus, while the enquiries into Welsh literature were due to Mr. Jones, a peasant. Bedell, an English Bishop in Ireland, was one of the few ecclesiastics who advocated the admission of the Irish nation to the ministry. He was opposed to it on the ground that patronage was the privilege of the conquerors, but, Cassandra-like, he told the rulers of that day that hoodwinking the Irish in ignorance was an ill principle of policy, which would be bitterness in the end. He was only ridiculed for this advice, and in the Irish rebellion of 1641 he was the only Englishman allowed to stay under his own roof.

V. Encouraging the combined study of Persian and English : We are happy to see a recent change in educational policy, which, while pursuing the study of English, recognizes the importance of the vernacular and classical languages of India, and that the aim must be not mere Anglicising, but an enlightened Orientalism.

The gratifying success of Sanskrit studies of late, in connection with the Calcutta University, affords one of the happiest omens for the future.

Surely, without deprecating the English, the Persian and Arabic have their claim also, as well as the Sanskrit. They are not only brought into the staple of the Hindustani, the *lingua franca* of India, but they form the key for communication with the majority of natives in North India and Central Asia.

A fatal mistake has arisen in Bengal from the circumstance that the Bengalis have such a wonderful power of speaking and writing in a foreign language, that no Native or European equals them in that except the Russians. Even John Bull himself is notoriously deficient in his knowledge of foreign languages, as every Frenchman and German can testify. Why then apply this test to all, and especially to a class like the Musalmans, who hold it a matter of religious duty to pay attention to the study of Persian and Arabic ?

Are we, for the sake of swelling our University lists, and gratifying the pride of pedagogues, to enforce the English Test Act, and thus to violate one of the essential principles on which we hold India—the giving the natives a large share in the administration of their own country, and thus creating a joint interest with us in the land, identifying their interests with ours ?

But filling offices with men like books in breeches is hardly carrying out this plan : we want these, but we require also those with a better *physique*,—not only strong in the brain, but also in the legs. Physical energy is as necessary as mental. If mere book-cram is to be the test, why not allow Bengalis to compete for the artillery or cavalry ? Just fancy a Bengali B.A. leading a charge of infantry !

Sir Donald McCleod, the able Governor of the Punjab, made the following

remarks, in reply to an address of the native nobility of Lahore, on the subject of an Oriental University :—

“It appears indeed evident, that to impart knowledge in a foreign tongue must, of necessity, greatly increase the difficulties of education. In England, where the Latin and Greek languages are considered an essential part of a polite education, all general instruction is conveyed, not in those languages but in the vernacular of the country ; and it seems difficult to assign a sufficient reason why a different principle should be acted upon here.

“And this brings me to the defect,—which I myself more especially deplore—in the system of instruction at present almost exclusively followed, viz., that it has tended, though not intentionally, to alienate from us, in a great measure, the really learned men of your race. Little or nothing has been done to conciliate these, while the literature and science which they most highly value have been virtually ignored. The consequence has been that the men of most cultivated minds amongst our race and yours have remained but too often widely apart, each being unable either to understand or to appreciate the other. And thus we have virtually lost the aid and co-operation of those classes who, I feel assured, afforded by far the best instruments for creating the literature we desire.”

VI. Imparting knowledge to the Muhammadans through the vernacular : While, then, a knowledge of English is of great value, and deserves every encouragement, still, in the present state of the Muhammadan mind, it is not prepared to do what the Bengali does—gain European knowledge entirely through a foreign language : you must therefore at present, give it to him through his own vernacular, as is the Lahore University plan, and as the Alighur Vernacular Society has proposed to Government. Require a high test of knowledge for office, but let it be given through a vernacular medium.

As the Muhammadan student has, besides English, to study two languages. Persian and Bengali, whereas the Bengali has only one, the principle of an equivalent should be allowed, viz., his knowledge of Persian should compensate for his inferiority to the Bengali in English pronunciation and composition.

The Lahore University movement is, in this respect, on a broader basis than that of the Calcutta University. One of its objects is to give a high course of English knowledge, but in the vernacular language.

Its objects are thus stated :

“In the examinations and the tuition of the University, ‘the comparative method’ will be aimed at, in order to form a link between the languages, literature, and science of the East and the West.

“Urdu and Hindi will be the principal vehicles for *direct instruction* to the masses of people.

"Arabic with Muhammadans and Sanskrit with Hindus will hold that place which the classical languages of Greece and Rome hold towards ourselves.

"English will give the opportunity for comparing their own language, literature, and science with our own, and its tuition will thus be rendered a really invigorating exercise for already prepared minds, not a mere word-teaching."

This plan has met with the cordial approval of the Governor-General, who in 1865 subscribed Rs. 2,000 per annum to it ; Sir Donald McCleod, Governor of the Panjab, gives Rs. 1,000 annually ; the Raja of Kashmere subscribed half a lakh to it ; and the torrent swells as it rolls.

The results of this oriental movement are thus stated :—

"1st.—The establishment of the Vernacular Literary Society of the Panjab, the Anjuman-i-Panjab, and that of a number of either affiliated or independent Societies of the same kind in different parts of the Punjab.

"2nd —The establishment of a Free Public Library and Reading Room in the City of Lahore.

"3rd.—The composition, compilation, and translation of a number of valuable treatises in Urdu, Hindi, Arabic, Sanskrit, and Persian.

"4th.—The presence of over 120 candidates from all parts of the Panjab, the North-Western Provinces, and even Bengal, at the first Oriental Examination held at Lahore. The examination—a very strict one—was in Arabic, Sanskrit, Urdu, Hindi, Gurumukhi, Pukhtu, and Persian ; and although only a very short notice of it was given, and the prizes offered were few and small in value, it attracted a considerable number of candidates.

"5th.—The establishment of an Oriental and of an Anglo-Oriental University School, at which more than 500 pupils of all ages attend, and the affiliation to these schools and to the Anjuman of a number of smaller schools.

"6th—The great concession made by Moulvies and Pandits to English education in themselves undergoing or promoting a more critical system of studies."

It is likely to end in the formation of a North-West University.

The feeling is still strong among the Moslems in favour of those languages which in their present depressed state they feel to be a glorious inheritance. Hence even here in Bengal, we have instances of Muhammadans who love this knowledge so for its own sake, as to think nothing of begging their bread to great distances, even to Arabia and Egypt, to study the favourite Arabic. They may be said literally to pursue knowledge even to China. Maulavi Abdool Luteef, in his able paper on the Hooghly Madrassa, has stated the case thus :

"The fruits of English education will show off to the best advantage, in conjunction with scholarships in the Muhammadan classics. Unless a Muhammadan is a Persian and Arabic scholar, he cannot attain a respectable position in Muhammadan society ; i.e. he will not be regarded or respected as a scholar ; and unless he has such a position, he can have no influence in the Muhammadan

community. Consequently, a Muhammadan who has received an English education, and has omitted the study of the Persian and Arabic, is little able to impart the benefits of that education to the members of his community : he cannot persuade others into an appreciation of the beneficence of the British rule, and the greatness of the British power."

This is not the occasion to dwell on the great importance of the Arabic and Persian languages and literature, which is acknowledged by the leading scholars of Europe, and which are of such great use for political and commercial objects : we need not therefore be surprised that the Muhammadans are justly proud of the Arabic and Persian languages, which enshrine so vast an amount of valuable literature, and which are associated with the palmy days of their greatness on the banks of the Guadelquiver or Euphrates, with the times of Harun-ul-Rashid or Akbar, with the learned days of Spain, and, in fact, with the recollection that their literature preserved civilisation in Europe during the middle ages, forming the golden link between Latin culture and modern progress.

If in every country a foreigner's knowledge of the language is the key to the people's heart, why should the Moslems form an exception ? Why should we try to adopt towards them the worst features of the Irish policy, the endeavour to confine knowledge to the difficult and distasteful medium of a foreign language ? Do we want to receive the policy of William the conqueror in England, which made Norman French the language of the court, the law,—the pathway to all honour and preferment ? yet in vain—the English mind, after centuries of suffering, rose against it. The Moslems themselves in Bengal made Persian the language of courts and business ; yet we know the vernacular has risen against it, and thrown off the incubas as the Spaniards did at a later period, in their own country, though the Muhammadans had for ages imposed the Arabic language on Spain. The truth holds—Nations follow the language of the mother.

VII. While, with a proper regard to native wants, able professors have been imported from Europe for the cultivation of Sanskrit ; while we have had a Ballantine, a Griffiths, and a Hall at Benares, a Wilson, a Marshall, and a Cowell in Calcutta, who by their influence have given a great impetus to Sanskrit literature ; while on the other hand, professors for various branches of English literature have been drawn from Europe ;—what has been done for Arabic and Persian, though Professors of these languages are required not merely for philological studies, but also for historical ? Persian, as Sir H. Elliot shows, embodies our best materials for the past history of India, and for throwing light on the line of politics.

The Madrassa in Calcutta, richly endowed by Warren Hastings, has scarcely ever had European professors attached to give their entire time to it, a measure absolutely necessary to secure success ; and even the college of Mahomed Sing at

Hoogly, founded with Muhammadan money, has been alienated to the Hindus, and no European professor acquainted with Arabic has ever been connected with it.

Sir Frederick Halliday quotes the following remarks of one of the first European professors appointed to the Madrassa, "that the system of study which was actually in operation led to the encouragement of purely dialectical pursuits, and tended to keep up antiquated prejudices and to give sanction to superstitions condemned even by Islam. The system is, in fact, precisely the same as the one which was in vogue in Europe during the darkest ages ; and it produces the same results. The sophistries of dialectics learned in a sacred language puff up the professors with conceit, render them hostile to everything practical or founded on experience, and extinguish in them the sense of art and beauty, and blunt the sentiment of equity and morality."

But Dr. Spranger was sent elsewhere, and could not carry out his reforms in the Madrassa.

VIII. Scholarships have been abundantly bestowed on Hindus to enable them to continue their studies ; a similar encouragement is even more urgently needed for the Muhammadans.

The above are some of the remedies proposed for the present state of things, based on the principle of employing Muhammadans more extensively under Government, and applying a different educational test from that for the Hindus.

There are signs of a move among Muhammadans. The Anglo-Persian class in the Madrassa has been a decided success ; many students have matriculated from it at the University ; two have obtained the degree of B.A. at the Entrance Examination. This year, of eight candidates sent up from the Madrassa for matriculation, six were successful.

Medical education through the vernacular has been a success in Calcutta. Agra and Lahore among the Muhammadans.

The Survey Department has given a scope to the Muhammadans. The publication and use of an Arabic grammar in India, compiled by Moulavi Abdullah Al-obydi, Anglo-Arabic Professor in Hoogly College, with the commencement of a series of works on this plan, is a sign of progress. The Moulavi is the author also of an interesting prize essay on the subject of Western and Muhammadan learning on their mutual action and influences on each other.

The foundation of a new literature, called the Musalman-Bengali, shows an awakening of mind among the lower orders.

The Muhammadan Literary Society, in its annual *soiree*, is a success.

The days of Muhammadan stagnation are, we believe, passing away ; there are ripples indicating that the current is in motion ; with a supply of European professors of Arabic and Persian, establishment of scholarships, the co-study of Persian and English and the opening of Government employ to the Muhammadans

on the terms of a special test, there is every likelihood that a new career may be open to the neglected Moslems of Bengal,—a measure conducive to peace, as well as to the elevation of an important class of Her Majesty's Indian subjects. •

DISCUSSION ON THE PAPER

MOULAVIE ABDOLL LUTEEF acknowledged the increasing interest which was taken by Europeans in the present day in the unfortunate condition of his co-religionists. For their sympathy and good-will such men as Mr. Long were entitled to the deepest gratitude of the Muhammadan community ; and on its behalf he now tendered the lecturer his best thanks. He fully concurred in the view which Mr. Long had taken of the encouragement which should be given to vernacular education among Muhammadans ; but he ventured to think that such effort would not be of much practical use, unless they embraced a scheme for imparting to Muhammadan youth the highest instruction in English science and literature. At present there was no provision for this purpose. He thought, therefore, that all who were interested in the social improvement of his countrymen should unite their exertions in the attempt to establish a strictly Muhammadan institution, in which instruction the Arabic classics might go hand in hand with the English studies of the University.

BABU CHUNDER NATH BOSE, after thanking Mr. Long for his valuable paper, said that, in considering the social status of the Muhammadans, it was of very great importance to bear in mind the historical changes which that people had undergone. There was a time when the Muhammadans were the greatest power on the face of the earth,—when their empire extended from India on the east to Spain on the west,—when poetry and philosophy were cultivated by them with a high degree of success. But the rise of the Muhemmadan power, he observed, was owing to the operation of a strong religious impulse and certain other principles, all of which seemed to him to have spent their force. Historically considered, the Muhammadans were, therefore, in the predicament of the descendants of the ancient Romans and of the degenerate Greeks of the present day. He thought

that the Muhammadans has passed that manhood which nations, like individuals, can enjoy but once ; and he was of opinion that having become in a manner fossilised the Muhammadans could not except any new life to be infused into them. He approved of the suggestions which Mr. Long had made for raising the social status of the Muhammadans, and perceived their excellence in connection with the objects aimed at by the lecturer ; but he thought that no very sanguine expectations could be founded upon them. The fact of the Muhammadans being a people scattered over different parts of the earth seemed to him to be worthy of serious consideration, in discussing the question of their social status in the light in which it had been brought forward by Mr. Long.

DR. CHUCKERBUTTY remarked that the subject discussed by the Rev. Mr. Long was of great importance, and the Muhammadan gentlemen present were better able to express an opinion on it than he himself. He understood that the great point insisted on by the author was, as recommended by Sir Donal McCleod, the establishment of an Oriental University for encouraging, through the medium of the oriental languages, the study of European science, history, and literature. So long as the object of study remained the same, it mattered little in what language the education was conducted ; surely physical truths taught in the vernaculars of India would not be different from the same truths taught in the English language. He would endeavour to illustrate this in the department of knowledge with which he was most familiar. It is true that the first attempt to give medical education in the vernaculars was a failure. But this was because it was conducted with great nervousness, without human dissection, and in constant dread of hurting the feelings of the Hindus. On the contrary, the attempt to impart medical education in English was a decided success. It was soon found out, however, that the success was limited, and that the English classes could never turn out a sufficient number of practitioners to meet the medical wants of the country. This led to the opening of first an Urdu class, and subsequently of a Bengali class. The progress of these vernacular classes, taught much in the same way as the English class, had been most remarkable. Out of a total of more than six hundred pupils, about five hundred belong to these classes ; and out of the total number of successful candidates who take the diplomas every year, a corresponding proportion comes from the same source. The cost of education per man of the vernacular students was, he was afraid to say how much, less than that of the English students ; perhaps not more than one-twenty-fifth to one-fiftieth of the cost in their case. Consequently, in the number of students under instruction, in the number of diploma-holders annually sent forth, as well as in the cheapness of cost, vernacular medical education in Bengal had a decided superiority. And what he had said about Bengal was equally applicable to Madras, Bombay, and Lahore ; and more than applicable to

Hyderabad, Agra and Nagpore, in these places medical instruction being, entirely confined to the vernaculars.

Now what is possible in one department of knowledge is equally possible in its other departments ; and if the Muhammadan preferred to receive instruction through their own vernacular or classical languages, they would be no worse than the Hindus. He could not admit that there was any real difference in vitality or intelligence between the Muhammadans and the Hindus. He denied that Muhammadans were in a fossilised state. Muhammadan workmen were as clever in the mechanical arts as the Hindus. In the learned professions, too, when they freely embraced them, the Muhammadans shone quite as much ; and Salar Jung and others named by the author were universally recognized as able and successful statesmen. If they had had the benefit of an English education, they would most probably have enjoyed a still greater reputation. He did not agree with Mr. Long that there was any necessity for an Oriental University. The Calcutta University was good enough for all purposes. It encouraged the study of several languages besides English. Let it extend their number and found classes upon all subjects in every one of them. Then the student could use his option as to the language he would learn and take his degree in. Mr. Long did not wish to exclude English from the Oriental University. The whole thing after all was, perhaps, a quibble about a name. It mattered little by what name the University was called, so long as it gave fair play to every language employed by the people, besides the English which must always hold its place, and could not be dispensed with. All these languages had their advantages as well as their disadvantages. The vernaculars were as yet poor in scientific and historical works. But let them create the demand, and it would be supplied before long. The vernacular medical classes had the same difficulty to contend against : but, he was happy to say, several good books had been already translated or composed, and if the publication was satisfactory, it commanded a rapid sale and was soon out of the market. The same thing would happen in other departments. The English language was rich in scientific, historical, and literary compositions ; but then it was a foreign language, and could not be acquired by an Indian student without many years application and loss of time which many people could ill afford, to say nothing of the expense.

MR. BEVERLEY agreed with the writer of the paper that any improvement in the social condition of the Muhammadans must be based upon a more liberal

employment of the higher classes in Government service. But he doubted whether the encouragement of the study of their vernacular was the most suitable means to this end in Lower Bengal. Mr. Long seemed to have forgotten that the Muhammadan vernacular was not the vernacular of Bengal. Urdu was almost as foreign a language in Bengal as was English ; and when there were so many vernaculars to deal with as Bengali, Uriya, Assamese, Urdu and Hindi, it was no wonder that English had come to be so largely used for purposes of administration in the Lower Provinces. He did not wish to be understood to undervalue a knowledge of the vernacular in the rulers of the country ; but he believed that under existing circumstances, a knowledge of English was the Muhammadan's surest pathway to office. He had himself been debarred from employing several Muhammadan gentlemen solely in consequence of their ignorance of the English language. They were, no doubt, placed at a disadvantage in this respect as compared with Hindus ; and he maintained that special facilities ought now to be afforded them for acquiring a knowledge of English in their own schools.

MOULAVIE ABDOOL LUTEEF explained that the reason why the Hindus had outstripped the Muhammadans in obtaining posts under Government was, that while the Hindus had no literature of their own to study, the latter were still under the necessity of cultivating their own language and literature. No Muhammadan gentleman was considered to have received a liberal education who had not studied Arabic and Persian ; but these languages were not taught in the same schools and colleges where English was taught, and thence arose the difficulty experienced by Muhammadans in the study of English. He did not think that any measures which did not aim at providing facilities for the acquirement of the English language would materially benefit his countrymen.

MOULAVIE ABDUR RAUF made some remarks in Urdu to the same effect.

In bringing the discussion to a close, the President remarked that he had little doubt that Mulavie Abdool Luteef had hit the right mark in accounting for the present relation which the Hindus occupied in regard to the Muhammadans. He thought, however, that argument had not been carried far enough. Under the early rule of the English, almost all the posts under Government were occupied by Muhammadans ; while, at the present day, the case was exacty the reverse. The

reason was that the Hindus had been wise enough, or fortunate enough to acquire a knowledge of the English language with the advantages which attend it. If the Muhammadan is still so proud and staunch that he will not accept that knowledge without his own literature, he cannot complain of the consequences which result. It was not true that the Hindu had no literature; he had, perhaps a finer literature than the Muhammadan. He (Mr. PHEAR) thought we had not yet truly measured the forces which operated in this matter, or gauged the real causes of the Muhammadans' great repugnance to the English language. They had now, however, he believed, seen their mistake, and were anxious to obtain an English education, if they could. This was doubtless the cardinal point. If they could not free themselves entirely from the idea that Persian and Arabic are essentials of a liberal education, we probably ought to give them opportunities for studying them side by side with English. In reply to observation of Molavie Abdool Luteef the PRESIDENT admitted that until the rise of the English power in this country, Sanskrit literature was not open to the body of the people in the same way as the Muhammadan classics. But this difference did not really affect the comparison, for the Hindu rivals of the Muhammadans, who had beaten them in the race, were at first almost entirely Brahman, and, moreover, the mass of the Muhammadans who were displaced were not in any sense men possessed of a liberal education.

ATĪŚA AND TIBET

SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJEE

Sometimes ago Professor Mrs. Alaka Chattopadhyaya brought out her *Atīśa and Tibet*¹ (January, 1967) and this forms in recent years quite a land-mark in Indo-Tibetan studies. Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna, *alias* Atīśa, who died near Lhasa in 1054 at about the age of 73, was one of the greatest scholars of India who also had an international status in that he was a force in Buddhistic studies in Eastern Asia, particularly India and Tibet. He had part of his education in Buddhist philosophy under a very eminent Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti in Suvarṇadvīpa or Sumatra (possibly the present town of Palembang) which was a great centre of Buddhistic learning a thousand years ago. After having a distinguished life in India as a teacher of Buddhism in some of the Indian Universities like Vikramaśīla, Odantapurī, Somapurī and Nālandā, he was taken to Tibet at the invitation of the king and people of Tibet to re-establish Buddhism and Buddhist learning in that country. Dīpaṃkara's was a very fruitful life and he composed a number of specialised treatises on aspects of Buddhist philosophy and religion. But he was also instrumental in revising a number of other Buddhist texts and in translating some of his own writings as well as those of some other Indian scholars into Tibetan. He has always been held with the highest respect by the people of Tibet and he can be described as an intellectual and organiser of the highest rank.

There are some of the original Sanskrit and Old Bengali or Apabhraṃśa compositions of Atīśa extant. But most of his works are available in Tibetan versions. In India, apart from what little of his writings could be found in Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in Nepal, we have forgotten everything about him. But the Tibetans, who had a sense of history much stronger than the people of India,—and in this respect the Tibetans are comparable to the Chinese—have preserved records of Atīśa, about his life, his learning and his work for the spread of Buddhism and Buddhist thought and culture in Tibet. There have been here and there occasional studies of Atīśa, but nothing which could be mentioned as being worthy of such a great personality has as yet appeared. We have to thank Professor Mrs. Alaka Chattopadhyaya for filling—and filling in quite a worthy manner—this great lacuna in Indological and Tibeto-Buddhist studies. Professor

1. *Atīśa and Tibet : Life and Works of Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna in Relation to the History and Religion of Tibet, with Tibetan Sources translated under Professor Lama Chimpa. By Alaka Chattopadhyaya. Indian Studies : Past & Present, Calcutta, 1967.*

Mrs. Chattopadhyaya is to be congratulated both for her choice of the subject and the successful termination of her arduous task. She had to acquire a competent knowledge of Tibetan which naturally was a *sine qua non* for work of this type. For this she obtained the help and guidance of a Tibetan scholar of eminence, Professor Lama Chimpa of Visva-Bharati University. Mrs. Chattopadhyaya has in a way resuscitated and given a new lease of life to Indo-Tibetan studies, which were re-started in India during the last decade of the 19th Century by Sarat Chandra Das of illustrious memory. Sarat Chandra Das's translations from Tibetan, and his other works on religion, culture and history of Tibet, as well as his *magnum opus*, the Tibetan-English Dictionary, opened up for modern India a new line of study and research which was new in the present age on doubt, but 1500 to a 1000 years from now it was a flourishing subject of study in India and Tibet. After Sarat Chandra Das's initial work, Indo-Tibetan studies were once again begun at Visva-Bharati University when Rabindranath Tagore with the help of Mm. Vidhusekhar Sastri and Sylvain Lévi had Tibetan studies fully established in his newly founded university. The work has been continued by a succession of scholars, both in Bengal and outside Bengal, who had their training and inspiration under Pandit Vidhusekhar Sastri, and Visva-Bharati still continues to be the centre of Indo-Tibetan studies. These studies are being carried on in driblets in Calcutta also, but nothing very definite came out in this line. The Namgyal Institute of Tibetology in Gangtok and the Institute of Tibetan Studies at Dalhousie are trying to hold the torch, and some work is being done at these places.

But Professor Mrs. Chattopadhyaya had to work primarily on her own. She has devoted herself in a single-minded manner to this scholarly *devoir*, and the result has been this very fine work of nearly six hundred pages, which has brought *kudos* to the modern Indian scholarship in Tibetology.

The work is comprehensive enough, and it would appear that the subject has been almost exhausted in Professor Mrs. Chattopadhyaya's book. This book is very well documented and there are references to the original sources at each step. Besides, all ancillary work which has helped the author in preparing her book has been properly indicated. This book is in two sections: the book itself, which comes up to some 370 pages, and then there are some valuable *Appendices*, which are detailed and extensive and which take up the rest of the work. In part I of the first section, we have a full study of the baffling personality of Dīpaṅkara Atiśa, his identity, his place of birth and work, his time and his career. Here has been presented a lot of new information—new for scholars who do not know Tibetan—and all this is of a most useful kind in establishing the biography of Atiśa. Part II of Section A is entitled *The Tibetan Background* and here Professor Chattopadhyaya has given an account of the early history of Tibet and Indo-Tibetan connections, together with a study of Buddhism in Tibet from the seventh century onwards right down to the time of Atiśa in the eleventh

century. The work of the Indian *ācārya*-s and the Tibetan *lotsava*-s has been discussed. Mrs. Chattopadhyaya has given an account of the pre-Buddhist Bon Religion of Tibet. This is important to understand the Tibetan background.⁷ I would only wish that, for the sake of completeness of this portion of Part II, Chapter 19, she had said something about the Tibetan national epic of king Gesar of Gling, where there is a very important background of the Bon religion as it was coming into a compromise with Buddhism from India.

In the *Appendices*, the original sources in the Tibetan for Atīśa and his times have been discussed, and translations given from the Tibetan. *Appendix B* is very valuable, for here we have a full classification of all the available works of Atīśa in the original or in translation, and one translation into Tibetan has been utilised to restore it back into Sanskrit. It was done by Professor Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya,—the *Bodhi-patha-pradīpa*. There are short descriptive notes on these texts which add to their value. Finally, in *Appendix C* some of the selected writings and sayings of Dīpaṃkara have been given in English translation, with full reference to the original texts. Then there is in *Appendix D* a note on the Tibetan Sexagenary Cycle, which has been prepared by Professor Mrs. Chattopadhyaya in collaboration with Professor R. N. Bhattacharyya.

In this very elaborate piece of research, Mrs. Chattopadhyaya has received collaboration of her Tibetan and Indian teachers and scholars, and particularly in Tibetan she received an immense help and guidance from Professor Lama Chimpa on the subject, as mentioned in the title-page. There is a very useful Index.

We have thus in this substantial work quite an important contribution to Tibetan studies in India and once again I congratulate the author.

NARRATIVE
of the
INCIDENTS OF MY EARLY LIFE

SARAT CHNDRA DAS

I

When you asked me, Mr. Editor, to contribute a short biographical sketch of mine for your illustrated Bengali Magazine, the *Pravasi*, the question that I put to myself was : Had not I had a life of incidents and adventure ? I thought it over and over and re-counting the troubles that I had, unwittingly, with the civilized man, to serve whom I had often risked my life, I saw the possibility of a sketch of it. In my life I have come into close contact with two classes of men, the cultured European and Indian, and the Chinese and the Tibetans, whom the former call half-civilized men. The lesson that I have learnt from my experiences with these two is that the latter are simple and sincere. The so-called model of perfection sheds a lustre, the glare of which, like the sun on snow, blinds us—his artifices being successfully concealed beneath unquestionable honesty of intention.

I lived among the Chinese and the Tibetans, and trusted them. I opened my heart to them. I had, hardly, any occasion for regret in doing so. During my residence in Tibet I did not lose a single rupee. On my return to India, the first Indian whom I trusted cheated me of one hundred rupees.

It was chiefly with the help of the Lamaic Government that I travelled in Tibet. What ups and downs I had with my own Government, how unwilling some officers were to believe that I had at all visited Tibet, I shall narrate later on. The bulk of my countrymen can hardly conceive the troubles of exploration in wild and inhospitable region, because they seldom venture out of home. They are, therefore, unable to appreciate the humble services that I have rendered to geography and science.

My relation with the Government, whom I have served with continued and unswerving fidelity, for a period of thirty-three years, are and have been such, for some years, that I derive solace from the following lines of the famous Persian poet :

Oh Hafez, have patience, when in difficulties, day and night,
In the long run, you will attain your object, some day.
Hafez ! day and night, be patient in adversity,
So that, in the end, thou mayest, one day, gain thy desire.

As both light and shade are essential to create a picture, so success and failure make a life eventful. The delineation of the career of my early years would appear uninteresting but the vicissitudes which checkered my later life, would make it rather instructive.

Dr. Paul Carus, that eminent student of Buddhism, in whom a Lama would have seen the spirit of the founder of the Mahāyāna incarnate, if his *Gospel of Buddha* and other contributions to Buddhist philosophy were written in Tibetan, while noticing some works of my brother Nabinchandra, the well-known translator of *Raghuvamśa*, namely, *Legends and Miracles of Buddha* and the *Ancient Geography of Asia*, made a passing allusion to me. He put our names under what he thought was our family name—‘Chandra Das,’ it occurring in the two names.¹

1. Dr. Paul Carus in the *Open Court*, U.S.A., writes :

“Among the native scholars of India there are two brothers, Sarat Chandra Das and Nobin Chandra Das, well-known for their extraordinary success and unusual diligence. Sri Sarat Chandra Das is the editor of the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of India*, a publication which is very valuable to the students of Buddhism. It publishes English translations of selected chapters from the Buddhist scriptures, articles on Buddhist philosophy and rituals and notes of general interest in the line of comparative religion. Nobin Chandra Das, his brother, is engaged in the Bengal Provincial Service, but his professional duties do not prevent him from devoting much of his time to studies similar to those of his scholarly brother. We notice among other publications of his a translation in Bengali verse of the *Raghuvamśa*, one of the great poems of Kāli Dasa, the story which depicts the munificence and heroism of Raghu and the love of Aja for his fair consort Indumatī, whom he lost in the very bloom of her youth.

“Nobin Chandra Das has just published a booklet entitled *Legends and Miracles, of Buddha, Sakya Sinha*, which are four cantos of a larger work entitled *Avādana-kalpa-latā* by Kṣemendra, the great Sanskrit poet of Kashmir. When Buddhism disappeared from India, almost all the Buddhist literature was destroyed, and there are only fragmentary remnants which survived ravages of the time and the bigotry of the various foreign conquerors. Happily Sarat Chandra Das recovered in his search for old Buddhistic Sanskrit literature the great work of Kṣemendra in a monastery in Tibet. He visited the ancient libraries of Sakya, Samye, and Lhasa. It was in Sakya that the monumental work of the Sanskrit poet was translated into Tibetan verse by the order of Phagspa, the patriarch who converted the emperor Khublai to Buddhism. In Lhasa he finally obtained Kṣemendra's work which was thought to be lost. It consists of 108 legends of the Bodhisattvas written in classic Sanskrit verse, 107 of which were written by himself and one by his son Sōmendra. Nobin Chandra Das selected four of 108 cantos and presents them to the English-reading public as samples of the whole work.

“The first of these four cantos is entitled *Ekaśṛṅga* which describes the romance of a youth, a Bodhisattva, brought up by his father in his hermitage of

In Christian Europe an individual is called by his surname *i. e.*, the name which is over and above his Christian name. In polytheistic India it has been the custom from Pauranic times to name an infant after some divinity, earthly or celestial. The name Kālī Dasa, by which India's great poet is known, signifies

a forest and in utter ignorance of the fair sex. But owing to the innate disposition produced by the habits of former lives, love springs up in his soul at the sight of a black eyed maiden, the daughter of a king. The main charm of the poem consists in the unconsciousness of the boy concerning his own sentiments, for he imagines that all human beings are hermits. When his father asks him : "Son, what ails thee ?" he replies :

"Father, I saw in younder grove
By Gaṅgā's side a hermit sure ;
Whose face was like a spotless moon,
Whose eyes became my cynosure.
His neck and hands and waist were girt
With beads reflecting rainbow hues.
Why father, is it that I lack
Such ornaments that grace infuse ?
The music of his loving voice
Still vibrates in my inmost heart ;
The hum of bees or cuckoo note
Compares not with his artless art.
The bark that round his graceful form
He wore, was white as Gaṅgā's foam ;
My barky covering now doth seem
Compared with it as black as loam.

He pressed my cheek to his lotus face
And in his arms he me embraced.
His tender lips spoke passioned prayers
As I in his sweet clasp was laced.

And ever since I've had no peace,
Nor shall, till I see him again ;
Sweet balmy sleep from me repelled.
By thoughts of him I seek in vain.

For day and night nought else I see
But the outline of his face divine ;
Nor can I think of sacred rites
While for his absent form I pine."

“servant of (the goddess) Kālī,” That was certainly not his family name. As a Brahmin he must have borne some surname like *Upādhyāya* (Professor), *Dvivedī* or *Trivedī* (Professor of two or three Vedas). The name Rāmacandra by which the great hero of the Epic *Rāmāyaṇa* is known, means ‘delightful moon.’ On account

“The poem ends in the marriage of the hermit youth with the princess.

“The second canto, written in the style of the Jātakas, illustrates the principle of self-sacrifice with a view to relieving the distress, and saving the life of others.

“The third story describes the miraculous birth of a Buddhist saint, Jyotiṣka, and his renunciation of the world. The fourth canto narrates how Śrīgupta at the instigation of an enemy of Buddhism laid a plot to poison the Buddha whom he invited to a feast, but he was converted by the calm forgiveness of mercy of the Enlightened One :

“The Lord saved Śrīgupta from spite and crime
And shewed how mercy conquers e’en a foe ;
And thus he taught forgiveness’ rule sublime
To free his followers from the world and woe.”

Dr. Paul Carus writes in another issue of *The Open Court*, thus on the Geography of Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇa :

“Sri Nobin Chandra Das, of Chittagong, Bengal, is a prominent Sanskrit scholar, and brother of Sarat Chandra Das, of Darjeeling, the only traveller who has been in the interior of Tibet. The present pamphlet and map are an important contribution to the literature of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the ancient epic of the Aryan Hindus. Mr. Das has located all the geographical sites, and thus renders it possible for us to have a better comprehension of Rāma’s wanderings in search of his faithful wife Sītā, who has been captured by the island King Rāvaṇa.

“We need not call attention to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which, to the Hindu, even today, is scarcely less than the *Illad* and the *Odyssey* were to the Greek, or the Nibelungen Saga and Gudran to the Teutons. Says Mr. Das : “The names of Rāma and his faithful Sītā are still by-words for the model king and the model wife and the two most important factors in the social and domestic life of a nation throughout the length and breadth of this country.” (*Preface, vii*).

“Mr. Das accepts (against Professor Weber) Signor Gorresio’s opinion that the *Rāmāyaṇa* is based upon historical facts ; and he may be right, for there are reasons to believe that both the Greek and Teutonic sagas, too, are based upon real events which once took place in the prehistoric times. But the more remarkable are the similarities among the ancient legends of the three nations. Sītā (like Gudran) is abducted and Rāma (like Herasig) pursues the robber and regains his faithful wife. In his search Rāma (like

of his Kṣatriya origin, his family, might have borne some designation of that warrior caste signifying heroism. In like manner, the names Vikramāditya and Pratāpāditya, by which the two great personages of Malwa and Bengal are known, signify 'powerful (like the) sun.' We know the family name of the latter was 'Ray' meaning 'lord.' So it is clear from these instances that in India the surname has always been an unimportant factor in the system of naming individuals. Occidentals, therefore, ought to know that we Indians should be called by our real names and not by our family names, which are generally indicative of caste and profession. My name is Saratchandra and that of my brother is Nobinchandra—these were given to us by our parents during the *nāmakaraṇa* (naming) ceremony which was solemnly held in the first month of our birth.

We were born in a respectable Vaidya^s family which came from Rāḍha

Odyssey) wanders about and visits almost all the places known to the poet. Like Helen, Sītā is well treated by her abductor while Rāma wages war for her recovery. The allies of Rāma are enumerated as minutely in the *Rāmāyaṇa* as the allies of Menelaus in Homer, and there are several other noteworthy similarities which caused Professor Weber to think that Vālmiki, author of the best version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, must have been familiar with the epics of Homer—a view which is not very probable. The problem of these coincidences has not as yet found its solution, but we believe that the epics of all the nations are a mixture of myth and history that there are events which actually happen again and again. An Indian chief sent the same reply to the President of the United States that Aristovus sent to Caesar. Both declared, "If I want something of you, I will go to you, but as you want something of me, you may please come to me!" Must we conclude that the American Indian had read Caesar? In an early stage of civilisation abduction of wives was probably an event that happened in the North, in Greece and in India and the search for a lost wife was probably compared to the wanderings of the Sun over the whole earth by more than one poet.

"But we cannot discuss the subject in a book-review, and conclude our remarks by mentioning that Nobin Chandra Das endeavours to explain the mythological elements of the story, the *vānara* or monkey chiefs, the dwellers of the forest, who assist Rama in his warfare as the aboriginal non-Aryan tribes, whom the Aryans, call *vā-nara* (*vā*—like; and *nara*—man) i.e. those creatures who are only similar to, but not of the kind and race of the real men or Aryans."

2. In Bengal the *Vaidya* or the medical caste occupies a position which is second only to the Brahmin who enjoys the monopoly of the study of the four *Vedas* and the priestly cult founded on them. The fifth *Veda* which was delivered by Śiva treating of the healing art and the Science of medicine or *Āyurveda*,

(West Bengal) and settled in an obscure village of Pergannah Chaksala in Chittagong, shortly after its conquest by the Moguls. Though our first ancestor 'Gopālchandra bore the surname of Ray, yet our family on account of its isolation called Das Gupta—a designation signifying Vaidya observing religious ceremonies of the Bharadwaja clan.

This introduction would be incomplete if I did not attach to it the result of our first and earliest adventure in the Sikkim Himalayas. It was written by Nobinchandra. Nobinchandra thus describes our Excursion in Sikkim in February, 1877.

We left Darjeeling on the afternoon of the 27th January, 1877, and walked down hill continually till we were overtaken by night. We passed the night at a place near Badamtam under the open sky. Here we met a somewhat warmer climate ; and a screen set up on bamboos protected us from the inclemency of the wind that blew chill from the higher regions. Several Bhutças who were on there way to Darjeeling stopped also by our side and became our temporary neighbours. At day-break we were roused by the warbling of birds and the murmur of mountain rills. These rills are the sources on which the natives depend for the supply of water. They generally mark the sites of villages. Every village has in or near it, one or more of these streams of water, so necessary for the support of human life. Their passage invariably lies through pebbles and masses of stones worn out by the continuous flow of water. In many rills the force of the current is so strong that nothing can withstand it. They cut their way through solid rocks ; stupendous masses of stone and huge trunks of trees are carried away in their onward course. In some places the water flows gently down a slope, elsewhere it falls from a height of several hundred feet with a noise with which the valleys resound proclaiming to a distance of several miles its bountiful career, covering the irregular projection of rocks and detached stones in the way, with a coating of foam which rises and boils for ever and ever. The air is charmed with the everlasting music of these dancing and playful rivulets, as the sight is gratified with their wild grandeur, while the cooling effect is almost indescribable. They are the sources of the rivers which wash and fertilize the plains. We saw many of the streams which combining with others have swelled into the furious rivulets, the Rungeet and the Teesta, of which the latter has its origin among the snows of the grey-headed Kanchanjunga as the holy Gaṅgā is said in the Purāṇas to have descended from the clotted hair of Śiva's head, too true to be mythic, if the snow-clad peaks of the Himalaya were meant to be a symbol of the god. It is true

for the good of all living beings, was given to the most advanced and cultured section of the Vaiśya, or the trading caste. These, following the profession or trade of medicine, in Bengal came to be known under the designation of Vaidya.

that many of the rills are melted snow dripping directly down the slopes of the hills ; but some of those we saw issued directly from the sides of the hills in which the water has been absorbed. Here the water falls from a projected rock, there a piece of bamboo has been fitted for an easy flow, elsewhere the water is collected in open cavities of the rock to which a bamboo tube is applied for the purpose of drinking.

In this exquisite way has Providence provided for an easy supply of water to the natives of the hills, with respect to which the scarcity of water is the first idea which strikes a man of the plains. But in this respect the native of the plain may know that the hillman is placed in a better position than he is. He has to dig ponds, or construct wells for the purpose, while the hillman is under no such necessity ; he has simply to open his mouth under the flow of a rill or also to apply his little tube, or to fill his large bamboo, 3 to 4 feet long, no other water-pot made of earth or metal, large or small, is either necessary or convenient to him. We ought to remember with a sense of gratitude that the children of the hills first drink the bounty of nature ; that the excess after they have satisfied their want, unlimited as is the supply, is the source of our rivers and with then of our civilisation.

We went on our way downwards and at 8 A.M. reached the great Rungeet which marks the boundary between English possessions and those of the State of Sikkim. Over the Rungeet for the first time I saw the cane bridge so much heard of, the bridge appeared to be very old and not much used except during the rainy season. We crossed the rivulet by a boat which was a hollowed trunk of a tree. We stopped for a few hours on the Sikkim bank of the Rungeet and set out on our journey at noon. We rode up the hills for the rest of the day and just reached the first Bhutea monastery in the hill of Namchi when the shades of evening closed fast around us. There is a solid pile of stones of an oblong form, the sides being about 24 feet by 10 feet, and the height about 6 feet. On all sides of this rough pile there are small niches, the inner walls being smooth slabs of stone, on each of which is painted the image of Buddha in his various postures, the image of Rudra or Mahakal or the mysterious Padma, and on which are engraved the sacred characters. On the exterior side of each stone of the walls are engraved the names of the deities or mantras in Tibetan. In front of, and behind the phantastic 'stūpas' are posted reeds bearing flags written all over in Tibetan letters in a beautiful form, resembling a fresco. The flags are peculiar in their shape—a long piece of cloth, generally silk, about half a yard wide is attached by its long end to the pole. When it flutters in the wind, the appearance is like a blade of knife placed in the direction of the wind. Similar flags are also set up in front of every Bhutea village, fixed on tall bamboos, the object being to drive off, according to

popular belief, evil spirits. Scraps of inscribed paper are seen fastened to branches of trees for a like purpose.

As we approached the monastery, several Bhuteas, both young and old, gathered round us—a strange people with strange faces. The Lama, or the head of the monastery who was distinguished from the rest by his age and venerable appearance, received us with some regard.

The Gompa, or the monastery at Namchi is a new one. The capitals of the wooden pillars are tastefully ornamented in the Buddhist style and are very beautiful to look at. After dinner we drowned the day's weariness in sound sleep.

In the morning we mounted our ponies and wended our way up hill. The hills of Sikkim are not like those of the plains of Bengal, they are hills overtopping hills. As soon as we ascend up one, a new height presents itself to the sight, with a vaporous top, as far as the eye can reach, while looking behind, we find the hill we struggled to climb up, to wear the aspect of a plain.

It was noon when we reached a vast forest of oak trees. As far as the eye could reach on either side of the way, I saw nothing but an infinitude of oaks, young and old, standing erect in their sylvan majesty in such a thick body that a deer can hardly run through it without hindrance. Most of the trees count their age by centuries. Their trunks are straight like flag poles to the height of 3 or 4 hundred feet, above which spread the branches in the likeness of umbrellas. It struck me with a feeling of awe to look up at their tops. The trees are, without exception, covered with green moss, several inches thick, giving them an appearance of wild grandeur almost unspeakable. I was reminded of the Hindu sage, a hair of whose body is said to drop by the lapse of an age, *yuga*. The moss looks just like green velvet, and serves to protect the body of the trees from the effect of snowfall to which they are forever exposed. Innumerable creepers, hundreds of feet long, wrapped up with the moss, hang down like rods in the firm grasp of hoary age. Many of the creepers hung in splendid festoons over our heads, connecting the oaks on either side of the way. The height, the magnitude, the position and the wear of ages visible on the ancient Himalayan oaks cannot fail to impress a poet with the idea that they are pillars posted on the heights of the Himalaya to support the vault of heaven. At noon we experienced the gloom of evening while we passed through the forest. We could hardly see things at a distance of 20 yards and I had to call my brother Babu Sarat Chandra to lead me, whenever I lost sight of him on account of the misty gloom. The fact was we passed through a cloud which had enveloped the forest.³ Our clothes were all wet

3. "Dear to the nymphs are the cool shadows thrown by dark clouds wandering round the mountain's zone ; still frightened by the storm and rain they seek Eternal sunshine on each loftier peak." Griffith : *Kumārasambhāva*.

with dews or rather dense vapours. The extreme cold penetrated through the lined robe of Bhutea blanket I wore, my hands and legs were almost benumbed, and it was with difficulty that I could hold the reins of my Bhutea pony.

After crossing the forest we threaded our way down a difficult descent. Our troubles were increased by rain which rendered the whole path slippery and extremely dangerous. We were often obliged to dismount as the ponies could with difficulty carry their own body down the perilous path. At every step the foot tended to slip, and I was in fear of falling headlong into the abyss thousands of feet deep. It was despair of life which gave me strength and patience to struggle with the faithless path. Our Bhutea servants and coolies felt no such difficulty as we did. With them the steep and slippery path seemed to be a genial element. The descent took us three hours and just when the gloom of night spread like a pall over the face of nature, we took shelter in a Bhutea house in the village of Timi. The house was a homely one. The four slopes of the roof were thatched with twisted bamboo pieces instead of long grass, but exactly by the same method. The bamboo thatching though not so even and good as that made of grass, is yet more lasting than the latter. The floor consisted of planks resting on wooden pillars about 4 feet above the ground. The lower story under the floor is reserved for swine and goats. There are two apartments in the house. In the front room is the hearth, round which the family circle is formed for enjoying the genial warmth. The fire place is paved with stone and clay. The hinder apartment is very spacious and is the parlour and common bedroom. Over this there is an inner roof made of close packed bamboos, on which provisions are stored. From this roof is hung in beautiful rows the maize or the Indian corn presenting to the eye uniform globules of pearl and ruby. The walls are made of bamboos. The only thing which shocks a Hindu is meat hung in a part of the room with the ribs opened, sickening to the sight. Close to the hindmost wall of the room there is a large wooden structure in the form of an almyrah. This frame is decorated according to the means of the family to serve the purpose of a chapel. On the shelves are placed little figures of Sakya Muni and his disciples. A lamp is allowed to burn all night in front of the images.

